Competition in Mobile Communications and the Allocation of Scarce Resources: The Case of UMTS. Jörn Kruse

Transcription

1 EU DG Competition Economic Advisory Group Telecommunications Competition in Mobile Communications and the Allocation of Scarce Resources: The Case of UMTS Jörn Kruse 1 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

2 Content 1 Scarce Spectrum and Licensing in Mobile Communic. 2 Scarcity, Spectrum Prices and Efficiency 3 How to Allocate Spectrum 4 License and Spectrum Allocation in GSM and UMTS 5 Competition Intensity in GSM and UMTS 2 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

3 1 Scarce Spectrum and Licensing in Mobile Communications License Requirements constitute Entry Barriers and (potential) Inefficiencies Spectrum is limited - overall and due to intermodal spectrum allocation Spectrum Divisibility is limited due to Economies of Scale Proper intramodal spectrum allocation is the economic rationale for Licensing 3 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

4 Significance of Spectrum Availability TAC AIC BAC TAC 1 AIC 1 TAC 2 AIC 2 TAC 3 AIC 3 BAC A Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 x Traffic BAC A shows Economies of Scale, AIC i : Av. Incremental Cost of Cell Splitting, TAC i : Average Costs 4 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

5 2 Scarcity, Spectrum Prices and Efficiency Factor Substitution (mobile comm production function) Spectrum vs base station equipment etc. (cell splitting) Spectrum rivalry between different Spectrum Usages (intermodal) Services and applications (mobile comm, broadcasting, etc.), different factor substitution in different usages Efficiency requires Spectrum Prices (prices according to degree of scarcity) 5 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

6 Intramodal Spectrum Prices Price SD 3 SS* SD 2 P 2 A P 3 B SD 1 C D 0 Q 1 Q 4 Q* Q G Spectrum 6 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

7 Intermodal Spectrum Allocation Spectrum Price Spectrum Price E T SD H SD A SD B P 2 B D SD J P s C S U P J J P 1 F R V H 0 D Q H Q* Q S Q J O R 7 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

8 3 How to allocate Spectrum Objectives Efficiency of Mobile Markets Competition Intensity vs. Scale Economies Transaction Costs, Non-Discrimination, Transparency Social Objectives Regional Coverage, Universal Service Fiscal objectives (???) Methods Criteria/Beauty Contest Auction 8 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

9 Allocation Methods Efficiency of Mobile Markets Transaction Cost Time Nondiscriminating, Transparent Social and fiscal objectives Governments Influence (from their point of view) first come first served Lottery Auction depends Discretionary -- depends -- depends ++ Decisions depends Beauty Contest/ Criteria Contest + depends -- - depends depends + 9 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

10 Features of Spectrum Auctions Auctions pick the expectedly most-efficient operator, if willingness to pay = efficiency (no winners curse / no unrealistic assessments) No discrimination (i.e. foreign companies), transparent Transaction costs may be low, quick Spectrum Fees do not increase consumers prices, since / if fees are fixed and sunk Auction Spectrum Fees (if very high) may endanger firms Financial Stability (Auctions in UK and Germany for many European firms) 10 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

11 Auction Methods compared Low Risk of Collusion Low Risk of Entry-Block Endogenous Information for the Regulator High Bidder Information and Low Risk- Aversion Suitability for multipleobject cases with complex cost and/or demand efficiencies English Auction (ascending A.) Dutch Auction (descending A.) First Price SB (discriminating A.) Second Price SB (Vickrey A.) Mostly Used: English Auctions + Suitable, Comfortable - Higher Risk of Collusion and Entry Blocking 0 Bidder Info (to prevent Winners Curse) may be questionable after UMTS in UK and Germany 11 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

12 4 License and Spectrum Allocation in GSM and UMTS Netherlands Denmark Germany United Kingdom Austria Sweden Italy Hungary Belgium Finland France Greece Poland Portugal Spain Switzerland Ireland Czech Republic Iceland Luxembourg Norway Betreiber 2 Betreiber 3 Betreiber 4 Betreiber 5 und mehr Betreiber GSM Licensing: Step-by-Step 12 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

13 UMTS Spectrum Allocation in Europe Country Month Method Number of licences Spectrum Fees (Euro per population) Cost-Index per population per license United April 2000 Auction Kingdom Germany August 2000 Auction endogenous Italy October 2000 Auction Netherlands July 2000 Auction France February Beauty contest Austria November Auction endogenous Poland December Beauty contest Belgium March 2001 Auction Portugal December Beauty contest Switzerland December Auction Spain March 2000 Beauty contest Norway December Beauty contest Sweden December Beauty contest Finland March 1999 Beauty contest 4 free - 13 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

14 UMTS Auction Spectrum Fees Spectrum Fees via Auctions higher than BC (administratively set) Fees Auction Theory Explanations are limited. Outcomes rather specific for indiv. Country, time etc. Time of Auction in UK + Germany (Internet + Mobile Hype) Winners Curse (esp. newcomers), shock for the following auctions Number of UMTS Licenses mostly higher (+1) than number of GSM incumbents UK and Germany "strategic countries" for firms with "European approach Germany: Entry blocking or econ. Reasons, quality / cost AC(15) < AC(10)? Newcomers winners curse, market structure (2-2-2) 14 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

15 5 Competition Intensity in GSM and UMTS Structural Feature/Factor 1 Number of Operators Assess future Relevance Relevanz Relevanz für high (+) Assess. für high (+) Assess. für high (+) + low (-) + low (-) + low (-) competition- competition- competition- Intensity Intensity Intensity a b c d e f g Concentration small - relatively small very high - high o + medium + 2 Entry Barriers high - - high - high o 3 Fixed Costs very high 4 Sunk Costs very high 5 Elasticity of MarketDemand, Substitution 6 Homogeneity und Transparency + + very high o very high + + very high + very high low - high + very high high + + high + + high Switching Costs medium o medium - low + 8 Technical and high - medium + low ++ Economic Dynamics 9 Total moderate relatively high high Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

16 UMTS infrastructure sharing UMTS is late, cost-intensive and success is uncertain first years may be crucial RAN-Sharing (esp. in first years) will reduce costs, increases + enlarges UMTS-development (services) RAN-Sharing is not a Problem for Competition, even pro-competitive for services markets 16 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

17 Competition Policy or Regulation? Mobile Markets have been very successful, * because of low regulation (except licensing), * because they are competitive Mobile Markets would be harmed by new Regulation Cost coverage diff for indiv Tariff-elements (Ramsey) (1) Mobile Carrier Selection * would be inefficient (alloc, cost) * would dramatically increase regulation (origination, third-party billing) (2) Mobile Termination * if there is a problem... : Competition Policy 17 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

18 Comments Welcome 18 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

19 Backup

20 Abb. AS-6-3: Herfindahl-Index für diverse Länder im Zeitablauf Schweiz Österreich Deutschland Frankreich Italien Niederlande Spanien Schweden Großbritannien Finland Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Hj Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

21 Fixed Costs and competitive Incentives High fixed costs Fig. DG4-513: Incentives FK=9000, with high VK=10/ME and low fixed and variable costs Low fixed costs FK=1000, VK=90/ME Price FK 0 VK Quantity / Price FK VK Quantity / Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

22 22 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg

23 23 Prof. Dr. Jörn Kruse, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg