I :1) I AD-A ,9,5 ROBERT P. WALDEN UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA ISUMMER 1991

Transcription

1 AD-A ,9,5 A STUDY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLJNT CONSTRUCTON N THE UNTED S T ATES BY ROBERT P. WALDEN A REPORT PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COMMTTEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CVL ENGNEERNG N PARTAL FULFLLMENT OF THE REQUREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ENGNEERNG UNVERSTY OF FLORDA SUMMER :1)

2 A STUDY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTON N THE UNTED STATES SBY 0 * ROBERT P. WALDEN A REPORT PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COMMTTEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CVL ENGNEERNG N PARTAL FULFLLMENT OF THE REQUREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ENGNEERNG * UNVERSTY OF FLORDA SUMMER 1991

3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 3 The author wshes to express hs apprecaton to those ndvduals who contrbuted to the development of ths manuscrpt. Specal thanks are gven to my wfe, 3 Bobblu, and my two chldren, Jessca and Tyler, for endurng the past eleven months wth me. To my parents, 3 Mr. and Mrs. Joe P. Walden, extend a heartfelt thanks for the many years of encouragement gven to me throughout all of my edlucatonal endeavors. am also gratefully ndebted to the Unted States Navy for allowng me ths opportunty to further my educaton and foz strrng my nterests n the subject matter of ths report. Lastly, a note of thanks to snger and songwrter, Mr. Jmmy 3 Buffett, wthout whose musc ths effort would have been extremely borng.

4 ABSTRACT 3 Constructon of nuclear power plants n the Unted States has experenced a serous declne durng the last decade and has vrtually stopped snce However, the demand for energy n ths country contnues to arow at an alarmng rate. The Unted States possesses the technology * and captal to produce more nuclear-generated electrcty. f the need s there and the technology and money are avalable to meet that need, then why has ths specalzed 3 ndustry experenced such a dramatc declne? The answer to ths queston s not a smple one. Two * of the prmary reasons for the declne n nuclear power plant constructon are: the regulatory demands placed on the ndustry by the Federal government, and the publc's percepton of safety regardng the nuclear power ndustry. The constructon of nuclear power plants s obvously 5 a complex and captal-ntensve undertakng. The hstory of nuclear power plant constructon n the Unted States 3 has been one of enormous cost and schedule overruns. Proponents of nuclear power, wthn the government and ndustry, are attemptng to pass new legslaton whch 3 wll requre a one-step lcensng procedure and promote a standard desgn for all new nuclear plants. The one-step 3 lcensng procedure and the standard desgn are both major

5 ncentves that may help rejuvenate ths specalzed ndustry. The purpose of ths study s to examne the reasons for the declne n nuclear power plant constructon n the 3 Unted States wth emphass on government nvolvement and publc opnon. v

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS 5 Page Chapter One - ntroducton... 1 Chapter T-wo - Lcensng and Legslatve Reform... 5 * Chapter Three - Standardzaton Chapter Four - The Publc's Percepton * Chapter Fve - Qualty Assurance and Qualty Control.. 39 Chapter Sx - Constructon Management Chapter Seven - Concluson and Recommendatons Glossary References v

7 CHAPTER 1 NTRODUCTON Background 5 operatng permts n the Unted States. However, the number of unts wth constructon permts has steadly 3 declned from 91 n 1979 to four n Today, there are currently no new unts planned for constructon B on 1990, there were 112 nuclear reactor unts wth 1 (18:5). "The Unted States Department cf Energy (DOE) says the country wll have to rase ts present generatng 3 capacty of 700 bllon watts another 250 bllon watts by 2010" (6:56). Ths ncrease s equvalent to the 5 generatng capacty of 250 nuclear power unts. The DOE has also estmated that the Unted States wll need an addtonal 1,250 bllon watts of generatng capacty by 5 the year Further compoundng the need s the realzaton that many exstng nuclear plants, whch were 5 desgned for forty years, wll have ther operatng lcenses removed durng the comng decade (6:56). As our energy needs ncrease and foregn sources of 3 ol become less relable the Federal government s provdng ncreased support for new legslaton that would * ease the current regulatory clmate governng nuclear

8 power plant desgn, constructon, and operaton. The proposed legslaton calls for a one-step lcensng process to be completed pror to commencng constructon. Current regulatons requre one permt to be ssued for 5 constructon and one permt to be ssued for operaton of the plant. Ths two-step procedure also requres a publc hearng before each of the lcenses s ssued (9:1). 3 The Bush Admnstraton has also requested that key supplers of nuclear plants buld them to a standard 3 desgn. The advantages of standardzaton are obvously: cost effcency, better mantanablty, and ease of repar. A lkely canddate for standard desgn s the 5 modular hgh-temperature gas cooled reactor (MHTGR) (6:55). 3 Problem Statement The number of nuclear power plants under constructon n the Unted States peaked n 1979 and snce that tme nuclear power plant constructon has stopped. Utlty companes ordered ther last new power plant n (6:54). Lcensng and regulaton by the Federal government has become such an extensve process that the 3 most recent unts placed nto operaton n 1989 and 1990 had an average constructon tme of approxmately 17 years (18:12). 3 Nuclear accdents at Three Mle sland and Chernobyl have created a strong "rallyng cry" for opponents of 3 nuclear power and have had tremendous negatve mpact on *2

9 the growth of the ndustry. Publc opnon, cost overruns, and legslatve overkll have forced utlty companes n the Unted States to abandon 120 nuclear 5 been abandoned than are currently n operaton. The total costs of abandonment are estmated n the hundreds of plants snce Amazngly, more nuclear plants have bllons of dollars (6:56). 5 Nuclear power plant constructon has hstorcally experenced enormous cost and schedule overruns. Some of * the problems wth cost and schedule can be attrbuted to the constantly changng government regulatons regardng stng, desgn, and lcensng. However, other factors 3 have also nfluenced cost and schedule negatvely. Among these factors are: overall poor constructon management, 5 qualty control and qualty assurance problems, and poor 5 ndustry. publc relatons by the utlty companes and the Report Objectve Ths paper wll examne the reasons for declne n 5 nuclear power plant constructon n the Unted States wth major emphass on government nvolvement and tne pulc's 3 percepton of safety n the ndustry. The current status of constructon and the possble reactvaton of abandoned 5 management vewpont: safety, qualty assurance and 3 control, contractng systems, cost control, and schedulng plants wll also be revewed. From a constructon

10 wll be studed to provde nsght nto how these factors contrbuted to the current state of the ndustry. 3 Current ssues regardng future energy needs, radoactve waste dsposal, desgn standardzaton, and 5 legslatve reform wll be dscussed relatve to ther U 4 role n possble rejuvenaton of the nuclear power plant constructon ndustry.

11 5 LCENSNG AND LEGSLATVE REFORM CHAPTER 2 "The regulatory process affects the ndustry by lengthenng the tme between plannng a new generatng faclty and placng t n operaton, by retroactve cnanges n plant desgn arsng from the unque survellance responsblty of the Nuclear Regulatory Commsson, and by provdng a specal forum for publc opposton to nuclear plants" (12:278). The above statement ndcates that one of the crtcal areas affectng constructon of nuclear power * plants s lcensng and government regulatons coverng the constructon and operaton of the power plants. Proponents of nuclear power clam that the lcensng * process and the current regulatons are key areas that must be reformed n order for the ndustry to experence * revtalzaton. The lcensng procedures and regulatons governng the desgn, constructon, and operaton of nuclear power plants s contaned n Ttle 10, Chapter 50 of the Unted 3 constructon on a nuclear project the Nuclear Regulatory 5 Commsson must ssue a constructon permt (17:532). States Code of Federal Regulatons. Pror to startng U

12 :ethe lcensng process for constructon contans four 3of major steps. The frst step s the flng and acceptance the applcaton by the NRC. Ths document usually conssts of ffteen or more volumes of materal and s 5 known as the Prelmnary Safety Analyss Report (PSAR). The PSAR s prepared and submtted by the utlty company or owner and shows n detal the desgn assumptons and 5 lmtatons of the proposed plant. Along wth the PSAR the owner fles an Envronmental Report (ER). The tme 3 requred to prepare these two documents can take up to two years (4:352). The second stage n obtanng the constructon permt conssts of a revew of the PSAR and ER by the NRC. Ths revew process takes approxmately eghteen months. The NRC staff revews safety, envronmental safeguards, and anttrust ssues. The thrd step s a more comprehensve safety revew by the Advsory Commttee on Reactor Safety (ACRS). The ACRS s commssoned by the NRC, but s an 3 statute (4:352). ndependent agency. Ths revew s requred by federal The last step n the constructon lcensng process 3 s a mandatory publc hearng by the Atomc Safety and Lcensng Board (ASLB). Ths board s composed of three members - a charman and two techncal advsors, all wth 3 expertse n envronmental and nuclear technology. Ths porton of the lcensng procelure vares drastcally n 3 duraton dependng upon those who are nterested n seeng 6 U

13 the plant bult or those who are not nterested n seeng the plant bult. These publc hearngs have vared n length from one day to three years (4:352). The tme nvolved n obtanng a constructon permt s a -reat source of frustraton to the nuclear ndustry. Ths chapter wll focus on how the lcensng process has affected the ndustry and the push for legslatve reform that s currently ongong to allevate the problem. The exstng lcensng process requres two publc hearngs and two separate lcenses-one pror to grantng the utlty a constructon permt and another before the plant can begn operaton. Ths dual lcensng process, whch allows the publc to ntervene at crtcal steps, has caused many of the cost and schedule overruns assocated wth the constructon of nuclear power plants. For example, the second round of publc hearngs (requred before the ssuance of an operatng lcense) kept the Seabrook Nuclear Power Staton n New Hampshre dle for 3 nterest and other expenses (6:61). As can be seen by ths llustraton, the nuclear three years. Ths delay cost the owner over $1 bllon n lcensng process s not only a poltcal ssue, but also a serous economc ssue that wll drectly affect how much Amerca pays for electrcty for the frst half of the 21st century. A recent analyss by the Unted States Councl on Energy Awareness (USCEA) compared the cost of 3 electrcty from four electrc generatng optons-!7

14 nuclear, coal, gas, and ol. The analyss showed that the nuclear plant could produce electrcty for 4.3 cents/klowatt hour (kwh). Ths compares to 4.8 cents/kwh for the coal plant, 6.1 cents/kwh for the gas fred plant, and 8.1 cents/kwh for the ol fred plant (11:42). The results of ths analyss were based on the key assumpton that new advanced nuclear energy plants would be bult under stable regulatory condtons. Stable regulatory condtons means that standardzed desgns wll * be utlzed and that all regulatory ssues (ncludng stng, desgn, and emergency plannng) wll be settled before constructon starts and not afterwards. The USCEA * analyss also assumed that plants bult to the Nuclear Regulatory Commsson's rgd specfcatons wll be allowed to start up upon completon of constructon, and wll not be subject to lengthy publc hearngs whch cause costly delays (11:42). The results showng nuclear power as the most economcal means of electrcal generaton may be hard to beleve consderng the costs of recently completed plants. (To provde a common ground of measurement, nuclear power plant constructon costs are measured n dollars per klowatt (kwe) of peaktme generatng capacty.) $161/kwe. The frst plants completed n 1968 averaged Fve unts completed n 1988 averaged over 3 year perod. By comparson the consumer prce ndex (the $3000/kwe. Ths amounts to an 1800% ncrease n a twenty 8

15 Federal government's measure of annual nflaton) only ncreased by about 300% n the same perod. There s no 3 doubt that the demandng regulatons and the lengthy lcensng process have had a major effect on the cost 5 ncreases (18:11). The man concern of utlty companes s not the regulatons themselves but the fact that the process lacks 5 stablty and predctablty. When plannng for captal nvestments of the magntude of a nuclear power plant t 3 becomes mportant to be able to accurately estmate all the costs assocated wth the project. Ths has been almost mpossble because of constantly changng * regulatons and publc nvolvement n the lcensng procedure. The two-step lcensng procedure that s currently used requres utltes to take a huge fnancal rsk on a desgn that s not completed and fnally approved untl the plant s constructed. The lack of a standardzed desgn has also contrbuted to some of the dfferences n the lcensng procedure (19:2). 3 The costs for constructng a nuclear power plant have escalated rapdly durng the last two decades, at a much hgher rate than nflaton. Ths escalaton has been partly due to changes and addtons to plant desgns requred by regulatons for mproved safety or 3 envronmental protecton. Because of the uncertanty of these changes, whch often result n completed costs 3 orders of magntude hgher than the orgnal estmate, 9

16 utlty companes have been reluctant to plan for and fund any new reactors (12:263). Under the exstng law constructon begns before the plant desgn s completed. Crtcal decsons on approval of the plant desgn are often made after constructon has begun. Ths process s extremely neffcent, ncreases the overall costs dramatcally, and has forced many projects to be abandoned after owner's have sunk mllons and sometmes bllons of dollars nto constructon (19:2). Part of the ncreased costs related to regulaton can be assocated wth the contractor and owner attemptng to cover rsks that are unnsurable. As prevously stated, regulatory changes frequently cause changes n desgn, * whch result n rework and delays or shutdowns n the constructon schedule. Also related to rsk management * are the costs assocated wth rsk due to delays n * lcensng that may occur once constructon has been completed. The costs for these rsks are ncluded as contngences n the constructon schedule of prces and ths s standard n the ndustry (12:272). By comparson, fossl fuel plants usually requre eght to ten years from the start of plannng to completon of constructon, nuclear plants are now averagng over seventeen years. A large porton of ths addtonal tme s because of the extensve revews requred for nuclear plants pror to constructon. Ths *10

17 extra tme costs money and ncreases the urnertanty of meetng the orgnal target cost of constructon. The nuclear ndustry would very much lke to shorten the tme perod used by the lcensng process. Snce the ndustry s regulated by law, ths wll only be accomplshed through legslatve reform (12:27c). As can be expected n a democratc country, the publc has great nfluence over matters affectng publc 3 created laws and a bureaucratc agency to regulate all safety. Congress s certanly attuned to ths and has facets of the nuclear power ndustry. The regulatons themselves have been proven capable of beng met. The * actual regulatons have not caused the declne experenced by the ndustry. The problem has been the numerous 3 changes n regulatons that are mposed on the owner, desgner, constructon-manager, and contractors durng the constructon phase. These changes are much more expensve 3 to mplement durng the constructon phase then they would have been durng desgn. Each change n regulatons ncreases the opportunty for further legal and admnstratve nterventons durng the lfe of the project. Ths s especally true durng the publc * hearng held before the operatng lcense s obtaned (12:278). Another area of frustraton s the ablty to the publc to ntervene durng the lcensng process. 3 "nterventons have been used to ncrease opposton to 311

18 nuclear power, and n some cases, have forced postponement or cancellaton of nuclear power plants, ether by generatng resstance n the regon affected, or by delays that brng the economcs of the plant nto queston" (12:278). The same ndvduals questonng the economcs of a partcular plant durng a publc hearng often do not realze that they are drectly contrbutng to the cost * neffcences by delayng ether the constructon or operaton of the plant. 3 Whle t has been good from a safety standpont to have a strong regulatory envronment surroundng ths ndustry, from an economc standpont t has been a major lablty. However, a competent and ndependent regulatory agency s also necessary to ensure any 3 resemblance of publc acceptance of nuclear power. Publc opnon and acceptance of ths ndustry must be changed drastcally from what currently exsts f nuclear power s to make a comeback (12:279). LeQslatve Reform 3 n February 1991, Presdent Bush publshed hs new energy polcy. ncluded n ths polcy s a proposal to 3 speed up the procedure for lcensng the next generaton of nuclear plants. Ths "streamlnng" process places lmts on the publc's ablty to comment on new plants 3 and the ablty of state utlty commssons to regulate ' them. The proposed legslaton also lmts a state's

19 ablty to comment on the locaton of dsposal stes for radoactve wastes (13:2G). As of Aprl 1991, ths legslaton had won approval from the Senate Energy Commttee. A clear majorty of the commttee members endorsed the new legslaton. The key ponts of the new legslaton are: a one step lcensng procedure to occur before constructon begns, twenty year renewals on operatng lcenses for exstng plants, and commtment of government funds to conduct research for developng modern, standardzed plant desgns (9:1). Because of recent events n the Persan Gulf and ncreased concern over the emsson of carbon doxde nto the atmosphere, the current admnstraton, the utlty companes, and the scentfc communty are takng a second look at the many advantages of nuclear power as an energy resource for ths country durng the next century. Utlty companes are well aware of the capabltes of nuclear power, but are reluctant to expend further resources untl the Federal government stablzes the * regulatory process so that costs and schedules can be planned wthn a reasonable probablty of beng on Larget upon completon. The hstory of constructon n ths ndustry has shown that the probablty of beng on target for cost and schedule has been much less than reasonable. The man reason for ths s the current lcensng process. The * Presdent and some members of Congress have recognzed!13

20 ths and are attemptng to correct the problem through legslatve reform. f the new legslaton s passed t wll certanly provde the prme mpetus n revtalzng the ndustry. The USCEA analyss, prevously mentoned n ths chapter, "shows that wth lcensng reform and a stable regulatory clmate, nuclear plants can be one of the least cost ways to meet future electrcty needs. As a result, consumers of electrcty would be the man benefcares of a more stable regulatory and lcensng system for future nuclear plants" (11:42). As wth most economc ssues n the Unted States, costs wll drve the market. f the lcensng system does mprove and costs can be reasonably predcted and controlled on nuclear power plants, then utlty companes wll once agan start plannng and constructng more of them. When asked about the need for nuclear power durng the comng decade, Mr. Alan Stoga, a member of the Board * of Drectors of Kssnger and Assocates (a geopoltcal!14 and economc consultng frm), had these comments: We need to get away from our dependence, not just on foregn ol, but on ol. To the extent we can replace ol wth non-ol sources, we ought to do so. There, thnk, s where we have to re-examne the role nuclear power plays n our energy mx. fnd t crmnal--and that really s the best word--that we have abandoned nuclear power for all practcal purposes. The federal and state governments should be n the busness, not of preventng nuclear power at any cost, but of provdng the regulatory,

21 the safety, the economc framework n whch sensble nvestment decsons can be made. They have not been. Rather, they have been crusaders wth a msson to dscourage, and prevent, addtons of nuclear power to the naton's energy resource stock. We need to create a regulatory process that offers the opportunty to lcense new facltes. We need to create a * system where the chances of approval at the end of the day justfy the massve nvestment at the start of the day, and that really s the role of the federal government (11:49). *l1

22 CHAPTER 3 STANDARDZATON Wth few exceptons, the 112 nuclear reactors bult n the Unted States have been custom-desgned and custombult. knd. Almost all of the 112 lcensed plants are one of a Buldng one of a knd plants on a desgn-as-youbuld bass has resulted n both safety problems and escalatng constructon costs. These two ssues have resulted n a lack of nvestor and publc confdence n nuclear power (19:1). The Unted States House of Representatves' Commttee 3 on Energy and Power held hearngs n May of 1988 to dscuss the ssue of nuclear power plant standardzaton. The commttee hearngs nvolved many people from the 3 ndustry and the scentfc communty. The fndngs from the hearngs ndcated that standardzaton was a "good" dea and that Congress should enact legslaton to encourage standardzaton n the ndustry (19:1). There s enormous fnancal rsk nvolved on the part of the utlty companes and owners wth the current twostep lcensng procedure. The use of standardzed desgns would reduce that rsk and help revtalze the use of nuclear power as a proftable electrcty-generatng 3 opton. The custom desgn approach has led to numerous 16

23 reactors of great varablty and dversty. The varablty has created dfferences n the lcensng of nuclear power plants and dffcultes n transferrng experence and materals from one plant to another (19:2). Standard desgns can reduce the cost of new plants U and mprove ther safety. Ths s realzed through mprovements n tranng, operaton, and mantenance that can be readly shared between facltes. Also, standardzed desgns provde addtonal assurance that all major elements of a nuclear power plant arc produced to exactng requrements and that these requrements have been subject to a complete publc revew process. Standardzaton allows for a more effcent and expedtous revew process and thorough understandng of the desgns by the NRC. Each of these effects of standardzaton relate to reduced overall costs (19:2). Newly ntroduced legslaton n the House of Representatves calls for the pre-approval of standardzed desgn and a combned constructon permt-operatng lcense hearng for the desgn. Unlke exstng legslaton, plant constructon would not begn untl * after the desgn has been fully revewed and approved. Ths approach wll enhance safety, decrease the cost of nuclear power plant constructon, and hopefully, gve the 1 ndustry a much needed boost n constructon starts (19:2).

24 Regulaton s one of many reasons why nuclear power plant constructon has experenced zero growth n recent 5 years. Standardzaton plays a key role n regulatory reform. However, whether or not there s regulatory reform, utlty companes, out of economc necessty, must look at standardzaton as a means of reducng spralng constructon costs (19:3). * Standardzaton s not the only answer to revtalzng the ndustry. Problhms wth publc 3 acceptance and nvestor concerns must also be overcome. These two areas can be releved by the use of standardzed desgns because ths wll result n lower costs and safer plants. However, standardzaton through regulatory changes must be done carefully so as not to agtate these 5 two groups any more than they already have been (19:3). f standardzed desgns are gong to be used, whch desgn should be chosen? There are a number of good * desgns that have been bult and operated durng the past 5 problems. t would be too easy wth the exstng desgns for somebody to fnd somethng that should be bult 5 better, or to requre some backfttng. Therefore, a look at altelaatves n new technology should be done to pck thrty years. However, they have all experenced 5 (19:4). the best desgn or group of desgns from whch to chose There are currently two desgn alternatves that are 5 avalable that provde for the most advantages n terms of *18

25 standardzaton. They are: the advanced lght water reactor (whch s bascally an mprovement over most of the current reactors) and the modular hgh temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR) (19:4). The advanced lght water reactors are n the desgn stage now. The desgns are beng accomplshed by Westnghouse, General Electrc, and Combuston Engneerng. The frst two companes are cooperatng wth Japanese frms n ther desgns. The new desgn s sgnfcantly safer, from an operatng standpont, than exstng plants. The rsk factor for a catastrophc accdent occurrng has been lowered by a factor of ten wth ths desgn. Ths s a sgnfcant accomplshment (19:4). 3 These advanced reactors wll be desgned to be more easly operated and therefore, less susceptble to 3 dsruptons and shutdowns. Ths, n turn, results n a more stablzng lcensng envronment, meanng the lcense should be more easly obtanable upon completon of constructon, because there are fewer opportuntes for thngs to go wrong. The ease of lcensng efforts means less rsks for the owner, less delay tme between completon of constructon and operaton, and more mportantly, a lower and more stable overall cost (19:4). * These desgns wll be avalable for constructon n a few years. n all probablty the Japanese wll construct the frst one, so the Unted States wll have an 19

26 "experment" to analyze f we chose ths opton. t s not clear what the publc opnon wll be snce ths desgn s only a modernzaton of the most prevalent desgn n operaton today (19:5). The modular hgh-temperature gas-cooled reactor uses helum gas as a heat transport medum rather than water. Ths desgn centers on loadng modular fuel unts, capable of wthstandng extremely hgh temperatures (3300 degrees Fahrenhet), nto reactor vessels small enough that they * do not hold enough fuel to cause a "meltdown" of the 1 transports the heat from the fsson process to a gas reactor core f all the helum gas escaped. The helum turbne, whch provdes the moton for the electrc generator to produce electrcty (6:58). 3 Ths partcular desgn has been the only one to receve support from the Unon of Concerned Scentsts, whch s a group of scentsts, researchers, and academcans that has tradtonally opposed the use of 3 that t s "dot-proof" and "nherently-safe," manly because t reles on the laws of physcs and not human 3 nterventon to prevent a major accdent. One sgnfcant drawback to ths desgn s the lack of a contanment nuclear power n any form. Proponents of the desgn state vessel whch makes t vulnelable to terrorzt attack and 3 sabotage. From a publc percepton standpont, f a reactor whch s advertsed as nherently safe ever 1 experences a major accdent, publc confdence n that 20

27 technology mght never recover, especally n the Unted States (6:58). 3 The French have proven that standardzed desgns are less costly and can be bult qucker. France generates 75% of ts electrcty from nuclear power, more than any other country n the world. They have used a standardzed reactor snce the md-1970's. The average constructon tme has been sx to eght years. Ths compares to a current average tme of seventeen years n ths country. * France's nuclear engneers and operators can work on any of the country's ffty-fve nuclear plants. The cost effcency and safety value of standardzaton s selfevdent (6:55). 3 mportance The Bush Admnstraton has recognzed ther and s supportng the use of standardzed desgns, both fnancally and poltcally. The Unted States Department of Energy (DOE) has nvested more than $160 mllon durng the past fve years to assst n developng a new generaton of advanced reactors wth 3 standardzed desgns. General Electrc, Westnghouse, and other partcpants n the program have also nvested over 3 $70 mllon for ths effort. The admnstraton wants at learnt four desgns ready for utltes to choose from by 1995 (6:61). 3 Currently, the Federal Regulatons regardng nuclear power plant constructon and operaton allow for the 3 followng standardzaton optons: duplcate desgn, 21

28 replcate desgn, reference desgn, and lcense to manufacture (17:526). Duplcate Desgn allows for a sngle revew of the constructon lcense applcaton for two or more plants. The plants have the same desgn and wll be constructed n a specfed tme frame at dfferent stes. The only dfference n desgn allowed are those related to ste adaptablty. One set of drawngs s prepared and all equpment s procured at the same tme. Therefore, each * unt that s bult has the same make and model of all major tems (10:471). Replcate Desgn s nearly an exact replcaton of a * prevously establshed desgn constructed at a later tme at the same ste or a dfferent ste under separate 3 lcense applcatons. Equpment s procured to the same performance specfcaton as used n the orgnal desgn, 3 but may have some varatons because of dfferent manufacturers (10:471). Reference Desgn allows the desgn of an entre 3 plant, or major systems of the plant, to be revewed wth the ntent of beng standardzed for use n subsequent 3 plant applcatons. The second and subsequent applcatons would merely reference the frst (10:471). The lcense to manufacture concept provdes for a 3 lcensng revew of several facltes that are to be constructed at a locaton dfferent from where the plant 3 wll operate. The lcensng revew and hearngs are 322

29 lmted to ste-related questons. Ths dea apples prmarly to barge mounted off-shore power plants (10:471). All of the above optons are avalable and provde for some degree of standardzaton. They all stll requre two-step lcensng. The ntent of the legslatve reform currently n progress s to use the reference desgn opton wth a one step lcensng procedure. Ths concept hnges on fndng a desgn flexble enough to be adapted for stes almost anywhere n the Unted States. U The sound economc sense of usng nuclear power plants that are unformly standardzed, bult on a relable schedule wth a frm prce, as part of ths country's energy polcy has been clearly demonstrated. * Project managers overseas and n the Unted States have constructed power plants n sx years or less. The constructon methodology and technolcly for buldng the sx year plant exsts, however the ndustrywde commtment to make t happen consstently n the Unted States s severely lackng. The utlty companes and the government are showng a greater awareness toward ncreasng nuclear power generatng capacty. To accomplsh ths, everyone nvolved n the ndustry--the utlty companes, the manufacturers, Federal and state 3 regulators, the fnancal communty, and the poltcans-- must form a long term partnershp based on shared rsk and 3 shared rewards. Ths partnershp would be based on the *23

30 fundamental concept that a nuclear power plant wll be constructed n sx years wth a frm fxed prce (2:646). For the sx year process to work the partners must agree on: the need for addtonal power capacty, extensve pre-constructon desgn and plannng, fnancal backng and rsk sharng, frm prce bddng wth fnancal ncentves based on performance, reducton of regulatory uncertantes, streamlnng of the lcensng process, and early dentfcaton and resoluton of potental rsk ssues (2:647). The frst and most mportant step n makng ths process work s legslatve reform requrng only one-step lcensng and the use of standardzed desgns. The use of standardzed desgns wll reduce costs, ncrease safety, * and provde the publc wth the needed assurance that nuclear power s both safe and economcal.

31 CHAPTER 4 THE PUBLC'S PERCEPTON "Nuclear power. The words conjure frst the hellsh exploson at Chernobyl that spewed a radoactve cloud across the Ukrane and Europe fve years ago, posonng crops, spawnng bzarre mutant lvestock, kllng dozens of people and exposng mllons more to dangerous fallout. Then the words summon up Three Mle sland and the threat of a meltdown that spread panc across Pennsylvana's rollng countrysde seven years earler. From these grew the alarmng televson programs, the doomsday books, and the terrfyng moves. Could any technology survve all that? t seemed ths one couldn't." Ths s part of the openng paragraph for the cover story of the Aprl 29, 1991, ssue of Tme magazne enttled "Tme to Choose" (6:56). n ths paragraph a gloomy and dreadful pcture s panted concernng nuclear power. The two major accdents 3 that occurred, one n the Sovet Unon and the other n the Unted States, have had an overwhelmng effect on the nuclear power ndustry. Opponents of nuclear power have 3 used these two events to ther advantage. Opposton to nuclear power s well-organzed. Every opportunty s 3 taken by the opposton to nform the publc about the 25

32 negatve aspects of nuclear power. Conversely, the nuclear power proponents, ncludng the ndustry, do not * have an organzed publc relatons campagn. Consequently, the majorty of publc opnon has been * aganst any further development of nuclear power. Ths chapter wll attempt to revew three key ssues * that relate to the publc's percepton about nuclear power. These ssues are: safety, effects on the envronment, and cost. Because of ther ablty to ntervene durng the lcensng hearng, wnnng the publc's opnon n favor of the growth of nuclear power s crucal to nuclear power plant constructon. Publc * challenges made durng lcensng phases are one of the key causes of cost and schedule overruns. * The nuclear power ndustry must convnce the publc that the new plants that are bult wll be safe and have fewer problems. Ths wll be a crucal challenge, for wthout publc support ths ndustry wll surely fal. A Tme/CNN poll conducted n Aprl, 1991, showed that 32% of 1,000 adults surveyed strongly opposed buldng more nuclear plants n the Unted States, 18% were strongly n favor of buldng more (6:55). Conversely, a New York Tmes/CBS News opnon survey conducted n June, 1991, found that 41% of the 1424 adults polled were n favor of buldng more nuclear power plants. However, ths percentage s down from the 46% who sad they would approve n Aprl, 1979, one month after the Three Mle *26

33 sland accdent, and sgnfcantly lower than the 69% who sad they would approve n July, 1979 (20:3A). The Tme/CNN poll of Aprl, 1991, also asked whch energy source the Unted States should rely on most to meet ncreased energy needs n the next decade. Surprsngly, 40% of the respondents chose nuclear power, 25% chose ol, and 22% named coal. The contradcton of not wantng to buld more nuclear plants, but choosng t as a vable energy resource s probably due to the "not n 3 my backyard" syndrome. Many people want nuclear power as long as t s generated somewhere else. 60% of those * asked stated that a new nuclear power plant n ther communty would be unacceptable, whle 34% sad t would be acceptable (6:56). 3 The publc does not want nuclear power n ther backyards because of the percepton that nuclear plants are unsafe. Publc concern about nuclear power safety has centered on four key ssues: the safety of routne operaton of the nuclear fuel cycle and of reactors, the possblty and effects of a major nuclear accdent, the dsposal of radoactve wastes, and the producton of 3 nuclear weapons from byproducts of nuclear-powered facltes. Each of these ssues s mportant to the publc, however, from the vewpont of effects on 3 constructon, only the frst three are consdered n ths report (12:215).

34 Reactor safety s assured n the Unted States through a concept known as "defense-n depth." Nuclear power plants are desgned, bult, and operated under ths concept. The regulatons are also set-up to enforce the defense-n depth concept (3:316). Ths concept has three key elements. Frst s the phlosophy that the desgner contemplates all accdents hat he or she thnks have a sgnfcant probablty of occurrng, and desgns aganst them. Ths ncludes * ntrnscally safe desgns and engneered systems. ntrnscally safe means that the fundamental laws of physcs are used for protecton aganst accdents rather than human nterventon. Second, the assumpton s made that despte all good efforts n desgn, accdents wll happen anyway, therefore redundancy must be bult nto the desgn. The thrd element s reactor desgn and stng to 3 mtgate the consequences of accdents f the frst two elements fal. Examples of ths are: use of contanment buldngs to prevent release of radoactve materal nto 3 the envronment n the case of an accdent, use of remote stes, and the flterng of arborne releases to reduce 3 ther magntude (3:317). One of the key desgn features of reactors n the Unted States s multple barrers aganst the release of 3 radoactve materals from the fuel. There are four ba-rers between the fsson products n the fuel and the 28 envronment. Frst, the fuel s held together n a matrx

35 of ceramc-lke materal that bascally mmoblzes the fsson products. Second, the fuel claddng retans any fsson products that mgrate from ths fuel matrx. Thrd, the reactor prmary vessel keeps fsson products * that escape the fuel claddng from leavng the reactor. Last s a contanment buldng that encloses the entre reactor and the prmary and secondary coolant systems. * The effectveness of each of these barrers s a major element n safe reactor desgn and operaton (3:317). * Three other mportant areas must also be consdered when desgnng a safe reactor. Frst s the ablty to shut down the chan reacton and keep t shut down, ths s known as the "scram" mechansm. The second area s mantanng structural ntegrty of the fuel, the prmary coolant system, the contanment buldng, and other equpment. Sesmc, hurrcane, and nternally-generated reactor forces must be consdered to ensure structural ntegrty. Lastly, the need for resdual heat removal after a reactor scram s absolutely crtcal (3:317). Unlke fossl-fred plants, nuclear plants cannot fully extngush the heat generated from the chan reacton. A large amount of fssonable materal remans n the reactor core after a scram and ths produces heat as t undergoes radoactve decay. Ths decay heat must * be removed or the reactor core wll rse n temperature to the pont where fuel damage wll occur and release more and more radoactvty. Ths decay heat s removed * 29

36 through the use of a long range heat snk. The removal of decay heat s cne of the most vtal ssues n recoverng from any reactor accdent (3:317). The relance on automatc features and human * operators s also an nherent desgn feature n the Unted States. Reactor desgners have recognzed that many safety-related functons work best f they are automated. They have also realzed that some human nterventon s also essental for safety. Ths s because the complexty of possble accdent sequences s far too great to be controlled totally by automaton. n the long run, human judgment, wth ts versatlty and analytcal powers, produces safer operaton (3:318). The possblty and effects of a major nuclear 3 accdent s the second key safety ssue affectng publc concern. From the publc's vewpont, the ssue here s whether or not nuclear power s worth the rsks that are nvolved. The nuclear ndustry defnes rsk, as related to reactor safety, to be the product of consequences tmes ther probablty of occurrng. The publc generally thnks n terms of large rsks, whch means large consequences or large probabltes, or both. The safety record of the nuclear ndustry has shown that the most frequent accdents have small consequences, therefore, the * publc's percepton of the rsks of nuclear power have been exaggerated (3:325).

37 The publc needs to understand that even large accdents n the majorty of reactors operatng n the Unted States today are not analogous to the exploson of a nuclear weapon. No exploson or release of neutrons occurs, buldngs outsde the reactor plant are not physcally damaged, nor are any fres started. Any damage to property, ground, or water that occurs s due to radoactve contamnaton. The danger to humans s the nhalaton or ngeston of radoactve substances or gases, or rradaton from substances released to the atmosphere or deposted on the ground (12:460). n 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commsson conducted a study on reactor safety rsk assessment. The fndngs from ths study were publshed n a report known n the ndustry as the Rasmussen Report or WASH-1400 (12:216). The report stated that the rsks of a major accdent occurrng that would cause large numbers of casualtes are extremely small. The study showed that the probablty s so small that t s not normally wthn the range of rsks that are consdered (12:217). The WASH-1400 report was crtczed for several reasons. The two man reasons were: casualty fgures for the most severe types of accdents were underestmated, and accdent frequences were overestmated. However, f both of these fgures from the study are altered to make more conservatve estmate, the rsk of reactor accdents stll remans small enough when compared to other man- 31

38 caused events (.e. arplane crashes, fres, explosons) that nuclear power s stll an acceptable means of * generatng electrcty for ths country (12:217). The nuclear ndustry must develop a program for educatng the publc on the actual rsks that are nvolved so that publc opnon s not swayed by the emotonalsm and msnformaton that s prevalent n the opnons of the * opponents of nuclear power. Despte the publc's percepton, the nuclear power ndustry mantans a remarkable safety record. There have been no large releases of radoactvty, no core meltdowns, no radoactvty-nduced prompt fataltes, and excellent control of routne emssons durng almost three decades of commercal reactor operaton. Ths mpressve record ndcates the effcency of the nuclear program n the Unted States and the dedcaton of those people n the ndustry who are commtted to makng nuclear power a safe energy alternatve (3:323). The last area of safety that appears as a threat to the publc s dsposal of radoactve waste. The publc s understandably apprehensve about the ablty of nsttutons and the ndustry to manage or dspose of radoactve waste. The man concern s the possblty of the release of ths radoactvty nto the atmosphere after the waste s stored (6:57). Radoactve materal remans n fuel rods that are no longer economcal to use. Most of these fsson products 32

39 (.e. strontum 90 and cesum 137) have half-lfes of about 30 years. However, others such as plutonum, have half-lfes of up to 1000 to 10,000 years. Wth 112 reactors operatng, the amount of radoactve waste s growng fast (6:57). Hgh-level waste from power plants n the Unted States has accumulated to 17,000 tons n thrty years. * The same number of coal-fred plants operatng for thrty years, under the current emsson standards, would produce over 1 bllon cubc feet of ash, 100 mllon tons of (8:23). sulfur doxde, and 1 bllon tons of carbon doxde The amount of waste that currently exsts would fll all of the avalable storage space n the Unted States. * The government and the ndustry have made lttle progress n developng facltes for storng ths waste. However, Congress, n 1988, selected Yucca Mountan n Nevada as the ste for a permanent storage area. Unfortunately, the State of Nevada has fought the plan so fervently that f the ste opens at all, t wll not be untl 2010 (6:57). Most experts agree that the waste problem can be handled wth relatve ease. The spent fuel rods can be vtrfed and bured n steel contaners thousands of feet below the ground. Hghly accurate predctons have been made when nuclear waste s nvolved. Even though the rsks are no more than encountered n everyday lfe, no one can guarantee that a dsposal ste would reman ntact l33

40 for ths long, or that groundwater ntruson would not occur. The publc wants an absolute guarantee that the waste wll never escape from the contaners. Untl ths guarantee s made, publc fears wll not be overcome. "There wll be no nuclear renassance untl a wastedsposal program exsts that passes some common sense test of publc credblty and acceptablty" (6:57). From an envronmental standpont, nuclear energy s the cleanest source of electrcty currently avalable for large-scale growth. Nuclear reactor plants do not emt sulfur oxdes, ntrogen oxdes, partculate matter, or "greenhouse" gases such as carbon doxde. More strngent * ar polluton regulatons that are beng enacted have no negatve mpact on the cost of nuclear power. The contnued use of nuclear power helps prevent large amounts of ar polluton annually. t has been estmated that the use of nuclear power n 1989 alone reduced emssons of N sulfur oxdes by 5 mllon tons, ntrogen oxdes by 2 mllon tons, and carbon doxde by 128 mllon tons (1:17). Another factor affectng the publc's opnon of nuclear power s the staggerng costs nvolved wth constructon. Unfortunately, one of the methods employed by utlty companes to rase captal costs for constructon s a rate ncrease. t s dffcult for the common consumer to understand why he or she has 3 experenced a medum term (3 to 5 year) rate ncrease to 34

41 pay for a nuclear power plant that may be completed n 15 to 20 years so rates wll then go down. Also of concern are the enormous amounts of money that have been sunk nto nuclear power plants only to have * the plant constructon stopped or the plant abandoned after completon because of a lcensng challenge. Some examples are: the Long sland Lghtng Company of New * York gave up on tryng to obtan a lcense on ts completed $5.5 bllon Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant n The reason for abandonment was local authortes refused to approve the company's plans for evacuaton n the event of a major accdent. The State of New York plans to buy the plant for $1 and have t dsmantled at a cost of $186 mllon. A regonal utlty company n ndana stopped constructon on a nuclear plant n 1984 after snkng $2.7 bllon (6:56). The fnancal brokerage frm, Merrll Lynch, has estmated that abandoned nuclear projects n the Unted States has cost utlty stockholders $10 bllon. "The * frst utlty that announces plans to buld a new nuclear reactor wll see ts stock dumped" says Leonard Hyman, 3 Merrll Lynch's expert on electrc utltes. Stockholders are stll tryng to recover from ther frst experence wth losses. "There s no demand for new plants, because no one wants to spend the next 10 years n court or beng pcketed" states Hyman (6:57). 3

42 Nuclear power has been and probably wll reman a controversal ssue n the Unted States. Despte the polls that have shown that the majorty of Amercans thnk nuclear power s our most promsng source of energy for the future, there exsts a sgnfcant facton of strong opposton to t. These opponents of nuclear power wll lkely contnue ther efforts to persuade the publc to abandon ths source of energy. Nuclear power opponents are hghly organzed and mantan a well-establshed nformaton network. The bulk of the nformaton that s crculated s hghly partsan, but contans just enough facts to keep the opposton much better nformed about nuclear power than the general publc (12:260). The fght for survval of the nuclear ndustry n the * Unted States s mostly a contest among groups n our socety, and not the publc as a whole. The leadershp of * the ant-nuclear movement s clearly n the hands of envronmental organzatons. The proponents of nuclear power are led by ndustres and professonal assocatons wthn the nuclear power feld. Each group s tryng to gan publc support (12:260). * The scentfc communty plays a crtcal role n the nuclear power debate for two reasons. Frst, scentsts are found on both sdes of the ssue. Second, both sdes of the ssue are eager to get scentfc support for ther vewpont. More mportantly, scentsts are held n hgh publc esteem n regard to nuclear power, much more than *36

43 ether of the other two groups. One factor affectng publc opnon s that scentsts themselves are not decded on the need for nuclear power n respect to te rsks nvolved (12:261). * How has the publc's percepton of nuclear power affected the constructon of nuclear power plants? As mentoned n Chapter 2, the current lcensng procedures allow for the publc to ntervene durng both of the steps requred n the two step process. The law requres that a * publc hearng be held pror to the ssuance of the constructon permt and also pror to the ssuance of the operatng lcense. "nterventons have been used to buld up opposton to nuclear power, and n some cases, have forced postponement or cancellaton of nuclear plants, ether by generatng resstance n the regon affected, or by delays that brng the economcs of the plant nto queston" (12:278) The most effectve method of combattng the opponents of nuclear power s through educaton. f the current * admnstraton and the nuclear power ndustry want to experence addtonal growth, they must develop together a * comprehensve plan of educatng the publc on: 1. The amazngly low rsks of nuclear power when compared to the rsks of everyday lfe. 2. The remarkable safety record of the ndustry. 3. The technology that exsts for the proper and safe dsposal of radoactve waste and the real * rsks assocated wth ths technology. 37

44 4. Why constructon costs have skyrocketed, and the long term consequences on electrcty rates f nuclear power s not allowed to reach ts full potental The postve effects on the envronment f nuclear power s allowed to grow. These ponts must be made totally clear to the publc f nuclear power s to survve. Also, the ffteen years of msnformaton publczed by the opposton must be * dspelled n order for the publc to really understand l what t needs to know to make ntellgent decsons regardng nuclear power. 3

45 CHAPTER 5 QUALTY ASSURANCE AND QUALTY CONTROL "Man has been nterested n qualty constructon for many years" (4:349). However, nuclear power plants have had much more emphass on qualty n constructon than on typcal constructon projects. Ths added emphass s necessary because of the fuel that s used n a nuclear power plant. Snce radoactve fuel s used, extreme care must be taken to ensure that accdents are prevented from occurrng durng plant operaton. One method of provdng the necessary care s to ensure that qualty materals and sound constructon practces are used durng the constructon of the plant (4:369). * Because of the tremendous potental for damage and the number of lves that may be affected by an accdent, the Federal government has establshed certan standards * to ensure that nuclear power plants are constructed wth the necessary qualty to provde for safe operaton. Ths * level of government nvolvement s not found on typcal constructon projects. For ths reason, nuclear power plant constructon has a unque poston n the constructon ndustry (4:350). The prncpal focus of ths chapter wll be on qualty assurance (QA) and qualty control (QC), and the 39