Lecture 13: Risk Aversion and Expected Utility

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Lecture 13: Risk Aversion and Expected Utility"

Transcription

1 Lecture 13: Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Uncertainty over monetary outcomes Let x denote a monetary outcome. C is a subset of the real line, i.e. [a, b]. A lottery L is a cumulative distribution function F : [0, 1]. Let f(x) be the density function associated with F(x). The expected value of L is Consumers preferences are represented by U :. By the expected utility theorem, there is an assignment of values u(x) to monetary outcomes with the property that any F( ) can be evaluated by a utility function U( ) of the form: which we call the expected utility of F. Note: by MWG convention, U( ) is the vnm utility function defined over lotteries. u( ) is the Bernoulli utility function defined over monetary outcomes.

2 Risk Aversion and Utility Definition: An individual is (weakly) risk averse if for any lottery F( ), the degenerate lottery that places probability one on the mean of F is (weakly) preferred to the lottery F itself. If the individual is always indifferent between these two lotteries, then we say the individual is risk neutral. An individual is a risk lover if a degenerate lottery is never preferred to the lottery F. With a Bernoulli utility function representation of these preferences, an individual is therefore risk averse if and only if: for all F( ), This is Jensen s Inequality and is the defining property of a concave function. Hence, risk aversion is equivalent to the concavity of a Bernoulli utility function u(x). Therefore strict concavity strict risk aversion linearity risk neutrality strict convexity risk loving

3 Certainty Equivalence Definition: Given a Bernoulli utility function u( ), the certainty equivalent of a lottery F( ), denoted c(f,u), is the quantity that satisfies the following equation: An individual would be exactly indifferent between a lottery that placed probability one on the certainty equivalent and the lottery F( ). Risk Premium Definition: Given a Bernoulli utility function u( ) and a lottery F( ), the risk premium, denoted ñ(f,u), is the difference between the mean of F and the certainty equivalent c(f,u): Application: Risk Aversion and Insurance A strictly risk-averse individual has initial wealth of w but faces the possible loss of D dollars. This loss occurs with probability ð.

4 This individual can buy insurance that costs q dollars per unit and pays 1 dollar per unit if a loss occurs. The individual is deciding how many units of insurance, á, she wishes to buy. For a purchase of á units of insurance, the individual faces the following set of monetary outcomes and the corresponding lottery: C = {w - áq, w - áq - D + á} L = ((1 - ð), ð) The expected wealth of the individual is: EW = (1 - ð)(w - áq) + ð(w - áq - D + á) = w - áq - ð(d - á). The utility maximization problem, with Bernoulli utility function u( ), is: The FOC is: -q(1 - ð) u (w - á*q) + ð(1 - q)u (w + (1 - q)á* - D) = 0 assuming á* > 0. Now, suppose that the price of insurance is actuarily fair, in the sense that q = ð. Then the FOC becomes: u (w + (1 - q)á* - D) = u (w - á*q)

5 Since u is strictly decreasing by strict risk aversion, we must have w + (1 - q)á* - D = w - á*q or equivalently á* = D. Proposition: If insurance offered is actuarily fair, a strictly risk averse individual will choose full insurance. What if insurance offered is not actuarily fair? Measuring Risk Aversion Local Risk Aversion Definition: Given a twice-differentiable Bernoulli utility function u( ), the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion at x is defined as: For two individuals, 1 and 2, with twice-differentiable, concave, utility functions u 1( ) and u 2( ), respectively, person 2 is more risk averse than person 1 at the level of income x iff

6 This measure allows us to compare attitudes towards risky situations whose outcomes are absolute gains or losses from current wealth x. Note: Why not u (x) as measure? Note: Approximate relationship to ñ (for small gambles). Global Risk Aversion Given two twice-differentiable Bernoulli utility functions u 1( ) and u 2( ), individual 2 is globally more risk averse than individual 1 if and only if there exists a concave function ø( ) such that u 2(x) = ø(u 1(x)). That is, u 2( ) is a concave transform of u 1( ). Risk Premium and Certainty Equivalent Consider two individuals with utility functions u 1( ) and u 2( ). Individual 2 is more risk averse than individual 1 if and only if: c(f, u 2) < c(f, u 1) for every lottery F( ).

7 Since ñ = EV - CE, equivalently individual 2 is more risk averse than individual 1 when 2 s risk premium is higher: ñ(f, u 2) > ñ(f, u 1) for every F( ). Pratt s Theorem: The three previous measures of risk aversion are all equivalent, given twice-differentiable utility functions. Relative Risk Aversion Definition: Given a twice-differentiable Bernoulli utility function u( ), the coefficient of relative risk aversion at x is defined as: We can write it as follows:

8 Risk Aversion and Wealth Definition: The Bernoulli utility function u( ) a exhibits decreasing (constant) (increasing) absolute risk aversion if r (x,u) is a decreasing (constant) (increasing) function of x. A e.g. consider two different wealth levels w 1 > w 2. The set of possible outcomes involves a monetary payment x. A person s utility function u exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) iff r A(w 1 + x, u) < r A(w 2 + x, u). Some useful specific utility functions Consider set of utility functions with harmonic absolute risk aversion (HARA). Definition: A function displays HARA if the inverse of its absolute risk aversion is linear in wealth. Definition: Absolute risk tolerance T is the inverse of absolute risk aversion. -1 T(x) = r A(x) = -u (x)/u (x)

9 The HARA class of utility functions take the following spacial form: These functions are defined on the domain of x such that We then have that -1 To ensure that u > 0 and u < 0, we need to have æ(1 - ã)ã > 0. The different coefficients related to the attitude toward risk are thus equal to and

10 3 Important Special Cases of HARA. 1) Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) r A is independent of x if ã +, with r A(x) = r A = 1/ç. u(x) = - exp(-x/ç)/(1/ç) -ëx (alternatively, usually represented as u(x) = -e, ë > 0) 2) Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) r R = ã if ç = 0. If choose æ so as to normalize u (1) = 1, -ã then u (x) = x or 3) Quadratic Utility Functions Set ã = -1 Note: Only defined on x < ç

11 CARA, CRRA Utility Functions (From Gollier, 2001)

12 Estimating degree of risk aversion: What is the share of your wealth that you are ready to pay to escape the risk of gaining or losing a share á of it with equal probability?

Economics 1011a: Intermediate Microeconomics

Economics 1011a: Intermediate Microeconomics Lecture 12: More Uncertainty Economics 1011a: Intermediate Microeconomics Lecture 12: More on Uncertainty Thursday, October 23, 2008 Last class we introduced choice under uncertainty. Today we will explore

More information

Decision & Risk Analysis Lecture 6. Risk and Utility

Decision & Risk Analysis Lecture 6. Risk and Utility Risk and Utility Risk - Introduction Payoff Game 1 $14.50 0.5 0.5 $30 - $1 EMV 30*0.5+(-1)*0.5= 14.5 Game 2 Which game will you play? Which game is risky? $50.00 Figure 13.1 0.5 0.5 $2,000 - $1,900 EMV

More information

Choice under Uncertainty

Choice under Uncertainty Choice under Uncertainty Part 1: Expected Utility Function, Attitudes towards Risk, Demand for Insurance Slide 1 Choice under Uncertainty We ll analyze the underlying assumptions of expected utility theory

More information

Risk and Uncertainty. Vani K Borooah University of Ulster

Risk and Uncertainty. Vani K Borooah University of Ulster Risk and Uncertainty Vani K Borooah University of Ulster Basic Concepts Gamble: An action with more than one possible outcome, such that with each outcome there is an associated probability of that outcome

More information

Lecture 15. Ranking Payoff Distributions: Stochastic Dominance. First-Order Stochastic Dominance: higher distribution

Lecture 15. Ranking Payoff Distributions: Stochastic Dominance. First-Order Stochastic Dominance: higher distribution Lecture 15 Ranking Payoff Distributions: Stochastic Dominance First-Order Stochastic Dominance: higher distribution Definition 6.D.1: The distribution F( ) first-order stochastically dominates G( ) if

More information

Asset Pricing. Chapter IV. Measuring Risk and Risk Aversion. June 20, 2006

Asset Pricing. Chapter IV. Measuring Risk and Risk Aversion. June 20, 2006 Chapter IV. Measuring Risk and Risk Aversion June 20, 2006 Measuring Risk Aversion Utility function Indifference Curves U(Y) tangent lines U(Y + h) U[0.5(Y + h) + 0.5(Y h)] 0.5U(Y + h) + 0.5U(Y h) U(Y

More information

Chapter 25: Exchange in Insurance Markets

Chapter 25: Exchange in Insurance Markets Chapter 25: Exchange in Insurance Markets 25.1: Introduction In this chapter we use the techniques that we have been developing in the previous 2 chapters to discuss the trade of risk. Insurance markets

More information

Lecture 11 Uncertainty

Lecture 11 Uncertainty Lecture 11 Uncertainty 1. Contingent Claims and the State-Preference Model 1) Contingent Commodities and Contingent Claims Using the simple two-good model we have developed throughout this course, think

More information

Choice Under Uncertainty

Choice Under Uncertainty Decision Making Under Uncertainty Choice Under Uncertainty Econ 422: Investment, Capital & Finance University of ashington Summer 2006 August 15, 2006 Course Chronology: 1. Intertemporal Choice: Exchange

More information

.4 120 +.1 80 +.5 100 = 48 + 8 + 50 = 106.

.4 120 +.1 80 +.5 100 = 48 + 8 + 50 = 106. Chapter 16. Risk and Uncertainty Part A 2009, Kwan Choi Expected Value X i = outcome i, p i = probability of X i EV = pix For instance, suppose a person has an idle fund, $100, for one month, and is considering

More information

The Values of Relative Risk Aversion Degrees

The Values of Relative Risk Aversion Degrees The Values of Relative Risk Aversion Degrees Johanna Etner CERSES CNRS and University of Paris Descartes 45 rue des Saints-Peres, F-75006 Paris, France johanna.etner@parisdescartes.fr Abstract This article

More information

Lecture 5 Principal Minors and the Hessian

Lecture 5 Principal Minors and the Hessian Lecture 5 Principal Minors and the Hessian Eivind Eriksen BI Norwegian School of Management Department of Economics October 01, 2010 Eivind Eriksen (BI Dept of Economics) Lecture 5 Principal Minors and

More information

Certainty Equivalent in Capital Markets

Certainty Equivalent in Capital Markets Certainty Equivalent in Capital Markets Lutz Kruschwitz Freie Universität Berlin and Andreas Löffler 1 Universität Hannover version from January 23, 2003 1 Corresponding author, Königsworther Platz 1,

More information

Chapter 5 Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior

Chapter 5 Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior Chapter 5 Uncertainty and Consumer Behavior Questions for Review 1. What does it mean to say that a person is risk averse? Why are some people likely to be risk averse while others are risk lovers? A risk-averse

More information

Economics 1011a: Intermediate Microeconomics

Economics 1011a: Intermediate Microeconomics Lecture 11: Choice Under Uncertainty Economics 1011a: Intermediate Microeconomics Lecture 11: Choice Under Uncertainty Tuesday, October 21, 2008 Last class we wrapped up consumption over time. Today we

More information

Lecture 10 - Risk and Insurance

Lecture 10 - Risk and Insurance Lecture 10 - Risk and Insurance 14.03 Spring 2003 1 Risk Aversion and Insurance: Introduction To have a passably usable model of choice, we need to be able to say something about how risk affects choice

More information

Walrasian Demand. u(x) where B(p, w) = {x R n + : p x w}.

Walrasian Demand. u(x) where B(p, w) = {x R n + : p x w}. Walrasian Demand Econ 2100 Fall 2015 Lecture 5, September 16 Outline 1 Walrasian Demand 2 Properties of Walrasian Demand 3 An Optimization Recipe 4 First and Second Order Conditions Definition Walrasian

More information

Economics 2020a / HBS 4010 / HKS API-111 Fall 2011 Practice Problems for Lectures 1 to 11

Economics 2020a / HBS 4010 / HKS API-111 Fall 2011 Practice Problems for Lectures 1 to 11 Economics 2020a / HBS 4010 / HKS API-111 Fall 2011 Practice Problems for Lectures 1 to 11 LECTURE 1: BUDGETS AND REVEALED PREFERENCE 1.1. Quantity Discounts and the Budget Constraint Suppose that a consumer

More information

Precautionary Saving. and Consumption Smoothing. Across Time and Possibilities

Precautionary Saving. and Consumption Smoothing. Across Time and Possibilities Precautionary Saving and Consumption Smoothing Across Time and Possibilities Miles Kimball Philippe Weil 1 October 2003 1 Respectively: University of Michigan and NBER; and ECARES (Université Libre de

More information

Chapter 5: Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions,

Chapter 5: Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions, Chapter 5: Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions, Part 1 5.1 Introduction Chapters 3 and 4 provided a systematic procedure for assessing an investor s relative preference for various investment payoffs:

More information

Decision Making under Uncertainty

Decision Making under Uncertainty 6.825 Techniques in Artificial Intelligence Decision Making under Uncertainty How to make one decision in the face of uncertainty Lecture 19 1 In the next two lectures, we ll look at the question of how

More information

1 Uncertainty and Preferences

1 Uncertainty and Preferences In this chapter, we present the theory of consumer preferences on risky outcomes. The theory is then applied to study the demand for insurance. Consider the following story. John wants to mail a package

More information

Choice under Uncertainty

Choice under Uncertainty Choice under Uncertainty Jonathan Levin October 2006 1 Introduction Virtually every decision is made in the face of uncertainty. While we often rely on models of certain information as you ve seen in the

More information

INFERIOR GOOD AND GIFFEN BEHAVIOR FOR INVESTING AND BORROWING

INFERIOR GOOD AND GIFFEN BEHAVIOR FOR INVESTING AND BORROWING INFERIOR GOOD AND GIFFEN BEHAVIOR FOR INVESTING AND BORROWING Felix Kubler University of Zurich Larry Selden Columbia University University of Pennsylvania August 14, 211 Xiao Wei Columbia University Abstract

More information

Economics of Insurance

Economics of Insurance Economics of Insurance In this last lecture, we cover most topics of Economics of Information within a single application. Through this, you will see how the differential informational assumptions allow

More information

Lecture notes for Choice Under Uncertainty

Lecture notes for Choice Under Uncertainty Lecture notes for Choice Under Uncertainty 1. Introduction In this lecture we examine the theory of decision-making under uncertainty and its application to the demand for insurance. The undergraduate

More information

Risk Aversion. Expected value as a criterion for making decisions makes sense provided that C H A P T E R 2. 2.1 Risk Attitude

Risk Aversion. Expected value as a criterion for making decisions makes sense provided that C H A P T E R 2. 2.1 Risk Attitude C H A P T E R 2 Risk Aversion Expected value as a criterion for making decisions makes sense provided that the stakes at risk in the decision are small enough to \play the long run averages." The range

More information

The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection

The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self-protection David Alary Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA) Christian Gollier Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA and IDEI) Nicolas Treich Toulouse

More information

Econ 132 C. Health Insurance: U.S., Risk Pooling, Risk Aversion, Moral Hazard, Rand Study 7

Econ 132 C. Health Insurance: U.S., Risk Pooling, Risk Aversion, Moral Hazard, Rand Study 7 Econ 132 C. Health Insurance: U.S., Risk Pooling, Risk Aversion, Moral Hazard, Rand Study 7 C2. Health Insurance: Risk Pooling Health insurance works by pooling individuals together to reduce the variability

More information

The Cumulative Distribution and Stochastic Dominance

The Cumulative Distribution and Stochastic Dominance The Cumulative Distribution and Stochastic Dominance L A T E X file: StochasticDominance Daniel A. Graham, September 1, 2011 A decision problem under uncertainty is frequently cast as the problem of choosing

More information

Lecture Notes on Elasticity of Substitution

Lecture Notes on Elasticity of Substitution Lecture Notes on Elasticity of Substitution Ted Bergstrom, UCSB Economics 210A March 3, 2011 Today s featured guest is the elasticity of substitution. Elasticity of a function of a single variable Before

More information

Regret and Rejoicing Effects on Mixed Insurance *

Regret and Rejoicing Effects on Mixed Insurance * Regret and Rejoicing Effects on Mixed Insurance * Yoichiro Fujii, Osaka Sangyo University Mahito Okura, Doshisha Women s College of Liberal Arts Yusuke Osaki, Osaka Sangyo University + Abstract This papers

More information

Å Ò Ñ ÒØ Ö Ø ØÙÖ Ö Ñ ÛÓÖ ÓÖ Ø Ú Æ ØÛÓÖ Ð ÒϺ ÓÒ Â Ñ Èº ºËØ Ö ÒÞ Ñ Ñ Ò Ð Ü Ò ÖκÃÓÒ Ø ÒØ ÒÓÙ ÆÌ ÒÓÐÓ Î Ö ÞÓÒ ÓÐÙÑ ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝÝ ¼ÂÙÒ ¾¼¼ ÝØ ÊÄÙÒ ÖÓÒØÖ Ø ¼ ¼¾¹ ¹ ¹¼½ ½º Ì ÛÓÖ Û ÔÓÒ ÓÖ ÝØ Ò Ú Ò Ê Ö ÈÖÓ Ø ÒÝ

More information

Decision making in the presence of uncertainty II

Decision making in the presence of uncertainty II CS 274 Knowledge representation Lecture 23 Decision making in the presence of uncertainty II Milos Hauskrecht milos@cs.pitt.edu 5329 Sennott Square Information-gathering actions Many actions and their

More information

Analyzing the Demand for Deductible Insurance

Analyzing the Demand for Deductible Insurance Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 18:3 3 1999 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Manufactured in The Netherlands. Analyzing the emand for eductible Insurance JACK MEYER epartment of Economics, Michigan State

More information

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 2: Strategic Form Games

6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 2: Strategic Form Games 6.254 : Game Theory with Engineering Applications Lecture 2: Strategic Form Games Asu Ozdaglar MIT February 4, 2009 1 Introduction Outline Decisions, utility maximization Strategic form games Best responses

More information

Demand and supply of health insurance. Folland et al Chapter 8

Demand and supply of health insurance. Folland et al Chapter 8 Demand and supply of health Folland et al Chapter 8 Chris Auld Economics 317 February 9, 2011 What is insurance? From an individual s perspective, insurance transfers wealth from good states of the world

More information

Chapter 14 Risk Analysis

Chapter 14 Risk Analysis Chapter 14 Risk Analysis 1 Frequency definition of probability Given a situation in which a number of possible outcomes might occur, the probability of an outcome is the proportion of times that it occurs

More information

ÓÑÔ Ö Ø Ú ËØÙ Ý Ó ÌÛÓ ØÖÓÒÓÑ Ð ËÓ ØÛ Ö È Ò Ì Ø Ù Ñ ØØ Ò Ô ÖØ Ð ÙÐ ÐÐÑ ÒØ Ó Ø Ö ÕÙ Ö Ñ ÒØ ÓÖ Ø Ö Ó Å Ø Ö Ó Ë Ò Ò ÓÑÔÙØ Ö Ë Ò Ì ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝ Ó Ù Ð Ò ½ ÌÓ ÅÙÑ Ò Ò ØÖ Ø Ì Ø ÓÑÔ Ö Ø Ú ØÙ Ý Ó ØÛÓ ÓÔ Ò ÓÙÖ ØÖÓÒÓÑ

More information

Financial Services [Applications]

Financial Services [Applications] Financial Services [Applications] Tomáš Sedliačik Institute o Finance University o Vienna tomas.sedliacik@univie.ac.at 1 Organization Overall there will be 14 units (12 regular units + 2 exams) Course

More information

Saving and the Demand for Protection Against Risk

Saving and the Demand for Protection Against Risk Saving and the Demand for Protection Against Risk David Crainich 1, Richard Peter 2 Abstract: We study individual saving decisions in the presence of an endogenous future consumption risk. The endogeneity

More information

Linear Programming Notes V Problem Transformations

Linear Programming Notes V Problem Transformations Linear Programming Notes V Problem Transformations 1 Introduction Any linear programming problem can be rewritten in either of two standard forms. In the first form, the objective is to maximize, the material

More information

3.2. Solving quadratic equations. Introduction. Prerequisites. Learning Outcomes. Learning Style

3.2. Solving quadratic equations. Introduction. Prerequisites. Learning Outcomes. Learning Style Solving quadratic equations 3.2 Introduction A quadratic equation is one which can be written in the form ax 2 + bx + c = 0 where a, b and c are numbers and x is the unknown whose value(s) we wish to find.

More information

Choice Under Uncertainty Insurance Diversification & Risk Sharing AIG. Uncertainty

Choice Under Uncertainty Insurance Diversification & Risk Sharing AIG. Uncertainty Uncertainty Table of Contents 1 Choice Under Uncertainty Budget Constraint Preferences 2 Insurance Choice Framework Expected Utility Theory 3 Diversification & Risk Sharing 4 AIG States of Nature and Contingent

More information

Week 1: Functions and Equations

Week 1: Functions and Equations Week 1: Functions and Equations Goals: Review functions Introduce modeling using linear and quadratic functions Solving equations and systems Suggested Textbook Readings: Chapter 2: 2.1-2.2, and Chapter

More information

Financial Markets. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Financial Markets. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Financial Markets Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1 Trading and Price Formation This line of the literature analyzes the formation of prices in financial markets in a setting

More information

Client URL. List of object servers that contain object

Client URL. List of object servers that contain object ÄÓ Ø Ò ÓÔ Ó Ç Ø Í Ò Ø ÓÑ Ò Æ Ñ ËÝ Ø Ñ ÂÙ Ã Ò Ö Ù Ã Ø Ïº ÊÓ ÁÒ Ø ØÙØ ÙÖ ÓÑ ËÓÔ ÒØ ÔÓÐ Ö Ò Ò ÖÓ ÙÖ ÓѺ Ö Â Ñ Ïº ÊÓ ÖØ Ö Ò Ì Ð ÓÑ ß Æ Ì Á Ý Ð ÅÓÙÐ Ò ÙÜ Ö Ò ØÖ Ø ½ ÁÒØÖÓ ÙØ ÓÒ ÁÒ ÓÖ Ö ØÓ Ö Ù Ú Ö Ð Ý Ò Ò ¹

More information

Introduction to Game Theory IIIii. Payoffs: Probability and Expected Utility

Introduction to Game Theory IIIii. Payoffs: Probability and Expected Utility Introduction to Game Theory IIIii Payoffs: Probability and Expected Utility Lecture Summary 1. Introduction 2. Probability Theory 3. Expected Values and Expected Utility. 1. Introduction We continue further

More information

ÅÁÌ ½ º ÌÓÔ Ò Ì Ë ÁÒØ ÖÒ Ø Ê Ö ÈÖÓ Ð Ñ ËÔÖ Ò ¾¼¼¾ Ä ØÙÖ ½ ÖÙ ÖÝ ¾¼¼¾ Ä ØÙÖ Ö ÌÓÑ Ä ØÓÒ ËÖ ÇÑ Ö Ø ÑÓÒ Ï Ð ½º½ ÁÒØÖÓ ÙØ ÓÒ Ì Ð Û ÐÐ Ù Ú Ö Ð Ö Ö ÔÖÓ Ð Ñ Ø Ø Ö Ö Ð Ø ØÓ Ø ÁÒØ ÖÒ Øº Ð ØÙÖ Û ÐÐ Ù ÀÓÛ Ô ÖØ ÙÐ

More information

ÓÒØÖÓÐ ËÝ Ø Ñ Ò Ò Ö Ò ÖÓÙÔ Ò ÙØÓÑ Ø ÓÒ Ì ÒÓÐÓ Ý ÖÓÙÔ Ö¹ÁÒ Ò Ö ÂÓ Ñ ÔÙØݵ Ø ØÖ ½ ¼ ¼ À Ò È ÓÒ ¼¾ ½¹ ¹½½¼¼ Ü ¼¾ ½¹ ¹ ¹Å Ð Ò Ö Ó Ñ ÖÒÙÒ ¹ Ò Ñ Ø «È ÓÒ ÓÒØÖÓÐ ËÝ Ø Ñ Ò Ò Ö Ò ÖÓÙÔ ÔйÁÒ Ò Ö Ó«Ö¹ÁÒ ÍÐÖ ÓÖ ÓÐØ

More information

ÔØ Ö Ê Ö ÓÐÓ Ý ÁÒ Ø ÔØ Ö Ø Ö Ñ Ò ÛÓÖ Ø Ø ÓÒ Ú ÐÓÔ ÔÖ ÒØ º Ì ÛÓÖ Ø ¹ Ø ÓÒ ÓÑÔÙØ Ö Ø ÒÓ Ø ÑÓ ÙÐ Û Ö Ø ÓÖÓÒ ÖÝ ØÖ ÑÓ Ð ÐÐ ÔÐ Ý Ò ÑÔÓÖØ ÒØ ÖÓÐ Û Ò Ó Ò ÙØÓÑ Ø Ú Ð Ò ÐÝ Û Ø ÓÖÓÒ ÖÝ Ò Ó Ö ¹ Ô Ý Ñ º Ì ÔØ Ö Ò Û

More information

ÉÙ ÖÝ Ò Ë Ñ ØÖÙØÙÖ Ø ÇÒ Ë Ñ Å Ø Ò Á Ë Ë Ê Ì Ì Á Ç Æ ÞÙÖ ÖÐ Ò ÙÒ Ñ Ò Ö ÓØÓÖ Ö ÖÙÑ Ò ØÙÖ Ð ÙÑ Öº Ö Öº Ò Øºµ Ñ ÁÒ ÓÖÑ Ø Ò Ö Ø Ò Ö Å Ø Ñ Ø ¹Æ ØÙÖÛ Ò ØÐ Ò ÙÐØĐ Ø ÁÁ ÀÙÑ ÓРعÍÒ Ú Ö ØĐ Ø ÞÙ ÖÐ Ò ÚÓÒ À ÖÖ Ôк¹ÁÒ

More information

This unit will lay the groundwork for later units where the students will extend this knowledge to quadratic and exponential functions.

This unit will lay the groundwork for later units where the students will extend this knowledge to quadratic and exponential functions. Algebra I Overview View unit yearlong overview here Many of the concepts presented in Algebra I are progressions of concepts that were introduced in grades 6 through 8. The content presented in this course

More information

ÆÓØ Ä ØÙÖ Ð Ñ Ø ØÖÙ ÙØ ÓÒ ØÓ Á ¼ ØÙ ÒØ ÓÖ ÐÐ ÓØ Ö Ö Ø Ö ÖÚ Á ¼ ÈÊÇ Í ÌÁÇÆ ÈÄ ÆÆÁÆ Æ ÇÆÌÊÇÄ Ê Æ Ô ÖØÑ ÒØ Ó ÁÒ Ù ØÖ Ð Ò Ò Ö Ò ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝ Ø Ù«ÐÓ ¹ ËØ Ø ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝ Ó Æ Û ÓÖ Ò Ù«ÐÓº Ù Á ¼ ÈÊÇ Í ÌÁÇÆ ÈÄ ÆÆÁÆ Æ

More information

ÌÖ Ò Ø ÓÒ¹ Ö Ò Ò ÅÒ ÑÓ ÝÒ È Ö¹ØÓ¹È Ö ËØ ÒÓ Ö Ô ËØÓÖ ËÝ Ø Ñ Ì ÑÓØ Ý ÊÓ Ó ½ Ò ËØ Ú Ò À Ò ¾ ¾ ½ ËÔÖ ÒØ Ú Ò Ì ÒÓÐÓ Ý Ä ÓÖ ØÓÖÝ ÙÖÐ Ò Ñ ¼½¼ ÍË ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝ Ó Ñ Ö ÓÑÔÙØ Ö Ä ÓÖ ØÓÖÝ Ñ Ö ¼ Íà ØÖ Øº ÅÒ ÑÓ ÝÒ Ô Ö¹ØÓ¹Ô

More information

Ò Ñ Ö Ð ÓÙÒ Ø ÓÒ ÓÖ ÙØÓÑ Ø Ï ÁÒØ Ö Ú ÐÙ Ø ÓÒ Ý Å ÐÓ Ý Ú ØØ ÁÚÓÖÝ ºËº ÈÙÖ Ù ÍÒ Ú Ö Øݵ ½ ź˺ ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝ Ó Ð ÓÖÒ Ø Ö Ð Ýµ ½ ÖØ Ø ÓÒ Ù Ñ ØØ Ò ÖØ Ð Ø Ø ÓÒ Ó Ø Ö ÕÙ Ö Ñ ÒØ ÓÖ Ø Ö Ó ÓØÓÖ Ó È ÐÓ Ó Ý Ò ÓÑÙØ Ö

More information

3. The Economics of Insurance

3. The Economics of Insurance 3. The Economics of Insurance Insurance is designed to protect against serious financial reversals that result from random evens intruding on the plan of individuals. Limitations on Insurance Protection

More information

MTH6120 Further Topics in Mathematical Finance Lesson 2

MTH6120 Further Topics in Mathematical Finance Lesson 2 MTH6120 Further Topics in Mathematical Finance Lesson 2 Contents 1.2.3 Non-constant interest rates....................... 15 1.3 Arbitrage and Black-Scholes Theory....................... 16 1.3.1 Informal

More information

ÕÙ ØÝ ÌÖ Ò Ý ÁÒ Ø ØÙØ ÓÒ Ð ÁÒÚ ØÓÖ ÌÓ ÖÓ ÓÖ ÆÓØ ØÓ ÖÓ Ì Ó Ø ÆÓÖÛ Ò È ØÖÓÐ ÙÑ ÙÒ º Ê Ò Æ ÆÓÖ Ò ÖÒØ ÖÒ Ö ÆÓÖ Ò Ò ÆÓÖÛ Ò Ë ÓÓÐ Ó Å Ò Ñ ÒØ ½ Â ÒÙ ÖÝ ¾¼¼¼ ØÖ Ø Ì Ó Ø ØÓ Ò Ø ØÙØ ÓÒ Ð ÒÚ ØÓÖ Ó ØÖ Ò ÕÙ ØÝ Ö Ó

More information

Fund Manager s Portfolio Choice

Fund Manager s Portfolio Choice Fund Manager s Portfolio Choice Zhiqing Zhang Advised by: Gu Wang September 5, 2014 Abstract Fund manager is allowed to invest the fund s assets and his personal wealth in two separate risky assets, modeled

More information

Follow links for Class Use and other Permissions. For more information send email to: permissions@pupress.princeton.edu

Follow links for Class Use and other Permissions. For more information send email to: permissions@pupress.princeton.edu COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Ariel Rubinstein: Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, c 2006, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part

More information

Ì ÍÆÁÎ ÊËÁÌ ÌÁË ÆÁ ˵ Ë Öº Ð º Ò Ö º ÚÓк ½ ÆÓº ½ ÔÖ Ð ¾¼¼¾ ½ ¹ ½ ÐÓ Ò Ò ÅÙÐØ ¹ ÀÞ ÒÚ ÖÓÒÑ ÒØ ÎÓ Ò º Ç ÐÓ Þ ÁÒÚ Ø È Ô Ö ØÖ Ø Ò ÓÚ ÖÚ Û Ó ÐÓ Ò Ò Ò Ó ÐÓ ØÓÖ Ð Ñ ÒØ ÔÖ ÒØ º ËÝ Ø Ñ Ø Ò Ó Ô¹ ÓÔ ÜÔÐ Ò Û ÐÐ Ø

More information

ECON 459 Game Theory. Lecture Notes Auctions. Luca Anderlini Spring 2015

ECON 459 Game Theory. Lecture Notes Auctions. Luca Anderlini Spring 2015 ECON 459 Game Theory Lecture Notes Auctions Luca Anderlini Spring 2015 These notes have been used before. If you can still spot any errors or have any suggestions for improvement, please let me know. 1

More information

Insurability of low-probability risks

Insurability of low-probability risks Insurability of low-probability risks Alexis Louaas and Arnaud Goussebaile February 2, 216 Abstract Why are catastrophic events so difficult to insure? Their extreme severity advocates for a wide-spread

More information

ÆÏ ÈÈÊÇÀ ÌÇ Ëµ ÁÆÎÆÌÇÊ ËËÌÅË ÂÒ¹ÉÒ ÀÙ ÅÒÙØÙÖÒ ÒÒÖÒ Ó ØÓÒ ÍÒÚÖ ØÝ ËÓÖ ÆÒÒÙÙÐ Ý Ò Ï¹Ó ÓÒ Ý ÐØÖÐ Ò ÓÑÔÙØÖ ÒÒÖÒ ÍÒÚÖ ØÝ Ó Å Ù ØØ ÑÖ Ø ÖÙÖÝ ØÖØ ÁÒ Ø ÔÔÖ Û ÓÒ Ö ÔÖÓ ÖÚÛ Ëµ ÒÚÒØÓÖÝ Ý ØÑ ÛØ ÒÔÒÒØ Ò ÒØÐÐÝ ØÖÙØ

More information

TOPIC 4: DERIVATIVES

TOPIC 4: DERIVATIVES TOPIC 4: DERIVATIVES 1. The derivative of a function. Differentiation rules 1.1. The slope of a curve. The slope of a curve at a point P is a measure of the steepness of the curve. If Q is a point on the

More information

More Quadratic Equations

More Quadratic Equations More Quadratic Equations Math 99 N1 Chapter 8 1 Quadratic Equations We won t discuss quadratic inequalities. Quadratic equations are equations where the unknown appears raised to second power, and, possibly

More information

Æ ÒØ Ò Ö Ø ÓÒ Ó ÊÓØ Ø Ò ÏÓÖ ÓÖ Ë ÙÐ ÆÝ Ö Ø ÅÙ Ð ÂÓ ÒÒ Đ ÖØÒ Ö Ò ÏÓÐ Ò ËÐ ÒÝ ØÖ Øº Ò Ö Ø Ò ¹ÕÙ Ð ØÝ ÙÐ ÓÖ ÖÓØ Ø Ò ÛÓÖ ÓÖ Ö Ø Ð Ø Ò ÐÐ ØÙ Ø ÓÒ Û Ö ÖØ Ò Ø ÆÒ Ð Ú Ð ÑÙ Ø Ù Ö¹ ÒØ Ù Ò Ò Ù ØÖ Ð ÔÐ ÒØ Ó Ô Ø Ð

More information

Method To Solve Linear, Polynomial, or Absolute Value Inequalities:

Method To Solve Linear, Polynomial, or Absolute Value Inequalities: Solving Inequalities An inequality is the result of replacing the = sign in an equation with ,, or. For example, 3x 2 < 7 is a linear inequality. We call it linear because if the < were replaced with

More information

Ê ÔÓÒ Ú Ì ÒÛ Ö Î Ù Ð Þ Ø ÓÒ Ó Ä Ö Ó Ö Ô Ø Ø Ý Ã ÒÒ Ø Ò ÖØ Ø ÓÒ Ù Ñ ØØ Ò Ô ÖØ Ð ÙÐ ÐÐÑ ÒØ Ó Ø Ö ÕÙ Ö Ñ ÒØ ÓÖ Ø Ö Ó ÓØÓÖ Ó È ÐÓ ÓÔ Ý Ô ÖØÑ ÒØ Ó ÓÑÔÙØ Ö Ë Ò Æ Û ÓÖ ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝ Ë ÔØ Ñ Ö ¾¼¼¾ ÔÔÖÓÚ Ô Ã ÒÒ Ø Ò

More information

Author manuscript, published in "1st International IBM Cloud Academy Conference - ICA CON 2012 (2012)" hal-00684866, version 1-20 Apr 2012

Author manuscript, published in 1st International IBM Cloud Academy Conference - ICA CON 2012 (2012) hal-00684866, version 1-20 Apr 2012 Author manuscript, published in "1st International IBM Cloud Academy Conference - ICA CON 2012 (2012)" Á ÇÆ ¾¼½¾ ÌÓÛ Ö Ë Ð Ð Ø Å Ò Ñ ÒØ ÓÖ Å Ô¹Ê Ù ¹ Ø ¹ÁÒØ Ò Ú ÔÔÐ Ø ÓÒ ÓÒ ÐÓÙ Ò ÀÝ Ö ÁÒ Ö ØÖÙØÙÖ Ö Ð ÒØÓÒ

More information

1. a. (iv) b. (ii) [6.75/(1.34) = 10.2] c. (i) Writing a call entails unlimited potential losses as the stock price rises.

1. a. (iv) b. (ii) [6.75/(1.34) = 10.2] c. (i) Writing a call entails unlimited potential losses as the stock price rises. 1. Solutions to PS 1: 1. a. (iv) b. (ii) [6.75/(1.34) = 10.2] c. (i) Writing a call entails unlimited potential losses as the stock price rises. 7. The bill has a maturity of one-half year, and an annualized

More information

DIFFERENTIABILITY OF COMPLEX FUNCTIONS. Contents

DIFFERENTIABILITY OF COMPLEX FUNCTIONS. Contents DIFFERENTIABILITY OF COMPLEX FUNCTIONS Contents 1. Limit definition of a derivative 1 2. Holomorphic functions, the Cauchy-Riemann equations 3 3. Differentiability of real functions 5 4. A sufficient condition

More information

Answer Key to Problem Set #2: Expected Value and Insurance

Answer Key to Problem Set #2: Expected Value and Insurance Answer Key to Problem Set #2: Expected Value and Insurance 1. (a) We have u (w) = 1 2 w 1 2, so u (w) = 1 4 w 3 2. As we will see below, u (w) < 0 indicates that the individual is risk-averse. (b) The

More information

Advanced Microeconomics

Advanced Microeconomics Advanced Microeconomics Ordinal preference theory Harald Wiese University of Leipzig Harald Wiese (University of Leipzig) Advanced Microeconomics 1 / 68 Part A. Basic decision and preference theory 1 Decisions

More information

Lecture 2. Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization

Lecture 2. Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization Lecture 2. Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization 2.1. Introduction Suppose that an economic relationship can be described by a real-valued

More information

CHAPTER 6: RISK AVERSION AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION TO RISKY ASSETS

CHAPTER 6: RISK AVERSION AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION TO RISKY ASSETS CHAPTER 6: RISK AVERSION AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION TO RISKY ASSETS PROBLEM SETS 1. (e). (b) A higher borrowing is a consequence of the risk of the borrowers default. In perfect markets with no additional

More information

Capital Structure. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Capital Structure. Itay Goldstein. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Capital Structure Itay Goldstein Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania 1 Debt and Equity There are two main types of financing: debt and equity. Consider a two-period world with dates 0 and 1. At

More information

ÔØ Ö ½ ÊÇÍÌÁÆ ÁÆ ÅÇ ÁÄ ÀÇ Æ ÌÏÇÊÃË Å Ãº Å Ö Ò Ò Ë Ñ Ö Êº Ô ÖØÑ ÒØ Ó ÓÑÔÙØ Ö Ë Ò ËØ Ø ÍÒ Ú Ö ØÝ Ó Æ Û ÓÖ Ø ËØÓÒÝ ÖÓÓ ËØÓÒÝ ÖÓÓ Æ ½½ ¹ ¼¼ ØÖ Ø Æ ÒØ ÝÒ Ñ ÖÓÙØ Ò ÓÒ Ó Ø Ý ÐÐ Ò Ò ÑÓ Ð Ó Ò ØÛÓÖ º ÁÒ Ø Ö ÒØ Ô

More information

Lecture 05: Mean-Variance Analysis & Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)

Lecture 05: Mean-Variance Analysis & Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) Lecture 05: Mean-Variance Analysis & Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) Prof. Markus K. Brunnermeier Slide 05-1 Overview Simple CAPM with quadratic utility functions (derived from state-price beta model)

More information

3.1 State Space Models

3.1 State Space Models 31 State Space Models In this section we study state space models of continuous-time linear systems The corresponding results for discrete-time systems, obtained via duality with the continuous-time models,

More information

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ÙÐØ Ø Ò Ë Ó ³ Ò ÒÝ Ö ÁÒ ÓÖÑ Ø ÇÒ Ø Ò Ò ÓÒ ØÖÙØ ÓÒ Ó ÒØ¹Ñ Ø ÁÒ Ø ØÙØ ÓÒ Å Ñ ÓÖ ÔÖ ÒØ Ô Ö Ò ÂÙ Ò ÒØÓÒ Ó ÊÓ Ö Ù Þ Ù Ð Ö Ô Ö ÓÔØ Ö Ð Ö Ù ÓØÓÖ Ò ÒÝ Ö Ò ÁÒ ÓÖÑ Ø ÐÐ Ø ÖÖ Å ¾¼¼½

More information

Lecture 2: August 29. Linear Programming (part I)

Lecture 2: August 29. Linear Programming (part I) 10-725: Convex Optimization Fall 2013 Lecture 2: August 29 Lecturer: Barnabás Póczos Scribes: Samrachana Adhikari, Mattia Ciollaro, Fabrizio Lecci Note: LaTeX template courtesy of UC Berkeley EECS dept.

More information

4.6 Linear Programming duality

4.6 Linear Programming duality 4.6 Linear Programming duality To any minimization (maximization) LP we can associate a closely related maximization (minimization) LP. Different spaces and objective functions but in general same optimal

More information

Multi-variable Calculus and Optimization

Multi-variable Calculus and Optimization Multi-variable Calculus and Optimization Dudley Cooke Trinity College Dublin Dudley Cooke (Trinity College Dublin) Multi-variable Calculus and Optimization 1 / 51 EC2040 Topic 3 - Multi-variable Calculus

More information

Homework # 3 Solutions

Homework # 3 Solutions Homework # 3 Solutions February, 200 Solution (2.3.5). Noting that and ( + 3 x) x 8 = + 3 x) by Equation (2.3.) x 8 x 8 = + 3 8 by Equations (2.3.7) and (2.3.0) =3 x 8 6x2 + x 3 ) = 2 + 6x 2 + x 3 x 8

More information

Solving Linear Systems, Continued and The Inverse of a Matrix

Solving Linear Systems, Continued and The Inverse of a Matrix , Continued and The of a Matrix Calculus III Summer 2013, Session II Monday, July 15, 2013 Agenda 1. The rank of a matrix 2. The inverse of a square matrix Gaussian Gaussian solves a linear system by reducing

More information

25 Integers: Addition and Subtraction

25 Integers: Addition and Subtraction 25 Integers: Addition and Subtraction Whole numbers and their operations were developed as a direct result of people s need to count. But nowadays many quantitative needs aside from counting require numbers

More information

Problem Set 1 Solutions

Problem Set 1 Solutions Health Economics Economics 156 Prof. Jay Bhattacharya Problem Set 1 Solutions A. Risk Aversion Consider a risk averse consumer with probability p of becoming sick. Let I s be the consumer s income if he

More information

Solution: The optimal position for an investor with a coefficient of risk aversion A = 5 in the risky asset is y*:

Solution: The optimal position for an investor with a coefficient of risk aversion A = 5 in the risky asset is y*: Problem 1. Consider a risky asset. Suppose the expected rate of return on the risky asset is 15%, the standard deviation of the asset return is 22%, and the risk-free rate is 6%. What is your optimal position

More information

ÀÖÖÐ ÈÐÑÒØ Ò ÆØÛÓÖ Ò ÈÖÓÐÑ ËÙÔØÓ Ù Ñ ÅÝÖ ÓÒ Ý ÃÑ ÅÙÒÐ Þ ÅÝ ½ ¾¼¼¼ ØÖØ ÁÒ Ø ÔÔÖ Û Ú Ø Ö Ø ÓÒ ØÒعÔÔÖÓÜÑØÓÒ ÓÖ ÒÙÑÖ Ó ÐÝÖ ÒØÛÓÖ Ò ÔÖÓÐÑ º Ï Ò Ý ÑÓÐÒ ÖÖÐ Ò ÛÖ Ö ÔÐ Ò ÐÝÖ Ò ÐÝÖ Ø Ü ÔÖÒØ Ó Ø ÑÒ ÓÙÒ Ñ ÖØ µº

More information

Probability and Random Variables. Generation of random variables (r.v.)

Probability and Random Variables. Generation of random variables (r.v.) Probability and Random Variables Method for generating random variables with a specified probability distribution function. Gaussian And Markov Processes Characterization of Stationary Random Process Linearly

More information

**Unedited Draft** Arithmetic Revisited Lesson 4: Part 3: Multiplying Mixed Numbers

**Unedited Draft** Arithmetic Revisited Lesson 4: Part 3: Multiplying Mixed Numbers . Introduction: **Unedited Draft** Arithmetic Revisited Lesson : Part 3: Multiplying Mixed Numbers As we mentioned in a note on the section on adding mixed numbers, because the plus sign is missing, it

More information

Economics 326: Duality and the Slutsky Decomposition. Ethan Kaplan

Economics 326: Duality and the Slutsky Decomposition. Ethan Kaplan Economics 326: Duality and the Slutsky Decomposition Ethan Kaplan September 19, 2011 Outline 1. Convexity and Declining MRS 2. Duality and Hicksian Demand 3. Slutsky Decomposition 4. Net and Gross Substitutes

More information

Lecture Note 14: Uncertainty, Expected Utility Theory and the Market for Risk

Lecture Note 14: Uncertainty, Expected Utility Theory and the Market for Risk Lecture Note 14: Uncertainty, Expected Utility Theory and the Market for Risk David Autor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 14.03/14.003, Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy, Fall 2010 1 Risk Aversion

More information

14.16. a. Again, this question will be answered on the basis of subjective judgment. Here are some possible types :

14.16. a. Again, this question will be answered on the basis of subjective judgment. Here are some possible types : 14.11. If the two agree on the bet, then for both EU(et) > U(). a. If P(Rain tomorrow) =.1, and they agree on this probability, For,.1 U(4).9 U(-1) > U(), and E(Payoff) = -5. For,.1 U(-4).9 U(1) > U(),

More information

ØÙÖ Ò Ö Ø ÓÒ Ý ÁÑ Ø Ø ÓÒ ÖÓÑ ÀÙÑ Ò Ú ÓÖ ØÓ ÓÑÔÙØ Ö Ö Ø Ö Ò Ñ Ø ÓÒ ÖØ Ø ÓÒ ÞÙÖ ÖÐ Ò ÙÒ Ö Ó ØÓÖ Ö ÁÒ Ò ÙÖÛ Ò Ø Ò Ö Æ ØÙÖÛ Ò ØÐ ¹Ì Ò Ò ÙÐØĐ Ø Ò Ö ÍÒ Ú Ö ØĐ Ø Ë ÖÐ Ò ÚÓÖ Ð Ø ÚÓÒ Å Ð Ã ÔÔ Ë Ö ÖĐÙ Ò ¾¼¼ Ò ÎÓÖ

More information

Introductory Notes on Demand Theory

Introductory Notes on Demand Theory Introductory Notes on Demand Theory (The Theory of Consumer Behavior, or Consumer Choice) This brief introduction to demand theory is a preview of the first part of Econ 501A, but it also serves as a prototype

More information

ÌÊÅ ÎÄÍ ÌÀÇÊ ÈÇÌÆÌÁÄ Æ ÄÁÅÁÌÌÁÇÆË Ë Æ ÁÆÌÊÌ ÊÁËà ÅÆÅÆÌ ÌÇÇÄ ÈÍÄ ÅÊÀÌË ÈÊÌÅÆÌ Ç ÅÌÀÅÌÁË ÌÀ ĐÍÊÁÀ ÈÙÐ ÑÖØ ÈÖÓ ÓÖ Ó ÅØÑØ Ø Ø ÌÀ ËÛ ÖÐ ÁÒ Ø¹ ØÙØ Ó ÌÒÓÐÓÝ ĐÙÖµ ÛÖ Ø Ò ÙÖÒ Ò ÒÒÐ ÑØÑع º À ÖÚ ÑØÑØ ÔÐÓÑ ÖÓÑ Ø

More information

Deriving Demand Functions - Examples 1

Deriving Demand Functions - Examples 1 Deriving Demand Functions - Examples 1 What follows are some examples of different preference relations and their respective demand functions. In all the following examples, assume we have two goods x

More information