Impacts of Plug-in Electric Vehicle-Promoting Public Policy in Reducing Light Duty Vehicle Emissions *

Transcription

1 Impacts of Plug-in Electric Vehicle-Promoting Public Policy in Reducing Light Duty Vehicle Emissions * Santini Danilo*, Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 S Cass Ave, Lemont, IL, dsantini@anl.gov* Rood Marcy, Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 S Cass Ave, Lemont, IL, dsantini@anl.gov Yan Zhou, Argonne National Laboratory, 9700 S Cass Ave, Lemont, IL, mroodwerpy@anl.gov To be presented at: 2016 Transportation and Air Quality Conference Minneapolis, MN Aug. 4-5 We examine the pattern of light duty plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) ownership in the U.S., as a function of financial and regulatory incentives. The hypothesis is that technologypromoting public policy has been based on a broad desire to reduce light duty vehicle emissions. Policies have evolved in response to perceived public need first for urban air quality, then for world GHG reduction. When both of these perceived needs resulted in regulatory and financial incentives, the greatest PEV sales success has resulted. The hypothesis that energy security has been a motivator for incentives is also examined. We examine several hypotheses: (1) where urban air quality nonattainment is most severe, states have been more likely to provide incentives for PEVs (2) the more severe the air quality problem, the more likely states have been to adopt preferential incentives for electric vehicles (BEVs) than for plug-in hybrids (PHEVs). (3) states for which the electorate is receptive to the argument that global warming must be dealt with have been more likely to adopt PEV incentives and regulation (4) states where most life cycle analyses (LCAs) have concluded that electric operation of PEVs will reduce GHGs have been more likely to adopt incentives (5) states that adopted incentives but LCAs indicated concern that electric operation would increase GHGs have had least success among those states that did adopt incentives (6) automakers have responded in three distinct ways to incentives and regulations: (a) PEVs are not a desirable technology, so regulations have been met at minimum cost with good faith vehicle availability confined to states which have regulatory incentives (b) worldwide consumer demand for plug-in electric vehicles is a real possibility, so PEVs have been marketed in many states and nations (c) PEVs might become desirable, so production and marketing strategy compromises, focusing sales on locations where both regulations and incentives exist. Results for each hypothesis are reported.

2 Method Using R.L. Polk data, this paper examines state level 2014 calendar year plug-in vehicle (PEV) registrations in light of prior energy security and environmental policies affecting PEV registrations. Important factors that are taken into account include: (A) Federal financial incentives for PEVs. (B) Federal grants for planning in support of PEV implementation (C) State financial incentives for PEVs (D) California regulations promoting transitional zero emission (TZEV) and zero emission vehicles (ZEVs) in California and Section 177 states (A) Federal tax credits of $7500 per PEV applied to those with battery packs of 16 or more kwh. Credits dropped according to formula down to $2500 for a 4 kwh pack. The maximum credit was available to all battery electric vehicles (BEVs); to two extended range electric vehicles (EREVs) produced by General Motors (Volt and ELR), and to one BMW series hybrid capable of qualifying as a ZEV ( BEVx ) under California ZEV regulations (i3 REX). The i3 was also available as a pure BEV. Other PEVs that obtained varying credits were produced by Ford (Fusion and C- Max PHEVs) and Toyota (Plug-in Prius). The Prius obtained the lowest federal tax credit of any PHEV, and had the shortest range. (B) On Sept. 8, 2011, Energy Secretary Steven Chu announced awards for 16 PEV Readiness Grants totaling $8.5 million. These projects in 24 states and the District of Columbia helped communities prepare for plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) and charging infrastructure. Through these awards, local public-private partnerships collaborated on plans to deploy PEVs, with stated goals to reduce U.S. petroleum dependency and build a clean transportation future. (C) The International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) [Jin, Searle and Lutsey, 2014] studied the effects of State PEV Incentives on state PEV success rates, but did not also account for the effects of PEV Readiness Grants. ICCT provided their data base on state incentives as of late These were used in this paper. (D) The twelve Section 177 states that had adopted the light duty portion of the California Air Resources Board (CARB) Standards ( as of 2014 were examined as a group to assess whether PEVs were collectively more likely to have been registered in those states. Rulings by the Supreme Court and thereafter by EPA (2009) allowed California to regulate GHG emissions ( It is presumed that the purpose of state adoption and promotion of California Standards under Section 177 of the Clean Air Act is both in support of air quality improvement (criterial pollutant emissions reduction) and, more recently, greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction. The most recent

3 five of the 12 Section 177 states adopted the regulations to be effective in 2009 or later. CARB regulations set minimum credits for major manufacturers to earn by selling TZEV and ZEV plug-in vehicles. The TZEV acronym refers to plug-in hybrids (PHEVs) including the Prius, Ford C-Max, and Ford Fusion, as well as EREVs including the Chevrolet Volt and Cadillac ELR. The ZEV acronym refers to all-electric vehicles (BEVs) and series hybrids meeting the BEVx regulation (i.e. the BMW i3 REX). Broadly consistent with the financial structure of Federal incentives, CARB minimum credit requirements specify a higher percentage of credits to be earned from ZEVs than from TZEVs. Thus, both regulatory and fiscal policy is tilted toward implementation of BEVs and BEVx s rather than PHEVs. Overall support for EREVs is intermediate. Federal financial incentives for EREVs equal those for BEVs, but CARB regulations provide less regulatory credit for an EREV than a ZEV. Selected preliminary findings: Ten of the fifteen states identified as having PEV financial incentives in addition to Federal incentives were in ozone nonattainment. Of the twelve states that adopted California Low Emissions Vehicle regulations for light duty vehicles, only five contained a metro area in nonattainment. While maintenance of attainment should also have been a factor in adopting the California regulations, it is also logical that potential for regulation that would lead to GHG reductions (since adopted) played a role. The recent Union of Concerned Scientists Cleaner Cars from Cradle to Grave study estimates that all-electric vehicle operation within all 12 Section 177 states results in lower global warming pollution ratings than the best available gasoline hybrid vehicle, the Toyota Prius Eco (56 mpg). 1 Long-term policies to eliminate air quality nonattainment appear to have been important in the relative 2014 success of PEVs. The states that adopted incentives had significantly higher PEV success than those that did not. Federal PEV Readiness Grants also played a significant role, increasing PEV success relative to states that did not either conduct the advanced planning enabled by the Grants (Fig. 1), or adopt incentives. Thus, the Federal motivation to assist states to reduce gasoline and oil consumption also played a role in PEV success. A surprising finding was that the Toyota Prius PHEV was a car designed and marketed for California (80% of its registrations) and Section 177 (17%) compliance. 1 Aside from Long Island, where a car with 47 mpg would be better, and western Pennsylvania, where a 44 mpg car would be better. This study also estimates that electric drive in all but the northernmost portion of Georgia does better than a 51 mpg car. Georgia had the second highest BEV incentives of any state in 2014 ($5000).

4 Aside from the Prius PHEV, Ford PHEVs, GM EREVs and the BMW i3 REX were marketed much more widely than BEVs. BEV registrations were generally higher in states where regulatory credits and/or financial incentives existed. The bias favoring BEVs when states implemented additional financial and regulatory incentives (relative to Federal) worked as intended. The Nissan Leaf was the only BEV to take significant advantage (34% of its registrations) of the high Georgia financial incentives exclusively available to BEVs ($5000). The next closest was the BMW i3 BEV, with 7% of its registrations in Georgia. Figure average PEV shares of registered vehicles, by group with count of states in group. When manufacturers produced both PEV electric/gasoline and pure electric vehicles (BEVs) the share of BEVs in states with regulatory credits and financial incentives was consistently higher. Among BEVs, the most widely marketed have been the luxury/performance Tesla (34% registrations outside states with regulatory and significant BEV incentives) and BMW i3 (35%). The Nissan Leaf and Ford Focus lag (19%) relative to these two, while other BEVs examined thus far had shares of 5% and less. Conclusion: In the early introductory phase for PEVs, patterns of 2014 registrations by state support the hypothesis that urban air quality, greenhouse gas emissions reductions and energy security goals and policies of states and the federal government have played a strong role in the degree of success so far achieved.

5 References: Jin, L., S. Searle and N. Lutsey (2014). Evaluation of State-Level U.S. Electric Vehicle Incentives. White Paper. International Council on Clean Transportation, Washington DC. (Oct.). ( Nealer, R., D. Reichmuth and D. Anair (2015). Cleaner Cars from Cradle to Grave. Union of Concerned Scientists. Nov. (