BALTIC TARA / RAMONA Collision and later foundering of RAMONA in the Baltic Sea, North of Bornholm, Denmark, March 12, 2005

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1 Review from the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents BALTIC TARA / RAMONA Collision and later foundering of RAMONA in the Baltic Sea, North of Bornholm, Denmark, March 12, 2005 The ships data BALTIC TARA is a general cargo vessel with a dead weight tonnage of 4,281, length overall meters and built in 1993 at Shipyard Ferus Smit B.V. Westerbroek, Netherlands. The flag State is Antigua & Barbuda - homeport St. John s. The owner is Opielok Bereederungs GmbH & Co. KG, Germany. RAMONA was a one-man operated fishing boat with a gross tonnage of 7 BT, length overall 10,03 meters and built in 1989 at AS Selfa Båt Trondheim, Norway. RAMONA was registered in Denmark in a special register for small fishing crafts and it was owned and operated by the skipper from the homeport Christiansø. Stage of navigation / fishing according to statements BALTIC TARA departed Harlingen, Holland with a crew of seven, on 10 March 2005 at 1245 hours en route to Mantyluoto Finland via the Kiel Canal (Nord-Ostsee-Kanal) fully loaded with sea-salt. BALTIC TARA left the Kiel Canal 11 March at 1720 hours and entered Bornholmsgat in the morning of 12 March. On 12 March at approx hours RAMONA departed Christiansø towards a fishing area 10 nautical miles northwest of the island. The weather was clear with variable winds. The forecast predicted raising winds during the morning. At approx hours the sole fisherman (the skipper) on board commenced retrieving the first of seven rows of fishhook lines each containing about 300 fishhooks and extending approximately 0,5 nm in a East West orientation. The distance between the rows varied from 0.1 to 4 nm. The intention was to retrieve each fishhook line, one row at a time, collect the fish and then deploy the lines immediately after. The speed of the fishing boat had been about 1 knot during the retrieving of the lines. Source: The owner of RAMONA 1

2 Scene of the collision Position of the collision According to the skipper of RAMONA: 55º25,65 N 14º54,00E - and the master of BALTIC TARA: 55º25,5 N 14º54,3 E The events shortly before the collision The following section is based on oral and written statements from the skipper of RAMONA and the master of BALTIC TARA During the retrieving of the lines, the wind increased from a westerly direction with occasional snow showers. The current was south going with a speed of 0,75 knots. Shortly before the collision the skipper on RAMONA noticed that the wind was veering to the east and was reaching a speed of about 20 knots. The visibility was good but periodically restricted during the snow showers. The visibility was according to the skipper not poor at anytime. At approx hours BALTIC TARA was north of Hammerodde on course 059º true in accordance with a pre-planned route. Until that time, the master had been alone on the bridge. Due to heavy snow showers in the area, which had reduced the visibility, the master called a lookout (AB) on the bridge and reduced the ship s speed to 8 knots. According to the master the visibility was very poor. Working on the fourth row, the line broke because of a hold. The skipper sailed about 3 to 4 minutes to the other end of the row to retrieve the line from the other end but the line did still hold and the skipper went aft wards to arrange a grapnel. The fishing boat was going very slowly forward on a northerly course and it had practically stopped in the water. The boat was rolling about 10 degrees occasionally up to 20 degrees to each side. 2

3 The boat had been stopped for minutes when the skipper, at about 1040 hours, suddenly felt that the boat inclined rapidly to starboard. Seawater was filling the boat very quickly and the boat capsized. The skipper managed to clear the boat by forcing his way to the bow and managed to stay afloat by holding on to the boat. On board BALTIC TARA, the master and the lookout noticed that the stem of BALTIC TARA made a vertical movement followed by some indeterminable noises. Shortly after they saw a small craft, which later turned out to be RAMONA. RAMONA had capsized with the keel upwards. There was a person floating in the water close to the boat. According to their information these observations were made at 1025 hours. The master immediately reduced the vessel s speed and returned towards the position of the capsized boat. The master alerted the vessel s crew and shortly after they launched a MOB-boat. About 20 minutes after the collision the crew of BALTIC TARA had pulled the skipper, who was very perished with cold, on board the MOB-boat. They then returned to BALTIC TARA to give him first aid. The skipper recovered as he was warmed up. Later, the rescue vessel LEOPOLD ROSENFELDT transferred the skipper to Christiansø. Lookout RAMONA was fitted with two radars. According to the skipper, one of the radars was on 2 nm range and the other, which was an ARPA radar, was set on 4 nm range. The skipper was normally able to see the ARPA radar from his working / steering position on the deck trough the window on the aft part of the wheelhouse. The snow showers affected the display of the traffic in the area. According to the skipper it was periodically not possible to spot targets within the range of nm from the centre of the display. RAMONA was fitted with a shelter on the port side. Three windows cm high were fitted in order to improve the vision see picture on the front page. At the time of the collision the skipper was listening to FM radio and there was noise from both the wind and the boat s motor, which according to the skipper was preventing him from hearing other ships in the area. BALTIC TARA was fitted with two radars. One of these was in use prior to the collision. Rain- and sea clutter had been adjusted in order to eliminate / remove unwanted returns. The lookout was designated for the sole task of looking for other ships and crafts. 3

4 External information Radar observations and information from the ship borne Automatic Identification System Chart extract with route and positions. The blue line indicates BALTIC TARAs route in accordance with information from the ship s voyage plan. According to information from Sjöcentralen in Karlskrona, Sweden BALTIC TARAs position at 1025 hours local time was 55º24,8 N 014º51,6 E, the speed (SOG) was 11 knots and course (COG) was 058º. Extract of an AIS plot from the Royal Danish Administration of Navigation and Hydrography s display system. Track history shown in red. Times indicated in UTC. According to the AIS plot BALTIC TARAs position at 1031 hours local time was 55º25,31 N 014º53,10 E, the speed (SOG) was 10.8 knots and course (COG) was 058º. This position is marked in the chart extract above and indicated on the AIS plot (in the blue square) 4

5 On the AIS plot, east and northeast of BALTIC TARA, are shown two other vessels on the same course. The arrow on the AIS plot indicates the approx. position of the collision as shown on the above chart extract. There is practically agreement in the statements with respect to the position where the collision occurred. Based on the above information, the collision occurred few minutes after 1031 hours at approx hours. SAR report from the Admiral Danish Fleet The Admiral Danish Fleet was informed about the accident at 1116 hours. At that time, the skipper had already been taken on board BALTIC TARA. The rescue vessels MADS JACOBSEN and LEOPOLD ROSENFELD were sent to the scene. RAMONA was reported sunk on 13 march at 1327 hours in position 55º18,926 N 014º49,993 E. Conclusion According to the master of BALTIC TARA, the visibility was very poor at the time of the collision and RAMONA was neither observed visually nor by radar prior to the collision. Both the master on BALTIC TARA and the skipper on RAMONA experienced that snow showers had a negative influenced on the radar screen. According to the master of BALTIC TARA the speed was reduced to 8 knots at about 1000 hours. The external radar information and the AIS information on the ship s movements, however, do not indicate the slowing down of the vessel. BALTIC TARA did not proceed at a safe speed appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. According to the skipper of RAMONA the visibility was about two nautical miles. He did, however, neither observe BALTIC TARA visually nor by radar because he was occupied with the line-hold situation. On RAMONA, a proper look-out was not maintained appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions. Neither BALTIC TARA nor RAMONA sounded signals as prescribed for power-driven vessels in or near an area of restricted visibility (COLREG Rule 35 (A) and (B)) 5

6 The assistance from BALTIC TARA The fisherman was in the water for about 20 minutes. He was very perished with cold when BALTIC Tara s crew helped him on board the MOB-boat. The water was very cold. The normal temperature is between six and eight degrees Celsius at that time of the year. It is the opinion of the Investigation Division that the prompt response from the master and from the crew on BALTIC TARA saved the fisherman from a life-threatening situation. 10 June 2005 Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents 6

MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS. R U D O K O P & A T L A N T I C C o l l i s i o n o n 2 1 M a y 2 0 0 8

MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS R U D O K O P & A T L A N T I C C o l l i s i o n o n 2 1 M a y 2 0 0 8 Report from the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents