The experience of Peru with financial dedollariza6on. Zenón Quispe Central Reserve Bank of Peru

Transcription

1 The experience of Peru with financial dedollariza6on Zenón Quispe Central Reserve Bank of Peru

2 01 Content 1. Dollarization: the main vulnerability of the Peruvian economy 2. Why are we dollarized? 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency to dedollarize Monetary Policy and policies for macro-financial stability Fiscal Policy 4. Concluding remarks

3 1. Dollarization: the main vulnerability of the Peruvian economy Although, dollariza6on has been declining in recent years, it is s6ll an important source of financial vulnerability to credit risks associated with abrupt movements in the exchange rate and to risks related with the availability of adequate levels of interna6onal liquidity. Currency deprecia6on can increase the size of non- performing loans and induce a poten6al financial crisis. Banks dependence on dollar liabili6es can create pressures on interna6onal reserves when Central Bank liquidity support is needed ** January. April Credit dollarization (As a % total credit) *

4 2. Why are we dollarized? % 44.7% Inflation Rate (End of period) 1,722.3% 158.3% 7,649.5% 39.5% 11.8% Inflation target 1%- 3% 2.86% Inflation rate (Annual averages in percentages ) Inflation targeting: target range 1 %- 3 %

5 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy 04 MONETARY POLICY: Main features IndependentCentral Bank Single objective: Monetary stability Floating exchange rate Active policies to mitigate financial vulnerabilities Financing to the public sector is forbidden Inflation targeting since 2002: 2% (+/- ) 1% 10,000 Inflation rate: (End of period) 7,650% 1, Inflation targeting

6 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy and policies for macro-financial stability The Central Bank designed an ac6on plan to prevent a credit contrac6on during crisis events. Therefore, the monetary policy framework adds to the common features of infla6on targe6ng, a set of measures to deal with the risks of financial dollariza6on 05 Objectives Strategies Price stability Inflation target : 2% +/- 1% Short term interest rate as operational target + Macrofinancial Stability Actions to moderate credit cycles, and to deal with dollarization risks High reserve requirements on foreign currency liabilities of banks Forex interventions to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate Preventive build up of international reserves

7 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy Monetary policy: the pace of the policy interest rate Sub- prime Lehman QE Output gap Policy rate Inflation w/o food and energy Jan- 06 May- 06 Sep- 06 Jan- 07 May- 07 Sep- 07 Jan- 08 May- 08 Sep- 08 Jan- 09 May- 09 Sep- 09 Jan- 10 May- 10 Sep- 10 Jan- 11 May- 11 Sep- 11 Jan- 12 May- 12 Sep- 12 Jan- 13 May- 13 Sep- 13 Jan- 14 May- 14 QE2 QE3 Tapering announcement Effective Tapering

8 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy 07 Macro-prudential management of reserve requirement ratios (RRR) AddiAonally, if the average daily FX bank lending balances exceeds 1.05 (1.1, or1.15) Ames the balances of September 2013, the FX RRR will increase by 1.5 (3,0 or 5,0) percentage points Sub- prime 49 Lehman Reserve requirement in foreign currency Reserve requirement in domestic currency 12 Jan-07 May-07 Sep-07 Jan-08 May-08 Sep-08 Jan-09 May-09 Sep-09 Jan-10 May-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 May-11 Sep-11 Jan-12 May-12 Sep-12 Jan-13 May-13 Sep-13 Jan-14 May-14 QE1 QE2 QE3 Tapering announcement Effective Tapering

9 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy 08 Reserve requirements, growth of bank credit and de-dollarization Annual growth of credit in domestic currency Average reserve requirement in domestic currency Jan- 07 Apr- 07 Jul- 07 Oct- 07 Jan- 08 Apr- 08 Jul- 08 Oct- 08 Jan- 09 Apr- 09 Jul- 09 Oct- 09 Jan- 10 Apr- 10 Jul- 10 Oct- 10 Jan- 11 Apr- 11 Jul- 11 Oct- 11 Jan- 12 Apr- 12 Jul- 12 Oct- 12 Jan- 13 Apr- 13 Jul- 13 Oct- 13 Jan- 14 Apr Annual growth of credit in foreign currency Average reserve requirement in foreign currency Mar- 07 Aug- 07 Jan- 08 Jun- 08 Nov- 08 Apr- 09 Sep- 09 Feb- 10 Jul- 10 Dec- 10 May- 11 Oct- 11 Mar- 12 Aug- 12 Jan- 13 Jun- 13 Nov- 13 Apr- 14

10 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy 09 Intervention in the FX market to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate Exchange Rate (PEN per USD) Sub- prime Lehman QE1 QE2 QE3 Tapering announcement Effective Tapering FX market intervention (millions of USD) Jan-07 Mar-07 May-07 Jul-07 Sep-07 Dec-07 Feb-08 Apr-08 Jun-08 Aug-08 Nov-08 Jan-09 Mar-09 May-09 Jul-09 Oct-09 Dec-09 Feb-10 Apr-10 Jun-10 Sep-10 Nov-10 Jan-11 Mar-11 May-11 Aug-11 Oct-11 Dec-11 Feb-12 Apr-12 Jul-12 Sep-12 Nov-12 Jan-13 Mar-13 Jun-13 Aug-13 Oct-13 Dec-13 Feb-14 May Net purchases of FX Exchange Rate

11 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy 10 Intervention in the FX market to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate

12 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy 11 To sterilize the liquidity created by foreign exchange intervenaons, the Central Bank issues its own CerAficates with maturiaes of up to 18 months aucaoned when needed, which are complemented by required reserves and Treasury deposits. Balance sheet of the Central Bank as of December 2013 (As percentage of GDP) Assets Liabilities International reserves 31.8 Treasury deposits 11.9 In domestic currency 6.7 In foreign currency 5.3 Reserve requirements 11.0 In domestic currency 4.1 In foreign currency 6.9 Central Bank's instruments 3.7 Currency in circulation 5.1

13 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Monetary policy 12 From a low buffer stock of international reserves to a high protection against external shocks 32.0 International Reserves (% GDP, 2013) Net International reserves: (% of GDP) Peru Chile Brazil Mexico Colombia Source: BCRP, JP Morgan and FMI (WEO)

14 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Fiscal policy 13 From fiscal mismanagement to an countercyclical fiscal policy Fiscal balance (% GDP) Fiscal balance: 2013* (%GDP) * * Forecast Peru Chile Colombia Brazil Mexico * Forecast. Source: IMF and BCRP.

15 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Fiscal policy 14 Fiscal Responsibility Law Deficit Rule: Fiscal deficit shall not be higher than 1,0% of GDP Expenditures Limit Rule: The annual increase in consumpaon spending of Central Government shall not exceed 4% in real terms Fiscal Stabiliza6on Fund: Based on surplus of the public budget. The fund balance at December 31, 2013 is US$ 8,6 billion

16 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Fiscal policy 15 From 72% of public debt (in default) to sustained public finances 68.3 Public Debt: 2013* (% GDP) Public debt (% GDP) 2013 Net debt 3.5% % Gross debt 19.3% Brazil Mexico Colombia Peru Chile * Forecast Source: IMF and BCRP. 19% * Forecast.

17 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Fiscal policy 16 The development of a yield curve in domestic currency has been important as benchmark for the private sector Peru: Treasury bonds yield curve Yield to maturity (%) Jun 2001 Dec 2005 Dec 2008 May 9, / Yields traded at the end of each month. Years to maturity

18 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Fiscal policy year Treasury bond yield Long term interest rates are consistent with recent developments in the world economy and macroeconomic fundamentals Country Yield (%) Dec-12 Apr-13 Dec-13 7-May-14 Policy rates (%) Brasil Colombia Mexico Perú

19 3. Rebuilding credibility on the Peruvian currency: Fiscal policy 18 The recent upgrade in the risk rating reflects is explained by high economic growth, high level of international reserves and fiscal solvency S&P: Long- term sovereign debt in foreign currency Chile Peru Mexico Brazil Colombia Panama Uruguay Costa Rica Guatemala Bolivia Paraguay El Salvador Rep. Dominican Honduras venezuela Ecuador Argentina AA- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB- BB B+ B CCC+ Investment grade: BBB-

20 4. Concluding remarks Financial dollarizaaon is the main vulnerability of the Peruvian economy. High levels of inflaaon during the 1970 s, 80 s and 90 s induced the financial dollarizaaon of the economic agents. The first best policy acaon to dedollarize the economy is a credible fight against inflaaon through an inflaaon targeang framework. 2. The Central Reserve Bank of Peru has developed a policy framework based on a risk management approach combining the inflaaon targeang regime with the control of the dollarizaaon risks with the support of a disciplined fiscal policy. 3. The vulnerabiliaes associated with the paraal dollarisaaon of the banking system have been taken into account in order to incorporate unconvenaonal policy tools like intervenaon in the foreign exchange market, the accumulaaon of internaaonal reserves, the applicaaon of different forms of reserve requirements and various types of liquidity sterilisaaon. 4. With this policy framework, the Peruvian economy was relaavely isolated from the effects of the global financial crisis and was able to return to growth with low inflaaon and to avoid major disrupaons due to the surge in capital inflows, and conanued in the long path of dedollarizing the economy.

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