Public Opinion on Immigration in Western Europe: Economics, Tolerance, and Exposure

Transcription

1 Comparative European Politics, 2007, 5, ( ) r 2007 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd /07 $ Public Opinion on Immigration in Western Europe: Economics, Tolerance, and Exposure Jason E. Kehrberg Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, 1615Patterson Office Tower, Lexington, KY 40506, USA. jkehrberg@uky.edu Several studies of cross-national attitudes on immigration use a theory of selfinterest that focuses upon the relative size of the immigrant group and the economic situation of the survey respondent. Kunovich wrote that attitudes can also be shaped by national economics, political structure, and culture. This study examines the influences of national economics and one factor of culture: political tolerance. I build upon previous explanations of public attitudes on immigration in two ways. First, I add to the current knowledge concerning the influence of the national economy on attitudes by including estimates of economic wealth and growth. Second, I examine the influence of political tolerance on attitudes on immigration. This study uses ordered probit to examine data from the 1997 Eurobarometer survey. The results show that both economic and political tolerance influence public opinion on immigration. Therefore, attitudes are shaped by numerous factors beyond self-interest economic theories, including the health of the national economy and political tolerance. Comparative European Politics (2007) 5, doi: /palgrave.cep Keywords: public opinion; immigration; political tolerance; exposure; economics Introduction One of the major changes in European society since World War II has been the increase in immigration bringing new peoples, languages, religions, and cultural practices to the continent. These changes have resulted in immigration becoming one of the most important political and social issues in Europe, due to a developing pattern of tension between the immigrant population and the native population throughout Europe. The city of Oldham in the United Kingdom has a contemporary history of riots by immigrants and natives. In 2005, civil unrest erupted in France and more recently, immigrant protests throughout Europe erupted due to the political cartoons printed in Denmark. 1 Europe has also witnessed the emergence of extreme-right-wing political parties with an anti-immigration platform (Betz, 2001; Lubbers et al., 2002;

2 Jason E. Kehrberg 265 Mayer, 2002; Golder, 2003). These contemporary events increase the importance of understanding the source of public opinion on immigration. Cross-national studies of Europeans views on immigration are an increasing body of literature that include studies by Lincoln Quillian (1995), Peer Scheepers et al. (2002), Laruen McLaren (2003), Robert M. Kunovich (2004), Gallya Lahav (2004), and Kessler and Freeman (2005). Currently, we do not completely understand what shapes individual attitudes on this subject. Previous cross-national research has mainly focused upon individual economics, social status, and relative group size to explain public opinion on immigration (Quillian, 1995) 2. Exceptions to this include Scheepers et al. (2002) who include two national economic variables: unemployment and change in unemployment, and Kunovich (2004) who includes the moving average of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The purpose of this paper is to provide a more comprehensive examination of the factors that influence public opinion on immigration. First, this study expands upon a previous examination of national economic factors, building upon the work of Scheepers and Kunovich by including a measure of economic growth. Second, this study examines the role of political tolerance, defined here as the acceptance of civil liberties in all circumstances. The first section of this study examines the theoretical strengths and weaknesses of each of these explanations: economic, political tolerance, and exposure to immigrants. Next, empirical tests are conducted to examine the relationship between public opinion on immigration and variables measuring each set of explanations across 12 European countries. Finally, a combined model is run with all of the variables. The combined model proves to be the most accurate in explaining public opinion towards immigration, indicating that the combination of the economic, tolerance, and exposure explanations best explain public opinion on immigration. Public Opinion on Immigration Each explanation or theory purports to explain public opinion on immigration, and each does so by specifying the existence of conflict between the native population and immigrants over resources. The nature of the conflict, however, is different for each of the explanations. Despite the differences between the explanations, it is simple to combine the three into one complete model of explaining attitudes on immigration. Economic theories of public opinion Theories concerning the effects of economic factors on electoral preferences are common in political studies (Lewis-Beck, 1986; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier

3 266 Jason E. Kehrberg 2006), and can be divided into two general types. One type is commonly referred to as the individual theory and the second is the collective theory. 3 Both theories hold that individuals act differently depending upon the state of the economy. The difference between the two theories is the level of measurement for the economy. The individual theory focuses upon individual economic variables, such as individual income, social status, and employment status. It argues that people are concerned with their personal economic situation. Meanwhile, the collective theory focuses on national economic variables, such as unemployment and economic growth rates. This theory argues that people s behavior and attitudes are shaped by the national economic situation. Economic performance can explain public opinion concerning immigration (Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002; Kunovich, 2004; Lahav, 2004; Sniderman et al., 2004). Specifically, bad economic times should be associated with a negative opinion of immigrants. In stagnating economies, job competition can create a conflict between the native and the immigrant populations, which according to both economic theories should result in a negative backlash against immigrants (Zolberg, 1991). In periods of economic growth, as the number of jobs increases and job competition is less affected by the arrival of immigrants, public opinion on immigrants should moderate. The demand for labor increases during periods of economic growth, providing a reason to increase the number of immigrants. Theoretically, native individuals who are in direct competition with immigrants for jobs should have the most negative attitudes about immigrants and immigration (Runchiman, 1966; Brox, 1972). Individuals with economic security should feel less threatened by immigrants. Economic security is achieved through having an economic advantage over immigrants such as education, skilled labor, or financial resources. But, do individuals base their opinion on immigration on individual economic conditions or collective (national) economic performance? Political tolerance A large number of scholarly papers focuses on the sources of political tolerance (e.g. Bobo and Licari, 1989; Sniderman et al., 1989; Gibson, 1992; Gaasholt and Togeby, 1995; Golebiowska, 1995, 1996), and the majority of these papers examine the causes of political tolerance. Political tolerance is defined as moral, nonmaterial values (Gaasholt and Togeby, 1995, 275). This research project is concerned with the relationship between attitudes on political tolerance and attitudes on immigration, resulting in the determination of how political tolerance influences public opinion on immigration.

4 Jason E. Kehrberg 267 Immigrants are among social groups that are different than the mainstream European society. Many immigrants to Europe have different cultures, religions, languages, and ethnic backgrounds than the natives of the receiving country. Any or all of these differences may invoke intolerance by native individuals (Sullivan et al., 1982). Gibson and Anderson (1985, 120) argued that political tolerance shapes political culture. Besides shaping political culture, political tolerance can shape the severity of political and cultural conflict between immigrants and the native population. If the native population accepts the civil rights of immigrants (high level of political tolerance), it should lower the perceived threat of immigrants to the society and culture of the native population. Thus, a high level of political tolerance decreases the probability of having negative attitudes on immigration. This is not arguing that these individuals who support civil liberties like or dislike immigrants. Previous research found that individuals are equally tolerant no matter their personal feelings towards a group (Sniderman et al., 1989), but individuals who support civil liberties will simply have a more positive attitude towards immigrants. It seems plausible, for example, that countries have at their core a basic level of tolerance for outsiders, immigrants in this case, and that the level of tolerance varies from one country to another. This level of tolerance results in differences in policies, civic institutions, and opinions concerning the public s commitment to civil liberties, a common measure of political tolerance (Bobo and Licari, 1989; Gaasholt and Togeby, 1995; Golebiowska, 1995). Exposure to immigrants and size of immigrant population Exposure to immigrants can influence both the political tolerance and economic theories. The collective threat theory contains two parts: economic and the relative size of the immigrant population (Quillian, 1995). Quillian (1995, 589) argued that as the relative size of the immigrant population increases, there is a corresponding increase in the perceived threat of immigrants to the native population. Theoretically, the relative size of the immigrant population can influence both economics and political tolerance. Large immigrant populations impact the job market, thus increasing the economic threat of immigration. The influence on political tolerance concerns the perceived threat to the native culture and society. As the size of the immigrant population increases so does their visibility, which may cause an increase in perceived threat to culture and society, and lower political tolerance. A relatively small immigrant population can be perceived as a smaller threat than a larger immigrant population. A second measure of exposure examines contact between the individual respondent and immigrants (McLaren, 2003). This measure provides a more

5 268 Jason E. Kehrberg accurate individual indicator of contact, which might indicate direct individual competition within a neighborhood and therefore a decrease in tolerance. On the other hand, an increase in exposure might result in an increase in tolerance if the individual gains further understanding of immigrants and sees them as less of a social threat. Data, Hypotheses, and Analytical Methods The main data source for this study is the Eurobarometer Survey 47.1, conducted in The survey sampled the opinions of the general population in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Additional national level data for 1996 came from the 2002 Eurostat Yearbook (number of unemployed individuals, GDP per capita, gross national product (GNP) change, and percentage of foreign citizens) and the 1997 CIA World Factbook (population). Dependent variable The dependent variable for this study is a question concerning public opinion on immigration from the Eurobarometer survey. The question, number 55, concerned people s opinion on the presence of immigrants in the host country. The dependent variable ranges from 0, great deal better off without immigrants or negative attitudes, to 4, benefits a great deal from immigrants or positive attitudes. 5 Economic variables The economic variables are divided into collective economic indicators and individual economic indicators. The collective economic variables measure both the current state of the economy and the trends in growth from 1995to 1996 to operationalize the collective economic theory. The variables are the unemployment rate in 1996, 6 the change in unemployment from 1995to 1996, 7 GDP per capita 1996, and GNP change from 1995to As the unemployment rate increases, public opinion on immigration should become more negative, because the number of individuals in direct competition with immigrants increases as economic conditions worsen. High levels of unemployment should also result in negative attitudes towards immigrants. Higher per capita GNP should be positively correlated with public opinion of immigration. Countries with higher GNP per capita have an economic need for immigrants to fill lower wage and labor-intensive sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, immigrants see these countries as desirable places, due to the

6 Jason E. Kehrberg 269 economic wealth. Thus, these countries probably receive more immigrants than less economically developed countries. It is expected that as the economy grows, measured by the changes in GNP from 1996 to 1997, public opinion on immigration will improve because the number of jobs is also growing, decreasing job competition. Two Eurobarometer questions were used to measure respondents individual economic situation. The respondents personal economic situation is measured with a question that asks if the individual s present situation has improved, stayed the same, or worsened in the past 5years. I coded the question as 1 for worse, as 2 for same, and as 3 for better. Thus, personal economic situations should be positively correlated with opinions of immigration, because good economic standing should lessen the perceived threat of immigrants in the job market. The final individual variable is income, and is measured using a four-point scale that divides respondents into quartiles, allowing for a cross-national comparison of economic status. 9 While this variable is not ideal, it does account for differences in the value of each country s currency. It is expected that as income increases, public opinion on immigration will become positively correlated. High income implies economic security and a decreased economic threat from immigrants. Political tolerance variables The tolerance model uses two variables: a tolerance index and trust. I use survey questions concerning civil liberties to measure political tolerance (Bobo and Licari, 1989; Gaasholt and Togeby, 1995; Golebiowska, 1995). Tolerance is an additive index 10 using five questions from the Eurobarometer survey that focus on civil liberties and lack any mention of immigration. The questions were asked about freedom of speech, the right to one s own language and culture, religious freedom, freedom of association, and equality before the law. 11 It is expected that countries that have a strong ethnic identity and those that support assimilation of minorities will score lower on the tolerance variable than countries that have a more multi-cultural outlook. So, as tolerance increases, public opinion on immigration should become more positive. Inglehart s (1997) interpersonal trust data are used as another cultural variable. The variable is the percentage of respondents from each country who said that people could be trusted in the World Values Survey. Each country s percentages were attached to the respondents from that country in my data set. As the level of trust increases, public opinion on immigration should become more positive since the outsider is seen as less threatening to the society. A society with a high level of trust should be more accepting of immigrants and consider them to be less of a threat.

7 270 Jason E. Kehrberg Exposure variables The first variable in the exposure model is the percentage of non-european Union (EU) foreign citizens in each country in This serves as an estimate of the number of immigrants in each country. It does not include those immigrants who became naturalized citizens before 1996 and it only includes immigrants from non-eu countries. These are the individuals who are often targeted by the extreme-right parties and anti-immigration movements, who are less likely to assimilate, and who simply stand out more to the native population due to cultural and ethnic differences. As the number of these foreign citizens increases, public opinion on immigration should become more negative due to the increased amount of conflict between groups. The second exposure variable is from the Eurobarometer survey, thus it is an individual level measure (McLaren, 2003). The question asks if the respondent has friends who are in a minority group. The question is coded as 0 for none, 1 for some, and 2 for many. It is expected that individuals with some or many friends among a minority group will have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than those who do not, due to exposure to a minority group. Control variables Three control or background variables are included in every model. These are age, gender, and education. Age is measured in years, and is expected to be negatively correlated with attitudes on immigration (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992; Quillian, 1995). Gender is coded as 0 for male and 1 for female. Previous research has found that females tend to have more positive attitudes on immigration than males, thus a positive correlation is expected (Hernes and Knudsen, 1992). Education is measured as the age of the respondents when they completed their last full year of education. 12 Education has been found to be a strong indicator of public attitudes on immigration (Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002; Kunovich, 2004). It is expected that education is positively correlated with attitudes on immigration; it is difficult to explain why. Previous work on attitudes on immigration theorized that education is a proxy for economic well being (Quillian, 1995), while the literature on tolerance argues that higher education causes greater tolerance for noneconomic reasons (Golebiowska, 1995, 1996). Analytical Results The dependent variable is an ordinal measure ranging from 0 to 4, indicating that the proper method is an ordered probit model. The dependent variable is

8 Jason E. Kehrberg 271 the same in each model, facilitating a comparison of models, and is presented in Table 1. The first model is the economic model with variables from both the individual and collective economic theories. The second model uses the tolerance index and trust variables. The final model is a combination of the Table 1 Ordered probit results for attitudes on immigration in western Europe 1. Economic 2. Tolerance 3. Combined Collective economic Unemployment *** 2.20* (0.770) (0.881) GDP per capita *** 0.001*** (5.65e-06) (8.16e-06) GNP % change *** 0.060*** (0.009) (0.010) Unemployment change ** 1.31 (2.31) (2.44) Individual economic Personal situation 0.180*** 0.175*** (0.016) (0.018) Income 0.030** 0.026* (0.011) (0.012) Tolerance Tolerance index 0.124*** 0.101*** (0.008) (0.010) Trust 0.003*** (0.001) (0.001) Exposure % Foreign citizens (0.006) (0.007) Minority friends 0.448*** 0.440*** (0.019) (0.022) Control variables Education 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.052*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) Gender (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) Age 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Log likelihood 13, , , Chi , ,255.90

9 272 Jason E. Kehrberg Table 1 (continued) 1. Economic 2. Tolerance 3. Combined Prob>Chi Cut (0.130) (0.070) (0.182) Cut (0.130) (0.071) (0.182) Cut (0.130) (0.071) (0.182) Cut (0.132) (0.074) (0.184) Pseudo R N ,002 7,726 Note: Robust coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. *Po0.05; **Po0.01; ***Po Dependent variables: 0=great deal better off without immigrants, 1=a little better off without immigrants, 2=no difference, 3=benefits a little from immigrants, and 4=benefits a great deal from immigrants. previous two models. The findings are very consistent across each of the three models and provide evidence supporting several of the different hypotheses. Economic model GNP change, income, and personal situation are positively related with attitudes on immigration, supporting the hypotheses for these variables. Examining the predicted probabilities provides further information, as shown in Table 2. Individuals whose personal situation improved in the last five years are 4.9% more likely to have positive attitudes and those whose situation worsened are 10.7% more likely to have negative attitudes. GNP change had a similar influence; low GNP growth resulted in an increase in the probability of negative attitudes by 13.7% and high GNP growth resulted in an increase in probability of positive attitudes by 5.7%. GNP change has the largest impact of the economic variables on the probability of negative and positive attitudes. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, the coefficient for GDP per capita has a negative correlation with public attitudes. The predicted probabilities for GDP per capita indicate that moving the variable from its minimum (Portugal) to its maximum (Denmark) results in individuals being 2.4% less likely to believe that their country benefits a great deal from immigrants. This result is difficult to explain, but it is possible that countries with a high GDP per capita perceive immigrants as a greater threat to both their high level of economic development and the extensive welfare system in countries such as Sweden and

10 Jason E. Kehrberg 273 Table 2 Predicted probabilities 1. Economic 2. Tolerance 3. Combined GDP per capita DV (0) (0.018) (0.023) DV (1) 0.015(0.004) (0.010) DV (2) (0.002) (0.002) DV (3) (0.014) (0.021) DV (4) (0.006) (0.010) GNP change DV (0) (0.017) (0.019) DV (1) (0.008) 0.045(0.010) DV (2) (0.001) (0.001) DV (3) (0.015) (0.018) DV (4) (0.010) (0.010) Personal situation DV (0) (0.010) (0.010) DV (1) (0.003) (0.004) DV (2) 0.005(0.001) (0.001) DV (3) (0.008) (0.009) DV (4) (0.005) (0.004) Tolerance index DV (0) (0.015) (0.017) DV (1) (0.003) (0.004) DV (2) (0.003) (0.003) DV (3) (0.010) (0.012) DV (4) (0.004) (0.003) Trust DV (0) (0.010) DV (1) (0.004) DV (2) (0.001) DV (3) (0.009) DV (4) (0.005) Minority friends DV (0) (0.007) (0.010) DV (1) (0.006) (0.008) DV (2) 0.015(0.002) (0.003) DV (3) (0.006) (0.010) DV (4) (0.010) (0.010) Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All dichotomous variables are held at zero, all other variables are held at their mean. All variables of interest are moved from their minimum to their maximum. DV=dependent variable, 0=great deal better off without immigrants. 1=a little better off without immigrants, 2=no difference, 3=benefits a little from immigrants, and 4=benefits a great deal from immigrants.

11 274 Jason E. Kehrberg Denmark. This result is similar to those of R.M. Kunovich who found that advantaged groups of society feel threatened during poor economic conditions and lose any advantage in having lower levels of prejudice (2004, 39). The coefficient for unemployment is unexpectedly positive and provides no support for my hypothesis. Theoretically, I expected high levels of unemployment to result in negative public opinion, since immigrants would be viewed as direct competition to the native population. It could be that the trend in change of unemployment may be more important than the actual unemployment rate. Adding an unemployment change variable tested this idea. The coefficient for the unemployment change is positively correlated as expected. An increase in unemployment results in an increase of the probability of negative attitudes by 4.8%, while a decrease in unemployment results in only a 1.6% increase in the probability of positive attitudes on immigration. Political tolerance model Political tolerance, trust, and having minority friends are significant and positively correlated with attitudes on immigration. Trust is a weak predictor of attitudes on immigration. A low level of trust results in an individual being 3.7% more likely to have negative attitudes, and an individual with a high level of trust is 1.8% more likely to have positive attitudes. The tolerance index and having minority friends are strong predictors of attitudes. A lack of political tolerance increases the probability of not believing your country benefits from immigration by 19.6%. A lack of minority friends increases the probability of the same outcome by 20%. The minority friends variable is also a strong predictor of positive attitudes towards immigrants by increasing the probability of the outcome by 16.6% for those individuals with many minority friends. Final model The final model combines all the variables from the previous two models, presenting what I believe to be a more realistic model of individual attitudes, and showing that both tolerance and economics influence public opinion on immigration. The pattern established in each of the economic models continues in the final model for the majority of the variables. Unemployment change, GNP change, income, and personal situation continue to be positively correlated with public opinion, even after including the political tolerance model. Unemployment and GDP per capita are still negatively correlated, the opposite direction than was predicted. Political tolerance and having minority friends are positively correlated with attitudes on immigration. Trust is not significant in the final model. The impact

12 Jason E. Kehrberg 275 of political tolerance continues to be strong, despite the introduction of the economic variables into the final model, particularly in the lack of political tolerance and negative attitudes on immigration (17.2% more likely). Having minority friends is the strongest predictor of positive attitudes on immigration while not having minority friends is also a strong predictor of negative attitudes. Individuals with no minority friends are 23.1% more likely to have negative attitudes of immigration. Individuals with many minority friends are 12.2% more likely to have positive attitudes towards immigrants. Examining the predicted probabilities provides evidence that GDP per capita, GNP change, and personal situation have greater influence on public attitudes on immigration than income and change in unemployment. An interesting pattern develops when examining the predicted probabilities for all three models. The minimum value of the variables of interest tends to be strong predictors of the most negative attitudes on immigration, individuals who believed that their country was a great deal better off without immigrants. The one exception is trust, which is not a strong predictor of public opinion immigration. The only variable that is a strong predictor of the most positive attitudes (individuals who believed their country benefits a great deal from immigrants) on immigration is having minority friends. Political tolerance and inter-country variation Both the ordered probit model and the predicted probabilities indicate that political tolerance is a strong predictor of attitudes towards immigration, particularly the relationship between low political tolerance and negative attitudes. Therefore, is political tolerance a strong predictor for each country in this study? Unfortunately, the answer is mixed due to the results presented in Figure 1 and Table 3. Figure 1 provides an examination of the relationship between political tolerance and attitudes on immigration on the country level. The scatterplot indicates a positive relationship between attitudes and political tolerance, as indicated in the multi-variate model. The overall pattern is interesting. Greece and Portugal have the highest mean value for both political tolerance and attitudes toward immigration, while both Spain and Italy have high levels of political tolerance but lower immigration attitudes than expected. Interestingly, these are four of the five countries with the lowest percentage of foreign citizens in their country. 13 The correlation between the mean value of political tolerance and the percentage of foreign citizens is 0.614, and the correlation is significant. Table 3 shows the correlation between political tolerance and attitudes on immigration at the individual level for each country in the study. These correlations indicate whether a country s political tolerance predicts attitudes on immigration at the bivariate and individual levels, and the strength of the

13 276 Jason E. Kehrberg GR PO Immigration Attitudes SW NE FR DE UK GE FI AU IR IT SP 1.4 BE Political Tolerance Figure 1 Relationship between immigration attitudes and political tolerance. Note: Plotted the mean value for immigration attitudes (dependent variable) and political tolerance per country. AU=Austria, BF=Belgium, DE=Debmark, FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IR=Ireland, IT=Italy, NE=Netherlands, PO=Portugal, SP=Spain, SW=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom. Table 3 Correlation between political tolerance and immigration attitudes Austria: 0.170** Germany: 0.129** Portugal: 0.105** Belgium: 0.288** Greece: 0.075* Spain: 0.097** Denmark: 0.150** Ireland: 0.072* Sweden: 0.112** Finland: Italy: UK: 0.098** France: 0.295** Netherlands: *Po0.05; **Po0.01; one-tailed test. relationship between the two variables. The strongest of these results are for Belgium, France, Austria, and Denmark. It is not a significant predictor of public attitudes on immigration in Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands. Conclusions Building upon the work of Lincoln Quillian (1995), Peer Scheepers et al. (2002), and Robert M. Kunovich (2004), I expanded the research on collective

14 Jason E. Kehrberg 277 economics and tested the influence of political tolerance on the cross-national level. Thus, the final model provides evidence that public opinion on immigration is explained by numerous factors (Sniderman et al., 2004): the collective economy (Lahav, 2004), political tolerance, individual exposure in the form of having minority friends (McLaren, 2003), and how the individual views their individual economic situation. Adding collective economic variables shows that the national economy is also an important factor in explaining public attitudes on immigration, but the variables with strongest impact are GDP per capita and GNP change, and not the unemployment variables used in the previous studies. Second, the results show that both short- and long-term influences are important determinants of individual attitudes. The long-term influences (political tolerance) are difficult to change; one possible method is through education. A country that is able to increase their political tolerance of outsiders will more likely have a positive attitude of immigrants. This is especially true in Belgium and France that have the strongest individual relationship between political tolerance and attitudes on immigration. The second part of this story is the short-term economic influence upon public opinion on immigration. Economies cycle through periods of good and bad times, and these cycles tend to be mostly uncontrollable by governments. Based upon the results, we can expect attitudes on immigration to also cycle with the national economy. Specifically, I would expect attitudes to cycle with GDP growth rates. Finally, an individual s number of minority friends is a strong predictor of attitudes on immigration. It is unclear at this time what is causing this result. One theory is that this type of contact decreases the perceived threat of the other ethnic groups. Another possibility is that friendship causes an understanding of their friend s social marginality. Future research can expand our understanding of the relationship between economic factors, political tolerance, and exposure to immigrations in four different ways. First, this study focuses upon a single survey conducted in 1997; the results may be a product of that individual year. 14 Research using a longer period of time but the same variables would provide better evidence of the relationship between these variables and public opinion. Second, future research should also expand the number of countries included in the study. Expanding the number of countries allows for greater generalization of the results, and a better understanding of a general theory of attitudes on immigration. Third, several of the variables should be studied in greater detail. Does an individual s attitude, which has minority friends from a single ethnic group, have positive attitudes for that specific ethnic group or for all ethnic groups? By accomplishing these tasks in future research, scholars can expand the width of our understanding of attitudes toward immigrants and be able to generalize as the field moves towards a grand theory of public opinion on

15 278 Jason E. Kehrberg immigration. Fourth, the study raises several questions concerning the relationship between political tolerance and immigration attitudes. Table 3 and Figure 1 provide evidence that the relationship between these two variables vary from one country to the next country. Weldon (2006) explains part of this variance by examining how citizenship laws influence the political tolerance of immigrants, but the picture is still incomplete on this subject. It is important that future research determines why countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, with similar economies and political cultures vary greatly while other very different countries are similar, in their opinions on immigration and political tolerance. Notes 1 The conflict between natives and immigrants is not the typical interaction between the two groups and only includes a small percentage of both groups. These events do result in immigration being a political, social, and media issue in Europe. 2 Lincoln Quillian (1995, 586) refers to his theory as a collective threat. 3 For a review of individual and collective categories concerning electoral performance, see Lewis-Beck (1986). 4 Random samples of individuals were taken from each member of the EU. The questions are the same, and the sample size is usually 1,000 individuals except for the United Kingdom and Germany. Note that Luxembourg is not included in this study but was included in the survey. 5The appendix provides further details about the coding changes to the dependent variable as well as the mean and standard deviation for the dependent variable in Tables A1 and A2. 6 The unemployment variables used data from two sources. The Eurostat Yearbook provided the number of unemployed individuals in each country for 1995and 1996, and the CIA World Factbook provided the population of each country for the same years. I divided the number of unemployed individuals by the total population to find the percentage of each country that was unemployed. 7 The unemployed change variable was simply the difference between the percentages from 1995 and Most of the variables came from the Eurostat Yearbook, and each country s values were attached to the respondent from that country. 9 The bottom 25% of the respondents in each country are coded as 1, the second quartile is coded as 2, the third as 3, and the highest as I ran the models with individual questions and found that each was in the expected correlated direction. The reported results use the combined tolerance index. 11 See Appendix for exact questions and coding changes for the tolerance index. 12 I removed all respondents currently continuing their education as they were coded as Finland has the lowest percentage of foreign citizens, but ranks in the middle of the scatterplot. 14 Unfortunately, the number of data sets with immigration questions are limited, and the 1997 Eurobarometer is the only data set that I am aware of that includes both immigration and political tolerance questions, thus limiting us to a temporary analysis at this time. References Betz, H.-G. (2001) Exclusionary populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland, International Journal 56(3):

16 Jason E. Kehrberg 279 Bobo, L. and Licari, F.C. (1989) Education and political tolerance: testing the effects of cognitive sophistication and target group affect, The Public Opinion Quarterly 53(3): Brox, O. (1972) Strukturfacismen ock andraessaer, Stockholm: Prisma. Gaasholt, O. and Togeby, L. (1995) Interethnic tolerance, education, and political orientation: evidence from Denmark, Political Behavior 17(3): Gibson, J.L. (1992) The political consequences of intolerance: cultural conformity and political freedom, The American Political Science Review 86(2): Gibson, J.L. and Anderson, A.J. (1985) The political implications of elite and mass tolerance, Political Behavior 7(2): Golder, M. (2003) Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe, Comparative Political Studies 36(4): Golebiowska, E.A. (1995) Individual value priorities, education, and political tolerance, Political Behavior 17(1): Golebiowska, E.A. (1996) The pictures in our heads and individual-targeted tolerance, The Journal of Politics 58(4): Hernes, G. and Knudsen, K. (1992) Norwegians attitudes toward new immigrants, Acta Sociologica 35: Inglehart, R. (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kessler, A.E. and Freeman, G.P. (2005) Public opinion in the EU on immigration from outside the community, Journal of Common Market Studies 43(4): Kunovich, R.M. (2004) Social structural position and prejudice: an exploration of cross-national differences in regression slopes, Social Science Research 33: Lahav, G. (2004) Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lewis-Beck, M.S. (1986) Comparative economic voting: Britain, France, Germany, Italy, American Journal of Political Science 30(2): Lewis-Beck, M.S. and Stegmaier, M. (2006) Economic Models of the Vote, in R. Dalton and H.-D. Klingemann (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M. and Scheepers, P. (2002) Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe, European Journal of Political Research 41: Mayer, N. (2002) Ces Francais qui votent Le Pen, Paris: Flammarion. McLaren, L.M. (2003) Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe: contact, threat perception, and preferences for the exclusion of migrants, Social Forces 81(3): Quillian, L. (1995) Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe, American Sociological Review 60(4): Runchiman, W.G. (1966) Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Scheepers, P., Gijsberts, M. and Coenders, M. (2002) Ethnic exclusionism in European countries: public opposition to civil rights for legal migrants as a response to perceived ethnic threat, European Sociological Review 18(1): Sniderman, P.M., Tetlock, P.E., Glaser, J.M., Green, D.P. and Hout, M. (1989) Principled tolerance and the American mass public, British Journal of Political Science 19(1): Sniderman, P.M., Hagendoorn, L. and Prior, M. (2004) Predisposing factors and situational triggers: exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities, American Political Science Review 98(1): Sullivan, J.L., Piereson, J.E. and Marcus, G.E. (1982) Political Tolerance and American Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Weldon, S.A. (2006) The institutional context of tolerance for ethnic minorities: a comparative, multi-level analysis of Western Europe, American Journal of Political Science 50(2):

17 280 Jason E. Kehrberg Zolberg, A.R. (1991) Bounded States in A Global Market: The Uses of International Labor Migrations, in P. Bourdieu and J.S. Coleman (eds.) Social Theory for a Changing Society, Boulder, CO: Westview. Appendix Dependent Variable Question Wording and Code Changes Eurobarometer Question 55: Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY) benefits from the presence of immigrants from non European Union countries, or do you think that (OUR COUNTRY) would be better off without them? The following changes were made to this variable (Tables A1 and A2): Table A1 Changes to question 55, immigrants presence benefit Original code Answer Code change 1 Benefits a great deal 4 2 Benefits a little 3 3 A little better off 1 4 Great deal better off 0 5No difference 2 Table A2 Mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable by country Country Mean Standard deviation Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK

18 Jason E. Kehrberg 281 Independent Economic Variables Question Wording Eurobarometer Question 37, Personal Situation: If you compare your present situation with five years ago, would you say it has improved, stayed about the same or got worse? Eurobarometer Question 39, Unemployed in Last 5Years: During the last five years I have been unemployed once or more Tolerance Index Question Wording and Code Changes Each individual was asked for each of the following rights and freedoms, could you please tell me whether you think they should be respected under all circumstances, or whether this depends on the circumstances. The individual was then asked about certain rights and freedoms. Eurobarometer Question 46_1, Freedom of Speech Eurobarometer Question 46_2, Freedom of Association Eurobarometer Question 46_3, Own Culture and Language Eurobarometer Question 46_4, Religious Freedom Eurobarometer Question 46_5, Equality Before the Law Each question was coded 1 for all circumstances and 2 for it depends. I changed the 2 for it depends to a 0 and then added all four questions together.