Lecture 9.2 Cultural Ethical Relativism; Rachels. The theory of Cultural Ethical Relativism. James Rachels Critique of Cultural Relativism.

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1 TOPIC: Lecture 9.2 Cultural Ethical Relativism; Rachels The theory of Cultural Ethical Relativism. James Rachels Critique of Cultural Relativism. KEY TERMS/ GOALS: Argument for Cultural Ethical Relativism (CER). Rachel s Logical Argument against CER. Rachel s Empirical Argument against CER. Three bad implications of CER. Motivations for CER. READING: James Rachels, The Challenge of Cultural Relativism (on E-Reserves.) Optional: Mackie, The Subjectivity of Values (Perry, p ). CONTENT: CULTURAL ETHICAL RELATIVISM. We will be discussing CULTURAL ETHICAL RELATIVISM or CER, the doctrine that what is right/true depends on the culture s perspectives. The selection of The Challenge of Cultural Relativism by James Rachels comes from Rachels book The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Mackie s article The Subjectivity of Values offers arguments for CER. Cultural relativism moves from an empirical observation that different cultures have different moral codes based on the moral habits or customs of the majority of the culture. The doctrine concludes that there is no Ethical Truths which are absolute to everyone at any time. It claims that the idea of universal truth in ethics is a myth. CER claims that because there are so many different standards, they can t all be right, or that we have no principled way to tell which one is right. If the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action IS right, at least within that society. As a non-ethical example, consider that the custom of British drivers is to drive on the left side of the road. Americans drive on the right side of the road. Is there ONE TRUTH to the question, which side of the road is the RIGHT side to drive on? CER says that BOTH are right relative to each culture respectively. When you ask is X action morally right, then you must answer for whom? or according to what culture? Some implications of CER is that what is right is based on what is the norm, or custom for behavior in that society. That means that cannibalism is right for some cultures, or that polygamy is right for some Eskimo cultures. There can be as many ethical truths as there are ethical systems. Another implication is that no one moral code is better than any other. The morality of all cultures is equally right. If we ask how the moral codes are determined, there are a number of different answers. We may know what is right for a culture based on a dictatorship, or based on the majority opinion of a culture. It is not easy to tell what is considered morally right for a culture (indeed the vagueness of defining what is right is used as a critique of the idea of CER itself). Nevertheless, that is a practical worry about how to determine what is right for a culture. What is important is

2 that the moral code of a society (however that is understood) determines what is right. (Rachels, p. 421 #5). The conclusion is that is no absolute or objective standard for morality. Let s examine a basic argument for CER. Take an ethical proposition such as Eating the flesh of a dead person is wrong. This might be true (acceptable) relative to one culture and false relative to another culture. Or it might be true or false within one culture at different times. Rachels gives the example of a Persian who visited the ancient culture of the Callatians. They sanction eating the flesh of their dead fathers for religious reasons. So the proposition that cannibalism is morally wrong is false. For the Greeks however, the proposition is true because their cultural norms prohibit eating the dead. CER maintains that we cannot determine whether this proposition is true unless we know for whom it is meant to apply. The broader conclusion is that there are no objective ethical propositions that apply to everyone absolutely. Here is the basic outline: The argument for Cultural Ethical Relativism: P1: If different cultures have different moral codes, then there is no objective moral truth. P2: Different cultures have different moral codes. C: Therefore, there is no objective truth in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture. This conclusion means that there are no ethical truths that hold for all people at all times. There are no moral truths. This is the core claim of cultural ethical relativism. Rachels gives four main critiques of CER: A logical problem where he points out that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. An Empirical problem where he denies the truth of premise 2 above (thus making the argument unsound). Then he mentions some bad implications (consequences) of CER. Finally, he mentions that although the motivations for CER are good, they do not warrant conclusion of CER. RACHELS LOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM. Rachels argues that the Cultural Differences Argument is not valid, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises. That is, even if the premise is empirically true that cultures have different moral codes, we cannot conclude that there are no OBJECTIVE MORAL TRUTHS. To show this, Rachels gives a COUNTEREXAMPLE. He says that different cultures have different beliefs about the shape of the earth. Thousands of years ago, people saw that the horizon was flat, and concluded that the Earth was flat. In fact, there are still people today (Flat-Earth Believers) that believe the world is flat. Other cultures, of course, think the world is round. So cultures disagree about the premise The world is round. Here is the analogous argument, called the GEOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES ARGUMENT: P1) Different cultures have different beliefs about the shape of the earth. C:) Therefore, there is no objective truth about the shape of the earth. Geographical beliefs are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture. The argument has an analogous logical form as the CULTURAL DIFFERENCES argument. But is this a sound argument? Rachels says no: Just because people disagree about the shape of the earth, it does not mean that

3 THERE IS NO TRUTH about the matter. There could be an absolute objective truth about whether the world is flat or round, despite the fact that people disagree. Just because cultures disagree about the shape of the earth does not guarantee that there is no objective truth about the shape of the earth. After all, one culture (or both) could be mistaken. The same is true about moral codes: Cultures disagree, but that doesn t mean there is no objective moral truths. So, we cannot conclude that there is no absolute objective truth about the shape of the earth or about moral codes, based off the justification that cultures disagree. (p. 422). To sum, the Cultural Ethical Relativity argument attempts to move from the fact that people have different opinions or beliefs concerning a given subject matter to the conclusion that there is no objective truth concerning the subject matter. Rachels Logical Argument against CER is that the conclusion simply does not follow. There still may be an absolute objective truth about whether certain moral codes are right, even if cultures disagree. EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE OF CER. The second argument that Rachels gives attempts to undermine the truth of the premise 2 of CER. Premise 2 states that different cultures have different moral codes. This is an empirical claim, since it is based on the observation that different cultures consider certain moral codes to be right or wrong, depending on the culture. The Callatians, for example, thought that cannibalism was morally right, and the Greeks thought it was morally wrong. Rachels thinks that the claim is exaggerated. He says that in order for the argument to have any bite, then the differences between cultures must be radically different. But, he asks, is it true that cultures have radically different (contradictory) values? Rachels argues that the differences are trivial, but when it comes to the big moral issues, cultures actually share the same values. His reason is that societies would not exist without enforcing certain ethical codes. He says There are some moral rules that all societies will have in common, because those rules are necessary for a society to exist (425). What are some universal values shared by all cultures? Here s one: Murder. If we define murder as the intentional killing for fun, then every culture believes that murder is wrong. Rachels gives an anthropological story about how if people prohibited murder, then the society would not survive (425). If murder was allowed in a society, then people would not feel secure, and would avoid others. But we are social creatures and rely on others. Any society who could not associate with others would collapse (425). However, since societies HAVE survived, then we know that they did not allow people to kill others for fun. Another universal value is caring for the young. If a group did not care for their young, then the young would not survive and the society would die out (425). The third example is truth-telling and prohibitions on lying and cheating. If lying was condoned, then communication would be difficult, because you couldn t trust anyone (425). There would be no motivation to pay attention to others, and social interactions would cease. So, there must be some universal values. That is, all cultures must think that it is absolutely and objectively right that people should not murder or lie, and that people should care for their young. Premise 2 of CER ( Different cultures have different moral codes ) is only true about trivial moral codes. When we consider the important moral codes, like murder or protecting the young, then premise 2 is false: Every culture must agree that these moral codes are true. BAD CONSEQUENCES and CONTRADICTORY IMPLICATIONS: Rachels argues that believing in the CER argument will lead to bad consequences. He also argues that CER often implies contradictory claims.

4 A) CER implies that no moral code is better than any other moral code. If CER is true, then we are unable to judge that any ethical customs or beliefs of any culture are ethically inferior or superior to any other cultural perspective. This follows because CER rejects the existence of any universal ethical principles, standards, or truths, and so one moral code cannot be better or worse than any others. CER forces us to recognize that the moral code of our own society has no special status; it is merely one among many (423). Indeed, one of the motivations for CER is that it keeps people from claiming that their ethical system is better than another culture s. However, Rachels argues, this implication means that we cannot judge cultures that have norms permitting, say, genocidal practices or slavery, as ethically inferior to those with norms prohibiting them. But wouldn t we want to judge cultures that have norms protecting basic human rights as ethically SUPERIOR to those that violate basic human rights? Don t we want to say that the Nazi genocide was WRONG? Since, by intuition, we might think that protecting human rights is superior to ethical systems that don t protect rights, then we would want to disagree with CER. We would want to say that it is an objective truth that human rights are worth protecting, and thus it should be part of any culture to protect human rights. Furthermore, CER precludes you from ranking these different moral codes and leads you to conclude, Slavery is wrong for us, but it is right for them. This is because CER claims that there IS NO RIGHT OR WRONG MORAL CODE. Slavery is an action, but it cannot be considered absolutely right or wrong. However, Rachels argues, most of us would think that slavery is wrong, for anyone at any time. If CER is right, then we could not say that protecting human rights is the right thing to do, and that slavery and genocide is morally wrong. B) CER implies that the majority rules. If CER is true, then you would determine whether an action is right or wrong by consulting the existing code (or norms) of the society. This might be done by careful observation of how people act: We might take a poll, look at the society s laws, or consult dictators opinions. CER implies that what is right for a culture is what is right by the majority or customary opinion. For example, if a society thought that cannibalism is right, then it is RIGHT for them. This means that it would be conceptually incoherent to argue against this ethical system. After all, if it is right, then you should not protest what is right. The bad consequence, however, is that a person in a society should not protest against their society because they would be protesting against what is right. CER implies that a person who protests against an ethical code is wrong because she is opposing the well established cultural rules which are, by CER, considered right. However, Rachels points out that it is not incoherent to protest against the rules of one s society. But it is surely not incoherent to ask, Is this cultural norm right? or to engage in reflection such as, My culture says it is right to do X but is it really right to do X? In fact, in democratic societies, it is one s right to protest against the majority opinion. If CER was right, however, then it would be unethical to protest against the cultural norms. C) Different times, not better times. If CER is true, then there is no such thing as moral PROGRESS (reform) or moral regress (degeneration). This is because there is no better or worse moral codes, there is only different moral codes. Just as we cannot say, by CER, that one society s codes are better or worse than anothers, so, too, we cannot make judgements on our own

5 societies codes which may have changed over the years. There is only change in moral codes andnorms; the replacement of one set of norms with another different set of norms, not a better set. However, Rachels argues, we would want to say that our society s moral codes have progressed. I.e. The U.S. Constitution of 2008 is not simply different from the U.S. Constitution of 1800; it is better. The U.S. moral codes use to ban Blacks from restaurants, and it did not allow women to vote. But don t our civil rights amendments today represent moral advancement? These amendments are not simply a change in codes, but a change for the better. Below is a summary of the three bad implications of CER: Bad implications of CER 1. If CER is true, then we are unable to judge any ethical customs or beliefs of any culture as ethically inferior or superior to any other cultural perspective. But we would want to say that an ethical system that protects human rights is superior to a system that doesn t. 2. If CER is true, then whether an action is right or wrong is determined by the existing code (or norms) of the society, or by the majority of people. But it s not incoherent to ask if our existing codes are right or wrong, independent of the majority opinion. 3. If CER is true, then there is no such thing as moral PROGRESS (reform) or moral regress (degeneration) only change in mores/norms; the replacement of one set of norms with another different set of norms. But we would want to say that our ethical system is better today than it was 300 years ago, so there is progress. MOTIVATIONS FOR CER. In section 7 Rachels notes that 1) it is dangerous to assume that our preferences are based on absolute moral standards, and CER can help us see that many ethical principles and standards are simply the products of culture and nothing more. Moreover, 2) Consideration of CER should teach us that to be open minded and not dogmatic in our beliefs. I leave it up to you to summarize these points. Instead, I want to mention a couple of motivations for CER that Rachels critiques in his book (that is not mentioned in the selections you will read.) Rachels notes that although CER has good motivations, those motivations are good independent of the argument for CER. People who are motivated to believe in CER want to promote tolerance and respect of other societies, and to avoid cultural imperialism. However, we do not need to conclude that there are NO MORAL TRUTHS, in order to value tolerance and respect. We can value tolerance of other societies, and still think that some moral codes are better than others. After all, just because you think that you have better values, knowledge, or habits than someone else, it doesn t mean that you will not tolerate or respect that person. You can value tolerance and still think that there are moral truths.

6 It is worth noting that the motivation of tolerance by cultural relativists is inherently contradictory. If CER is correct, then no value is better than others. But that means that TOLERANCE should not be better than INTOLERANCE. CER maintains that universal ethical principles or virtues do not exist including our culturespecific value of tolerance. If, however, we do say that tolerance should be privileged over intolerance, then this amounts to a refutation of CER! It shows that there IS an objective absolute value that everyone should have, namely that everyone should be tolerant. Rachels says that we don t need to conclude that there are no moral truths to think that tolerance or respect of other moral codes is good. We should distinguish between respecting the other and affirming all their views. We can agree to disagree by respecting others but also valuing our own views. Another motivation for CER is that it helps us avoid moral imperialism i.e., seeking to impose by force our ethical code and norms on other cultures. But Rachels points out that we should distinguish ethical judgement (including condemning others for having inferior views) from forceful interference. Just because you think that there are ethical truths, it does not mean that you will enforce your judgements on others. Thinking that there are moral truths does not necessarily lead to imperialism. In addition, there may well be cases where forceful intervention is ethically justified (e.g., to prevent genocide). But the forceful intervention was not done solely because the society thought that their ethical standards are objectively better than another culture s. Forceful intervention is simply not a direct consequence of believing in moral truths. We have independent reasons for thinking that forceful intervention is wrong (or right in some cases), regardless of whether we think there are absolute moral standards. The take home message is that tolerance and respect are good motivations. However, one can accept these lessons without endorsing the core claim of CER namely, that the idea of universal truth in ethics is a myth. DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: Give some examples of ethical principles that different cultures have. Do you agree with CER? Why? Do you think that Rachel s Logical argument provides a good analogy to show that the conclusion of CER (There are no moral truths) does not follow from the premises (Cultures have different moral codes)? The argument for CER is based on the fact that cultures have different codes. Do you think this is true, or do you think, like Rachels, that there are universal moral codes? If there ARE universal moral codes, do you think that it falsifies the argument for CER? The argument for CER is yet another argument from relativity. Recall that Pojman and Berkeley uses the same form of the argument to show that because people disagree about X, then there is no truth of the matter about X. (Or, because people have different experiences of X, then they are not justified in claiming that X is true). Compare and contrast Pojman or Berkeley s Relativity arguments with the Cultural Ethical Relativism argument. Do you find one argument convincing (i.e. you are a Cultural Relativist), but not another (i.e. you disagree with Berkeley)?