MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS. R U D O K O P & A T L A N T I C C o l l i s i o n o n 2 1 M a y

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1 MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION OF MARITIME ACCIDENTS R U D O K O P & A T L A N T I C C o l l i s i o n o n 2 1 M a y

2 Report from the Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents Collision between RUDOKOP and ATLANTIC on 21. May 2008 Factual information RUDOKOP is a former tug-vessel registered in Cayman Island. The vessel is converted into a pleasure craft. It is steam propelled and is built in The length overall is 32.8 m, the breath 7.62 m, and the maximum draught is 4.09 m. The vessel measures 201 GRT. After being bought in October 2007 by a Polish buyer, the vessel was on a voyage from Sevilla in Spain til Gdynia in Poland. During the voyage the vessel had a crew of 5, consisting of Master Chief Officer, Chief Engineer, Engineer, AB/Cook. ATLANTIC (R.57, c/s OY7228) is a one-man-operated fishing vessel. The homeport is Roenne and it s registered under Danish flag. The vessel is built in The length overall is 12.2 m, the breath is 4.00 m and the maximum draught is 1.82 m. The vessel measures 13.0 GT / 3.9 NT. In the morning of the 21 st May 2008 RUDOKOP was in a position south of Rønne. The vessel was following the voyage plan on an easterly course. ATLANTIC and another fishing vessel, KIKI LOUISE (R.67, c/s XP5636) had just finished trawlfishing and was steaming together on a due northerly course bound for Rønne. At approximately 05:25 LT RUDOKOP and ATLANTIC collided. ATLANTIC immediately rolled over. The crewmember was caught in the wheelhouse, but subsequently succeeded in clearing his vessel and crawl up on the ships upturned bottom. From here KIKI LOUISE, who hurried to assistance, was able to embark the crewmember. ATLANTIC sank shortly after. After approximately 30 minutes KIKI LOUISE continued towards Rønne. RUDOKOP was ordered to Rønne. The Rønne Police Maritime Taskforce was taken to RUDOKOP during this vessels voyage to Rønne. The Police embarked on RUDOKOP a good two hours after the collision. Upon their embarkation the Police could establish that the Master of RUDOCOP was under the influence of alcohol and had an alcohol content in the blood of 1,16 per thousand. The Chief Officer, who was duty officer during the collision, was not influenced by alcohol. According to the Master and the Chief Officer on RUDOKOP, the weather on the time of the incident was good. Calm with good visibility. The Rønne lifeboat, which was transporting the Rønne Police to RUDOKOP, indicates the weather to a SW-ly wind 5 m/s, waveheight 0 m and visibility 4-10 km.

3 Narrative The following is based on the interviews conducted by the Investigation Division with the Master and officer of the watch of RUDOKOP and the skipper of ATLANTIC; the Police interrogations of the involved, recordings of communication on VHF made by Lyngby Radio and AIS plot received from the Danish Maritime Safety Administration In the following all times are stated in local times (UTC +2). Figure 1 below illustrates the area in which the collision took place using an extract from the electronic chart system, Det Levende Søkort. Figure 1. As seen from RUDOKOP During the voyage from Sevilla to Gdynia the watch on the bridge was split up between the Master and the Chief Officer. The Master had the watches from 08-14/20-02 and the Chief Officer the watches from 02-08/ On 21. May 2008 the Chief Officer relieved the Master as officer of the watch (OOW) at 02:00. The watch went by without incidents until approximately 12 nm from the voyageplans waypoint 49 (see figure 1 above), where two fishing vessels were observed ahead to starboard in a distance of approximately 6 nm. The two vessels was observed both visually and on radar, and appeared to be laying dead in the water while taking in their fishing gear. One of the vessels (ATLANTIC) began steaming, and approached RUDOKOP from starboard on a Northerly

4 course, apparently passing astern of RUDOKOP. When the distance between the vessels was approximately 1.5 nm, RUDOKOP OOW observed that ATLANTIC now seemed to be passing ahead of RUDOKOP with a very small CPA. Therefore the OOW changed his course to starboard in order to pass astern of ATLANTIC. When the distance between the vessels was about 0.5 nm the OOW observed that ATLANTIC still had a course towards RUDOKOP. He changed the steering mode from steering in autopilot to hand, and put the helm hard to starboard. From RUDOKOP it was observed that ATLANTIC appeared to be turning further to port, thereby maintaining a course towards RUDOKOP. The vessels were now so close, that RUDOKOP OOW observed that the wheelhouse on ATLANTIC was unmanned. When colliding, ATLANTIC first hit the bow of RUDOKOP. Subsequently it hit RUDOKOP s anchor, tearing it off. Immediately after the collision RUDOKOP continued with full speed ahead and steady on the course the vessel had in the moment of collision, and the OOW ran down to call the Master. According to the Chief Officer of RUDOKOP he approximately 3 minutes before the collision signalled the engine for a Full Astern -manoeuvre. However, the interrogation made by the Police of the duty engineer at the time of collision indicates, that no such engine order was given to the engine prior to the collision. According to the Chief Officer of RUDOKOP he made several attempts to contact ATLANTIC on VHF channel 16 prior to the collision. He indicates that the first of these attempts to establish communication was made when the distance between the vessels was about 1.5 nm. However, recordings of the communication on VHF channel 16 indicate, that no communication took place between the vessels prior to the collision. First communication received from RUDOKOP was at 05:37 (approximately 12 minutes after the collision), when RUDOKOP made a call to fishing boat and subsequently established contact to the other fishing vessel: KIKI LOUISE. As seen from ATLANTIC With one man on board ATLANTIC departed Rønne on 20. May 2008 at 19:30. In the morning of 21. May 2008 the fishing gear had been taken in at approximately 05:00, and together with the fishing vessel KIKI LOUISE ATLANTIC started steaming towards Rønne. The course was North and the speed 4-5 knots. The skipper of ATLANTIC was occupied on deck handling fish. From the work position on deck the skipper had visibility to port through a clear panel in the windbreak tarpaulin and to the instruments through windows in the aft part of the wheelhouse. At approximately 05:15 the skipper observed RUDOKOP to port in a distance estimated to 1.5 nm and with a course of With the ARPAfunction of the vessels radar RUDOKOP was plotted, and the skipper returned to the work on deck. Later, when the vessels were very close to

5 each other, the skipper could see that they would collide. At this time he was still working on deck, but now returned to the wheelhouse, where he went to full astern on the vessels engine. At the time when the skipper made the full astern -manoeuvre he estimates that the distance to RUDOKOP was m. The skipper noticed that there was at least one person on the bridge of the other vessel, and that this person seemed to be taking no actions towards avoiding a collision. The skipper sensed that the other vessel was trying to pass astern of his own vessel. He therefore changed the engine to full ahead in an attempt to avoid collision by passing ahead of RUDOKOP. However, this was unsuccessful and RUDOKOP hit ATLANTIC s port side at about midship. ATLANTIC rolled over, and the skipper was caught in the wheelhouse. He succeeded in exiting the wheelhouse and entering the now upturned ships bottom of his vessel. From here it was possible to come on board KIKI LOUISE. Analysis and conclusion The two vessels had seen each other, visually and on radar, in due time before the collision. According to the international COLREG 15, RUDOCOP should give way to ATLANTIC. The Chief Officer of RUDOKOP first estimated that ATLANTIC would pass aft of RUDOKOP. Later this changed, and he now estimated that ATLANTIC would pass forward of RUDOKOP with a very small CPA. He therefore changed his course to starboard and, in the last moments before the collision, put his helm to hard a starboard. He did not indicate his manoeuvres by using the ships whistle. When the distance between the vessels was approximately 1.5 nm, the skipper of the ATLANTIC estimated that RUDOKOP would pass ahead of his own vessel. He therefore returned to the work on deck. At a distance between the vessels of about m, the skipper became aware that the vessels were about to collide, wherefore he went to full astern on his engine. The collision between RUDOKOP and ATLANTIC was caused by: RUDOKOP did not follow his obligation to give way to ATLANTIC (COLREG 15) RUDOKOP s starboard turn was not big enough to adress the danger of collision between the two vessels, and not big enough to be perceived from ATLANTIC (COLREG 8). RUDOKOP did not give the required manoeuvring signal with the vessels whistle (COLREG 34) indicating his manoeuvres. This could be the

6 reason why the skipper of ATLANTIC was not aware of RUDOKOP s intentions, wherefore he went to full astern on his engine. From ATLANTIC a proper look-out was not maintained (COLREG 5), since RUDOKOP was not kept under observation to avoid the danger of collision (COLREG 7). 1 September 2008 The Division for Investigation of Maritime Accidents.