Triathlon of Lightweight Block Ciphers for the Internet of Things
|
|
|
- Blake McBride
- 8 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 NIST Lightweight Cryptography Workshop 2015 Triathlon of Lightweight Block Ciphers for the Internet of Things Daniel Dinu, Yann Le Corre, Dmitry Khovratovich, Leo Perrin, Johann Großschädl, Alex Biryukov Laboratory of Algorithmics, Cryptology and Security (LACS) University of Luxembourg
2 Outline Lightweight Crypto for the IoT Benchmarking of Lightweight Ciphers Two application scenarios Implementation aspects Results Execution time, RAM footprint, code size 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430, 32-bit ARM CortexM Figure of Merit (FOM) Conclusions 2 / 16
3 What are Things? Vehicle, asset, person & pet controlling and monitoring Agriculture automation Energy consumption Security & surveillance Building management Embedded mobile M2M & wireless sensor network Source: nkonnect.com Everyday things Smart homes Telemedicine & healthcare Processors embedded into everyday objects ( things ) Wireless communication (WiFi, Bluetooth, ZigBee) 3 / 16
4 IoT Forecast by Cisco Source: Cisco 4 / 16
5 Lightweight Cryptography Not meant to be Weak Cryptography Cryptographic primitives, schemes and protocols tailored to extremely constrained environments such as sensor nodes or RFID tags (Gligor 2005) Requirements for IoT Efficient in HW (performance, area, power) Efficient in SW (performance, RAM, code size) on many 8, 16, and 32-bit platforms Efficient protection against physical attacks Support of different functionality (encryption, hashing) 5 / 16
6 Benchmarking of Lightweight Ciphers Fair and consistent evaluation How well are existing LW suited for the IoT? What are the promising directions for new designs? 3 Core Metrics Execution time, RAM footprint, code size Other metrics can be derived or estimated thereof (e.g. energy consumption) 3 Platforms 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430, 32-bit ARM CortexM Further platforms may be supported in the future 6 / 16
7 13 Considered Ciphers 7 / 16
8 Application Scenarios Scenario 1: Bulk Encryption Example: data transfer between two sensor nodes 128 bytes of data, CBC mode, 80-bit key We measure encryption + decryption + key schedule Representative for performance matters Scenario 2: Challenge-Response Authen. Example: access control, device authentication 128 bits of data, CTR mode, 80-bit key We measure encryption time (round keys pre-comp.) Representative for code size and RAM matter 8 / 16
9 Implementations Several Implementations for each cipher Between 2 and 24 implementations for each cipher (more than 100 in total) Different trade-offs, at least one speed-oriented and one size-oriented implementation Written in ANSI C Portability is very important in the IoT (many HW platforms and operating systems), Useful to assess new ciphers in early stages of the design phase Assembly implementations for AES and PRESENT 9 / 16
10 AES LED RC5 Scenario 1: Execution Time AVR MSP ARM Execution time (cycles) HIGHT Fantomas LBlock Piccolo PRINCE PRESENT Robin Simon Speck TWINE 10 / 16
11 AES LED RC5 Scenario 1: RAM footprint AVR MSP ARM RAM (bytes) Fantomas HIGHT LBlock Piccolo PRESENT PRINCE Robin Simon Speck TWINE 11 / 16
12 AES LED RC5 Scenario 1: Code Size AVR MSP ARM Code size (bytes) HIGHT Fantomas LBlock Piccolo PRESENT PRINCE Robin Simon Speck TWINE 12 / 16
13 AES LED RC5 Scenario 2: Execution Time AVR MSP ARM Execution time (cycles) HIGHT Fantomas LBlock Piccolo PRINCE PRESENT Robin Simon Speck TWINE 13 / 16
14 AES LED RC5 Scenarion 2: RAM Footprint 400 AVR MSP ARM RAM (bytes) Fantomas HIGHT LBlock Piccolo PRESENT PRINCE Robin Simon Speck TWINE 14 / 16
15 AES LED RC5 Scenario 2: Code Size AVR MSP ARM Code size (bytes) HIGHT Fantomas LBlock Piccolo PRESENT PRINCE Robin Simon Speck TWINE 15 / 16
16 Figure of Merit (FOM) 16 / 16
17 AES RC5 LED Scenario 1: FOM Speck Simon Robin Fantomas LBlock HIGHT Piccolo PRESENT PRINCE TWINE 17 / 16
18 AES RC5 LED Scenario 2: FOM Speck Simon Fantomas Robin LBlock HIGHT Piccolo PRESENT TWINE PRINCE 18 / 16
19 Conclusions Simon Wins Big! Consistently fast and small on all three platforms Best FOM score in both scenarios Speck on 2 nd place Other advantages (small silicon area, SCA protection) Runner Up: LS Designs Also fairly good on all three platforms FOM score twice as high as Simon Interesting from SCA perspective More security analysis needed 19 / 16
20 Triathlon Competition Submit implementations (assembly/c) of existing lightweight block ciphers (published at well-known conferences) for the 3 target devices (AVR, MSP, ARM). Based on the implementation performance figures on the 3 target devices (AVR, MSP, ARM) in the 2 evaluation scenarios, you get a number of points. Collect as many points as possible to win the Triathlon The first 3 players/teams by the number of points will be rewarded with special prizes First deadline: September 6, 2015 (before CHES) More info: 20 / 16
Triathlon of Lightweight Block Ciphers for the Internet of Things
Triathlon of Lightweight Block Ciphers for the Internet of Things Daniel Dinu, Yann Le Corre, Dmitry Khovratovich, Léo Perrin, Johann Großschädl, Alex Biryukov University of Luxembourg {dumitru-daniel.dinu,
Thanks, But No Thanks
Thanks, But No Thanks Current Cryptographic Standards Are Sufficient for Software Dan Shumow MSR Security and Cryptography Group Microsoft Research Introduction Disclaimer: I am a Software Developer, so
AES1. Ultra-Compact Advanced Encryption Standard Core. General Description. Base Core Features. Symbol. Applications
General Description The AES core implements Rijndael encoding and decoding in compliance with the NIST Advanced Encryption Standard. Basic core is very small (start at 800 Actel tiles). Enhanced versions
Internet of things (IOT) applications covering industrial domain. Dev Bhattacharya dev_bhattacharya@ieee.org
Internet of things (IOT) applications covering industrial domain Dev Bhattacharya dev_bhattacharya@ieee.org Outline Internet of things What is Internet of things (IOT) Simplified IOT System Architecture
Lightweight Cryptography. Lappeenranta University of Technology
Lightweight Cryptography Dr Pekka Jäppinen Lappeenranta University of Technology Outline Background What is lightweight Metrics Chip area Performance Implementation tradeoffs Current situation Conclusions
Lightweight Cryptography From an Engineers Perspective
Lightweight Cryptography From an Engineers Perspective ECC 2007 Acknowledgement Christof Paar A. Bogdanov, L. Knudsen, G. Leander, M. Robshaw, Y. Seurin, C. Vikkelsoe S. Kumar 2 Outline Motivation Hardware
Introduction of Information Security Research Division
Introduction of Information Security Research Division 2005. 5. 13. Kyo-il Chung, Ph. D. Information Security Infrastructure Research Group Contents Overview - Secure u-it KOREA - Organization of ETRI
The new 32-bit MSP432 MCU platform from Texas
Technology Trend MSP432 TM microcontrollers: Bringing high performance to low-power applications The new 32-bit MSP432 MCU platform from Texas Instruments leverages its more than 20 years of lowpower leadership
Lightweight Encryption Protocol for Passive RFID System using SIMON
Lightweight Encryption Protocol for Passive RFID System using SIMON Vidur Nayyar, Prajna Setty Graduate students Electrical and Computer Engineering (nayyar.vidur, prajna.setty)@rutgers.edu Rutgers,The
CycurHSM An Automotive-qualified Software Stack for Hardware Security Modules
CycurHSM An Automotive-qualified Software Stack for Hardware Security Modules Dr. Frederic Stumpf, ESCRYPT GmbH Embedded Security, Stuttgart, Germany 1 Introduction Electronic Control Units (ECU) are embedded
12/3/08. Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks. Wireless Magnifies Exposure Vulnerability. Mobility Makes it Difficult to Establish Trust
Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks Wireless Magnifies Exposure Vulnerability Information going across the wireless link is exposed to anyone within radio range RF may extend beyond a room or
A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF COMMON ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES WITH SECURE WATERMARK SYSTEM (SWS)
A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF COMMON ENCRYPTION TECHNIQUES WITH SECURE WATERMARK SYSTEM (SWS) Ashraf Odeh 1, Shadi R.Masadeh 2, Ahmad Azzazi 3 1 Computer Information Systems Department, Isra University,
Lecture Objectives. Lecture 8 Mobile Networks: Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks. Agenda. References
Lecture Objectives Wireless Networks and Mobile Systems Lecture 8 Mobile Networks: Security in Wireless LANs and Mobile Networks Introduce security vulnerabilities and defenses Describe security functions
An Introduction to Cryptography as Applied to the Smart Grid
An Introduction to Cryptography as Applied to the Smart Grid Jacques Benoit, Cooper Power Systems Western Power Delivery Automation Conference Spokane, Washington March 2011 Agenda > Introduction > Symmetric
IoT Security Platform
IoT Security Platform 2 Introduction Wars begin when the costs of attack are low, the benefits for a victor are high, and there is an inability to enforce law. The same is true in cyberwars. Today there
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks
SPINS: Security Protocols for Sensor Networks Adrian Perrig, Robert Szewczyk, J.D. Tygar, Victor Wen, and David Culler Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences, University of California
Performance Investigations. Hannes Tschofenig, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 25 th March 2015
Performance Investigations Hannes Tschofenig, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 25 th March 2015 1 Motivation In we tried to provide guidance for the use of DTLS (TLS) when used in
Error oracle attacks and CBC encryption. Chris Mitchell ISG, RHUL http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~cjm
Error oracle attacks and CBC encryption Chris Mitchell ISG, RHUL http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~cjm Agenda 1. Introduction 2. CBC mode 3. Error oracles 4. Example 1 5. Example 2 6. Example 3 7. Stream ciphers
The Misuse of RC4 in Microsoft Word and Excel
The Misuse of RC4 in Microsoft Word and Excel Hongjun Wu Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore hongjun@i2r.a-star.edu.sg Abstract. In this report, we point out a serious security flaw in Microsoft
ETSI TS 102 176-2 V1.2.1 (2005-07)
TS 102 176-2 V1.2.1 (2005-07) Technical Specification Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures; Part 2: Secure channel protocols and algorithms
Table of Contents. Bibliografische Informationen http://d-nb.info/996514864. digitalisiert durch
1 Introduction to Cryptography and Data Security 1 1.1 Overview of Cryptology (and This Book) 2 1.2 Symmetric Cryptography 4 1.2.1 Basics 4 1.2.2 Simple Symmetric Encryption: The Substitution Cipher...
CAESAR candidate PiCipher
CAESAR candidate PiCipher Danilo Gligoroski, ITEM, NTNU, Norway Hristina Mihajloska, FCSE, UKIM, Macedonia Simona Samardjiska, ITEM, NTNU, Norway and FCSE, UKIM, Macedonia Håkon Jacobsen, ITEM, NTNU, Norway
Vulnerabilities in WEP Christopher Hoffman Cryptography 2 2011-3
Vulnerabilities in WEP Christopher Hoffman Cryptography 2 2011-3 1. Abstract Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was the first encryption scheme used for protecting wireless traffic. It consisted of a private
Overview of Cryptographic Tools for Data Security. Murat Kantarcioglu
UT DALLAS Erik Jonsson School of Engineering & Computer Science Overview of Cryptographic Tools for Data Security Murat Kantarcioglu Pag. 1 Purdue University Cryptographic Primitives We will discuss the
Pervasive Computing und. Informationssicherheit
Pervasive Computing und 11. Symposium on Privacy and Security Rüschlikon, 13. September 2006 Prof. Christof Paar European Competence Center for IT Security www.crypto.rub.de Contents 1. Pervasive Computing
SEMICONDUCTOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK MARKET EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. Wireless Sensor Network Energy Harvesting And Storage Applications
Semiconductor Wireless Sensor Internet of Things (IoT): Market Shares, Strategies, and Forecasts, Worldwide, 2014 to 2020 ResearchMoz include new market research report" Semiconductor Wireless Sensor Internet
Secure, Efficient, and Open Standard Internet of Things
Secure, Efficient, and Open Standard Internet of Things Zach Shelby Director of Technology, IoT ARM acknowledges the trademarks and copyrights of 3 rd parties included in this presentation What is the
The Encryption Technology of Automatic Teller Machine Networks
Software Engineering 4C03 Winter 2005 The Encryption Technology of Automatic Teller Machine Networks Researcher: Shun Wong Last revised: April 2nd, 2005 1 Introduction ATM also known as Automatic Teller
Aalborg Universitet. Publication date: 2011. Document Version Early version, also known as pre-print. Link to publication from Aalborg University
Aalborg Universitet Proposed on Device Capability based Authentication using AES-GCM for Internet of Things (IoT) Babar, Sachin D.; Mahalle, Parikshit N.; Prasad, Neeli R.; Prasad, Ramjee Published in:
RAIN RFID and the Internet of Things: Industry Snapshot and Security Needs. Matt Robshaw and Tyler Williamson Impinj Seattle, USA
RAIN RFID and the Internet of Things: Industry Snapshot and Security Needs Matt Robshaw and Tyler Williamson Impinj Seattle, USA Overview RAIN RFID The product and standardization landscape Security, performance,
EXAM questions for the course TTM4135 - Information Security May 2013. Part 1
EXAM questions for the course TTM4135 - Information Security May 2013 Part 1 This part consists of 5 questions all from one common topic. The number of maximal points for every correctly answered question
Practical applications of Lightweight Block Ciphers to Secure EtherNet/IP Networks
Practical applications of Lightweight Block Ciphers to Secure EtherNet/IP Networks Jordon Woods Chief Technical Officer Innovasic, Inc. Patricia Muoio Director of Research and Development G2, Inc. Presented
Security. Contents. S-72.3240 Wireless Personal, Local, Metropolitan, and Wide Area Networks 1
Contents Security requirements Public key cryptography Key agreement/transport schemes Man-in-the-middle attack vulnerability Encryption. digital signature, hash, certification Complete security solutions
NXP & Security Innovation Encryption for ARM MCUs
NXP & Security Innovation Encryption for ARM MCUs Presenters Gene Carter- International Product Manager, NXP Semiconductors Gene is responsible for marketing of the ARM7 and Cortex-M3 microcontrollers.
Summary of Results. NGINX SSL Performance
NGINX SSL NGINX is commonly used to terminate encrypted SSL and TLS connections on behalf of upstream web and application servers. SSL termination at the edge of an application reduces the load on internal
2014 IBM Corporation
2014 IBM Corporation This is the 27 th Q&A event prepared by the IBM License Metric Tool Central Team (ICT) Currently we focus on version 9.x of IBM License Metric Tool (ILMT) The content of today s session
How To Attack A Block Cipher With A Key Key (Dk) And A Key (K) On A 2Dns) On An Ipa (Ipa) On The Ipa 2Ds (Ipb) On Pcode)
Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 6 Fifth Edition by William Stallings Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown (with edits by RHB) Chapter 6 Block Cipher Operation Many savages at the present day regard
Side Channel Analysis and Embedded Systems Impact and Countermeasures
Side Channel Analysis and Embedded Systems Impact and Countermeasures Job de Haas Agenda Advances in Embedded Systems Security From USB stick to game console Current attacks Cryptographic devices Side
The Internet of Things: Opportunities & Challenges
The Internet of Things: Opportunities & Challenges What is the IoT? Things, people and cloud services getting connected via the Internet to enable new use cases and business models Cloud Services How is
ECC is Ready for RFID A Proof in Silicon
ECC is Ready for RFID A Proof in Silicon RFIDsec 08 Presentation Daniel Hein, daniel.hein@gmx.at Johannes Wolkerstorfer, Johannes.Wolkerstorfer@iaik.tugraz.at Norbert Felber, felber@iis.ee.ethz.ch 1 Outline
Part I. Universität Klagenfurt - IWAS Multimedia Kommunikation (VK) M. Euchner; Mai 2001. Siemens AG 2001, ICN M NT
Part I Contents Part I Introduction to Information Security Definition of Crypto Cryptographic Objectives Security Threats and Attacks The process Security Security Services Cryptography Cryptography (code
Current and Future Trends in Medical Electronics
Current and Future Trends in Medical Electronics By Steven Dean, Medical Marketing Director, Texas Instruments www.arrownac.com 800.833.3557 Current and Future Trends in Medical Electronics By Steven Dean,
802.11 Security (WEP, WPA\WPA2) 19/05/2009. Giulio Rossetti Unipi Giulio.Rossetti@gmail.com
802.11 Security (WEP, WPA\WPA2) 19/05/2009 Giulio Rossetti Unipi Giulio.Rossetti@gmail.com 802.11 Security Standard: WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy The packets are encrypted, before sent, with a Secret Key
IoT Security Concerns and Renesas Synergy Solutions
IoT Security Concerns and Renesas Synergy Solutions Simon Moore CTO - Secure Thingz Ltd Agenda Introduction to Secure.Thingz. The Relentless Attack on the Internet of Things Building protection with Renesas
AES-GCM for Efficient Authenticated Encryption Ending the Reign of HMAC-SHA-1?
Workshop on Real-World Cryptography Stanford University Jan. 9-11, 2013 AES-GCM for Efficient Authenticated Encryption Ending the Reign of HMAC-SHA-1? Shay Gueron University of Haifa Department of Mathematics,
Evaluating The Performance of Symmetric Encryption Algorithms
International Journal of Network Security, Vol.10, No.3, PP.213 219, May 2010 213 Evaluating The Performance of Symmetric Encryption Algorithms Diaa Salama Abd Elminaam 1, Hatem Mohamed Abdual Kader 2,
Caught in the Maze of Security Standards
Caught in the Maze of ΓΝΩΘΙΣ Know Thyself ΑΥΤΟΝ Security Standards Dieter Gollmann Hamburg University of Technology What this talk is not about 1. Designing security protocols is difficult and error prone
Making Sense of Internet of Things Protocols and Implementations
Making Sense of Internet of Things Protocols and Implementations Author: Kim Rowe, RoweBots Higher level protocols for Internet of Things have various features and offer different capabilities. Most of
Problems of Security in Ad Hoc Sensor Network
Problems of Security in Ad Hoc Sensor Network Petr Hanáček * hanacek@fit.vutbr.cz Abstract: The paper deals with a problem of secure communication between autonomous agents that form an ad hoc sensor wireless
Practical Evaluation of a Secure Key-Distribution and Storage Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Using TinyOS
Practical Evaluation of a Secure Key-Distribution and Storage Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks Using TinyOS Juliano F. Kazienko, Igor G. Ribeiro, Igor M. Moraes, and Célio V. N. Albuquerque Abstract
Secure Internet of Things Project
Secure Internet of Things Project Philip Levis, Stanford Computer Forum Internet of Things Workshop April 14, 2016 Stanford University 1 The Internet of Things (IoT) 2 A Security Disaster HP conducted
Strengthen RFID Tags Security Using New Data Structure
International Journal of Control and Automation 51 Strengthen RFID Tags Security Using New Data Structure Yan Liang and Chunming Rong Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University
IT Networks & Security CERT Luncheon Series: Cryptography
IT Networks & Security CERT Luncheon Series: Cryptography Presented by Addam Schroll, IT Security & Privacy Analyst 1 Outline History Terms & Definitions Symmetric and Asymmetric Algorithms Hashing PKI
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition. Chapter 6. Wireless Network Security
Security+ Guide to Network Security Fundamentals, Third Edition Chapter 6 Wireless Network Security Objectives Overview of IEEE 802.11 wireless security Define vulnerabilities of Open System Authentication,
Internet of Things 2015/2016
Internet of Things 2015/2016 The Things Johan Lukkien John Carpenter, 1982 1 What makes up the IoT? IoT versus WSN What are examples? Guiding questions 2 Some definitions of IoT (march 2015) Whatis.com:
Fast Software AES Encryption
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 2010 Fast Software AES Encryption Osvik, Dag Arne Proceedings FSE'10 Proceedings of the 17th
Computer Security: Principles and Practice
Computer Security: Principles and Practice Chapter 20 Public-Key Cryptography and Message Authentication First Edition by William Stallings and Lawrie Brown Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown Public-Key Cryptography
Secure Internet of Things Project (SITP)
Secure Internet of Things Project (SITP) Philip Levis Stanford University Project Workshop Stanford University August 11, 2014 1 The Internet of Things (IoT) 2 A Security Disaster HP conducted a security
CS 758: Cryptography / Network Security
CS 758: Cryptography / Network Security offered in the Fall Semester, 2003, by Doug Stinson my office: DC 3122 my email address: dstinson@uwaterloo.ca my web page: http://cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/~dstinson/index.html
How To Understand The Concept Of Internet Of Things (Iot)
Privacy and Security Challenges in Internet of Things Manik Lal Das DA-IICT, Gandhinagar Disclaimer Many third party copyrighted material is reused within this talk under the 'fair use' approach, for sake
Symantec Corporation Symantec Enterprise Vault Cryptographic Module Software Version: 1.0.0.2
Symantec Corporation Symantec Enterprise Vault Cryptographic Module Software Version: 1.0.0.2 FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy FIPS Security Level: 1 Document Version: 1.1 Prepared for: Prepared
Security Protocols HTTPS/ DNSSEC TLS. Internet (IPSEC) Network (802.1x) Application (HTTP,DNS) Transport (TCP/UDP) Transport (TCP/UDP) Internet (IP)
Security Protocols Security Protocols Necessary to communicate securely across untrusted network Provide integrity, confidentiality, authenticity of communications Based on previously discussed cryptographic
Security Protocols/Standards
Security Protocols/Standards Security Protocols/Standards Security Protocols/Standards How do we actually communicate securely across a hostile network? Provide integrity, confidentiality, authenticity
RIOT CONTROL The Art of Managing Risk for Internet of Things
RIOT CONTROL The Art of Managing Risk for Internet of Things Kim Singletary McAfee Session ID: Session Classification: Advanced Intro What is IoT and why is it different? What are the risks? What are the
Message Authentication Codes
2 MAC Message Authentication Codes : and Cryptography Sirindhorn International Institute of Technology Thammasat University Prepared by Steven Gordon on 28 October 2013 css322y13s2l08, Steve/Courses/2013/s2/css322/lectures/mac.tex,
Cryptographic Hash Functions Message Authentication Digital Signatures
Cryptographic Hash Functions Message Authentication Digital Signatures Abstract We will discuss Cryptographic hash functions Message authentication codes HMAC and CBC-MAC Digital signatures 2 Encryption/Decryption
Authentication requirement Authentication function MAC Hash function Security of
UNIT 3 AUTHENTICATION Authentication requirement Authentication function MAC Hash function Security of hash function and MAC SHA HMAC CMAC Digital signature and authentication protocols DSS Slides Courtesy
Safeguarding Data Using Encryption. Matthew Scholl & Andrew Regenscheid Computer Security Division, ITL, NIST
Safeguarding Data Using Encryption Matthew Scholl & Andrew Regenscheid Computer Security Division, ITL, NIST What is Cryptography? Cryptography: The discipline that embodies principles, means, and methods
NanopowerCommunications: Enabling the Internet of Things OBJECTS TALK
NanopowerCommunications: Enabling the Internet of Things OBJECTS TALK When objects can both sense the environment and communicate, they become tools for understanding complexity and responding to it swiftly.
Data Encryption WHITE PAPER ON. Prepared by Mohammed Samiuddin. www.itmr.ac.in
01 0110 0001 01101 WHITE PAPER ON Data Encryption Prepared by Mohammed Samiuddin www.itmr.ac.in Contents INTRODUCTION... 2 NEED FOR DATA ENCRYPTION... 3 DUE CARE... 3 REPUTATIONAL RISK... 3 REGULATORY
Rfid Authentication Protocol for security and privacy Maintenance in Cloud Based Employee Management System
Rfid Authentication Protocol for security and privacy Maintenance in Cloud Based Employee Management System ArchanaThange Post Graduate Student, DKGOI s COE, Swami Chincholi, Maharashtra, India archanathange7575@gmail.com,
Cryptography and Network Security
Cryptography and Network Security Spring 2012 http://users.abo.fi/ipetre/crypto/ Lecture 3: Block ciphers and DES Ion Petre Department of IT, Åbo Akademi University January 17, 2012 1 Data Encryption Standard
Secret File Sharing Techniques using AES algorithm. C. Navya Latha 200201066 Garima Agarwal 200305032 Anila Kumar GVN 200305002
Secret File Sharing Techniques using AES algorithm C. Navya Latha 200201066 Garima Agarwal 200305032 Anila Kumar GVN 200305002 1. Feature Overview The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) feature adds support
The Internet of Things (IoT)
The Internet of Things (IoT) The New New Thing October 2014 Smart Planet Green Environment Environmental Sensors Water, power leak detection Pollution, weather monitoring Smart Cities Connected Communities
A New Security Protocol Using Hybrid Cryptography Algorithms
International Journal of Computer Sciences and Engineering Open Access Review Paper Volume-4, Special Issue-2, April 2016 E-ISSN: 2347-2693 A New Security Protocol Using Hybrid Cryptography Algorithms
A PPENDIX H RITERIA FOR AES E VALUATION C RITERIA FOR
A PPENDIX H RITERIA FOR AES E VALUATION C RITERIA FOR William Stallings Copyright 20010 H.1 THE ORIGINS OF AES...2 H.2 AES EVALUATION...3 Supplement to Cryptography and Network Security, Fifth Edition
Securing IP Networks with Implementation of IPv6
Securing IP Networks with Implementation of IPv6 R.M.Agarwal DDG(SA), TEC Security Threats in IP Networks Packet sniffing IP Spoofing Connection Hijacking Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Man in the Middle
A Comparative Study Of Two Symmetric Encryption Algorithms Across Different Platforms.
A Comparative Study Of Two Symmetric Algorithms Across Different Platforms. Dr. S.A.M Rizvi 1,Dr. Syed Zeeshan Hussain 2 and Neeta Wadhwa 3 Deptt. of Computer Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi,
National Cybersecurity Challenges and NIST. Donna F. Dodson Chief Cybersecurity Advisor ITL Associate Director for Cybersecurity
National Cybersecurity Challenges and NIST Donna F. Dodson Chief Cybersecurity Advisor ITL Associate Director for Cybersecurity Though no-one knows for sure, corporate America is believed to lose anything
Selecting the Right MCU Can Squeeze Nanoamps out of Your Next Internet of Things Application
Selecting the Right MCU Can Squeeze Nanoamps out of Your Next Internet of Things Application www.silabs.com Introduction Industry leaders predict that the number of connected devices for the Internet of
Password-based encryption in ZIP files
Password-based encryption in ZIP files Dmitri Gabbasov December 15, 2015 Abstract In this report we give an overview of the encryption schemes used in the ZIP file format. We first give an overview of
BlackBerry Enterprise Solution
BlackBerry Enterprise Solution Security Technical Overview for BlackBerry Enterprise Server Version 4.1 Service Pack 5 and BlackBerry Device Software Version 4.5 2008 Research In Motion Limited. All rights
Usable Crypto: Introducing minilock. Nadim Kobeissi HOPE X, NYC, 2014
Usable Crypto: Introducing minilock Nadim Kobeissi HOPE X, NYC, 2014 2012 Browsers are an environment that is hostile to cryptography Malleability of the JavaScript runtime. The lack of low-level (system-level)
Secure Network Communications FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy
Secure Network Communications FIPS 140 2 Non Proprietary Security Policy 21 June 2010 Table of Contents Introduction Module Specification Ports and Interfaces Approved Algorithms Test Environment Roles
Network Security. Abusayeed Saifullah. CS 5600 Computer Networks. These slides are adapted from Kurose and Ross 8-1
Network Security Abusayeed Saifullah CS 5600 Computer Networks These slides are adapted from Kurose and Ross 8-1 Goals v understand principles of network security: cryptography and its many uses beyond
In the pursuit of becoming smart
WHITE PAPER In the pursuit of becoming smart The business insight into Comarch IoT Platform Introduction Businesses around the world are seeking the direction for the future, trying to find the right solution
Network Security - ISA 656 Introduction to Cryptography
Network Security - ISA 656 Angelos Stavrou September 18, 2007 Codes vs. K = {0, 1} l P = {0, 1} m C = {0, 1} n, C C E : P K C D : C K P p P, k K : D(E(p, k), k) = p It is infeasible to find F : P C K Let
EDA385 Embedded Systems Design. Advanced Course
EDA385 Embedded Systems Design. Advanced Course Encryption for Embedded Systems Supervised by Flavius Gruian Submitted by Ahmed Mohammed Youssef (aso10ayo) Mohammed Shaaban Ibraheem Ali (aso10mib) Orges
Microsemi Security Center of Excellence
Microsemi Security Center of Excellence Sales and FAE Training August 24, 2015 1 Outline What is the Security Center of Excellence (SCoE)? Overview of Microsemi s Security capabilities and expertise Threat
National Security Agency Perspective on Key Management
National Security Agency Perspective on Key Management IEEE Key Management Summit 5 May 2010 Petrina Gillman Information Assurance (IA) Infrastructure Development & Operations Technical Director National
A Road Map on Security Deliverables for Mobile Cloud Application
A Road Map on Security Deliverables for Mobile Cloud Application D.Pratiba 1, Manjunath A.E 2, Dr.N.K.Srinath 3, Dr.G.Shobha 4, Dr.Siddaraja 5 Asst. Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
ETHERNET ENCRYPTION MODES TECHNICAL-PAPER
1 ETHERNET ENCRYPTION MODES TECHNICAL-PAPER The CN series encryption platform is designed to secure information transmitted over a number of network protocols. The CN series encryptors secure Ethernet
Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm By Mihir Bellare and Chanathip Namprempre
Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm By Mihir Bellare and Chanathip Namprempre Some slides were also taken from Chanathip Namprempre's defense
Fast Implementations of AES on Various Platforms
Fast Implementations of AES on Various Platforms Joppe W. Bos 1 Dag Arne Osvik 1 Deian Stefan 2 1 EPFL IC IIF LACAL, Station 14, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland {joppe.bos, dagarne.osvik}@epfl.ch 2 Dept.
H MICRO CASE STUDY. Device API + IPC mechanism. Electrical and Functional characterization of HMicro s ECG patch
H MICRO CASE STUDY HMicro HMicro is a wireless healthcare chip company to enable industry s first fully disposable wireless patches with high reliability, high data integrity, low cost, small form factor
The Impact of IoT on Semiconductor Companies
Advisory The Impact of IoT on Semiconductor Companies Rajesh Mani Director, Strategy and Operations April 15, 2015 The Internet of Things (IoT) has been defined in multiple ways here s our take! The collection
Common Pitfalls in Cryptography for Software Developers. OWASP AppSec Israel July 2006. The OWASP Foundation http://www.owasp.org/
Common Pitfalls in Cryptography for Software Developers OWASP AppSec Israel July 2006 Shay Zalalichin, CISSP AppSec Division Manager, Comsec Consulting shayz@comsecglobal.com Copyright 2006 - The OWASP
NVM memory: A Critical Design Consideration for IoT Applications
NVM memory: A Critical Design Consideration for IoT Applications Jim Lipman Sidense Corp. Introduction The Internet of Things (IoT), sometimes called the Internet of Everything (IoE), refers to an evolving
Single Sign-On Secure Authentication Password Mechanism
Single Sign-On Secure Authentication Password Mechanism Deepali M. Devkate, N.D.Kale ME Student, Department of CE, PVPIT, Bavdhan, SavitribaiPhule University Pune, Maharashtra,India. Assistant Professor,
ARTIFICIAL NEURAL CRYPTOGRAPHY DATAGRAM HIDING TECHNIQUES FOR COMPUTER SECURITY OBJECTS REGISTER
International Journal of Computer Engineering & Technology (IJCET) Volume 7, Issue 2, March-April 2016, pp. 36 43, Article ID: IJCET_07_02_005 Available online at http://www.iaeme.com/ijcet/issues.asp?jtype=ijcet&vtype=7&itype=2