Lecture Notes 10
|
|
|
- Ira Floyd
- 9 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Lecture Notes 1 Guido Lorenzoni Fall 29 1 Continuous time: nite horizon Time goes from to T. Instantaneous payo : f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) ; (the time dependence includes discounting), where x (t) 2 X and y (t) 2 Y. Constraint: _x (t) = g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) : (1) Relative to discrete time, we are now using the state variable/control variable approach (x is the state, y is the control). We assume throughout that f and g are continuously di erentiable functions. Problem is to choose the functions x (:) and y (:) to maximize f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt subject to constraint (1) for each t 2 [; T ] and the initial condition: x () given. We will use two approaches, a variational approach and a dynamic programming approach. Both approaches will be used as heuristic arguments for the Principle of Optimality. 1.1 Variational approach Necessity argument Suppose you know that optimal x (t) and y (t) exist and are interior for each t. We use a variational approach to derive necessary conditions for optimality. Take any continuous function h (t) and let y (t; ") = y (t) + "h (t) : To obtain the perturbed version of x, solve the di erential equation _x (t; ") = g (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) (2) 1
2 with initial condition x (; ") = x (). For j"j small enough both y (t; ") and x (t; ") are, respectively, in Y and X. Optimality implies that W (") f (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) dt f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt = W () for all " in a neighborhood of, and, supposing, W is di erentiable this implies Moreover, (2) implies that W (") = f (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) dt + W () = : (t) [g (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) _x (t; ")] dt for any continuous function (t). Integrating by parts, this can be rewritten as W (") = [f (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) + (t) g (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; "))] dt + (T ) x (T; ") + () x (; ") + _ (t) x (t; ") dt Suppose we can di erentiate x (t; ") and y (t; "), we have that W (") = + h f x (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) + (t) g x (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) + _ i (t) x " (t; ") dt [f y (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; ")) + (t) g y (t; x (t; ") ; y (t; "))] y " (t; ") dt (T ) x " (T; ") (given that x (; ") = x ()). Now we will choose the function so that all the derivatives x " (T; ") (which are hard to compute since they involve the di erential equation (2)) vanish. In particular set (T ) = and let (t) solve the di erential equation _ (t) = f x (t; x (t) ; y (t)) (t) g x (t; x (t) ; y (t)) : Moreover y " (t; ") = h (t) so putting together our results we have: W () = [f y (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g y (t; x (t) ; y (t))] h (t) dt = : Since this must be true for any choice of h (t) it follows that a necessary condition for this to be satis es is f y (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g y (t; x (t) ; y (t)) = : We can summarize this result de ning the Hamiltonian H (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) = f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) ; and we have the following: 2
3 Theorem 1 If x and y are optimal, continuous and interior then there exists a continuously di erentiable function (t) such that H y (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) = (3) and (T ) = Su ciency argument _ (t) = H x (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) (4) _x (t) = H (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) (5) Now suppose we have found candidate solutions x (t) and y (t) which satisfy (3)-(5) for some continuous function (:). We want to check if these conditions are su cient for an optimum. For this, we need an additional concavity assumption. Let M (t; x (t) ; (t)) = max H (t; x (t) ; y; (t)) (6) y and suppose that M is concave in x. Consider any other feasible path x (t) and y (t). Then f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) M (t; x (t) ; (t)) M (t; x (t) ; (t)) + M x (t; x (t) ; (t)) (x (t) x (t)) or f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + M x (t; x (t) ; (t)) (x (t) x (t)) Now M x (t; x (t) ; (t)) = H x (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) = _ (t) the rst from an envelope argument, and the second from (4). So we have f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) ( _x (t) _x (t)) + _ (t) (x (t) x (t)) (7) Integrating by parts and using (T ) = and x () = x () we have f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt We have thus proved a converse to Theorem 1: f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt: Theorem 2 If x and y are two continuous functions that satisfy (3)-(5) for some continuous function (:) with (T ) =, X is a convex set and M (t; x; (t)) is concave in x for all t 2 [; T ] then x and y are optimal. 3
4 1.2 Dynamic programming We now use a di erent approach to characterize the same problem. De ne the value function (sequence problem): V (t; x (t)) = max x;y s:t: t f (t; x () ; y ()) d _x () = g (; x () ; y ()) x (t) given The principle of optimality can be applied to obtain Z s V (t; x (t)) = max f (; x () ; y ()) d + V (s; x (s)) x;y s:t: t _x = g (; x () ; y ()) and x (t) given rewrite the maximization problem as Z s f (; x () ; y ()) d + V (s; x (s)) max x;y t and taking limits we have Z 1 s lim s!t s t max f (; x () ; y ()) d + V (s; x (s)) x;y t V (t; x (t)) = V (t; x (t)) = Suppose now that: (1) we can invert taking the limit and taking the maximum, and (2) V is di erentiable w.r.t. to both arguments. Then we obtain n max f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + _ o V (t; x (t)) + V x (t; x (t)) _x (t) = y and max ff (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + V x (t; x (t)) g (t; x (t) ; y (t))g + V _ (t; x (t)) = (8) y This is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. We can use it to derive the Maximum Principle conditions once more. Given an optimal solution x ; y just identify (t) = V x (t; x (t)) (9) and we immediately have that y (t) must maximize the Hamiltonian: max ff (t; x (t) ; y) + (t) g (t; x (t) ; y)g : y We can also get the condition for (t) (4) assuming V is twice di erentiable. Di erentiating both sides of (9) yields _ (t) = V x;t (t; x (t)) + V x;x (t; x (t)) _x (t) 4
5 Di erentiating (8) with respect to x (t) (which can be done because the condition holds for all possible x (t) not just the optimal one, we are using a value function!) and using an envelope argument we get f x (t; x (t) ; y (t))+v x (t; x (t)) g x (t; x (t) ; y (t))+v x;x (t; x (t)) g (t; x (t) ; y (t))+v t;x (t; x (t)) = Combining the two (at the optimal path) yields which implies (4). f x (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g x (t; x (t) ; y (t)) + _ (t) = 2 In nite Horizon The problem now is to maximize subject to f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) _x (t) = g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) an initial condition x () and a terminal condition lim b (t) x (t) = where b (t) is some given function b : R +! R +. Going to in nite horizon the Maximum Principle still works, but we need to add some conditions at 1 (to replace the condition (T ) = we were using above). 2.1 Su ciency argument Let us go in reverse now and look rst for su cient conditions for an optimum. Suppose we have a candidate path x (t) ; y (t) that satis es conditions (3)-(5) for some continuous function and the function M de ned in (6) is concave. We can compare the candidate path with any other feasible path as in the proof of Theorem 2, however at the moment of integrating by parts (7) we are left with the following expression: f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt + lim (t) (x (t) x (t)) : If we assume that lim (t) x (t) = and lim (t) x (t) for all feasible paths x (t) we then have This proves the following. f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt f (t; x (t) ; y (t)) dt: 5
6 Theorem 3 Suppose x and y are two continuous functions that satisfy (3)- (5) for some continuous function (:), X is a convex set and M (t; x; (t)) is concave in x for all t and the following two conditions are satis ed and lim (t) x (t) = (transversality condition) (1) lim (t) x (t) for all feasible paths x (t) : (11) Then x and y are optimal. If M (t; x; (t)) is strictly concave in x then x and y are the unique optimal solution. We have thus established that the transversality condition (1) (together with concavity and our usual optimality conditions) is su cient. 2.2 Necessity Proving that some transversality condition is necessary is more cumbersome and requires additional assumptions (although, clearly, when we deal with necessary conditions we don t need concavity). The general idea is the following. Use the HBJ equation (8) to show that _V (t; x (t)) = H (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) : If you can argue that lim _ V (t; x (t)) = then you have the transversality condition lim H (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) = : Under additional conditions (e.g. if x (t) converges to a steady state level) then this condition implies (1). (See Theorems 7.12 and 7.13 in Acemoglu (29)). However, in applications it is often more useful to use the transversality condition as a su cient condition (as in Theorem 3 and in Theorem 7.14 in Acemoglu (29)). 3 Discounting The problem now is to maximize subject to e t f (x (t) ; y (t)) _x (t) = g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) an initial condition x () and a terminal condition lim b (t) x (t) = 6
7 where b (t) is some given function b : R +! R +. First, notice that the Hamiltonian would be H (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) = e t f (x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) but de ning (t) = e t (t) we can de ne the current-value Hamiltonian ~H (x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) = f (x (t) ; y (t)) + (t) g (t; x (t) ; y (t)) (so that H = e t ~ H, so H is also called present-value Hamiltonian). Therefore, conditions (3)-(5) become ~H y (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) = _ (t) = (t) ~ Hx (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) _x (t) = ~ H (t; x (t) ; y (t) ; (t)) : The limiting conditions (1) and (11) become and lim e t (t) x (t) = (transversality condition) lim e t (t) x (t) for all feasible paths x (t) : All the results above go through and we just express them using di erent variables. 7
8 MIT OpenCourseWare Dynamic Optimization Methods with Applications Fall 29 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit:
14.452 Economic Growth: Lectures 6 and 7, Neoclassical Growth
14.452 Economic Growth: Lectures 6 and 7, Neoclassical Growth Daron Acemoglu MIT November 15 and 17, 211. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Economic Growth Lectures 6 and 7 November 15 and 17, 211. 1 / 71 Introduction
This is a simple guide to optimal control theory. In what follows, I borrow freely from Kamien and Shwartz (1981) and King (1986).
ECON72: MACROECONOMIC THEORY I Martin Boileau A CHILD'S GUIDE TO OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY 1. Introduction This is a simple guide to optimal control theory. In what follows, I borrow freely from Kamien and
14.452 Economic Growth: Lectures 2 and 3: The Solow Growth Model
14.452 Economic Growth: Lectures 2 and 3: The Solow Growth Model Daron Acemoglu MIT November 1 and 3, 2011. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Economic Growth Lectures 2 and 3 November 1 and 3, 2011. 1 / 96 Solow Growth
4. Only one asset that can be used for production, and is available in xed supply in the aggregate (call it land).
Chapter 3 Credit and Business Cycles Here I present a model of the interaction between credit and business cycles. In representative agent models, remember, no lending takes place! The literature on the
The Real Business Cycle Model
The Real Business Cycle Model Ester Faia Goethe University Frankfurt Nov 2015 Ester Faia (Goethe University Frankfurt) RBC Nov 2015 1 / 27 Introduction The RBC model explains the co-movements in the uctuations
UCLA. Department of Economics Ph. D. Preliminary Exam Micro-Economic Theory
UCLA Department of Economics Ph. D. Preliminary Exam Micro-Economic Theory (SPRING 2011) Instructions: You have 4 hours for the exam Answer any 5 out of the 6 questions. All questions are weighted equally.
Representation of functions as power series
Representation of functions as power series Dr. Philippe B. Laval Kennesaw State University November 9, 008 Abstract This document is a summary of the theory and techniques used to represent functions
CAPM, Arbitrage, and Linear Factor Models
CAPM, Arbitrage, and Linear Factor Models CAPM, Arbitrage, Linear Factor Models 1/ 41 Introduction We now assume all investors actually choose mean-variance e cient portfolios. By equating these investors
Discrete Dynamic Optimization: Six Examples
Discrete Dynamic Optimization: Six Examples Dr. Tai-kuang Ho Associate Professor. Department of Quantitative Finance, National Tsing Hua University, No. 101, Section 2, Kuang-Fu Road, Hsinchu, Taiwan 30013,
Market Power, Forward Trading and Supply Function. Competition
Market Power, Forward Trading and Supply Function Competition Matías Herrera Dappe University of Maryland May, 2008 Abstract When rms can produce any level of output, strategic forward trading can enhance
Economics 326: Duality and the Slutsky Decomposition. Ethan Kaplan
Economics 326: Duality and the Slutsky Decomposition Ethan Kaplan September 19, 2011 Outline 1. Convexity and Declining MRS 2. Duality and Hicksian Demand 3. Slutsky Decomposition 4. Net and Gross Substitutes
Optimal Auctions. Jonathan Levin 1. Winter 2009. Economics 285 Market Design. 1 These slides are based on Paul Milgrom s.
Optimal Auctions Jonathan Levin 1 Economics 285 Market Design Winter 29 1 These slides are based on Paul Milgrom s. onathan Levin Optimal Auctions Winter 29 1 / 25 Optimal Auctions What auction rules lead
Partial Derivatives. @x f (x; y) = @ x f (x; y) @x x2 y + @ @x y2 and then we evaluate the derivative as if y is a constant.
Partial Derivatives Partial Derivatives Just as derivatives can be used to eplore the properties of functions of 1 variable, so also derivatives can be used to eplore functions of 2 variables. In this
CHAPTER 7 APPLICATIONS TO MARKETING. Chapter 7 p. 1/54
CHAPTER 7 APPLICATIONS TO MARKETING Chapter 7 p. 1/54 APPLICATIONS TO MARKETING State Equation: Rate of sales expressed in terms of advertising, which is a control variable Objective: Profit maximization
15 Kuhn -Tucker conditions
5 Kuhn -Tucker conditions Consider a version of the consumer problem in which quasilinear utility x 2 + 4 x 2 is maximised subject to x +x 2 =. Mechanically applying the Lagrange multiplier/common slopes
Long-Term Debt Pricing and Monetary Policy Transmission under Imperfect Knowledge
Long-Term Debt Pricing and Monetary Policy Transmission under Imperfect Knowledge Stefano Eusepi, Marc Giannoni and Bruce Preston The views expressed are those of the authors and are not necessarily re
IDENTIFICATION IN A CLASS OF NONPARAMETRIC SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODELS. Steven T. Berry and Philip A. Haile. March 2011 Revised April 2011
IDENTIFICATION IN A CLASS OF NONPARAMETRIC SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODELS By Steven T. Berry and Philip A. Haile March 2011 Revised April 2011 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1787R COWLES FOUNDATION
1 Present and Future Value
Lecture 8: Asset Markets c 2009 Je rey A. Miron Outline:. Present and Future Value 2. Bonds 3. Taxes 4. Applications Present and Future Value In the discussion of the two-period model with borrowing and
Lecture 3: Growth with Overlapping Generations (Acemoglu 2009, Chapter 9, adapted from Zilibotti)
Lecture 3: Growth with Overlapping Generations (Acemoglu 2009, Chapter 9, adapted from Zilibotti) Kjetil Storesletten September 10, 2013 Kjetil Storesletten () Lecture 3 September 10, 2013 1 / 44 Growth
36 CHAPTER 1. LIMITS AND CONTINUITY. Figure 1.17: At which points is f not continuous?
36 CHAPTER 1. LIMITS AND CONTINUITY 1.3 Continuity Before Calculus became clearly de ned, continuity meant that one could draw the graph of a function without having to lift the pen and pencil. While this
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II. The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model
Universidad de Montevideo Macroeconomia II Danilo R. Trupkin Class Notes (very preliminar) The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans Model 1 Introduction One shortcoming of the Solow model is that the saving rate is exogenous
Exact Nonparametric Tests for Comparing Means - A Personal Summary
Exact Nonparametric Tests for Comparing Means - A Personal Summary Karl H. Schlag European University Institute 1 December 14, 2006 1 Economics Department, European University Institute. Via della Piazzuola
Adverse selection and moral hazard in health insurance.
Adverse selection and moral hazard in health insurance. Franck Bien David Alary University Paris Dauphine November 10, 2006 Abstract In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance
Section 2.4: Equations of Lines and Planes
Section.4: Equations of Lines and Planes An equation of three variable F (x, y, z) 0 is called an equation of a surface S if For instance, (x 1, y 1, z 1 ) S if and only if F (x 1, y 1, z 1 ) 0. x + y
Intertemporal approach to current account: small open economy
Intertemporal approach to current account: small open economy Ester Faia Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität Frankfurt a.m. March 2009 ster Faia (Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität Intertemporal Frankfurt
Chapter 13 Internal (Lyapunov) Stability 13.1 Introduction We have already seen some examples of both stable and unstable systems. The objective of th
Lectures on Dynamic Systems and Control Mohammed Dahleh Munther A. Dahleh George Verghese Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Massachuasetts Institute of Technology 1 1 c Chapter
Critical points of once continuously differentiable functions are important because they are the only points that can be local maxima or minima.
Lecture 0: Convexity and Optimization We say that if f is a once continuously differentiable function on an interval I, and x is a point in the interior of I that x is a critical point of f if f (x) =
Chapter 3: Section 3-3 Solutions of Linear Programming Problems
Chapter 3: Section 3-3 Solutions of Linear Programming Problems D. S. Malik Creighton University, Omaha, NE D. S. Malik Creighton University, Omaha, NE Chapter () 3: Section 3-3 Solutions of Linear Programming
Advanced Microeconomics
Advanced Microeconomics Ordinal preference theory Harald Wiese University of Leipzig Harald Wiese (University of Leipzig) Advanced Microeconomics 1 / 68 Part A. Basic decision and preference theory 1 Decisions
How To Solve A Minimum Set Covering Problem (Mcp)
Measuring Rationality with the Minimum Cost of Revealed Preference Violations Mark Dean and Daniel Martin Online Appendices - Not for Publication 1 1 Algorithm for Solving the MASP In this online appendix
Implementation of optimal settlement functions in real-time gross settlement systems
Universidade de Brasília Departamento de Economia Série Textos para Discussão Implementation of optimal settlement functions in real-time gross settlement systems Rodrigo Peñaloza Texto No 353 Brasília,
Class Notes, Econ 8801 Lump Sum Taxes are Awesome
Class Notes, Econ 8801 Lump Sum Taxes are Awesome Larry E. Jones 1 Exchange Economies with Taxes and Spending 1.1 Basics 1) Assume that there are n goods which can be consumed in any non-negative amounts;
Walrasian Demand. u(x) where B(p, w) = {x R n + : p x w}.
Walrasian Demand Econ 2100 Fall 2015 Lecture 5, September 16 Outline 1 Walrasian Demand 2 Properties of Walrasian Demand 3 An Optimization Recipe 4 First and Second Order Conditions Definition Walrasian
1 Maximizing pro ts when marginal costs are increasing
BEE12 Basic Mathematical Economics Week 1, Lecture Tuesda 12.1. Pro t maimization 1 Maimizing pro ts when marginal costs are increasing We consider in this section a rm in a perfectl competitive market
Duality of linear conic problems
Duality of linear conic problems Alexander Shapiro and Arkadi Nemirovski Abstract It is well known that the optimal values of a linear programming problem and its dual are equal to each other if at least
Chapter 7 Nonlinear Systems
Chapter 7 Nonlinear Systems Nonlinear systems in R n : X = B x. x n X = F (t; X) F (t; x ; :::; x n ) B C A ; F (t; X) =. F n (t; x ; :::; x n ) When F (t; X) = F (X) is independent of t; it is an example
Discussion of Self-ful lling Fire Sales: Fragility of Collateralised, Short-Term, Debt Markets, by J. C.-F. Kuong
Discussion of Self-ful lling Fire Sales: Fragility of Collateralised, Short-Term, Debt Markets, by J. C.-F. Kuong 10 July 2015 Coordination games Schelling (1960). Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
Financial Economics Lecture notes. Alberto Bisin Dept. of Economics NYU
Financial Economics Lecture notes Alberto Bisin Dept. of Economics NYU September 25, 2010 Contents Preface ix 1 Introduction 1 2 Two-period economies 3 2.1 Arrow-Debreu economies..................... 3
14.773 Problem Set 2 Due Date: March 7, 2013
14.773 Problem Set 2 Due Date: March 7, 2013 Question 1 Consider a group of countries that di er in their preferences for public goods. The utility function for the representative country i is! NX U i
Practice with Proofs
Practice with Proofs October 6, 2014 Recall the following Definition 0.1. A function f is increasing if for every x, y in the domain of f, x < y = f(x) < f(y) 1. Prove that h(x) = x 3 is increasing, using
Surface Normals and Tangent Planes
Surface Normals and Tangent Planes Normal and Tangent Planes to Level Surfaces Because the equation of a plane requires a point and a normal vector to the plane, nding the equation of a tangent plane to
Real Business Cycle Models
Real Business Cycle Models Lecture 2 Nicola Viegi April 2015 Basic RBC Model Claim: Stochastic General Equlibrium Model Is Enough to Explain The Business cycle Behaviour of the Economy Money is of little
Review Horse Race Gambling and Side Information Dependent horse races and the entropy rate. Gambling. Besma Smida. ES250: Lecture 9.
Gambling Besma Smida ES250: Lecture 9 Fall 2008-09 B. Smida (ES250) Gambling Fall 2008-09 1 / 23 Today s outline Review of Huffman Code and Arithmetic Coding Horse Race Gambling and Side Information Dependent
Portfolio selection based on upper and lower exponential possibility distributions
European Journal of Operational Research 114 (1999) 115±126 Theory and Methodology Portfolio selection based on upper and lower exponential possibility distributions Hideo Tanaka *, Peijun Guo Department
Online Appendix to Stochastic Imitative Game Dynamics with Committed Agents
Online Appendix to Stochastic Imitative Game Dynamics with Committed Agents William H. Sandholm January 6, 22 O.. Imitative protocols, mean dynamics, and equilibrium selection In this section, we consider
Midterm March 2015. (a) Consumer i s budget constraint is. c i 0 12 + b i c i H 12 (1 + r)b i c i L 12 (1 + r)b i ;
Masters in Economics-UC3M Microeconomics II Midterm March 015 Exercise 1. In an economy that extends over two periods, today and tomorrow, there are two consumers, A and B; and a single perishable good,
HOMEWORK 5 SOLUTIONS. n!f n (1) lim. ln x n! + xn x. 1 = G n 1 (x). (2) k + 1 n. (n 1)!
Math 7 Fall 205 HOMEWORK 5 SOLUTIONS Problem. 2008 B2 Let F 0 x = ln x. For n 0 and x > 0, let F n+ x = 0 F ntdt. Evaluate n!f n lim n ln n. By directly computing F n x for small n s, we obtain the following
Moreover, under the risk neutral measure, it must be the case that (5) r t = µ t.
LECTURE 7: BLACK SCHOLES THEORY 1. Introduction: The Black Scholes Model In 1973 Fisher Black and Myron Scholes ushered in the modern era of derivative securities with a seminal paper 1 on the pricing
Nonlinear Optimization: Algorithms 3: Interior-point methods
Nonlinear Optimization: Algorithms 3: Interior-point methods INSEAD, Spring 2006 Jean-Philippe Vert Ecole des Mines de Paris [email protected] Nonlinear optimization c 2006 Jean-Philippe Vert,
Elements of probability theory
2 Elements of probability theory Probability theory provides mathematical models for random phenomena, that is, phenomena which under repeated observations yield di erent outcomes that cannot be predicted
MATH 425, PRACTICE FINAL EXAM SOLUTIONS.
MATH 45, PRACTICE FINAL EXAM SOLUTIONS. Exercise. a Is the operator L defined on smooth functions of x, y by L u := u xx + cosu linear? b Does the answer change if we replace the operator L by the operator
8.1 Min Degree Spanning Tree
CS880: Approximations Algorithms Scribe: Siddharth Barman Lecturer: Shuchi Chawla Topic: Min Degree Spanning Tree Date: 02/15/07 In this lecture we give a local search based algorithm for the Min Degree
6.207/14.15: Networks Lecture 15: Repeated Games and Cooperation
6.207/14.15: Networks Lecture 15: Repeated Games and Cooperation Daron Acemoglu and Asu Ozdaglar MIT November 2, 2009 1 Introduction Outline The problem of cooperation Finitely-repeated prisoner s dilemma
Lecture 6: Price discrimination II (Nonlinear Pricing)
Lecture 6: Price discrimination II (Nonlinear Pricing) EC 105. Industrial Organization. Fall 2011 Matt Shum HSS, California Institute of Technology November 14, 2012 EC 105. Industrial Organization. Fall
Voluntary Voting: Costs and Bene ts
Voluntary Voting: Costs and Bene ts Vijay Krishna y and John Morgan z November 7, 2008 Abstract We study strategic voting in a Condorcet type model in which voters have identical preferences but di erential
14.452 Economic Growth: Lecture 11, Technology Diffusion, Trade and World Growth
14.452 Economic Growth: Lecture 11, Technology Diffusion, Trade and World Growth Daron Acemoglu MIT December 2, 2014. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Economic Growth Lecture 11 December 2, 2014. 1 / 43 Introduction
Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk
Optimal insurance contracts with adverse selection and comonotonic background risk Alary D. Bien F. TSE (LERNA) University Paris Dauphine Abstract In this note, we consider an adverse selection problem
Pricing Cloud Computing: Inelasticity and Demand Discovery
Pricing Cloud Computing: Inelasticity and Demand Discovery June 7, 203 Abstract The recent growth of the cloud computing market has convinced many businesses and policy makers that cloud-based technologies
Common sense, and the model that we have used, suggest that an increase in p means a decrease in demand, but this is not the only possibility.
Lecture 6: Income and Substitution E ects c 2009 Je rey A. Miron Outline 1. Introduction 2. The Substitution E ect 3. The Income E ect 4. The Sign of the Substitution E ect 5. The Total Change in Demand
LS.6 Solution Matrices
LS.6 Solution Matrices In the literature, solutions to linear systems often are expressed using square matrices rather than vectors. You need to get used to the terminology. As before, we state the definitions
Consumer Theory. The consumer s problem
Consumer Theory The consumer s problem 1 The Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) We define the MRS(x,y) as the absolute value of the slope of the line tangent to the indifference curve at point point (x,y).
Labor Economics, 14.661. Lecture 12: Equilibrium Search and Matching
Labor Economics, 14.661. Lecture 12: Equilibrium Search and Matching Daron Acemoglu MIT December 8, 2011. Daron Acemoglu (MIT) Equilibrium Search and Matching December 8, 2011. 1 / 61 Introduction Introduction
Do option prices support the subjective probabilities of takeover completion derived from spot prices? Sergey Gelman March 2005
Do option prices support the subjective probabilities of takeover completion derived from spot prices? Sergey Gelman March 2005 University of Muenster Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultaet Am Stadtgraben
Cooperation with Network Monitoring
Cooperation with Network Monitoring Alexander Wolitzky Microsoft Research and Stanford University July 20 Abstract This paper studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in sequential
1 if 1 x 0 1 if 0 x 1
Chapter 3 Continuity In this chapter we begin by defining the fundamental notion of continuity for real valued functions of a single real variable. When trying to decide whether a given function is or
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 6.436J/15.085J Fall 2008 Lecture 5 9/17/2008 RANDOM VARIABLES
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 6.436J/15.085J Fall 2008 Lecture 5 9/17/2008 RANDOM VARIABLES Contents 1. Random variables and measurable functions 2. Cumulative distribution functions 3. Discrete
Lecture Notes: Basic Concepts in Option Pricing - The Black and Scholes Model
Brunel University Msc., EC5504, Financial Engineering Prof Menelaos Karanasos Lecture Notes: Basic Concepts in Option Pricing - The Black and Scholes Model Recall that the price of an option is equal to
The Binomial Distribution
The Binomial Distribution James H. Steiger November 10, 00 1 Topics for this Module 1. The Binomial Process. The Binomial Random Variable. The Binomial Distribution (a) Computing the Binomial pdf (b) Computing
An investigation of cheapest-to-deliver on Treasury bond futures contracts
An investigation of cheapest-to-deliver on Treasury bond futures contracts Simon Benninga and Zvi Wiener It is commonly believed that the cheapest-to-deliver bond on a Treasury bond futures contract has
OPTIMAL CONTROL OF A COMMERCIAL LOAN REPAYMENT PLAN. E.V. Grigorieva. E.N. Khailov
DISCRETE AND CONTINUOUS Website: http://aimsciences.org DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS Supplement Volume 2005 pp. 345 354 OPTIMAL CONTROL OF A COMMERCIAL LOAN REPAYMENT PLAN E.V. Grigorieva Department of Mathematics
LECTURE NOTES IN MEASURE THEORY. Christer Borell Matematik Chalmers och Göteborgs universitet 412 96 Göteborg (Version: January 12)
1 LECTURE NOTES IN MEASURE THEORY Christer Borell Matematik Chalmers och Göteborgs universitet 412 96 Göteborg (Version: January 12) 2 PREFACE These are lecture notes on integration theory for a eight-week
Midterm Practice Problems
6.042/8.062J Mathematics for Computer Science October 2, 200 Tom Leighton, Marten van Dijk, and Brooke Cowan Midterm Practice Problems Problem. [0 points] In problem set you showed that the nand operator
ECON20310 LECTURE SYNOPSIS REAL BUSINESS CYCLE
ECON20310 LECTURE SYNOPSIS REAL BUSINESS CYCLE YUAN TIAN This synopsis is designed merely for keep a record of the materials covered in lectures. Please refer to your own lecture notes for all proofs.
A Simpli ed Axiomatic Approach to Ambiguity Aversion
A Simpli ed Axiomatic Approach to Ambiguity Aversion William S. Neilson Department of Economics University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN 37996-0550 [email protected] March 2009 Abstract This paper takes the
Economic Principles Solutions to Problem Set 1
Economic Principles Solutions to Problem Set 1 Question 1. Let < be represented b u : R n +! R. Prove that u (x) is strictl quasiconcave if and onl if < is strictl convex. If part: ( strict convexit of
Scalar Valued Functions of Several Variables; the Gradient Vector
Scalar Valued Functions of Several Variables; the Gradient Vector Scalar Valued Functions vector valued function of n variables: Let us consider a scalar (i.e., numerical, rather than y = φ(x = φ(x 1,
Lecture 2. Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization
Lecture 2. Marginal Functions, Average Functions, Elasticity, the Marginal Principle, and Constrained Optimization 2.1. Introduction Suppose that an economic relationship can be described by a real-valued
General Theory of Differential Equations Sections 2.8, 3.1-3.2, 4.1
A B I L E N E C H R I S T I A N U N I V E R S I T Y Department of Mathematics General Theory of Differential Equations Sections 2.8, 3.1-3.2, 4.1 Dr. John Ehrke Department of Mathematics Fall 2012 Questions
Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet
Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet Yongmin Chen y Chuan He z August 2006 Abstract Paid placement, where advertisers bid payments to a search engine to have their products appear next
Math 319 Problem Set #3 Solution 21 February 2002
Math 319 Problem Set #3 Solution 21 February 2002 1. ( 2.1, problem 15) Find integers a 1, a 2, a 3, a 4, a 5 such that every integer x satisfies at least one of the congruences x a 1 (mod 2), x a 2 (mod
Lecture 1: Systems of Linear Equations
MTH Elementary Matrix Algebra Professor Chao Huang Department of Mathematics and Statistics Wright State University Lecture 1 Systems of Linear Equations ² Systems of two linear equations with two variables
160 CHAPTER 4. VECTOR SPACES
160 CHAPTER 4. VECTOR SPACES 4. Rank and Nullity In this section, we look at relationships between the row space, column space, null space of a matrix and its transpose. We will derive fundamental results
14.41 Midterm Solutions
14.41 Midterm Solutions October 6, 010 1 Question 1 Please write whether the following claims are true, false, or uncertain. No credit will be awarded without a clear, well-reasoned explanation. In the
