Chapter 1. Concepts and Cognitive Science. Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis

Transcription

1 Chapter 1 Concepts and Cognitive Science Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis L. Introduction: Some Preliminaries Concepts are the most fundamental constnrcts in theories of the mind. Given their importance to all aspects of cognition, ifs no su{prise that concepts raise so many.oitto,rersies in philosophy and cognitive science. These range from the relatively local Should concepts be thought of as bundles of feafures, or do they embody mental theories? to the most global Are concepts mental representations, or might they be abstract entities? Indeed, it's even controversial whether concepts are objects, as opposed to cognitive or behavioral abilities of some sort. Because of the scope of the issues at stake, it's inevitable that some disputes arise from radically different views of what a theory of concepts ought to achieve-differences that can be especially plonounced across discipiinary boundaries. Yet in spite of these differertces, there has been a significant amount of interdisciplinary interaction among theorists working on concepts. In this respect, the theory of concepts is one of the great success stories of cognitive science. Psychologists and linguists have borrowed freely from philosophers in developing detailed empirical theories of concepts, drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein's discussions of family resemblance, Frege's distinction between sense and reference, and Kripke's and Putnam's discussions of externalism and essentialism. And piilosophers have found psycjrologists' work on categorization to have powerful implications for a wide r*g" of philosophical debates. The philosopher Stephen Stich (1993) has gone so far as to remark that current empirical models in psychology undermine a traditional approach to philosophy in which philosophers engage in _co:rceptual analyses. As a.*"qrrence of this *ork Stich and others have come to believe!h{ philosophers have to rethink their approach to topics in areas as diverse as the philosophy of mind and ethics. So even if disciplinary boundaries have generated the appearance of dis;oint research, it's hard to deny that significant interaction has taken place. We hope this volume will underscore some of these achievements and- open the way for increased cooperation. In this introduction, we sketch the recent history of theories of concepts. However, our purpose isn't solely one of exposition. We also provide a number of reinteqpretations of what have come to be standard arguments in the field and develop a framework that lends more prominence to neglected areas This paper was fully collaborative; the order of the authors'narnes is arbihary.

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3 Concepts and Cognitive Science 5 fured concepts are primitive or atomic. What exactly it means to say that a concept has, or lacfcs, stmcture is another matter. This brings us to our second preliminary point. Two Models of Conceptual Stntcture Most theories of concepts treat lexical concepts as structured complexes. This raises the issue of what it is for such representational complexes to have structure. Despite the important role that conceptual structure plays in many debates, there has been little explicit discussion of this question. We discem two importantly different models of stmcture that are irnplicit in these debates. The first view we'll call the Containment Model. On this view, one concept is a structwed complex of other concepts iust in case it literally has those other concepts as proper parts. In this way, a concept C might be composed of the concepts X, Y, *a Z. fnen an occturence of C would necessarily involve an occuffence of X, Y, and Z because X, Y, and Z are contained within C, C couldn't be tokened wiihout X, y, and Z being tokened. For example, the concept DRoppED rhe AccoRDloN couldn't be tokened without AccoRDroN being tokened. As an analogy, you might think of the relation that words bear to phrases and sentences. The word "accordion" is a strucfural element of the sentence 'Tony dropped the accordion" in the sense that it is a proper part of the sentence. Consequently, you can't utter a token of the sentence 'Tony dropped the accordion" without thereby uttering a token of the word "accordion." The second view, which we'll can the Inferential Model, is rather different. According to this view, one concept is a stmcfured complex of other concepts just in case it stands in a privileged relation to these other concepts, generally, by way of some type of inferential disposition. On this model, even though X, Y, arrd Z may be part of the structure of C, C can still occur without necessitating their occurence. For example, RED might have a structure implicating the concept colo& but on the Inferential Model, one could entertain the concept neo without having to token the concept color. At most, one would have to have certain dispositions linking nno and color-for example the disposition to infer X s colonep from X s nep. Thus, for any claim that a concept has such-and-such structure-or such-and-such tvpe of strucfure (see sec. 7)-there will be, in principle, two possible inteqpretations of the daim: one in terms of the Containment Model and one in terrns of the Inferential Model. The signiftcance of these distinctions will become clearer once we present some speciftc theories of concepts. For now we simply want to note that discussions of concepfual strucfure are often based on an implicit commitment to one of these models and th"t a proper evaluation of a theory of concepts may hrrn on which model is adopted. Concepts as Abstracta os. Concepts as Mental Representations The third and last preliminary point that we need to discuss concerns a more basic issue-the ontological status of concepts. In accordance with virtually all discussions of concepts in psychology, we will assume that concepts are mental particulars. For examplq your concept crandmother is a mental representation of a certain type Perhaps a shructured mental representation in one of the two senses we've isolated. It should be sai4 however, that not all theorists accept as their starting point the thesis that concepts are mental particulars. In philosophy especially it's not uncommon to

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5 Concepts and Cognitive Science 7 expression "the morning stay'' refers to the object it does because this expression has the sense it does. g. Senses are the indirect referents of erpressions in intmsional conterts Certain linguistic contexts (e.g., "... believes that..." and other propositional attitude reports) have distinctive and peorliar semantic properties. Outside of these contexts, one can freely substitute coreferential terms without affecting the truth value of the sentence ("the morning star is bright" + "the evening star is ' bright"), but within these contexts, the same substifutions are not possible ("Sue believes that the morning star is bright" # "Sue believes that the evening star is bright"1. Frege's explanation of this bype of case is that in such contexts expressions do not refer to their customary referents, but rather to their customary ssrrses. Since the expressions have different customary senses, they actually have different referents in these contexts. Thus Frege is able to maintain the principle that coreferring terms can be substituted one for the other without a.t *gl in truth value, despite what otherwise may have appeared to be a decisive counterexample to the principle. Frege's semantic theory, and the phenomena he used to motivate it, have generated a great deal of controversy, and they have had an enorrnous influence on the development of semantic theories in philosophy and linguistics. For now, though, the important issue is the ontological stafus of senses. Frege argued that senses, construed in terms of these theoretical roles, cannot be mental entities. Since it's conrmon in philosophy to hold that concepts just are Fregean senses, it would seem that Frege's case against mental entities is especially pertinent. The problem, in his view, is that mental entities are subjective, whereas senses are supposed to be obiective. Two people "are not prevented from grasptng the same sense; but they cannot have the same idea" ( , p. 60). (Note that for Frege ideas are mental entities.) If this is the argument against the view that concepts are mental representations, however, it isn't the least bit convincing. To see why, one has to be careful about teasing apart several distinctions that can get lumped together as a single contrast between the subjective and the objective. One of these concerns the difference between mental representation+ thoughts, and experiences, on the one han4 and exha-mental entities on the other. In this sensg a stone is objective but a mental representation of a stone is subiective; it's subjective simply because ifs mental. Notice, however, that sublectivity of this kind doesn't preclude the sharing of a mental representation, since two people can have the same type of mental representation. Whaf isn't possible is for two people to have the very same tolcen representation. This brings us to a second subjective-obiective distinction. It can be put this way: Mental reptisentations are subjective in that their tokens are uniquely possessed; they belong to one and only one subject. Their being subiective in this sense, however, doesn't preclude their being shareable in the relevant sense, since, again, two people can have lhe sa*e representation by eac} having tokens of the same type. When someone says that two people have the same concept, there is no need to suppose that she is saying that they both possess the same token concept. It would make as much sense to say that two people cannot utter the same sentence because they cannot both produce the same token sentence. Clearly what matters for being able to utter the same sentence, or entertain the same concept, is being able to have tokens of the same type. So while mental representations are subiective in the two senses

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7 Concepts and Cognitive Science 9 Theory holds that most concepts-especially lexical concepts-have deffnitional skucfure. What this means is that mo.st concepts encode necessary and sufficient conditions for their own application.s Considet for examplq the concept BAcHELoR. According to the Classical Theory, we can think of this concept as a complex mental representation that speciftes necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a bachelor. So BACHELoR might be composed of a set of representations such as Is Nor MARRTED, rs MAIE, and s ANr ADULT. Each of these components specifies a condition that something must meet in order to be a bacjrelor, and anything that satisftes them all thereby cowrts as a bacjrelor. These components, or feafures, yield a semantic inteqpretation for the complex representation in accordance with the principles of a compositional semantics. T[is conception of concepts has a long history in philosophy. The seventeenthcentury philosopher Iohn Locke seems to be assuming u *t"tsion of the Classical Theory when he gives his account of the concepts strn and cor^o (169A11975, pp. 2gS-299 and p. 317, respectively): [TJhe ldea of the Sun, What is it, but an aggregate of those several simple ldeas, Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, an4 perhaps, some other... [Tlhe greatest part of the ldeas, that make our complex ldea of Gold, are Yellowness, great Weight, Ductility, Fusibility, and Solubility, in Aquo Regia, etc. all united together in an unknown Substratum...e On the Classical Theory, most concepts-including most lexical concepts-are complex representations that are composed of structurally simpler representations. What's more, it's nafural to construe their structure in accordance with the Containment Model, where the components of a complex concept are among its ProPer parts.lo Some of these components may themselves be complex, as in the case of BACFTELoR. But evenhrally one reaches a level of primitive representations, which are undeftned. Traditionally, these prir.nitive representations have been taken to be sensory or perceptual in character, along broadly empiricist lines. It is, of course, an oversimplification to speak of the Classical Theory of concepts, as though there were just a single, unitary theory to which all classical theorists subscribe. In redity, there is a diverse family of theories centered around the idea that S. By -application" we mean a semantic relatioru that is, a concept encodes the conditions that are singly necessary and lointly sufficient for something to bi in its extension Another sense of the term is to indicate a psychologrcal process in whicjr an object is judged to fall under a concept. We'll try to avoid this ambigurty by always using "application" in the semantic sense, rrrless the context makes it very clear that the psychological sense is intended. Notice, then, that in the ftrst instance we have characterized the Classical tl,uory in semantic terms. This doesrt't mear however, that the theory is devoid of psychological import See the discussion of concept acguisition and categorization, below. 9. Locket views about natural kind concepts are complicated by the fact that he took nafural kinds to have both a nominal and a real essence. For Locke, the real essence of a kind like gold isn't known, but the nominal essence ir, *d must be, in order to possess the corresporrding concept. Arguably, howevet he takes the nominal essence to give necessary and suffcient conditions for the application of a kind concepb since he holds that the nominal essence is deftned relative to the real essence in such a way that the two kack one another. 10. It's naturat, but not mandatory. Alternatively, one could think of a classically shuctured concept as a node that stands in inferential relations to its deffning features. The advantage of the Containment Model is that it makes especially dear which associated concepts are its defining features and which are incidental.

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9 Concepts and Cognitive Science 11 In the case of many words, speciftcally in the case of the overwhelming maiority of scientiftc words, it is possible to specify their meaning by reduction to oih"t words ("constitution " definition). E.g- "'arthropodes' are animals with segmented bodies and jointed legs."... In this way every word of the language is ieduced to other words and ftn"lly to the words which occur in the so-called "observation sentences" or "protocol sentences-"l2 In the face of repeated failures to analyze everyday concepts in terms of a purely sensory base, contemporary theorists have often relaxed the strong empiricist assumpti,on that all simple concepts must be sensory. I"I example-, Eve Clark (1973') sees the process of acquiring the meaning of a word like 'trother" as comprising several stlges where semantic components get added to an initial representation. In the earliest stage the representation consists of only two components: *Manr, -ADULr. In subsequ"ni stages, -ADULT is changed to tqourr, *slsunc is added, and *necpnocar. is added. In this way, a representation for "brothey'' is gradually constructed from its constifuent representations, which collectively provide a definition of the word and distinguish it from related words, such as 'boy." Though these components may not be primitive Clark isn't comrnitted to the idea that further decomposition will always lead to purely sensory congepts. In fact, she says that many words, especially relational terms, require possibly irreducible features that encode "function"l,,o.ial, or cultural factors" (p. 106). Similarly, the linguist and philosopher Ienold Katzwrites (J:972 [chapter 4 in this volume], P- 4O), ttlhe English noun -chair- can be decomposed into a set of concepts which might be represented by the semantic markers in (a.10): (4.10) obiect, ftryscal NoN-uvING, ARTIFACT, FURNITURE, PoRTABIJ, SoMETIIING wlrh LEGS, SOMETHING WITH A BACK, SOMETHING WITH A SEAT, SEAT FOR ONE. He adds that these semantic markers-or features-reguire further analysis, but, like Clark, he isn't committed to a reduction that yields a purely sensory base. No doubt, a component-by-component model of concept acquisition is compellilg even when it is debached from its empiricist roots. The simplicity and Power of the model provides considerable motivation for pursuing the Classical Theory. Categorizntion The Classical Theory offers an equally compelling model of categorization (i.e., the application of a concept, in the psychological s ose see note S). In fact, the model of categorization is just the ontogeny run backwards; that is, something is judged to fall under a concept iust in case it is judged to fall under the features that.o*pote the concept. So, something might be categorized as falling under the concept charr by noting that it has a seat, ba& legs, and so on. Categorization on this model is basically a process of checking to see if the features that are part of a concept are satisfted by ihe item being categorized. As wilh th-" g"t eral_model of.ot."pt acquisition, this model of categorization is powerful and infuitively appealing, and it's a natural extension of the Classical Theory. fz. Thnoughout we'll ignore certain differences between language and thought, allorring daims about words to stand in for daims about concepts. Carnay's account is about the semantics of linguistic items but otherwise is a useful and explicit version of the Classical'lheory.

10 luoor aql q rpq? s sr araql (gt'r) (err) rrrory sa)uarajul aql Jo,QPIP^ aql to uolleuuldxa aru?s aql q?nul saa18 (Zt ed zp>l 's1sr(pue JaPun're1nu1s aq ol 1no tunl (f) pue (g) snql'uo oj pup'oxluuvlarml 'Nvm sldaruor eql salerqdr4 luql ernpruls Fuolltugap surl uoritrrrvs trdaruor aql lzril SupupP,tq '(s) Sulssassu ul PFolvl aql q {ool l,upaiu auo dqrvr st4eldxa froaql PlIssBI) aql 'fpn1s pcfolopos B -op ol sstl auo JI sb lou s,ll 'uatu arp srolaqf,?q leql,lolaql? q,, lo ttryrearu aql to iled sl ll lerll pe; a{l fq paalubren8 ag ol sruaas lnq parror fpo lou q (S) ul aruaraju! aqj. 'trelu P q qlrus os 'rolaq?eq P q qlnus (g) :(g) rapfuo) 'uollrdvs ldaeuor aql q arnlpralll rtreroduraluor aql ui tq{ -ruuxa palp flappra lsoru aql to au6l '@v'd'ggi:rlnn),,enaqlults raqlo aql q '41/tl -Err? $atu8pnf aql angua I aser auo aql ui 'll qllt uolpauuor u! puep PaaPu saop 11 qsnoqlp 'y ldaeuoe aql apflno sa{ g. ro :y qdacuor slql q Paurcluor (fpraaor) q q?h^ -8u1q1"*os se 'y pafqns ag o1 ssuopq g aprlpard aq1 ra$g, 'luauupluor pttld"i ro" se flpgr(f* to lunorf,? s,llle) Ianueunul ul ParnldP tt lhpn (1ettB to uon -daruoc sfll to rpnn 'suual luanlgsuor sll;o ssujuearu ag /[q patrqlssarau q qlrul sl! aser ul isnf rljrtp.n ag ol ua14 uaaq suq luarualels ro arualuas P PtrB '8t4treau uo paspq aru pg saruarajul aq o1 ua{e uaaq a^pq sajuarajul eg^rtpne 'fgeuoplp"rl,,'uplrl Palrruurun, 'flaureu '(I) u1 aseqd fa1 aql ;o Supreau ag ol 1ruq arerl ol sruaas aaluerens q$ 'raaoaro;41 'aspuard aqt r({ plaltnrens ol sruaas usru B sl tllfu5 ptll uolsnpuor ag '(Z) $l$m '(r) ui "q 'ueru p q qlfus os'raryil-lr{8pm " q qlfus (z) 'tretu s q rnfus os 'usru palrrbtuun u? sl tllltus (f) :(u) Pus (f) ul saruarajul aql uaamlaq aruarafllp +rurgptls e sl alag dpanruul 'satuaraln rgfpue {ppadsa leuaurouaqd rrluaras Jo flalren e upldxa ol dl[qe sll q e9"qf Isrlssul) arn rot uorl?anoru luuilodul raqlouv satuanlul t11fr1mty Wa nwtlnryuv.{s!r enuapgda a1lil rlll/vr samparord aluc[drul sdatrs ryql Jo safas e ol sarnpar -ajuaps Jo sldaeuoe,,pjparoaql,, aq1 Supnpyl-sldaeuor Pale-rllduroe ro pe4sqe rot uoll?rglpnf 1eql q lfsar ajl 'f,llaualqordun aq pa-soddns s! s?rqua-t a^h -ol -Fiqra s,firuo" e rc! anparord uoperggan aql 'salpadord rfuosuas ssardxa ldaeuoe qr?a to sluaqllsuor alaufln aql leql PaumssP uauo s,ll atuls Puv JIa't^ sp PagsllBs s1 faeuor pau$ap ag 1eql bu$luart-oj qtmourelupl q pagslles arp quauodrtor esaql r".ir suy(tlra",iair"- aqi Jo uohluqap? apford lderuor aql olu! ralua luql sluauod -ruoj aql arqs '(g9 'd 'liotlzssl),,; ",s&el palulol seq t,,'f,poq paluau8as B sbtl 4.,Ieurlup rre sl 4 rrrrot aql Jo sasfrard ruor; alqljnpap,, s!,,apodorqlr ub sl r Sqql aqltj uuo, aql Jo arualuas e JI apodorqlr? rre ag 'r u1q1 e_8uqe4 u1 pagnsnf are aan leql _ol yed s1 (aaoqe) durue3 ulort uolplonb aq1. rrrpfa*i rq aseisbd. ra8rel e "r"qlo pagsllbs a.rp quauodtuor Surugap sll raqlaq/u EqnanrrlapP fq ldaruor ual18 p rapun IpJ ol uall ue Suupl q peggsnf aq Ppor auo letll sl EaPI a{i.uollprggsnf cpuafslda;o froaql B se ltuld plnor ll alor aql pazlseqdura osle a Brl &6qf prlisu13 aql to salbrolp? pegqdosopd to raqumu V uouat{1lst I tynpldt slp8rery pus aouams'i ZT

11 Concepts and Cognitive Science to (4.t4)-(4.2I) (4.14) There is a physical object in the room. (4.1,51 There is something nonliving in the room. (4.16) There is an artifact in the room. (4.T7) There is a piece of furniture in the room. (4.1S) There is something portable in the room. (4.19) There is something having legs in the There is something with a back in the room. (4.2I) There is a seat for one person in the room. According to Katz, all of these inferences are to be explained by reference to the concept charr and its definitioo given above as (4.10). The deftnition is supposed to be tnderstood in Kantian terms, by supposing that the one concept contains within it the other concepts that secure the inferences-artrfacr, physrcal o& recr, and so on. The only difference then between (1) and (3), or (1) and the inferences from (4.13) to ( !'), is that the logical form of (f) is manifest, whereas the forms underlying the other inferences are hidden.r3 Refrmce Determination One of the most important properties of concepts is that they are semantically evaluable. A thought may be true or fdse, depending on how things are with that portion of the world which the thought is about. In like fashion, an item may fall under a concept or not, depending on the concept's referential properties. When someone categorizes something as a bir4 for example she may or may not be right. This is perhaps the most basic feature of what is called the normatioity of meafting. lust because she applies the concept srrp to the item (in the sense that she judges it to be a bird) doesn't mean that the concept truly applies to the item (in the sense that the item is in the extension of the concept nno). The referential properties of a concept are among its most essential properties. When one acquires the concept RoBrN, doing so crucially involves acquiring a concept that refers to robins. And when one draws an inference from RoBrN to n A BrRD, or rs AN Ar{rMAr, one draws an inference about robins. This isn't to say that reference is sufficient to distinguish behnreen concepts. rrrancr,rrrr and rmnrrner refer to exactly the sirme dass of mathematical objects, yet they are different concepts for all that. And in Plato's time one might have believed that prery and AcrrNG rn A way rhar rs ple^&srng ro rhe GoDs are coextensive-perhaps even necessarily coextensive-but that doesn't make them the same concept. Thus Plato can sensibly ask whether an action is pious because it is pleasing to the gods or whether it is pleasing to the gods because it is pious (19SI). That concepts have referential properties is a truism, but an important truism. A clear desiderat"* on a theory of coniepts is that it should account for, or at least be 13. If (1) is considered to be a logicd truttr" then much the same point can be put by saying that the Classiel Theory explains the other inferences by reducing informal validity to logical necessity.

12 .augap ol pu?q fpuraqxa are sldaeuor pg sl 'taaairaog 'uolpas pasard aql ro tuajuoj aq1 'atuapadxa pailu4l rno uaag8,op erl s? q?nru se l oud! uh, a*r luorl qlp s! ruajuo) s,flsruoq3 {996I) dlsuoqs upon ltq auztr aru"s aql ua!8 sl qrlq ^ anss! us tilpr pasryuor aq l,uppotls tualqord sppld [tt:l a^ l?tlm 'SI -aqdaqrorssa,r',*,,,,0:""t;tff"x"f, Jlff :ff ihhtliilffhjl:,fij,fi TffiF,J:; pufl luapuadaptr;-pu.nu e sl p4q lou rc Jaqpqru spptl uo1lrupstp sp11 '8uor^ aru nor{ sar4lautos 'P4q e sl 8u1q1auos lsrn lyfll nof uaq,rn ry8p are nof saruparuos 'quau8pnl aqqt Pue arul uaart4ag aruara#lp aql q uo Flsu! ol lu?,r a { leql uollrullslp q?rr arf,l '$aryor luasard aql q parqdqru are faql lnq tqdosolh{ u! sansq IEFra oquor pue dop oqul de1 sruatuot s,goptrape( 'il Sqzrynldaruor;o s[e,n rno to,{puapuad -apq fprjgn splxa ppo^ aql qrlq^ o1 Sr4proris auo 's4s/tqdqau parro)tt! tt? ol PaH are suollou pafpr raqlo pue gru1 pup aruarajar 1afl $fufll aq truql s1 uograloo ttt?tu s,ttopua)p?f 'fiatunlo s$ll ul 91 raldapl 6961l pu? (166I) gogra:1ret,qf ^8'a 'aag'aar8esro s&rqlo 1nq tunlerapfap rpap sl slt1l leg fes am 'ti " frosuas to la^al aql ol nsop fue sn SuJrq a)po"i l(q palsa88ns auo aql sp qjns suoglu -Uap lprll realr uala l,usl ll '(196I 'V '[ topog {aumloa sfn ul 91 raldyqrl g6l''le la Suoqsuuy) paruasqo aaeq sroqlne lpralas sv'sluauoduroo rfuosuas 1dur1s olu! u/vrop ldaruor aql Suuearq 'slsl(leue aql aplduror ol Mor.l sttolaqo fiq flu sl ll 'flaleunilojun 'Jlastunr ol lno a{pul ol alqs aq lnq loutrbr a{?ps uaaq sbq lpq/yr luoj' 'tpflrvl lauo xaldulor sfil oluj sao8 treql 'aepl aldrurs repdgred frana to uolleraurnua alnulru arotu p ql!^ uih alqnorl o _tapeax fut ol ssausnolpel a lsuajjo tre aq nq lou Plnor ll puv $aaf[ a1du4s;o dn aperu sl li let{l '^ aqs o1 q8noua sl PIes a Eq I lbt{m :aft7 s IIpr arn,'aapl xalduror 1urfl ;o qsfpuy aql q DqlrEJ fue o8 1ou Paau 1 rygl I '(ggt'd1 sppe ag 'raleadg aql to pu$r aql q are 'ro; pusls daql *th aql lptfl aslmraqlo 'uoj1e8au ro uogpuusrp fq raqla8ol 1nd susf asoql 'V 'svdpl asog ;o susrs a{l spro^a asoql 'E 'raryadg aqt to pqru aql v saapl ulera) 'z 'spunos alpimhry 'I ppor{s sluauodruor srr lpq' to q4ills s saajb 'ur rrrffir"it'htrjjffrfi';1ffi"1 'sernlrlrls pphdrua WFn ajrrpprojjp u! suual rtrosuas ro pnldarrad q paqjnor ag ol a Eq faql JI dppadsa,ltq aruor ol lprrgtlp z(geuoqdarxa uaaord a^pq suolllu -ga6 'suopprsep,tup l,uare fldrugs ara{l 'strdaruoj lsolu rot 'letil s1 froaql prlsselj aql lsule8e paplal uaaq seq 1eql rualqord tlspq lsoru aql sdeqra; s{ilelqotd 1oyld 'froaql lsrlsssl) aql FutpSu paspr uaaq e^bq gql surslrllfr rrlbru aql to xls ls lool il,am.) ro/r^ ol appru aq l,upr /troaql lprlssbl) aql suollrerllp sno!^qo sll to aqgds q l?ql 1aa; fueru pue 'urslrllpr asualul ol papalqns ueaq seg froaql aql taaaaroq 'sreaf luarar ui 'uogerap1suor snolras se/uasap op ol sasluord froaql lerlsselj aql s" qrnul sp op tier lptll froa{l,fuv suouu{ag uo4 pe4ey eql 'T'T 'Jaraod fropueldxa s,froaqg prissbi) aql sagprn lpq^^ s! uoppuruualap atuararar to lunorru sll 'ldaruor E Jo a)uarajar aql saunurapp letn arnpn4s puoglultap aql,o suual u! paulpldxa ilp eje uo os pus 'uoprzposaler 'uolltsmbre ldaruo) 'suollel$our raqlo s,froaq; prlssplj atfi {lfa saqsaru 1; fplp rvrotl sl lunorre sltn Jo padde aql 'saporua arnpruls sll lern suollrpuor a{l f;sqes lutll s8urql asoql 1sn[ sluasardar ldaruor? 'sl lpr{i 'uollnuap sll f;spes lprll s8m4 asog ol srarar ldaruol e 'r(loaql p)lss"l) aql ol SurprorrV rr'sldaruor to salpadord Flluara;ar a{l 'tllp a[qgedtuor slptrery pup aruarnu'i VI

13 Concepts and Cognitive Science 15 concepts than the concept under analysis. Are the concepts snnercrn, AFFIRMATIoN, NEGArroN, or STANDTNG FoR really any closer to the sensory level than the concept ue.16 Even putting aside the empiricist shictures, however, there are few, if any, examples of deftnitions that are uncontroversial. Some of the most intensively sfudied concepts are those connected to the cenhal topics of philosophy. Following Plato, many philosophers have hied to provide definitions for concepts like xr'rowrndce, IUs rrcq coodness, rrurh, and BEAUTv. Though much of interest has come from these attempts, no convincing deftnitions have resulted. One of the more promising candidates has been the traditional account of KNot^rL- EDGE as IUsrrFrED rrr,re BEUEF. But even this account is now widely thought to be inadequate, in particular, because of Gettier examples (named after Edmund Gettier who ftrst put forward an example of this kind in his 1963 paper "Is ustified True Belief Knowledge?"). Here is a sample Gettier case (Dancy 1985, p. 25): Henry is watching the television on a fune afternoon. It is Wimbledon men's finals duy, and the television shows McEnroe beating Connors; the score is two sets to none and match point to McEnroe in the third. McEnroe wins the point. Henry believes justifiably that I I have just seen McEnroe win this year's Wimbledon ftnal. and reasonably infers that 2 McEnroe is this year's Wimbledon champion. Actually, however, the carireras at Wimbledon have ceased to function, and the television is showing a recordi.g of last year's matc}. But while it does so McEnroe is in the process of repeating last yeay's slaughter. So Henry's belief Z is true, and surely he is iustifred in believing 2. But we would hardly allow that Henry knows 2. Notice that the signiftcance of the example is that each condition in the proposed analysis of rnowr..edge is satisfted yet, intuitively, we all know that this isn't a case of knowledgu. Philosophers concemed with the nature of xr.rowrocn have responded in a variety of ways, usually by supplementing the analysis with further conditions (see D"ncy 1985 for discussion). One thing is clear, though: Despite a tremendous amount of activity over a long period of time no uncontroversial deftnition of KNowLEDGT has emerged. Nor is the situation conftned to concepts of independent philosophical interest. Ordinary concepts have resisted attempts at deftnition as well. Wittgenstein (1953/ 1955). famously argues that the concept came cannot be defrned. His argument consists of a series of plausible stabs at deftnition, followed by clear counterexamples (see the excerpt reprinted as chapter 6 in this volume). For instance, he considers and rejects the proposal that a game must be an activity that involves competition (counterexample a card game such as patience or solitaire), or that a game must involve winning or losing (counterexample throwing a ball against a wall and catching it). 16. Arelated point is that many concepts seem to involve functional elements that can't be eliminated (e.g., it may be essential to chairs that they are designed or used to be sat upon). These predude a deftnition in purely sensory terms. Cf. Clark (1973), quoted above, and Miller and Iohnson-Laird (1976).

14 .arpu sasud rpzrrralqord 'rmao saq?lsruslru qrns lptn luaga aql oi 'Ppo A aql lnoq? Moll)l aftr pq,l tl$etu,{payrad l,usaop lprll Japour aapp or pszl1',eapl,, u" ol Pxzllnelat s! uohlrrqap aql lz$ lnq uollruqap? serl uo.erlrvx lsql sulelr4bur aq 'ragu[ 'r(um lerfl saeuc ffiqt pear ruu s.fqlo q8*$ trt{l IB4ssBI) aql q saldruuxaralunor apilfuor q[ aql pu? uorrtdvs ryql suhslsq lsnf ueql Parcgdruo.r aroul sl uojlpod sgo:p1 tsrlt pps Hnoqs ap1 {[aurnpn sgl ul 8I raldapl 1f,6D to)f I PIIB (U86I) arout111g aas 'SI 'Iguorn 4$rsuas e o1 Eqmo a{ lou fetu ssauppo aql 1nq qsru$q?d qg s$lud_opsuqaqlml luql 8uy(es T"q PPo tultbaluor s! araql rpaelra3.uoprj ipuurterd,*r$ raqlur '4rlwd p Su.nreatu aql ruo{ $uaf salduexaralunot qq ro arrot aql pql reap pu si!,repcpred q 'froaql FcFsep aql ol ac1trsn[ op lou feu uolssnrslp s,rcpo{ 'r.rpt ag ol 'Lr 'arnlrruls PuoHlultaP ) JPI sldaeuor rno asnef,aq al?flruot ol prerl aru suorllt4tap letfl aq ol atuor seq aruaps aaprusor to qrnru ul uolrrdsns aql 'SaHIrrrIJJIP qf,ns to lpsar P sv srlsrea/l rot tlllm pa^[ s?q aq ruoq/6 raqred trual-8uol B tnyt ueru palrjettrun ue si laosruj uosulqou q Folarppq p ado4 aql sl 'palsaluoj uaaq _seq (r.rvrt omruvhtnn : xoiiildys) uo111u1 -trp p qrrm ld"euor e to aldurexa agutusgpured aql uaaa 'saldurexalalunot ol aununul luaas Ja1au suonpgap pasodor; :sangoprc s,olpld ul pafe4rod sb 'srolnr_olra$l,salerro5 ol pareadde jleq feul ll sp arups aql qrnur q uolrenlgs a{l lng 'Pasoddns seq auortue usql rapreq qrnu s! uoglultap E 8qzlpads ;o paford aql leql q aug 'suo!l$ -gap alqlsneld Jo )pq aql rot suospar to raqumu l(ue aq PFot ara{l 'asrnor 19 pu' suoplugap pasodord ro uorssarord ssalptrnoq e pnf-ruat, ", i[:"llt:::ilti; b.rg1""; "q1 -airq f"- auo Ptre 'q8noua PBq seq_ropod 1u1od sfil lv qsruqlqud tq to dn -aq1-sugutsd l,ust aq?e$ Ip roj trnq?qud _qtvn rfruqlryd th Jo 4t aql ralor ol s! uo!ilalq,fueur.ud sh'luled aql q qsruqlupd sq sdp opsrrepq?u{ uaq ^'salou ropod sv 'srualqord sil lnoqlpt l,uq uolltugep sfil uala laa 'JNIvd I{lrM,(, uiu\oj or $ iijrwjsm SlHr Nt NOrJJ\rsIr.II ruvhlrud sx qnv JNrvd r{ilm I do ldvduns il{r srllaoj ITIVNoLT -NirlNr X onv rnaev rw $ X # fpo pup JI,f, amuva;6 :uolflugap 8uy'ro11ot a111 lttl 8m4 -auos le a^lrrs a/vr lunorre olu! uolpugqp srutr Surxet 'Sq[ar ag lulud pu uqrar aql uo arnlejd aql luled sbaa op 9l papualu! qfetpd n,{ lpqryl 'uorrualu! s,olasue frldiia[ Wpn ag ol srueas rualqord a{i 'lufd $Fa Sqpar nt Sqtnlor fgeuohuaili rlni qbtroql uala 'arul q IHI '8u1gae aql uo arnqr;d e Sqluled sern aq pdeq3 "q aqls$ aql,o -8q1pe aql Sqlqed l,use^ ola8uelaqtgl1 'srles_topod sy 'q8noua l,usl ol ruaas sffl ua a pa 'lulud,nl- aru;rns aql sre^oe fgeuollualq lua8e aql leql Paau am.uaql palupd l,ualuq nof '1qred Wp,r saoqs r'rau rnof raloj ltqaraql Pu? 'lupd to p>1rnq p ralo :ppl tua8e tre 'nolt 1 'raqla lro/fr l,usaop uohlugap sfil lng 'rnlvd Hilrn,1 do idvdllfis itr{t suil o) X ot{v JI\n9v tw st X tl fpo PUP il L 4ttwa X_:sPJoll Jaqp.r1.1.rJBe a{l to suopre atfl to lpsar s sp os saop lupd u! paraloe sp8 leql arefln: arn pup parrlorrq aq o1 spaiu rya8e ub lall sg 8u1s_sp aq ol _suaas luqu 'psodord piippo iql lb af,uelsq u? q aser aql plt-srolppads ag lulpd l,usaop uojsoldxa aql io,fuop"l nqr-dnnnrvd Jo aruplsul rru sb lunoj l,usaop sfll 'lupd ui sjolepads aruos sralor plre sapoldxa /ftopq lured B JI ''Luva'ldaeuoe a{l rapun tqpl 8ug;auos rot uoprpuor luapgjns B apl^ord o1 s1je, ll lsql sl {ro^ l,usaop uoqpqap sfil uosear auo l?rn sarisre ropod '(916l ra[[lhl uo pasbg) luva HrIM I sril of, X :q sraplsuor aq uoq$ltap 1s4t aql,'lrr.red,, trnou aql ol Supuodsarror 'rhrvd trdaruor aq1 's8utp rag! Suoruri,rpn uala pauljap aq lourrpj {rxrva lpql /vtotls ol salq eq s? 'thyruejp_ alfb q aldurexa slopod',,'l.i["d,, qjaa a Hlstruq at1tr ol SupuodsarJor 'q$trva trdaruor aql rot spsodord prarras sraplsuor (rgor) ropod,{rra[ 'llrlds aures aql qrntu ui sqosrery pue aruarns-i gi

15 Concepts and Cognitive Science!7 The Problem of Psychological Reality A related difficulty for the Classical Theory is that, even in cases where sample deftnitions of concepts are granted for the pu{pose of argument, defrnitional strucfure seems psychologically irrelevant. The problem is that definitional structure fails to turn up in a variety of experimental contexts where one would expect it to. In particular, the relative psychological complexity of lexical concepts doesn't seem to depend on their relative deftnitional complexity.le Consider the following example of an experiment by Walter Kintsch, which has been used to try to locate the effects of concepfual complexity in lexical concepts (reported in Kintsch!974, pp It is based on a phoneme-monitoring task originally developed by D. f. Foss, where subjects are given two concurrent tasks. They are asked to listen to a sentence for comprehension and at the same time for the occurrence of a given phoneme. When they hear the phoneme, they are to indicate its occurrence as quickly as they can, perhaps by pressing a button. To ensure that they continue to perform both tasks and that they don't just listen for the phoneme, subjects are asked to repeat the sentence or to produce a new sentence that is related to the given sentence in some sensible way. In Foss's original study, the critical phoneme occurred either directly after a high-frequency word or directly after a low-frequency word. He found that reaction time for identifying the phoneme corelated with the frequency of the preceding word. Phoneme detection was quicker after high-frequency words, slower after lowfrequency words (Foss 1969). The natural and by now standard explanation is that a greater processing load is introduced by low-frequency words, slowing subjects' response to the critical phoneme. Kintsc} adopted this method but changed the manipulated variable from word frequency to definitional complexity. He compared subjects' reaction times for identifying the same phoneme in the same position in pairs of sentences that were alike apart from this difference In one sentence the phoneme occured after a word that, under typical deftnitional accounts, is more complex than the corresponding word in the other sentence. The stimuli were controlled for frequency, and Kintsch used a variety of nouns and verbs, including the mainstay of definitional accounts, the causatives. For example, consider the following pair of sentences: (1) The doctor was conoinced cnly by his visitor's pallor. (2) The story was belieoed gnly by the most gullible listeners.2r This ftrst test word ("convince") is, by hypothesis, more complex than the second ('telieve"), since on most accounts the ffrst is analyzed in terms of the second. That is, "convince" is thought to mean cause to belieoe, so that cohmnce would have BEuEVE as a constituent. Kintsch found that in pairs of sentences like these the speed at which the critical phoneme is recognized is unaffected by which of the two test words precedes it. So 19. The reason the focus has been on lexical concepts is that there is little doubt that the psyehological complexity associated with a phrase exceeds the psychological complexity associated with one of its constituents. In other words, the psychological reality of deftnitions at the level of phnases isn t in dispute. 20. For related experiments and disctrssion, see I.A Fodor et al. (I9S0 [chapter 21 in this volumed, and I. D. Fodor et al (1975). 21. Italics indicate the words whose relative complexity is to be tested; underlines indicate the phoneme to be detected.

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17 Concepts and Cognitive Science 19 spiders are artluopods one need only verify that spiders are animals, have jointed legs, segmented bodies, and so on. The theory that analytic statements are tautologies also helped the positivists in addressing a long-standing difficulty for empiricism, namely, how to account for the fact that people are capable of a priori knowledg" of factual matters even though, according to empiricism, all knowledge is rooted in experience. Mathematics and logic in particular, have always been sfumbling blocjcs for empiricism. The positivists' solution was to claim that logical and mathematical statements are analytic. Since they also held that analyticities are tautologie+ they were able to claim that we can know a priori the truths of logic and mathematics because, in doing so, we don't really obtain knowledge of the rvorld (see, e.g., Ayer ; Hahn ). As is clear from this brief account of the role of analyticity in logical positivism, the positivists' program was driven by epistemological considerations. The problem was, assuming broadly empiricist principles, how to explain our a priori knowledg" and how to account for our ability to know and speak of scientific truths that aren't directly observable. Considering the vast range of scientiftc claims-that atoms are composed of protons, neuhons, and elechons, that the universe originated from a cosmic explosion 10 to 2O billion years "Eo, that all animals on Earth descended from a common ancestor, etc.-it is clear that the positivists' program had huly enonnous scope and ambition. Quine's attack on the notion of analyticity has several components. Perhaps the most influential strand in Quine's critique is his observation, following Pierre Duhem, that confirmation is inherently holistic, that, as he puts it, individual statements are never conftrmed in isolation. As a consequence, one can't say in advance of empirical inquiry what would conftrm a particularstatement. This is partly because cotrfitm"- tion involves global properties, such as considerations of simplicity, conseryatism, overall coherence, and so on. But it's also because conftrmation takes place against the background of auxiliary hypotheses, and that, given the available evidencg one isn't forced to accept, or reiect, a partictrlar statement or theory so long as one is willing to make appropriate adjustments to the auxiliaries. On Quine's reading of science, no statement has an isolatable set of conftrmation conditions that can be established a priori, and, in principle there is no guarantee that any statement is immune to revision. Some examples may help to darifu these points and ground the discussion. Consider the case of Newton's theory of gravitatioo which was confirmed by a variety of disparate and (on a priori grounds) unexpected sources of evidence, suclr as obseryations of the moons of upiter, the phases of Venus, and the ocean tides. Similarly, part of the conftrmation of Darwin's theory of evolution is owing to the development of plate tectonics, which allows for past geographical continuities between regions which today are separated by oceans. This sarne case illustrates the dependency of conftrmation on auxiliary hypotheses. Without plate tectonics, Darwin's theory would face inexplicable data. A more striking case of dependency on auxiliary hypotheses comes from an early iugument against the Copernican system that cited the absence of annual parallax of the fixed stars. Notice that for the argument to worh one has to assume that the stars are relatively close to the Earth. Change the assumption and there is no incompatibility between the Earth's movement and the failure to observe parallax. There are also more mundane cases where auxiliary hypotheses account for recdcitrant data for instance, when college sfudents attempt

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19 Concepts and Cognitive Science 2l ranted. Its appeal may stem from payrng too much attention to a limited range of examples. It may be that the cases Putnam and others have discussed are simply misleading; perhaps the concepts for the kinds in science are special. This would still leave us with thousands of other concepts. Consider, for example, the concept KILL. What surrounding facts could force one to revise the belief that killings result in death? Take someone who is honest and sincerely claims that although he killed his father, his father isn't dead or dying. No matter what the surrounding facts, isn't the plausible thing to say that the person is using the words "kill" and "dead" with anomalous meanings? At any rate, one doesn't want to preiudge cases like this on the grounds that other cases allow for r visions without changes in meaning. In the ftrst instance, Quine's critique of analyticity turns out to be a critique of the role of the Classical Theory in theories of justification, at least of the sort that the positivists imagined. To the extent that his arguments are relevant to the more genlrd issue of analyticity, thafs because the potential revisability of a statement shows that it isn't analytic; and many philosophers hold that this potential spans the entire language. Whether they are right, however, is an empirical question. So the issue of what analyticities there are turns on a variety of unresolved empirical matters. The Problem of lgnorance and Enor In the t97ils Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam both advanced important arguments against desniptioist views of the meaning of proper names and nafural kind terms (Kripke 19721T980; Putnam t97o [chapter 7 in this volumel, 1975).23 (Roughly, a descriptivist view is one according to which, in order to be linguistically competent with a term, one must know a description that counts as the *"*ing of tl" i"rtr, and picks out its referent.) ff correct, these arguments would apparently undermine the Classical Theory, which is, in effect, descriptivism applied to concepts.2a lgipke and Putnam also sketched the outlines of an alternative positive account of the meaning of such terms, which, Iike their critical discussions, has been extremely influential in philosophy. Iftipke and Putnam offer at least three different types of arguments that are relevant to the evaluation of the Classical Theory. The frst is an argument from error. It seems that we can possess a concept in spite of being mistaken about the properties that we take its instances to have. Consider, for example, the concept of a disease, like *,reu-pox. People used to believe that diseases like smallpox were the effects of evil spirits or divine retribution. If any physical account was offered, it was that these diseases were the result of "bad blood." Today, however, we believe that such people were totally mistaken about the nature of smallpox and other diseases. Sayrng this, however, presupposes that their concept, smalrpox, was about the same disease that our concept is about. They were mistaken because the disease that their concept referred to-smallpox-is very different in nature than they had supposed. Presumably, then, their most fundamental beliefs about smallpox couldn't have been part of a definition of the concept. For if they had been, then these people wouldn't have been wrong about smallpox; rather they would have been thinking and speukit g 23. For arguments that similar considerations apply to an even wider range of term+ again, see Burge (te7el. 24. Again, we will move freely from daims about language to daims about thought, in this case adapting Kripk& and Putnam's disorssions of natural kind terms to the corresponding concepts. For an interesting discussion of how these arguments relate to the psychology of concepts, see Rey (19S3 [chapter 12 in this volume}.

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