Risk Assessment Data Directory. Report No. 434 A1 March Appendix 1

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1 Risk Assessment Data Directory Report No. 434 A1 March 2010 Appendix 1 I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n o f O i l & G a s P r o d u c e r s

2 P ublications Global experience The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers has access to a wealth of technical knowledge and experience with its members operating around the world in many different terrains. We collate and distil this valuable knowledge for the industry to use as guidelines for good practice by individual members. Consistent high quality database and guidelines Our overall aim is to ensure a consistent approach to training, management and best practice throughout the world. The oil and gas exploration and production industry recognises the need to develop consistent databases and records in certain fields. The OGP s members are encouraged to use the guidelines as a starting point for their operations or to supplement their own policies and regulations which may apply locally. Internationally recognised source of industry information Many of our guidelines have been recognised and used by international authorities and safety and environmental bodies. Requests come from governments and non-government organisations around the world as well as from non-member companies. Disclaimer Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither the OGP nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless of its or their negligence, assume liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipient s own risk on the basis that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer. The recipient is obliged to inform any subsequent recipient of such terms. This document may provide guidance supplemental to the requirements of local legislation. Nothing herein, however, is intended to replace, amend, supersede or otherwise depart from such requirements. In the event of any conflict or contradiction between the provisions of this document and local legislation, applicable laws shall prevail. Copyright notice The contents of these pages are The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. Permission is given to reproduce this report in whole or in part provided (i) that the copyright of OGP and (ii) the source are acknowledged. All other rights are reserved. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the OGP. These Terms and Conditions shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of England and Wales. Disputes arising here from shall be exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.

3 Appendix I Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: ESD and Blowdown Systems This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet ESD and Blowdown Systems. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1; the data previously presented is given in Table I.1 and Table I.2 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Table I.1 Illustrative Data for a Riser ESD Valves System Item Description Failure rate (per year) Pilot Valve Pilot Valve Pilot Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve PO Check Valve Check Valve ESD SOV ESD SOV ESD SOV ESD SOV ESDV ESDV Valve Actuator Actuator Actuator Ball Valve Ball Valve Valve Limit Switch Switch Switch Pilot Line Regulator Accumulator Accumulator Accumulator Annunciator Air Supply Air Supply Pump Filter Filter Filter Gauge Pipework All Failures Fail energised Fail de-energised Fail energised fixed Fail de-energised fixed Fail de-energised dynamic Blocked or pilot signal lost Internal leakage Hydraulic; All failures All failures Fail energised Fail de-energised Reset pin failure Fail to close position Fail to re-open Needle, Hydraulic Hydraulic, fail to close Hydraulic, fail to open Hydraulic, all failures + incipient Fail to close All failures Hydraulic manually activated Failure, closed circuit Level; all failures inc. incipient Press; all failures inc. incipient Failure Spring induced failure Hydraulic Leaking Hydraulic no operation/piston fail Minor leakage Microprocessor based; fail to alarm Instrument air supply failure 3 50% Compressor system Hydraulic Air Fluid Blocked, (Pre filter low concentration level) Pressure: Faulty indication Instrument Connection Leakage E not given E-5 OGP 1

4 Appendix II Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: Active Fire Protection Systems This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet Active Fire Protection Systems. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1Error! Reference source not found.; the data previously presented is given in Table II.1 to Table II.9 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Table II.1 Typical failure rates for fire protection systems Equipment Type Failures (per 10 6 hrs) Failures (per demand) Firewater system Water supply - diesel engine driven pumpset Water supply - electric motor driven pumpset Deluge system Sprinkler system Foam mixing system 0.01 Foam supply system 0.02 Halon system CO2 system Table II.2 Failure rates for pumps (source 1, oil and gas industry) Pump type Electric motor (offshore) Failures per demand (process industry) Failures per 10 6 hrs operating Failures per 10 6 hrs calendar Diesel engine (offshore) (process industry) Table II.3 Failure rates for pumps Pump type Failure mode Failures per 10 6 calendar hrs Positive displacement Failures per demand All While running Fail to start 1.9 Centrifugal All OGP

5 Table II.4 Failure rates for firewater distribution valves Type Failures per demand Failures per 10 6 operating hrs Air/hydraulic Motorised Solenoid Pressure regulating 50 Pressure relief 2.3 Table II.5 Failure rates for firewater distribution mains Equipment Leaks per 10 6 hrs type Medium Serious Large Fire main 0.04/m Joint (>2 in ND) Joint (<2 in ND) Valve (>2 in ND) Valve (<2 in ND) Pipe (>2 in ND) /100 m /100 m Equipment type Table II.6 Failure rates for sprinklers Failure per demand System Failures per 10 6 hrs Control valve Automatic head Equipment type Table II.7 Failure rates for deluge sets Failure per demand System Failures per 10 6 hrs Butterfly valve Swing type valve Pneumatic valve OGP 3

6 Equipment type Table II.8 Failure rates for foam supply systems Foam compound supply Failure per demand Failure per 10 6 hrs Centrifugal electric pump Pelton wheel motor Supply system 0.02 Foam compound proportioning negligible In-line proportioner negligible Nozzle eductor negligible Metered proportioner negligible Pressure proportioning tank negligible Around-the-pump proportioner negligible Foam generation Low expansion foam maker negligible back- foam maker negligible Table II.9 Failure rates for gaseous systems Equipment type Failure per demand Halon System * 0.02* Failure per 10 6 hrs Discharge nozzle 0.27 CO2 System 8 * 2 values quoted from different sources 87 4 OGP

7 Appendix III Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: Fire and Gas Detection This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet Fire and Gas Detection. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1; the data previously presented is given in Table III.1 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Table III.1 Typical failure rates for fire and gas detection systems Component Gas detector, conventional catalytic Gas detector, conventional IR λ crit per 10 6 hrs Coverage Failure rate per 10 6 hrs c λ det λ SO λ FTO TIF (Test Independent Failures) % % to 0.1 Gas detector, beam 7 70% to 0.1 Smoke detector % to 0.05 Heat detector % to 0.5 Flame detector % to 0.5 ESD push button % FGD node (single PLC system) % to Field bus coupler % Field bus CPU/ Communications unit % λ crit = Total critical failure rate of the component. Rate of failures that will cause either trip or unavailability of safety function (unless detected and prevented from causing such failure). λ det = Rate of critical failure which will be detected by automatic self-test or by control room monitoring. The effect of these failures on the Spurious Trip Rate (STR) depends on the operational philosophy of the system. c = det / crit = Coverage of the automatic self-test + control room operator. λ SO = Rate of Spurious Operation (SO) failures, undetectable by automatic self-test. The rate of Spurious Operation (SO) failures of a component contributes to the STR of the system (independent of operation philosophy). λ FTO = Rate of failures causing Fail-To-Operate (FTO) failures, undetectable by automatic self-test. The FTO failures contribute to the Critical Safety Unavailability (CSU) of the component/system. TIF = Test Independent Failures. The probability that a component which has just been functionally tested will fail on demand (applies for FTO failures only). The TIF probability is the probability that a component which has just been tested will fail on demand. This will include failures caused by for example improper location or inadequate design (software error or inadequate detection principle). An imperfect functional testing procedure will also contribute. Finally, the OGP 5

8 possibility that the maintenance crew perform an erroneous functional test or fail to return the component to a working state (which is usually not detected before the next test) also contributes to the TIF probability. 6 OGP

9 Appendix IV Data Presented in 1996 Datasheet: Blowout Prevention Equipment This Appendix presents data previously given in the OGP (then E&P Forum) QRA datasheet Blowout Prevention Equipment. The current data is copyright, as stated in Section 2.1; the data previously presented is given in Table IV.1 to Table IV.5 for reference but should be regarded as illustrative and checked against one of the current sources listed in Table 2.1. Notes: BOP item Table IV.1 Subsea BOP item specific average downtime No of failures Total down-time (hrs) Average downtime (hrs) per BOP-day per rig-day Flexible joints Annular preventers Ram preventers Hydraulic connectors Failsafe valves Choke and kill lines Hydraulic control system Acoustic control system Total BOP-days are all days from the time the BOP is first landed on the wellhead, until it is pulled the last time. 2. Rig-days is the time from when the rig arrives on location and drops the anchors, until the last anchor is pulled prior to leaving the location. OGP 7

10 Table IV.2 Subsea BOP item specific failure rate with 90% confidence limits BOP item Flexible joints Annular preventers Ram type preventers Hydraulic connectors Failsafe valves Choke and kill lines Hydraulic control system Failure mode Failure rate per 10 6 hours Lower limit Estimate Upper limit Failed to open fully Hydraulic leakage Unknown Total Internal leakage (seal failures) Internal leakage (seal and blade failure) External leakage (door seal) Failed to fully open Total External leakage Failed to unlock Hydraulic failure in locking device (minor) Total Internal leakage External leakage Unknown leakage Total Leakage to environment Plugged line (ice) Unknown Total riser related failures Total flexible jumper hose failures Total BOP flexible hose failures Total choke kill line system Spurious activation of BOP function Loss of all functions one pod Loss of several functions one pod Loss of one function both pods Loss of one function one pod Loss of one topside panel Loss of one function topside panel Topside minor failures Other Unknown Total OGP

11 BOP item Acoustic control system Failure mode Failure rate per 10 6 hours Lower limit Estimate Upper limit Failed to operate BOP Spurious operation one BOP function One subsea transponder failed to function Portable unit failed Function failure LMRP function Transducer arm failed Total Total subsea BOP system Table IV.3 Detection of subsea BOP failures BOP Item Activity when failure detected Total BOP on rig Running BOP Installation test Regular tests/ drilling Flexible joints Annular preventers Ram preventers Hydraulic connectors Failsafe valves Choke and kill lines Hydraulic. Control system Acoustic control system Total OGP 9

12 Table IV.4 Overview of surface BOP item specific number of failures and down times BOP item Annular preventers Shear/blind rams Pipe rams Control system BOP to high riser connection Riser conns. and wellhead connections Pressure class Days in servic e Number of failures Installation Operation Total Total down time (hrs) Averag e down time per day (hrs) Low Total Low Total Low Total Low Total Low Total Low Total Failsafe valves Total BOP stack clamps Choke/kill lines Total BOP system Low Total Low Total Low Total OGP

13 Table IV.5 Surface BOP item specific failure modes and frequencies with 90% confidence limits (all failures included) BOP Item Failure mode Failure rate per 10 6 hours Annular preventers Shear/blind rams Pipe rams Hydraulic control systems BOP to high riser connections Riser & wellhead connections Failsafe valves BOP stack clamps Choke/kill lines Total BOP system Lower limit Estimate Upper limit Failed to fully open Leakage in closed position Hydraulic leakage adapter ring (degraded) External leakage Leakage in closed position Premature partly closure shear ram Unknown Leakage in closed position Failed to fully open Failed to operate BOP Failed to operate one BOP function Failed to operate BOP from remote panels Spurious activation of BOP functions Failed to operate rams from remote panels Failed to operate rams from remote panels Hydraulic leakage Unknown Incipient External leakage External leakage External leakage External hydraulic leakage Failed to operate valve Leakage in closed position Failed to fully open Unknown External leakage External leakage OGP 11

14 Valve type Table IV.6 Overall failure categories for SCSSVs (production and injection wells) Wireline Retrievable Flapper Years in service No. of failures per category Total SCSSV Other Unknow n Failure rate per 10 6 hours Total SCSSV Wireline Retrievable Ball All Wireline Retrievables Tubing Retrievable Flapper Tubing Retrievable Ball All Tubing Retrievables Total, all valves Note: When SCSSV is stated, the valve itself failed mechanically. Other may typically be control line failure or scale in the well. 12 OGP

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