Russia s gas sector and gas export developments Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega June 215
IEA: 29 Members, worldwide engagement IEA member countries Accession country Key Partner countries Countries co-operating through IEA programmes
Mtoe Power generation and consumption, driver and break of gas consumption Natural gas supply by sector, 199-212 45 4 35 3 25 2 15 Power generation Other transformations* Industry** Transport Residential 1 Commercial*** 5 199 1992 1994 1996 1998 2 22 24 26 28 21 212 Source: IEA
Gazprom is Russia s swing producer with very large unused production capacity Overview of Russia s gas market, 27-214 bcm 8 % 9 Russia total gas production 7 8 Gazprom gas production 6 7 5 6 Total Russian gas consumption 4 5 Total non-gazprom gas production (total production - Gazprom production) 3 4 3 Novatek gas production 2 2 Rosneft gas production 1 1 Gazprom's share in total production 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 Source: Gazprom; IEA; Novatek; Rosneft; Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation
bcm Gas production overcapacity as driver for more competitive markets? Outlook for Russia s gas production until 23 1 9 8 7 6 5 Gazprom gas production Rosneft gas production Novatek gas production 4 3 2 1 213 estimate 22 forecast 23 forecast Russia total gas production, WEO 213 projection Russian total gas production, Ministry of Energy projection Source: IEA WEO estimates, Ministry of Energy projections; Gazprom; Novatek; Rosneft
Gazprom s exports: falling revenues Gazprom s exports to Europe and the former Soviet Union (volumes and prices) and comparison with Norwegian exports, 27-215E bcm 17 15 13 USD/kcm 45 4 35 3 Gazprom exports to EU+Turkey+Balkans - Baltic states Gazprom exports to Former Soviet Union countries (including Baltic states) 11 25 Norway total exports 9 7 2 15 Average sale price to EU+Turkey+Balkans - Baltic states 5 3 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215E 1 5 Gazprom average price to Former Soviet Union countries Source: Gazprom; IEA; Ministry of Petroleum of Norway Note: Norway 214 and 213 data is preliminary In the current market environment, given its low marginal cost production and high capital expenditure commitments, Gazprom needs to maximize revenues and should thus logically seek to expand market share and offer competitive prices, including to Ukraine
Strong volumes to Germany, Turkey growing exports, supplies to Ukraine falling bcm Evolution of Gazprom s exports to its key markets, 26-214 55 Germany 45 France Italy 35 Turkey 25 United Kingdom Poland 15 Ukraine Belarus 5 Source: Gazprom; Naftogaz
Gazprom in a comfort zone on the European market in the medium term Market factors positive for Gazprom s exports to Europe Decline in European gas production: - Groningen output reduction - Norway production flat - Failure to develop shale gas at any significant scale - Other producers see steady ongoing decline in production Capacity to withstand competition: - Very low marginal cost production given sunk investments and low delivery costs implying a strong capacity to underprice competitors - Lower gas prices are a challenge for potential new market entrants - Flat or lower supplies from North Africa: turmoil in Libya; strong domestic demand in Egypt and Algeria Potential for increased gas consumption: - Gas for transportation: maritime transportation, such as in the Baltic sea - Additional nuclear decommissioning by 22 - Large combustion plant directive, unlikely new investments in additional coal generation, phasing out of old coal fired power generation capacity, such as through climate levy proposals (DE) - Higher GDP growth levels Challenging, uncertain or negative trends for Gazprom s exports to Europe Gas supply security strategy: - Short term: Lithuania and Poland access LNG; LNG bouncing back to Europe, issue of price difference between Asia and Europe; - Medium Term: Shah Deniz 2/TANAP/TAP; Black Sea offshore Romania; more LNG likely to be available; - Market integration, interconnections, liquid hubs; Lower gas consumption: - Energy efficiency potential in Europe large, especially in residential sector in Eastern Europe, will depend on implementation of Energy Union proposals and ambitions - GDP growth levels remain low - Competition from other fuels: - High gas prices limit gas for power generation, coal remains cheaper for power generation than USD 7/Mbtu gas, low carbon prices - Pace of further RES deployment; possible progress in hydrogen electricity storage technologies; Will biogas replace shale gas? With falling domestic production, nuclear and old coal fired power plants decommissioning, growing European import needs can only be met by LNG, Gazprom, Iran and Turkmenistan. Producers with sunk cost infrastructure and low cost production have an advantage.
Ukraine s gas transmission system Map of Ukraine s gas transmission system Key foreignled shale gas projects May 214 pipeline explosions Current war zone Source: IEA 212 Ukraine Energy Policy Review
Ukraine: decreasing transit role Evolution of Ukraine s role for the transit of Russian gas, 27-214 bcm % 18 16 14 9 8 7 Transit through Ukraine to European countries (- Moldova) 12 6 1 8 5 4 Russian gas supplies to Europe (- former Soviet Union) 6 3 4 2 2 1 Share of the Russian gas volumes transiting Ukraine in total Russian supplies to Europe (-former Soviet Union)
Turkish stream and its challenges Line 1 of Turkish Stream to Turkey makes economic and strategic sense for both Russia and Turkey, but building the other three lines by 22 is highly uncertain so that Ukraine should remain a significant transit country for Russian gas
Ukraine transit down to 4% of Russian exports and proved fully reliable in 214 bcm 3 Evolution of Russian gas export capacities via pipelines to Europe and of gas volumes Export capacity "Turkish Stream" 25 Export capacity Nord Stream Export capacity "Blue Stream+" 2 Transit capacity Belarus Export capacity Finland 15 Transit capacity Ukraine 1 5 25 26 27 28 29 21 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 22 Russian gas flows to Europe (minus Baltic States), including projection Russian gas transit through Ukraine, with 5% OPAL limitation and full Turkish Stream Russian gas transit through Ukraine without OPAL limitation and assuming full Turkish Stream Russian gas transit through Ukraine with 5% OPAL limitation and 2 lines of Turkish Stream Source: Gazprom; Naftogaz; IEA s estimate
Ukraine: major import diversification in 214 as Gazprom not competitive, reversal in 215? Evolution of Ukraine s imports by source (prices and volumes, 214- USD/kcm 6 215) and comparison with German border price bcm 4,5 5 4 3 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 Imports from Gazprom Reverse imports from EU Sale price Gazprom 2 1 1,5 1,5 Average import cost EU reverse Average German border price Source: Naftogaz, Ukrtransgaz, Gazprom, IMF With the prolongation of the winter interim agreement and the lower contractual oillinked gas price, Gazprom s supplies are now competitive again, so that Ukraine should tap both Russian and reverse flow gas to fill up its storages
New export projects to Asia SKV pipeline 183km between Sakhalin- Khabarovsk-Vladivostok Full design capacity: 3bcm Current capacity: about 7 bcm Altai pipeline 26km from West Siberia to China Throughput capacity: 6 bcm Power of Siberia pipeline 4 km from Kovykta to Vladivostok Construction has commenced in Sep 214 Throughput capacity: 61 bcm Costs USD 21.3 billion Status Eastern Route Western (Altai) Route SKV Purchase and Sale contract in May 214 Framework agreement Nov. 214, MoU May 215 Under negotiation Volume 38 bcm for 3 years 3 bcm for 3 years 3 bcm domestic uses Possible commission 219 After 219 midterm project Cost USD 55 billion for; - Power of Siberia pipeline - Development of gas fields USD 2 billion for Russian section - Pipeline : USD 11-14 billion Gas Source East Siberia (Chayanda, Kovykta) West Siberia Sakhalin 3
Russia developing Asian gas exports: a pipeline export story to China Operating: Sakhalin-2 LNG: 14.8 bcm Final Investment Decision/under construction Yamal LNG: 3 successive trains of 7.5 bcm, first as of 218 if finance is secured Power of Siberia (22): 38 bcm final capacity in the mid 22s Pending/delayed Power of Siberia XXL : + 23 bcm Altai pipeline: 3 bcm Vladivostok LNG: 13.7-2.5 bcm Far East LNG (Sakhalin-1, Rosneft): 6.8 bcm Sakhalin-2 expansion (Gazprom): 6.8 bcn Pechora LNG (Rosneft): 6.8-13.7 bcm By 22, 21-3 bcm LNG capacity possible (Sakhalin-2 +Yamal 1 or 1+2)= ~4-5% of total global capacity by 22, unchanged + 8 bcm pipeline gas to China Pending/delayed/uncertain: 34-48 bcm LNG + 52 bcm of pipeline export capacity