Thanks, But No Thanks
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- Ursula Lambert
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1 Thanks, But No Thanks Current Cryptographic Standards Are Sufficient for Software Dan Shumow MSR Security and Cryptography Group Microsoft Research
2 Introduction Disclaimer: I am a Software Developer, so this talk is from the software perspective. Goals Identify and discuss what lightweight cryptography means in the context of the software development community. Explain the conclusion that software does not require specialized lightweight cryptography standards. This is not an argument against a lightweight cryptography standard in general. By removing software scenario from consideration, the design requirements for the standard can be most effectively focused on hardware use cases.
3 Outline Identify the Internet of Things (IoT) as the primary lightweight cryptography scenario in software. Brief overview of the current state of IoT security protocols. Discuss some of the problems with adding new cryptographic primitives. Conclusion for software: IoT does not require new cryptographic primitives.
4 Goal: Identify Lightweight Cryptography Scenarios From the description of this workshop: NIST is currently investigating whether there is a need for NIST to standardize lightweight cryptography. What does lightweight mean? means different things in software and hardware. Potentially refers to: Mobile platforms Low powered RFID Cards Microcontrollers Dedicated hardware Internet of Things (IoT)
5 Computational Platforms by Power High Server/High Performance Processors ( 2GHz) Computational Power PC: Laptop/Desktop ( 1GHz) Tablet/Smartphone ( 1GHz) IoT Devices (From 10s MHz up to 1 GHz) Dedicated Hardware, ASIC, FPGA ( 100s MHz) Microcontrollers (10s of MHz) Low Power/Cost Circuits: RFID Upper Bound Lower Bound Low What counts as lightweight?
6 IoT Platforms Development Board Processor Memory Beaglebone Black 1 GHz ARM Cortex-A8 512 MB Raspberry Pi MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 1 GB Raspberry Pi 700 MHz ARM 256 MB Intel Galileo 400 MHz Intel Quark 256 MB Arduino Due 84 MHz Cortex-M3 96 KB Arduino Uno 16 MHz AVR (8 bit) 2 KB This is a list of sample platforms and not meant to be exhaustive.
7 Computational Platforms by Power High Server/High Performance Processors ( 2GHz) Computational Power PC: Laptop/Desktop ( 1GHz) Tablet/Smartphone ( 1GHz) IoT Devices (From 10s MHz up to 1 GHz) Dedicated Hardware, ASIC, FPGA ( 100s MHz) Microcontrollers (10s of MHz) Low Power/Cost Circuits: RFID Upper Bound Lower Bound Low What counts as lightweight?
8 IoT Protocols AllJoyn Open Source project run by AllSeen Alliance. Industry stakeholders include Qualcomm, Microsoft and AT&T. Iotivity Open source project that has recently announced an association with the AllSeen Alliance. Backed by the Open Interconnect Consortium Industry stakeholders include Intel, Samsung and Cisco. Thread Open protocol run by the Thread Group. Industry stakeholders include ARM, Samsung and Qualcomm.
9 IoT Security Protocol AllJoyn Protocol derived from TLS hand shake and message protocol. Only asymmetric algorithms are negotiable, not authenticated encrypt. Iotivity and Thread both rely on DTLS for security. Cryptographic Algorithms Used: Protocol Asymmetric Bulk Encryption Authentication AllJoyn RSA, ECDSA/ECDHE P256 AES-CCM AES-CCM Iotivity Thread RSA, DSA/DHE, ECDSA/ECDHE (NIST Curves) RSA, DSA/DHE, ECDSA/ECDHE (NIST Curves) AES, AES-CCM, AES- GCM, 3DES AES, AES-CCM, AES- GCM, 3DES HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2 HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2
10 IoT Does Not Need Its Own Crypto Standards Any NIST standardization of cryptography for IoT is late to the party. Current IoT protocols (AllJoyn, Thread, IoTivity) already use current cryptographic standards. The protocols have already been deployed with existing algorithms. For backwards compatibility and interoperability these will need to remain in deployment. Current cryptographic standards work for IoT Current standards are not a limit on IoT performance. Perspective: Common IoT platforms are approximately as powerful as PCs from 15 years ago when AES was standardized.
11 Lightweight Crypto Standards: Why Not? We already have a set of cryptographic primitives. Some may say too many cryptographic primitives. Paradox of choice: more options is not necessarily better. Adding new standards can be problematic: New standards, especially with lower key sizes could be used in scenarios where they aren t intended. Example: Standardizing ECC over 160bit prime for an RFID card and it ends up being used for https; block cipher with 80bit key space ends up being used to encrypt hard drives. Giving developers more choices can lead to security vulnerabilities. Example: MAC-then-Encrypt vs Encrypt-then-MAC
12 Computational Platforms by Flexibility High Server/High Performance Processors Computational Flexibility (Programmability) Low PC: Laptop/Desktop Tablet/Smartphone IoT Devices Microcontrollers FPGA Dedicated Hardware, ASIC Low Power/Cost Circuits: RFID Software Hardware Thanks, But No Thanks Possible Overlap Lightweight cryptography goes here What does this have to do with lightweight cryptography?
13 Conclusion For Lightweight Cryptography Standard The usage scenarios for lightweight cryptography are limited to nonexistent for software platforms. Developers already have too many choices for cryptography. Current standards are good enough. This is not to say No lightweight cryptography. No lightweight cryptography in software. (With a possible exception for Microcontrollers.) Any such standard should apply to hardware only. Focus on hardware implementation for performance, side channel security etc. Limit standards to apply only to low powered hardware platforms (RFID etc.)
14 Thank You
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