Rodolfo Debenedetti Lecture

Save this PDF as:
 WORD  PNG  TXT  JPG

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Rodolfo Debenedetti Lecture"

Transcription

1 Rodolfo Debenedetti Lecture Andrei Shleifer March 2005

2 Legal Origin Distribution Legal Origins = English = French = German = Scandinavian = Socialist

3 Institution Procedural Formalism Outcomes Time to evict nonpaying tenan Time to collect a bounced che Judicial Independence Property rights gal igin Regulation of Entry Employment Laws Collective Relations Laws Social Security Laws Company Laws Securities Laws Bankruptcy Law Government Ownership of Banks Corruption Unofficial economy Participation rates Unemployment Stock Market Development Firm Valuation Ownership Structure Private Credit Interest Rate Spread

4 Variable: LEGAL FORMALISM (Check Collection) Description: The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level city trial courts, and is formed by adding up the following indices: (i) professionals versus laymen; (ii) written versus oral arguments; (iii) legal justification; (iv) statutory regulation of evidence; (v) control of superior review; (vi) engagement formalities; and (vii) independent procedural actions. The index ranges from zero to seven where seven means a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process. Source: Djankov et al, Courts, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2003). Legal Formalism (Check) Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 109 World mean: 3.53

5 Variable: LEGAL FORMALISM (Eviction) Description: The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level city trail courts, and is formed by adding up the following indices: (i) professionals versus laymen; (ii) written versus oral arguments; (iii) legal justification; (iv) statutory regulation of evidence; (v) control of superior review; (vi) engagement formalities; and (vii) independent procedural actions. The index ranges from zero to seven where seven means a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process. Source: Djankov et al, Courts, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2003). Legal Formalism (Eviction) Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 109 World mean: 3.58

6 Variable: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE Description: Judicial independence is computed as the normalized sum of: (i) the tenure of Supreme Court judges; (ii) the tenure of administrative Court judges; and (iii) the case law variable. Source: La Porta et al, Judicial Checks and Balances, Journal of Political Economy (2004). Judicial Independence Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Total countries represented: 69 World mean: 0.75

7 Variable: REGULATION OF ENTRY Description: The number of different procedures that a start-up has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status, i.e., to start operating as a legal entity. Source: Djankov et al, The Regulation of Entry, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2002). Regulation of Entry Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin 4.5 Total countries represented: 85 World mean: 10.48

8 REGULATION OF LABOR Employment laws Alternative employment contracts Conditions of employment; cost of increasing hours worked Cost of firing workers Dismissal procedures Industrial (collective) relations laws Collective bargaining Worker participation in management Collective disputes Social security laws Old age, disability and death benefits Sickness and health benefits Unemployment benefits

9 Variable: EMPLOYMENT LAWS INDEX Description: Measures the protection of labor through employment laws as the average of: (1) Alternative employment contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours worked; (3) Cost of firing workers; and (4) Dismissal procedures. Source: Botero et al, The Regulation of Labor, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2004). Regulation of Labor Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 85 World mean: 0.49

10 Variable: COLLECTIVE RELATIONS LAWS INDEX Description: Measures the protection of collective relations laws as the average of: (1) Labor union power and (2) Collective disputes. Source: Botero et al, The Regulation of Labor, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2004). Collective Relations Laws Index Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 85 World mean: 0.45

11 Variable: SOCIAL SECURITY LAWS INDEX Description: Measures social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and death benefits; (2) Sickness and health benefits; and (3) Unemployment benefits. Source: Botero et al, The Regulation of Labor, Quarterly Journal of Economics (2004). Social Security Laws Index Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 85 World mean: 0.57

12 Variable: DRAFT Description: Fraction of years 1985, 1990, and 1995 drafting. Source: Mulligan and Shleifer, Conscription as Regulation, American Law and Economics Review (2005). Draft Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 162 World mean: 0.638

13 Outcome Variables ration of cedure The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure. It equals the sum of: (i) duration until completion of service of process, (ii) duration of trial, and (iii) duration of enforcement. curity of perty rights The total estimated duration in calendar days of the procedure. It equals the sum of: (i) duration until completion of service of process, (ii) duration of trial, and (iii) duration of enforcement. official onomy rruption Size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP (varying time periods). ICR s assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores indicate high government officials are likely to demand special payments and illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government in the form of bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans. Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher levels of corruption. le labor force rticipation Male participation rate as a percentage of the total male population aged 15 to 64. Based on population censuses or household surveys. employment of les (20-24) Unemployed males aged 20 to 24 as a percentage of the total active male population of the same age during

14 Formalism in check collection determines duration of procedure Log of Duration HKG BLZ ITA LBN MLT ARE CAN MOZ COL AUT LKA PRT AUS PAK HUN CYP URY KWT BGRBHR ISR HRV GRC SEN EST ECU FIN CSE ISLMEX KEN CHE TTO JAM TWN NGA ZMB ZWE VIRTHA UKR SWE IDN GEO BRA EGY FRA DOM LUXROU HND CHN LVA MAR CHL RUS DEU BMU GRD IRL ZAF UGA GHA MYS MWI TUR BRBVNM IND GBR BEL CYM] CIV JOR LTU PHL TZA NAM KAZ DNK ANT NOR MCO KOR BWA NZL JPN USA SLV SGP NLD SWZ VCT TUN POL SVN Formalism coef = , (robust) se = , t = 6.19 BOL PER CRI ARG GTMPRY PAN ESP VEN

15 Formalism in eviction determines duration of procedure Log of Duration NZL ARE BMU POL SVN ITA MLT COL CAN AUT MOZ LKA PRT BOL AUS HUN CYP BHR HRV PAK URY BGR KWT CRI SEN ISR GRC ECUEST FIN CSE ISL MEX KEN TTOJAM NGA TWNUKR ZMB ZWEVIR EGY SWE IDN LUX CHE CHN RUS GEO LVA FRA THA DOM ROU HND BRA MAR CHLPRY DEU JOR BRB GBR VNM TZA GRD BEL IRL CIV LTU PHL ESP CYM] UGA MWI GHA MYS IND TUR NAM KAZ ANT MCO KOR ZAFDNK NOR BWA BLZ HKG JPN USA SLV SGP NLD SWZ VCT LBN PER VEN ARG GTM PAN TUN Formalism coef = , (robust) se = , t = 3.94

16 Judicial Independence determines security of property rights Security of Property Rights CHN VNM HND COL FRA PAN VEN MEX THA CHL KOR KWT AUT NLD BEL JPN CHE GRC PRT EGY ESP MOZ ITA LBN BRA UGA PAK PHL NZL JOR NOR DNK USA ISL DEU FIN SGP GBR IRL AUS CAN NGA MYS TUR IND GHA KEN ZMB IDN ZWE ARG ISRPER SWE ZAF Judicial Independence coef = , (robust) se = , t = 5.62

17 Regulation of entry determines corruption Corrpution CAN AUS NZL ZWEDNK IRLZMB ZAF TZACHN MOZ FIN NOR MYSKEN SWE NLD BGR ISR LKA GBR HUN CHEPOL SEN IND VNM FRA GHA UGA BEL DEU AUT JORECU USA NGA SGPSVN THA ROU PRT JPN BRA ESP TUN ARG PAK PER TWNMARTUR COL GRC ARG EGY CHL VEN IDNLBN URY MEX PHL BOL JAM ITA PAN Log Number of Procedures coef = , (robust) se = , t = -2.94

18 Regulation of entry determines unofficial economy Unofficial Economy AUS CAN NZL IRL DNK PAN PER MOZ SEN ISR TUN MYS URY PHL MEX NGA GEO THA KAZSVN BEL KOR BRA GRC ITA HRVESP NOR HUN USA LKA FIN SWE SGP CHL MAR VEN GBR TWN CHE NLD DEUJPN AUTPRTARG RUS FRA LVA IDN LTU UKR COL POL PAK JAM ARG BGR ECU TUR ROU IND EGY TZA ZAF Log Number of Procedures coef = , (robust) se = , t = 1.84 BOL

19 Employment laws determine male labor force participation Male Labor Force Participation HKG JAMYS GBR JPN CAN AUS ARG ZMB NGA SGP NZL USA ZWE URY ZAFCOLBOL EGY MAR IRL ISR GHA PAK ROU UGA KEN THA CHN HUN CHE TUR ECU KOR IND CHL AUT PHL LKA PER GRC HRV BGR BEL DNK BRA SENVNMDOM MEX DEU VEN NOR LTU PAN ITA POL SWE TZA LVA NLD IDN FIN ESP UKR SVN JOR FRA PRT TUN RUS KAZ Employment Regulation coef = , (robust) se = , t = -3.5

20 Employment laws determine unemployment of males Unemployment of Males NZL JPN HKG TUR CAN IRL GBR EGY AUS URY HUN USA ROU ARGECU SGP PAKBOL THA LKA PHL KOR PER CHL HRV BGR GRC BEL AUT DOM UKR LTU DNK BRA MEX POL ITA PAN LVA FRA NOR DEU ESP FIN GEO SVN SWE NLD RUS Employment Regulation coef = , (robust) se = , t = 3.21 PRT

21 What about financial markets?

22 Variable: SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS Description: An index of anti-director rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders vote. The index ranges from 0 to 6. Source: La Porta et al, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy (1998). Shareholder Rights Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Total countries represented: 49 World mean: 3.0

23 Variable: DISCLOSURE Description: The index of disclosure equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Prospectus; (2) Compensation; (3) Shareholders; (4) Inside ownership; (5) Irregular contracts; (6) and Transactions. Source: La Porta et al, What Works in Securities Laws?, Journal of Finance (2005). Disclosure Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Total countries represented: 49 World mean: 0.60

24 Variable: LIABILITY STANDARD Description: The index of liability standards equals the arithmetic mean of: (1) Liability standard for the issuer and its directors; (2) Liability standard for the distributor; and (3) Liability standard for the accountant. Source: La Porta et al, What Works in Securities Laws?, Journal of Finance (2005). Liability Standard Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Total countries represented: 49 World mean: 0.47

25 Variable: CREDITOR RIGHTS Description: A score of one is added for each of the following legal rights of secured lenders: (1) there are restrictions, such as creditor consent, for a debtor to file for reorganization; (2), there is no automatic stay on assets; (3) secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm; (4) management does not retain administration of property pending the resolution of the reorganization. Source: Djankov et al, Private Credit in 129 Countries, working paper (2004). Creditor Rights Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 129 World mean: 1.79

26 Variable: GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF BANKS IN 1995 Description: Share of the assets of the top 10 banks in a given country owned by the government of that country in Source: La Porta et al, Government Ownership of Banks, Journal of Finance (2002). Government Ownership of Banks Means by Legal Origin British Origin French Origin German Origin Scan. Origin Socialist Origin Total countries represented: 92 World mean: 41.57

27 Outcome Variables rket cap Average of the ratio of stock market capitalization held by small shareholders to gross domestic product for the period The stock market capitalization held by small shareholders is computed as the product o the aggregate stock market capitalization and the average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. mber of firms Logarithm of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country. O value Average of the ratio of the equity issued by newly-listed firms in a given country (in thousands) to its gross domestic product (in millions). ock premia The block premia is computed taking the difference between the price per share paid for the control block and the exchange price two days after the announcement of the control transaction, dividing by the exchange price and multiplying by the ratio of the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the controlling block. nership ncentration Average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-financial privately-owned domestic firms in a given country. ivate credit / P Ratio of credit from deposit taking financial institutions to the private sector (IFS lines 22d and 42d) relative to GDP (IFS line 99b). erest rate spread Interest rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers minus the interest rate paid by commercial o similar banks for demand, time or saving deposits. For most countries, the data is available for the period 1970 to 1995.

28 Shareholder Rights determine market capitalization Market Cap / GDP BEL JOR MEX VEN DEU ITA CHE NLD IDN THA EGY TUR ECU GRC DNK URY AUT FIN SWE TWN PHL ZWE NGA KEN LKA FRA PER BRA COL PRT ISR MYS SGP AUS JPN IRL ESP NZL ARG NOR HKG GBR USA ZAF IND CHL CAN PAK Shareholder Rights Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 3.41

29 Shareholder Rights determine number of listed firms Log of Number of Listed Firms BEL DEU ITA MEX JOR VEN EGY THA IDN TUR GRC CHE DNK NLD AUT ECU URY FRA ISR BRA TWN PER PHL LKA NGA SWE COL PRT FIN ZWE KEN JPN AUS MYS ESP SGP NOR NZL ARG IRL IN USA GBR CAN PA ZAF HKG CHL Shareholder Rights Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 3.78

30 Shareholder Rights determine IPO value TWN GBR IPO Value BEL ITA JOR DEU VEN MEX GRC CHE IDN EGY TUR THA ECU NLD URY AUT DNK SWE PHL ZWE KEN NGA LKA FIN PRT COL PER FRA BRA ISR AUS MYS IRL SGP ESP JPN NOR ARG NZL HKG CAN USA IND PAK ZAF CHL Shareholder Rights Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 2.04

31 Shareholder Rights determine block premia Block Premia ITA DEU MEX VEN AUT CHE DNK NLD ISR PRT TUR SWE THA FRA FIN EGY IDN TWN BRA PER COL PHL NOR SGP NZL JPN AUS ESP ARG MYS USA HKG GBR CAN CHL ZAF Shareholder Rights Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = -2.91

32 Shareholder rights determine ownership concentration Ownership Concentration BEL ITA MEX DEU VEN JOR URY GRC AUT TUR EGY DNK CHE ECU IDN NLD THA COL ISR PRT BRA KEN PER LKA PHL ZWE FIN FRA SWE NGA TWN SGP ESP ARG NZL MYS NOR IRL AUS JPN HKG ZAF CAN CHL IND USA PAK GBR Shareholder Rights Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = -3.95

33 Disclosure determines market capitalization Market Cap / GDP URY ECU VEN AUT FIN NLD SWE EGY PER BRA GRC BEL PRT COL TUR ESP ARG DEU DNK NOR IDN ZWE CHL KEN PAK MEX CHE IRL NZL ISR ITA TWN JORNGA AUS GBR JPN FRA KOR LKA ZAF PHL HKG CAN USA MYS THA SGP IND Disclosure Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 5.53

34 Disclosure determines number of listed firms Log of Number of Listed Firms URY ECU VEN AUT BRA JPN GBR EGY PAK AUS DEU ESP ISR FRA KOR IDNCHL TWN GRC PER TUR NGA LKA COL NLD DNK SWE MEX ITA NOR CHE BEL PRT ARG NZL JOR FIN ZWE KEN IRL ZAF MYS HKG THA PHL CAN IND USA SGP Disclosure Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 5.53

35 Disclosure determines IPO value TWN GBR IPO Value URY ECU VEN AUT BRA GRC FINTUR SWE IDN EGY ZWE KEN PRT PERDEU COLNLD ESP BEL CHL MEX ARGNOR DNK CHE IRL ITA PAK ISR NZL JOR AUS KOR NGA FRA JPN LKA PHL ZAF HKG CAN MYS THA SGP IND USA Disclosure Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 3.9

36 Disclosure determines block premia Block Premia AUT VEN BRA PRT DEU PER MEX ISR ITA CHL COL ARG CHE DNK TUR NLD SWE FIN NOR NZL ESP EGYIDN KOR JPN FRA AUS GBR TWN HKG USA SGP CAN PHL MYS THA ZAF Disclosure Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = -4

37 Disclosure determines ownership concentration Ownership Concentration URY ECU VEN AUT BRA GRC MEXITA BELCOL PER DEU PRT ESP ARG TUR EGY KEN ISR DNK NZL IDN CHE ZWE JOR NLD CHL FIN NOR IRL FRA SWE PAK AUS NGA JPN KOR TWN LKA GBR ZAF PHL HKG SGP MYS CAN THA IND USA Disclosure Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = -3.61

38 Liability Standard determines market capitalization Market Cap / GDP DEU AUT SWE JOR ECU FRA THA EGY TUR COL MEX ARG VEN URY ITA CHE CHL PAK NGA ZWE KEN LKA IRL BRA BEL NZL GRC DNK NOR HKG GBR FIN TWN SGP AUS MYS ZAF IDN JPN KOR PER ESP PRT ISR IND NLD USA CAN PHL Liability Standard Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 4.99

39 Liability Standard determines number of listed firms Log of Number of Listed Firms DEU TUR MEX ITA COL SWE JOR ARG VEN AUT URY FRA ECU EGY THA PAK BRA CHL LKANGA GRC NOR CHE DNK BEL NZL ZWE KEN IRL IND JPN GBR AUS KOR MYS ZAF HKG ISR ESP TWN IDN SGP PER PRT FIN NLD USA CAN PHL Liability Standard Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 3.06

40 Liability Standard determines IPO value GBR TWN IPO Value DEU ECU COL MEX URY AUT ITA SWE EGY TUR THA JOR VEN FRA ARG CHE IRL CHL BEL NOR BRA ZWE PAK NGA KEN LKA NZL GRC DNK HKG AUS MYS KOR SGP IDN IND FIN PRT ESPZAF PER JPN ISR NLD CAN USA PHL Liability Standard Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 3.88

41 Liability Standard determines block premia Block Premia DEU AUT MEX COL ITA VEN ARG TUR SWE FRA THA EGY BRA CHL CHE NOR NZL DNK ISR PRT KOR PER FIN HKG SGP JPN GBR AUS ESP TWN MYS IDN ZAF NLD USA CAN PHL Liability Standard Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = -2.88

42 Liability Standard determines ownership concentration Ownership Concentration DEU URY AUTMEX ITA COL TUR EGY ARG ECU VEN JOR THA FRA SWE BEL BRA NZL LKA CHE CHL NOR IRL GRC DNK PAK NGA KEN ZWE HKG SGP ISR ESP PRT MYS PER ZAF IDN FIN AUS JPN GBR KOR TWN IND NLD CAN USA PHL Liability Standard Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = -3.09

43 Creditor Rights determine private credit Private Credit / GDP FRA TUN ECU CIV COL PER MEX SEN CHE PRT USA IRL CAN PRY GRCGTM SWE HUN BRA POL CRI ROU FIN ARG JOR VNM MAR PAK PHL GHA ZMB THA EGY BOL ESP TWN HND IND MWI MOZ JPN CHL NAM LKA TZA IDN UGA DOM UKR ITA GEO NOR BEL BGR KAZ JAM TUR RUS ARELTU MYS NLD DNK DEU SGPZAF KOR AUT ISR AUS URY HRV KWTLVA BWA SVNSLV VEN HKG GBRPAN NZL LBN KEN ZWE NGA Creditor Rights Index coef = , (robust) se = , t = 2.66

44 Government ownership of banks determines interest rate spread Interest Rate Spread NGAZAF CHL MEX ECU NZL ESPIRL CAN GBR USA JPN ZWE PRT PHL NLD JOR DNK AUS FRA MYS THA SGP CHE KOR IDN SWE ITA BEL FIN DEU COL VEN NOR LKA ARG ISR URY GRC EGY Government Ownership of Banks coef = , (robust) se = , t = 1.69

45 Political Variables ief executive and rgest party in ngress have left center political ientation Measures the percentage of years between 1928 and 1995, and, alternatively, between 1975 an 1995, during which both the party of the chief executive and the largest party in congress had left o center orientation. If the country was not independent in the initial year of the period, we use th independence year as the first period. ion density Measures the percentage of the total work force affiliated to labor unions in tocracy This variable classifies regimes based on their degree of autocracy. oportional presentation Equals one if legislators were elected based on the percentage of votes received by their party; equal zero otherwise. vided government The probability that two randomly chosen deputies will belong to a different party in a given year. mocracy A measure of the degree of democracy in a given country based on: (1) the competitiveness of politica participation; (2) the openness and competitiveness of the chief executive recruitment; and (3) th constraints on the chief executive.

46 Cultural Variables ercent protestant Identifies the percentage of the population of each country that belonged to the protestant religions the world in uddhist, Catholic, uslim, Ortho, rotest, Other A dummy variable that identifies the religion practiced by the largest proportion of the populatio There are nine religions: Athiest, Buddhist, Catholic, Hindu, Indigenous, Judaism, Muslim, Orthod Christian, and Protestant.

47 Institutional possibilities Social losses due to private expropriation (Disorder) Private orderings Independent judges Total loss minimization Institutional possibility frontier (IPF) 45 o Regulatory state Socialism Social losses due to state expropriation (Dictatorship)

48 Legal origins Disorder France Civil law Common law England Dictatorship

49 Transplantation of laws Disorder Common law Civil law Less developed country Developed country Dictatorship

The new gold standard? Empirically situating the TPP in the investment treaty universe

The new gold standard? Empirically situating the TPP in the investment treaty universe Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Center for Trade and Economic Integration Working Paper Series Working Paper N IHEIDCTEI2015-08 The new gold standard? Empirically situating

More information

Economic Growth: the role of institutions

Economic Growth: the role of institutions ECON 184 Economic Growth: the role of institutions ECON 184: Institutions and Growth January 26, 2010 1 Contents 1 Institutions and growth: initial analysis 3 2 How can institutions affect economic growth?

More information

EC 2725 April 2009. Law and Finance. Effi Benmelech Harvard & NBER

EC 2725 April 2009. Law and Finance. Effi Benmelech Harvard & NBER EC 2725 April 2009 Law and Finance Effi Benmelech Harvard & NBER Broad Picture A market economy is not only laissez faire but it also requires a set of institutions that allow markets to work their magic.

More information

A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement

A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement Preliminary Draft By Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes YALE University and NBER October 2003 *I am indebted to Patricio Amador, Jose Caballero and Manuel Garcia-Huitron

More information

Figure 1.1 The Parade of World Income. Copyright 2005 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 1-1

Figure 1.1 The Parade of World Income. Copyright 2005 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 1-1 Figure 1.1 The Parade of World Income Copyright 2005 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 1-1 Copyright 2005 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 1-2 Growth and Development: The Questions

More information

A new metrics for the Economic Complexity of countries and products

A new metrics for the Economic Complexity of countries and products A new metrics for the Economic Complexity of countries and products Andrea Tacchella Dept. of Physics, La Sapienza - University of Rome Istituto dei Sistemi Complessi, CNR Roma CRISISLAB ANALYTICS FOR

More information

TRADE WATCH DATA JANUARY T RVSFRRTVL

TRADE WATCH DATA JANUARY T RVSFRRTVL Public Disclosure Authorized TRADE WATCH DATA JANUARY T RVSFRRTVL Public Disclosure Authorized A C F D H T W B DECRG Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized *TRADE WATCH is a monthly

More information

Addressing The Marketing Problem of the Social Market Economy

Addressing The Marketing Problem of the Social Market Economy Addressing The Marketing Problem of the Social Prepared for: KAS-Conference on 60 Years of Social Market Economy Sankt Augustin, November 30, 2009 Marcus Marktanner, American University of Beirut Outline

More information

THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT CA FOSCARI INTERNATIONAL LECTURE

THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT CA FOSCARI INTERNATIONAL LECTURE THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT CA FOSCARI INTERNATIONAL LECTURE Andrei Shleifer December 12, 2012 1 Richer countries almost always have better governments Less corrupt More efficient Quality of government improves

More information

Addressing institutional issues in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process

Addressing institutional issues in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process SESSION 1 Addressing institutional issues in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process Scoping notes, detailed diagnostics, and participatory processes Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Unit

More information

Finance, Growth & Opportunity. Implications for policy

Finance, Growth & Opportunity. Implications for policy Finance, Growth & Opportunity Implications for policy Today, I will make three points 1) Finance matters for human welfare beyond crises. 2) Financial innovation is associated with arguably necessary for

More information

In Defense of Wall Street. The Social Productivity of the Financial System

In Defense of Wall Street. The Social Productivity of the Financial System In Defense of Wall Street The Social Productivity of the Financial System Finance is powerful Mobilizes Researches and allocates Monitors and exerts corporate control Provides risk diversification and

More information

Macroeconomics II. Growth

Macroeconomics II. Growth Macroeconomics II Growth Growth Possibilities We previously referred to the aggregate production function Y = A K α L 1- α. The growth rate of real GDP, Y, is generated by the contributions of A, K and

More information

Financial services and economic development

Financial services and economic development GDP per capita growth 03/11/2014 Financial services and economic development Thorsten Beck Finance why do we care? 0.04 BWA 0.02 0.00-0.02 COG SLE ALB GAB IND KOR TUR SGP MUS SDN MOZ IRLLUX IDN MAR EGY

More information

Does Absolute Latitude Explain Underdevelopment?

Does Absolute Latitude Explain Underdevelopment? AREC 345: Global Poverty and Economic Development Lecture 4 Professor: Pamela Jakiela Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics University of Maryland, College Park Does Absolute Latitude Explain

More information

Bringing Up Incentives: A Look at the Determinants of Poverty. Alice Sheehan

Bringing Up Incentives: A Look at the Determinants of Poverty. Alice Sheehan Bringing Up Incentives: A Look at the Determinants of Poverty Alice Sheehan Outline presentation What s going on out there? Growth, Human Development indicators, Poverty rates, etc. A look at determinants

More information

Economic Complexity and the Wealth of Nations

Economic Complexity and the Wealth of Nations Economic Complexity and the Wealth of Nations Cesar A. Hidalgo ABC Career Development Professor MIT Media Lab Faculty Associate, Center for International Development Harvard University EARTH WIND WATER

More information

Lecture 12 The Solow Model and Convergence. Noah Williams

Lecture 12 The Solow Model and Convergence. Noah Williams Lecture 12 The Solow Model and Convergence Noah Williams University of Wisconsin - Madison Economics 312 Spring 2010 Recall: Balanced Growth Path All per-capita variables grow at rate g. All level variables

More information

Ken Jackson. January 31st, 2013

Ken Jackson. January 31st, 2013 Wilfrid Laurier University January 31st, 2013 Recap of the technology models Do the models match historical data? growth accounting Estimating technology change through history A revised model of technology

More information

Today s tips for the Country Buy Report

Today s tips for the Country Buy Report High level outline Today s tips for the Country Buy Report Stephen Malpezzi Introduction Overview of the country and economy Basic indicators (GDP, employment, etc.) Key institutions, the setting How does

More information

Lecture 21: Institutions II

Lecture 21: Institutions II Lecture 21: Institutions II Dave Donaldson and Esther Duflo 14.73 Challenges of World Poverty Institutions II: Plan for the lecture Discussion of assigned reading (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) Causes

More information

Building Capacity in PFM

Building Capacity in PFM Building Capacity in PFM Measuring economic governance in the context of national development planning LAMIA MOUBAYED BISSAT Beirut, Lebanon, 13 June 2014 The Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan 1996

More information

Export Survival and Comparative Advantage

Export Survival and Comparative Advantage Export Survival and Comparative Advantage (Work in progress) Regional Seminar on Export Diversification, October 27-28, 2010 Bolormaa Tumurchudur, UNCTAD Miho Shirotori, UNCTAD Alessandro Nicita, UNCTAD

More information

China: How to maintain balanced growth? Ricardo Hausmann Kennedy School of Government Harvard University

China: How to maintain balanced growth? Ricardo Hausmann Kennedy School of Government Harvard University China: How to maintain balanced growth? Ricardo Hausmann Kennedy School of Government Harvard University China s growth process An unprecedented miracle China has been the fastest growing country in the

More information

Governance, Rule of Law and Transparency Matters: BRICs in Global Perspective

Governance, Rule of Law and Transparency Matters: BRICs in Global Perspective Governance, Rule of Law and Transparency Matters: BRICs in Global Perspective Daniel Kaufmann * Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution http://www.brookings.edu/experts/kaufmannd.aspx Panel on Transparency

More information

Tripartite Agreements for MEPC.2/Circ. Lists 1, 3, 4 received by IMO following issuance of MEPC.2/Circ.20

Tripartite Agreements for MEPC.2/Circ. Lists 1, 3, 4 received by IMO following issuance of MEPC.2/Circ.20 The following is a list of tripartite agreements reported to IMO during the period between the issuance of the annual MEPC.2/Circular, disseminated in December of each year. Any countries wishing to join

More information

Infrastructure and Economic. Norman V. Loayza, World ldbank Rei Odawara, World Bank

Infrastructure and Economic. Norman V. Loayza, World ldbank Rei Odawara, World Bank Infrastructure and Economic Growth thin Egypt Norman V. Loayza, World ldbank Rei Odawara, World Bank Motivation Questions How does Egypt compare internationally regarding public infrastructure? Is Egypt

More information

DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST- SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST- COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE TRANSCONTINENTAL ONES? by Pal TAMAS [Institute of

DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST- SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST- COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE TRANSCONTINENTAL ONES? by Pal TAMAS [Institute of DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST- SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST- COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE TRANSCONTINENTAL ONES? by Pal TAMAS [Institute of Sociology, HAS Budapest] STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 1. STATE

More information

Estimating Global Migration Flow Tables Using Place of Birth Data

Estimating Global Migration Flow Tables Using Place of Birth Data Estimating Global Migration Flow Tables Using Place of Birth Data Guy J. Abel Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU) Vienna Institute of Demography/Austrian Academy of Sciences 1 Introduction International

More information

Trade Policy Restrictiveness in Transportation Services

Trade Policy Restrictiveness in Transportation Services Trade Policy Restrictiveness in Transportation Services Ingo Borchert, Batshur Gootiiz and Aaditya Mattoo Development Research Group Trade and International Integration, The World Bank OECD Expert Meeting

More information

Fear of flying: Policy stances in a troubled world economy

Fear of flying: Policy stances in a troubled world economy Fear of flying: Policy stances in a troubled world economy UNCTAD G-24 Technical Meeting Luxor, 10-11 March 2014 Session 1 Global Economy A weakening economic performance reflects inability to address

More information

The Fall of the Final Mercantilism

The Fall of the Final Mercantilism The Fall of the Final Mercantilism Labour Mobility in the Caribbean and the World, from Arthur Lewis to the 21 st Century Eastern Caribbean Central Bank Michael Clemens November 3, 2010 1 2 Migration

More information

Institutional Change and Growth-Enabling Governance Capabilities

Institutional Change and Growth-Enabling Governance Capabilities Institutional Change and Growth-Enabling Governance Capabilities Nicolas Meisel Strategy and Research Dept - French Development Agency (AFD) Jacques Ould Aoudia Treasury and Economic Policy Directorate

More information

Trade and International Integration: A Developing Program of Research

Trade and International Integration: A Developing Program of Research Trade and International Integration: A Developing Program of Research World Bank Development Economics Research Group Geneva, June 2013 Three areas of focus I. Implications of the changing patterns of

More information

Lecture 9: Institutions, Geography and Culture. Based on Acemoglu s L. Robbins lectures

Lecture 9: Institutions, Geography and Culture. Based on Acemoglu s L. Robbins lectures Lecture 9: Institutions, Geography and Culture Based on Acemoglu s L. Robbins lectures 1 The Wealth of Nations Vast differences in prosperity across countries today. Income per capita in sub-saharan Africa

More information

Deep Roots of Comparative Development

Deep Roots of Comparative Development Deep Roots of Comparative Development Oded Galor AEA Continuing Education Program Lecture III - AEA 2014 Oded Galor Roots of Comparative Development Lecture III - AEA 2014 1 / 41 Deep Roots of Comparative

More information

Tripartite Agreements for MEPC.2/Circ. Lists 1, 3, 4 received by IMO following issuance of MEPC.2/Circ.21

Tripartite Agreements for MEPC.2/Circ. Lists 1, 3, 4 received by IMO following issuance of MEPC.2/Circ.21 The following is a list of tripartite agreements reported to IMO during the period between the issuance of the annual MEPC.2/Circular, disseminated in December of each year. Any countries wishing to join

More information

NGO PERSPECTIVE: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS

NGO PERSPECTIVE: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS MMSD & IIED Managing Mineral Wealth NGO PERSPECTIVE: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS Miguel Schloss Executive Director Transparency International Issues Policy distortions Institutional incentives Governance Implications

More information

Subjective Well-Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth

Subjective Well-Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth Subjective Well-Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth Dan Sacks, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and NBER Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics--Stockholm,

More information

Natural Resources and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: An Alternative Perspective

Natural Resources and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: An Alternative Perspective Natural Resources and Development in the Middle East and North Africa: An Alternative Perspective Daniel Lederman and Mustapha K. Nabli The World Bank Presentation at the Workshop on Natural Resources

More information

The Shift to Government Banking:

The Shift to Government Banking: The Shift to Government Banking: Risks for the Netherlands and other Developed Countries Prof. Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School, NBER and DSF April 28, 2011 Amsterdam Outline I. The Policy

More information

The distribution of household financial contributions to the health system: A look outside Latin America and the Caribbean

The distribution of household financial contributions to the health system: A look outside Latin America and the Caribbean The distribution of household financial contributions to the health system: A look outside Latin America and the Caribbean Priyanka Saksena and Ke Xu 3 November, 2008 Santiago 1 The distribution of household

More information

Economic Growth: The Neo-classical & Endogenous Story

Economic Growth: The Neo-classical & Endogenous Story Density of countries Economic Growth: The Neo-classical & Endogenous Story EC307 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960 Dr. Kumar Aniet University of Cambridge & LSE Summer School Lecture 4 1980 2000 created on July

More information

Measuring the Pollution Terms of Trade with Technique Effects

Measuring the Pollution Terms of Trade with Technique Effects Measuring the Pollution Terms of Trade with Technique Effects Jean-Marie Grether, University of Neuchâtel Nicole Mathys, Swiss Federal Office of Energy and University of Neuchâtel Conference on the International

More information

Metrics Matters: Measures of Governance and Security and the Business Perspective An initial empirical exploration

Metrics Matters: Measures of Governance and Security and the Business Perspective An initial empirical exploration Metrics Matters: Measures of Governance and Security and the Business Perspective An initial empirical exploration Daniel Kaufmann, World Bank Institute www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance For presentation

More information

Life-cycle Human Capital Accumulation Across Countries: Lessons From U.S. Immigrants

Life-cycle Human Capital Accumulation Across Countries: Lessons From U.S. Immigrants Life-cycle Human Capital Accumulation Across Countries: Lessons From U.S. Immigrants David Lagakos, UCSD and NBER Benjamin Moll, Princeton and NBER Tommaso Porzio, Yale Nancy Qian, Yale and NBER Todd Schoellman,

More information

The Macroeconomic Implications of Financial Globalization

The Macroeconomic Implications of Financial Globalization The Macroeconomic Implications of Financial Globalization Eswar Prasad, IMF Research Department November 10, 2006 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) ) only, and the presence of

More information

Political Economy of Growth

Political Economy of Growth 1 Political Economy of Growth Daron Acemoglu Department of Economics, MIT Milan, DEFAP June 11, 2007 The Wealth of Nations Vast differences in prosperity across countries today. Income per capita in sub-saharan

More information

Human Resources for Health Why we need to act now

Human Resources for Health Why we need to act now Human Resources for Health Why we need to act now Progress towards the MDGs, particularly in Africa is slow, or even stagnating. Poor people cannot access basic services for want of doctors, nurses and

More information

Subjective Well Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth

Subjective Well Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth Subjective Well Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth Dan Sacks, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and NBER CSLS ICP Conference on Happiness December

More information

FACTSHEET. Figure [1]: Economic Complexity Index vs. Opportunity Value (Positive Product Complexity Index, 2011) 2 ESP ITA POL BEL DNK PRT

FACTSHEET. Figure [1]: Economic Complexity Index vs. Opportunity Value (Positive Product Complexity Index, 2011) 2 ESP ITA POL BEL DNK PRT Opportunity Value Median = -0.06 FACTSHEET Knowledge Economy Assessment of Tunisia - Identifying and addressing capability and innovation gaps in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region (SEMED) Overriding

More information

ECON 260 Theories of Economic Development. Instructor: Jorge Agüero. Fall 2008. Lecture 1 September 29, 2008 1

ECON 260 Theories of Economic Development. Instructor: Jorge Agüero. Fall 2008. Lecture 1 September 29, 2008 1 ECON 260 Theories of Economic Development. Instructor: Jorge Agüero. Fall 2008. Lecture 1 September 29, 2008 1 General information Time and location: TR 2:10-3:30 p.m. SPR 3123 Office hours: T 10am-11am,

More information

Employment, Structural Change, and Economic Development. Dani Rodrik March 15, 2012

Employment, Structural Change, and Economic Development. Dani Rodrik March 15, 2012 Employment, Structural Change, and Economic Development Dani Rodrik March 15, 2012 A remarkable reversal in fortunes since 1990s -.04 -.02 0.02.04.06 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

More information

2006/SOM1/ACT/WKSP/007a Recasting Governance for the XXI Century - Presentation

2006/SOM1/ACT/WKSP/007a Recasting Governance for the XXI Century - Presentation 2006/SOM1/ACT/WKSP/007a Recasting Governance for the XXI Century - Presentation Submitted by: Miguel Schloss, Managing Partner DamConsult Ltd. APEC Workshop on Anti-Corruption Measures for the Development

More information

The Effects of Infrastructure Development on Growth and Income Distribution

The Effects of Infrastructure Development on Growth and Income Distribution The Effects of Infrastructure Development on Growth and Income Distribution César Calderón Luis Servén (Central Bank of Chile) (The World Bank) ALIDE - The World Bank - Banco BICE Reunión Latinoamericana

More information

Infrastructure investment and growth

Infrastructure investment and growth Infrastructure investment and growth Luis Servén The World Bank IMF, November 2010 Background How important is infrastructure for economic growth? Old question even in Adam Smith s Wealth of Nations Empirically

More information

Law and Finance: Would Improved Investor Protection help the ECMU?

Law and Finance: Would Improved Investor Protection help the ECMU? Law and Finance: Would Improved Investor Protection help the ECMU? Professor Florencio Lopez de Silanes EDHEC Business School U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research October, 2015 Brussels Why do some

More information

Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM)

Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM) Development Economics and Public Policy Working Paper Series WP No. 33/212 Published by: Development Economics and Public Policy Cluster, Institute

More information

Accounting For Cross-Country Income Di erences

Accounting For Cross-Country Income Di erences Accounting For Cross-Country Income Di erences January 2011 () Aggregation January 2011 1 / 10 Standard Primal Growth Accounting Aggregate production possibilities frontier: where Change in output is )

More information

Movement and development. Australian National University Jan. 17, 2013 Michael Clemens

Movement and development. Australian National University Jan. 17, 2013 Michael Clemens Movement and development Australian National University Jan. 17, 2013 Michael Clemens ? 60% Benefits Little Haiti Cap-Haïtien Gibson and McKenzie 2010 Tongan seasonal workers in NZ NZ$1,400/family

More information

A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization. Eswar Prasad Cornell University

A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization. Eswar Prasad Cornell University A Pragmatic Approach to Capital Account Liberalization Eswar Prasad Cornell University Presentation partly based on my joint work with: Ayhan Kose, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei (2003, 2006) Raghuram Rajan

More information

Evaluation with stylized facts

Evaluation with stylized facts Evaluation with stylized facts AMPERE Subgroup on IAM Validation Valeria Jana Schwanitz Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 27. Mai 2013 Content Fundamental laws and stylized facts Systematic

More information

Does Export Concentration Cause Volatility?

Does Export Concentration Cause Volatility? Does Export Concentration Cause Volatility? Christian Busch 14. Januar 2010 Overview Countries with undiversified export structure are plausibly more vulnerable to external shocks. But difficult to evaluate

More information

Infrastructure and Economic Growth in Egypt

Infrastructure and Economic Growth in Egypt Public Disclosure Authorized Policy Research Working Paper 5177 WPS5177 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Infrastructure and Economic Growth in Egypt Norman V. Loayza Rei Odawara

More information

Incen%ves The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Incen%ves The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Incen%ves The Good, the Bad and the Ugly Vale Columbia Center Interna%onal Investment Conference New York, Nov 13-14, 2013 Sebas%an James The World Bank Group 1 Prevalence of Tax Incen%ves around the Number

More information

The Marginal Product of Capital. Francesco Caselli. Discussion by

The Marginal Product of Capital. Francesco Caselli. Discussion by 7 TH JACQUES POLAK ANNUAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 9-10, 2006 The Marginal Product of Capital Francesco Caselli Discussion by Chang-Tai Hsieh University of California, Berkeley The views expressed

More information

Rethinking the Wealth of Nations. Daron Acemoglu, MIT FEEM Lecture, December 14, 2009.

Rethinking the Wealth of Nations. Daron Acemoglu, MIT FEEM Lecture, December 14, 2009. Rethinking the Wealth of Nations Daron Acemoglu, MIT FEEM Lecture, December 14, 2009. 1 The Failure of Nations Vast differences in prosperity across countries today. Income per capita in sub-saharan Africa

More information

Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean

Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean WPS4888 Policy Research Working Paper 4888 Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean Norman V. Loayza Luis Servén Naotaka Sugawara The World Bank Development Research Group Macroeconomics and Growth

More information

Growing Together with Growth Polarization and Income Inequality

Growing Together with Growth Polarization and Income Inequality Growing Together with Growth Polarization and Income Inequality Sudip Ranjan Basu, Ph.D. Economist, United Nations ESCAP UN DESA Expert Group Meeting on the World Economy (LINK Project) United Nations

More information

Relative Prices and Sectoral Productivity

Relative Prices and Sectoral Productivity Relative Prices and Sectoral Productivity Margarida Duarte University of Toronto Diego Restuccia University of Toronto August 2012 Abstract The relative price of services rises with development. A standard

More information

The contribution of trade in financial services to economic growth and development. Thorsten Beck

The contribution of trade in financial services to economic growth and development. Thorsten Beck The contribution of trade in financial services to economic growth and development Thorsten Beck Finance why do we care? 0.04 BWA GDP per capita growth 0.02 0.00-0.02 COG SLE ALB GAB IND KOR TUR SGP MUS

More information

Geography and Economic Transition

Geography and Economic Transition Global Spatial Analysis at the Grid Cell Level Mesbah Motamed Raymond Florax Will Masters Department of Agricultural Economics Purdue University March 2009 Urbanization at the grid cell level Growth regimes

More information

Non-market strategy under weak institutions

Non-market strategy under weak institutions Lectures 5-6 Non-market strategy under weak institutions 1 Outline 1. Does weakness of institutions matter for business and economic performance? 2. Which institutions matter most? 3. Why institutions

More information

Trends in global income inequality and their political implications

Trends in global income inequality and their political implications Trends in global income inequality and their political implications LIS Center; Graduate School City University of New York Talk at the Stockholm School of Economics, September 1, 2014 A. National inequalities

More information

Outline 4/22/2011. Koc University April, 2011

Outline 4/22/2011. Koc University April, 2011 4/22/211 Koc University April, 211 Outline Main messages Crisis experience and focus Reserves trends Review of existing approaches Proposed new approach and metric Cost of reserves Reserve alternatives

More information

COMPLEXITY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

COMPLEXITY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IPD/JICA Task Force on Industrial Policy and Transformation Amman, Jordan, June 5-6, 2014 COMPLEXITY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY Luciano Pietronero Measuring the Intangible Growth Potential of Countries Collaborators:

More information

Technology Choice. Francesco Caselli. Summer School 2005

Technology Choice. Francesco Caselli. Summer School 2005 Technology Choice Francesco Caselli Summer School 2005 1 Motivation All of the evidence and all of the models we have studied so far assume that cross-country technology differences are factor-neutral.

More information

Measuring Services Trade Restrictions

Measuring Services Trade Restrictions Measuring Services Trade Restrictions Aaditya Mattoo (based on research with Ingo Borchert and Batshur Gootiiz) Development Research Group The World Bank 11 March 2012 Motivation: Policy Transparency and

More information

Inequality of Opportunity in Educational Achievements

Inequality of Opportunity in Educational Achievements Inequality of Opportunity in Educational Achievements Cross-Country and Intertemporal Comparisons P. Luongo University of Bari Inequality Measurement, trend, impacts and policies UNU-WIDER Conference September

More information

Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean

Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean Public Disclosure Authorized Policy Research Working Paper 4888 WPS4888 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean Norman V. Loayza Luis Servén

More information

Specialization Patterns in International Trade

Specialization Patterns in International Trade Specialization Patterns in International Trade Walter Steingress November 16, 2015 Abstract The pattern of specialization is key to understanding how trade affects the production structure of an economy.

More information

Online Appendix to The Missing Food Problem: Trade, Agriculture, and International Income Differences

Online Appendix to The Missing Food Problem: Trade, Agriculture, and International Income Differences Online Appendix to The Missing Food Problem: Trade, Agriculture, and International Income Differences Trevor Tombe, Uversity of Calgary Contents 1 Proof of Propositions 2 2 Data and Sample of Countries

More information

Subjective Well Being and Income: Is There Any Evidence of Satiation? *

Subjective Well Being and Income: Is There Any Evidence of Satiation? * Subjective Well Being and Income: Is There Any Evidence of Satiation? * Betsey Stevenson The Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan & CESifo and NBER betseys@umich.edu www.nber.org/~bstevens

More information

Diversification versus Polarization: Role of industrial policy in Asia and the Pacific

Diversification versus Polarization: Role of industrial policy in Asia and the Pacific TOWARDS A RETURN OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY? ARTNeT SYMPOSIUM 25-26 JULY 211 ESCAP, BANGKOK Diversification versus Polarization: Role of industrial policy in Asia and the Pacific Sudip Ranjan Basu* International

More information

Overview of Growth Research in the Past Two Decades

Overview of Growth Research in the Past Two Decades Overview of Growth Research in the Past Two Decades by Pete Klenow Stanford University and NBER September 21, 2010 Early Growth Research 1950s Solow (1956) 1960s Nelson and Phelps (1966) 1970s Dark Ages

More information

Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment

Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment Daron Acemoglu Department of Economics Massachusetts Institute of Technology October 10, 2005 The State of the World Economy Vast differences in prosperity

More information

Fertility Convergence

Fertility Convergence Fertility Convergence Tiloka De-Silva a Silvana Tenreyro a,b a London School of Economics, CfM; b CEP, CEPR July 2015 Abstract A vast literature has sought to explain large cross-country differences in

More information

GLOBAL IMBALANCES, CAPITAL FLOWS, AND THE CRISIS

GLOBAL IMBALANCES, CAPITAL FLOWS, AND THE CRISIS GLOBAL IMBALANCES, CAPITAL FLOWS, AND THE CRISIS Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti International Monetary Fund Global imbalances have declined.. Even though stock positions are still expanding 20 15 Net foreign

More information

Design of efficient redistributive fiscal policy

Design of efficient redistributive fiscal policy Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality Sanjeev Gupta Deputy Director Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF IMF-Hitotsubashi University Workshop March 12, Tokyo Structure of the presentation Trends in inequality

More information

Econ 1340: World Economic History

Econ 1340: World Economic History Econ 1340: World Economic History Lecture 16 Camilo Gracía-Jimeno University of Pennsylvania April 4, 2011 Camilo Gracía-Jimeno (University of Pennsylvania)Econ 1340: World Economic History April 4, 2011

More information

The Role of Trade in Structural Transformation

The Role of Trade in Structural Transformation 1 The Role of Trade in Structural Transformation Marc Teignier UNIVERSIDAD DE ALICANTE European Summer Symposium in International Macroeconomics 23 May 2012, Tarragona Question Contributions Road Map Motivation

More information

First Credit Bureau Conference

First Credit Bureau Conference First Credit Bureau Conference Riga, Latvia 13.1.15 Presentation by: Leora Klapper Lead Economist Development Research Group, World Bank DEVELOPING A NATIONAL CREDIT BUREAU Financial Development What is

More information

BUILDING A DATASET FOR BILATERAL MARITIME CONNECTIVITY

BUILDING A DATASET FOR BILATERAL MARITIME CONNECTIVITY Région et Développement n - BUILDING A DATASET FOR BILATERAL MARITIME CONNECTIVITY Marco FUGAZZA *, Jan HOFFMANN *, Rado RAZAFINOMBANA * Abstract - This paper presents a unique database reporting the shortest

More information

Are «Good Governance» reforms a priority? Conceptual, measurement, and policy issues

Are «Good Governance» reforms a priority? Conceptual, measurement, and policy issues SOAS & Mo Ibrahim Residential School on Governance in Africa Are «Good Governance» reforms a priority? Conceptual, measurement, and policy issues Nicolas Meisel (meiseln@afd.fr) Research Department - French

More information

The Role of Women in Society: from Preindustrial to Modern Times

The Role of Women in Society: from Preindustrial to Modern Times CESifo Economic Studies Advance Access published May 22, 2014 CESifo Economic Studies, 2014, doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifu019 The Role of Women in Society: from Preindustrial to Modern Times Paola Giuliano UCLA

More information

BUILDING A DATASET FOR BILATERAL MARITIME CONNECTIVITY. Marco Fugazza Jan Hoffmann Rado Razafinombana

BUILDING A DATASET FOR BILATERAL MARITIME CONNECTIVITY. Marco Fugazza Jan Hoffmann Rado Razafinombana U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T POLICY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMMODITIES STUDY SERIES No. BUILDING A DATASET FOR BILATERAL MARITIME CONNECTIVITY

More information

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE GYMNASTIQUE

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE GYMNASTIQUE Individual Competitions Qualifications C-I 22, 23, 24 and 25 September 2014 1st day of qualification 2nd day of qualification 3rd day of qualification 4th day of qualification 22 September 2014 23 September

More information

Language barriers to foreign trade: evidence from translation costs

Language barriers to foreign trade: evidence from translation costs Language barriers to foreign trade: evidence from translation costs Alejandro Molnar Vanderbilt University DRAFT, NOT FOR CIRCULATION November 9, 2013 Abstract [Foreign trade involves tasks that may be

More information

International Investment Patterns. Philip R. Lane WBI Seminar, Paris, April 2006

International Investment Patterns. Philip R. Lane WBI Seminar, Paris, April 2006 International Investment Patterns Philip R. Lane WBI Seminar, Paris, April 2006 Introduction What determines aggregate capital inflows and outflows? What determines bilateral patterns in international

More information

Long run growth 2: The Solow model

Long run growth 2: The Solow model International Economics and Business Dynamics Class Notes Long run growth 2: The Solow model Revised: November 7, 2012 Latest version available at http://www.fperri.net/teaching/20205.htm Why do we see

More information