Quantum cryptography



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Transcription:

Quantum cryptography

Optical fibers to carry information 10 Kb/s 1Tb/s 10 12 b/s

Optical fibers vs electrical cables Frequency: 10 8 Hz vs 10 15 Hz

Bit rate for electrical interconnections B B 0 A l 2 B 0 10 15 bit /s

Problema: Tizio abita in Europa e per telefonare al suo amico Caio in America spende circa 0.1 /minuto. Sapendo che la telefonata occupa una banda di circa 10kb/s, calcolare il ricavo di Sempronio, proprietario di una fibra da 1Tb/s posata nel fondo dell oceano tra l Europa e gli USA. 1Tb/s = 10 12 b/s = 10 8 telefonate = 10 7 /minuto (dieci milioni al minuto!) = 14.4 10 9 /giorno (quattordici miliardi al giorno!)

Privacy damage military governamental corporate collapse military governamental corporate compromise limited damage lifetime >10 y > 5y > 1y - 1m

How to tap a fiber

Private key cryptography (one time pad) Secure but unpractical, requires face-to-face meetings

Public key RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman): - take two large prime numbers and multiply them to obtain n=p q (128 o 256 bits) - send n to Alice to encode - to decode you will need p,q only Bob knows them, difficult for others to retrieve

Quantum cryptography How to distribute a private key through a public network Quantum key distribution + Private key cryptography = Secure comunication

Single photons Alice sends one photon at time No split photon attack!

Fotoni e bit L informazione è codificata nella direzione di polarizzazione =1 =0

How to confuse Eve ϑ = cosϑ + sinϑ P = ϑ 2 = cos 2 ϑ

How to confuse Eve

No cloning Cannot copy an unknown quantum state without modifing it ϑ α ( ) = ϑ ϑ ( ) = φ φ U ϑ α U φ α ( φ α )U + = φ φ ϑ φ = ( ϑ φ ) 2 ϑ = φ ; ϑ φ

BB84 protocol

BB84 protocol

Error correction Random deletion of photons: Absorption or scattering of the photons as they propagate from Alice to Bob Inefficient light collection so that some of the photons miss the detectors Detector inefficiency Birefringence polarization turns in random way during transmission same effect as eavesdropper

Errors and bit rate [ ( )] N correction = N εlog 2 ε ( 1 ε)log 2 1 ε ε error probability, N number of bits ε needs to be smaller than error introduced by Eve (0.25)

Identity verification Man in the middle attack: Eve pretends to be Bob, then sends Alice s message to Bob Need to ckeck Bob s identity carefully Need a first face-by-face encounter to establish the first confidential key (after that use it to establish Bob s ID and start quantum cryptography)

Single photon sources - Make sure no more than 1 photon is in each pulse: P(n>1)<<P(n=1) (n>1 decreases the error rate introdueced by Eve) - Attenuated coherent pulses from a laser (low mean number of photons to keep P(n>1) low) - Best choice is genuine single photon guns

Free-space quantum cryptography - Range 20 km - Use telescopes to avoid diffraction - Wavelength 600-900nm (low atmospheric losses, good detectors) - Goal to communicate with satellites in low earth orbits. Issues: - Air turbulence minimize with reference laser beam + adaptive optics) - Stray light (sun, lamps...) Minimize with spectral and temporal filters

Free-space quantum cryptography

Quantum cryptography in optical fibers Features: - Low losses - No diffraction - Widespread infrastructure - Wavelengths 850nm, 1300nm, 1500nm Issues: - Optical losses - Birefringence - Detectors

Quantum cryptography in optical fibers

Exercises 1- Consider a BB84 quantum cryptography system which employs attenuated laser pulses as the source of Alice s photons. (a) explain how Alice can produce photons with a particular polarization angle by placing suitable linear optical components after the laser. (b) Devise a scheme for producing a stream of single photons with their polarization angles switching between angles 0, 45, 90 or 135 at choice by combining four such laser beams (Assume that Alice can turn the lasers on and off at will) 2- In a free space quantum cryptography experiment operating over a distance of 20 km, Alice uses a beam collimator with a diameter of 5 cm to send her photons to Bob. On the assumption that other losses are negligible, compare the fraction of the photons that are incident on Bob s detector when he uses a collection lens with a diameter of (a) 5 and (b) 25 cm. 3- In classical fiber-optic communication systems, the signals are amplified at regular intervals by repeaters to compensate for the decay in intensity due to scattering and absorption losses. Discuss whether it is possible to use repaters to increase the range of a quantum criptography system.