Ibn Saud's Policy on the Palestinian Question

Transcription

1 Ibn Saud's Policy on the Palestinian Question Thesis submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy by Michael Kahanov Submitted to the Senate of Tel Aviv University September

2 Abstract This study reviews the position of Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, known as Ibn Saud, towards Jews and Zionism within the framework of his policy on the Palestinian question. Ibn Saud was the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, beginning with the conquest of Riyadh in After conquering most of the Arabian Peninsula, including the Hijaz and its holy cities Makkah and Al Madinah, he formally declared the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and ruled it until his death in His sons have been rulers of the Kingdom since then. Over the course of Ibn Saud s long rule, the first half of the twentieth century, events took place which shaped the Middle East as we now know it: World War I, the super powers mandates and the forming of the Arab countries: Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. A central process taking place at this time was the escalation of the dispute between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. This dispute fed on the strengthening and growth of the Jewish settlement (Yishuv) in Palestine, peaking with the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent war. Ibn Saud s attitude towards the Jews was based mostly on the Zionist enterprise that sought to increase the number of Jews in Palestine, secure the Yishuv financially, to found national institutes and to create an independent political entity. The Palestinians resisted this activity on grounds of infringements of their rights and began a struggle with the support of neighbouring Arab countries. Ibn Saud, the ruler of the only independent country in the region, could not avoid the question of Palestine. His leadership and prestige drew assistance requests from the Palestinians. He fully understood that the dispute carried ramifications for the whole region, and with it the position of his Kingdom. The dispute carried a religious as well as a political angle. Jerusalem was and is recognized in the Muslim world as their most holy place, after Makkah and Al Madinah. Haj Amin Al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, was the prominent Palestinian leader at the time, carrying a religious title in addition to his political one. He tried to involve the Muslim world in the Palestinian dispute and set himself up as leader of that world. This was a challenge to the leadership of Ibn Saud, guardian of the holy places of the Hijaz. Another aspect of the religious angle was that Ibn Saud founded his Kingdom on the Wahhabi movement, with an affinity to former states 2

3 that occupied the peninsula since the 18 th century and were ruled by his forefathers. The Wahhabi was seen as a fundamentalist, fanatical form of Islam, intolerant towards infidels and divergent Muslims. Saudi Arabia did not have a Jewish community. Ibn Saud s first knowledge of Jews came from the Islamic sources, in the Wahhabi version, in which he had been educated. There is a view that the source of Ibn Saud s objection to the Jews and his hatred of them was the religious fanaticism of his Wahhabi faith. By this outlook, this fanatic religious attitude formed Ibn Saud s opinion of the political struggle in Palestine, thus preventing any possibility of reaching a compromised solution to the dispute. Several Zionist leaders as well as different Western diplomats and researchers have adopted this viewpoint. This work disproves this opinion. It shows that despite his Wahhabi heritage, Ibn Saud had his own approach to Islam and of his responsibilities as a community leader (Imam). His views were moderate and open minded: he accepted all four schools of Sunni Islam as legitimate; his approach to the Shia s was tolerant when compared to the ferocious war his forefathers raged against them; he persuaded the religious leaders (the Ulama) to embrace western technologies that appeared to be in contradiction with the values of Islam and he treated Christianity with respect and benevolence. This research presents a view pointing to Ibn Saud s attitude to Jews and Zionism as determined by his strategic-political grasp of Saudi Arabia s interests in the Middle East arena: maintaining the borders of his Kingdom he had no desire to broaden his rule to additional territories in the Fertile Crescent; fortifying his position as a Muslim and Arab leader and countering any threat of expansion of the House of Hashim so that he could develop and advance his country. This view enables an understanding of Ibn Saud s attitude towards the Yishuv in Palestine and the struggle with the Palestinians, with all its accompanying upheavals of the 30 s and 40 s. The dispute had the potential to disrupt the status quo in the region were it to escalate. This was one of the main threats to Ibn Saud s Saudi Arabia and he devoted great efforts to resolve it. Cooperating with Great Britain was a basic element of Ibn Saud s policy. It was the only super power with the political influence and military strength in the region that could assure the balance of power was undisturbed. Great Britain had the mandate for Palestine and as such was responsible for its security. Ibn Saud had 3

4 contracts with Great Britain and enjoyed its financial support. Great Britain ruled Transjordan, which bordered Saudi Arabia and Palestine, and also Iraq, and was influential in the Persian Gulf Emirates bordering Saudi Arabia. Other Muslim countries were also under British influence and pilgrims would come from these countries to the holy places of the Hijaz, the main source of income for the Kingdom before the age of oil. It was these factors that made Ibn Saud coordinate with the British (the rulers of Palestine) ensuring good relations with them. He was prepared to help the British with their difficulties in Palestine hoping that this would ease the conflicts he had with them in regards to territories in the Persian Gulf. The Gulf area was far more important to him than Palestine and more so after the discovery of oil in this region. Beginning in the 1940 s the U.S.A. became a major factor in Saudi Arabia s economy as American oil companies made oil production the chief source of income for the Kingdom. These companies acted to influence the American administration into defending their interests and not supporting Zionism. Conversely, President Truman ran a pro-zionist policy, causing inter-arab pressure on Saudi Arabia to reverse the American companies concessions. Ibn Saud rejected this pressure and protected his Kingdom s vital interests. He did, however, approach the U.S.A. diplomatically and asked it to change its policy. Ibn Saud ensured that these activities were widely publicised intending to maintain his prestige in the Arab world and show his support for the Palestinian struggle. At this time, the U.S.A. joined Great Britain in its attempts to settle the dispute in Palestine. Ibn Saud, lending great weight to the super powers ability to act in the region, attempted to work directly with the U.S.A. and Great Britain to reach a resolution, but they rejected him preferring the solution to be reached through the U.N. The Hashimites were Ibn Saud s main rival in the region. The Sherif House with its heritage going back to the prophet Muhammad was embroiled in an age-old dispute with the Wahhabi House of Saud. Ibn Saud had destroyed their Kingdom in the Hijaz in the mid 1920 s and forced them into exile. After the Hashimites settled in Transjordan and Iraq with British assistance, their ambition was to extend their rule to additional territories in the Fertile Crescent towards Syria and Palestine. Abdullah of Transjordan was determined to take advantage of the problems in Palestine to take control of its Arab sections. He even had inspirations to re-conquer the Hijaz. This 4

5 illustrates the magnitude of the threat Ibn Saud perceived in the strengthening and spread of the Hashimites. The removal of this threat occupied most of his efforts for the remainder of his rule. Nazi Germany shared Ibn Saud s hatred of the Jews. Additionally, Germany had no political aspirations in the Middle East and was willing to block the Hashimites, the protégées of Great Britain. Germany was also a potential source of weapons to Saudi Arabia. Despite all this, contacts between Ibn Saud s representatives and the Nazi regime prior to World War II did not grow into a coordinated effort. Ibn Saud did not want to change his basic British orientation and the German regime, realising this, was reluctant to cooperate with him. During World War II Ibn Saud declared formal neutrality but he believed in the eventual victory of the allied forces. As developments on the ground proved this notion, his support of the allied nations became more apparent. The Palestinians and the Yishuv in Palestine were the direct enemies in the dispute over the land. Ibn Saud was unwilling to make any real sacrifices for the Palestinians that could hurt the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. His aid to the Palestinians in terms of funds and weapons was very limited and done secretly. He had no faith in the Mufti, the Palestinian leader, who tried to involve him in the dispute. He saw the divisions in the Palestinian society, and above all was not ready to identify himself as a supporter of the Palestinian rebels acting against the British. He saw the Jews as enemies of Islam, considered them cursed by God from the beginning of time and despised them for what he considered their materialistic nature. Zionism seemed to him an act of oppression, the disowning of the local Arabs from their land. He did not believe the Jews had any rights over Palestine. Nevertheless, he supported protecting the Jewish minority in Palestine and maintaining its safety, although this was subject to discontinuing the Jewish Immigration. This policy was meant to prevent a takeover of Palestine by the Hashimites and to assist in finding a solution that would settle the dispute in a manner of which the British would approve again protecting his prime interest not to disrupt the balance of power in the region. Ibn Saud s policy was tested by the main events from the 1920 s until the 1940 s. In August 1929 violent attacks took place against the Jews in Palestine Ibn Saud was unaware at that time of the severity of the problem. He believed that co-existence between the Arabs and the Jews could be achieved with the British in charge of 5

6 security. In 1936 he acted with other Arab kings and in coordination with the British to stop the great Palestinian strike of that year. He convinced the Arab Executive Committee to cooperate with the Peel Commission that the British appointed in 1937, in an attempt to settle the Palestinian problem. He opposed the commission s recommendation to divide the land because of the strength it would give Abdullah of Transjordan. Ibn Saud s moderate approach was evident at the St. James conference in London (1939), when his representative Emir Faisal called for a British initiative to end the dispute. He supported the British White Paper policy set after the conference failed. The White Paper accepted some of the Palestinians claims but most Arabs objected to it. In the 1940 s Ibn Saud acted within the Arab League to reject proposals, which would harm the U.S.A. and Great Britain. He avoided obligations to give substantial aid to the Palestinians and opposed a war against the Jews. He quickly reconciled himself to the U.N. decision of 29 th November 1947 to divide the land. In 1948 when Israel declared its independence and the Arab armies attacked, he settled for a symbolic involvement sending a small, untrained force under Egyptian command that contributed little to the Arab war effort. The new reality in the region after the defeat of the Arab armies caused Ibn Saud to stop meddling in the affairs of Palestine. Ibn Saud s attitude towards the Jews was determined by political consideration rather than on a religious basis. Many statements exist in which he denounces the Jews as the enemies of Islam, a cursed race, using their money to gain political influence and to fulfil groundless territorial ambitions. These statements doubtlessly stem from a genuine hatred by Ibn Saud, further influenced by the opinions of foreigners, mainly European and American anti-semites. But his hatred of the Jews was mostly due to the activities of the political Zionist movement, which was responsible for the dispute in Palestine. Ibn Saud believed these activities infringed on the rights of the Palestinians, and furthermore, threatened the stability of the region and Saudi interests. These expressions of hatred and attacks on the Jews were also intended to show the Arab world his solidarity with the Palestinian struggle. Despite these feelings he was still intent on ensuring the safety of the Yishuv in order to solve the Palestinian problem. He recognized the Jewish influence in the world and appreciated their talent and ability to promote development through science and 6

7 technology. Boycotting Jewish products made in Palestine, Jewish firms around the world, and prohibiting the entrance of Jews into the Saudi Kingdom were mainly a manifestation of his commitment to the Arab interest. These actions caused no significant damage to his Kingdom. Ibn Saud drew on foreign counsellors to run his foreign policy. These were welleducated multi-lingual Arabs who filled prominent positions in his administration. With no roots in Saudi society they were absolutely loyal to the ruler. They were very familiar with the dispute in Palestine and were close to the Palestinian leadership. They tried to influence the Kingdom to give greater support to the Palestinians but were often forced to go against their own agenda, in order to fulfil Ibn Saud s dictated policy. The Zionist leadership did not have a unified opinion on Ibn Saud and his policies. They had a thorough knowledge of Ibn Saud s policies regarding the problems in the region and the guidelines he followed via various sources. They were in possession of authentic British diplomatic papers; the Arab department of the Jewish Agency was well informed through its employed agents and their sources. Jewish Agency personnel met with Ibn Saud s representatives, leaders of the Syrian National Block and courtiers of Abdullah of Jordan. All these, together with Ibn Saud s actions in the region, pointed to his moderate approach to the dispute in Palestine and an attempt to find a settlement to calm the situation. But in spite of all this, the Zionist leaders had different opinions. Moshe Shertok, who was in charge of political affairs in the Jewish Agency and responsible for the Arab department, thought that there was no way to reach a settlement with Ibn Saud as he was a man of the desert and a fanatical extremist Wahhabi. Chaim Weizmann held the opposite view. Confident in his ability to reach a settlement with Ibn Saud he tried to involve the British and Americans in a plan initiated by St. John Philby. This plan proposed a Jewish autonomous region to be included in an Arab federation headed by Ibn Saud. It was suggested that the Jews transfer twenty million pounds sterling to Ibn Saud for execution of the plan. The plan failed both because of tactical mistakes in its implementation and because the region was unwilling to accept an Arab federation led by Ibn Saud. This eventually led to worsening Ibn Saud s attitude towards the Jews as he saw this plan as an attempt by the Jews to bribe him. Ben Gurion met with Saudi administration officials more than other Zionist leaders but with no result. He 7

8 took the view that the Yishuv had to be strengthened first. Only then can an attempt be made for a settlement with the Arabs while maintaining Jewish political independence. The Jewish Agency maintained close relations with their neighbour Abdullah of Transjordan, who was willing to accept some of the Zionists demands, on the understanding that he would rule the Arab portion of Palestine. These dealings were known to Ibn Saud and as far as he was concerned, eliminated the Zionist leadership as a partner for any agreement. Despite contacts at different levels and mediation attempts, Ibn Saud refused to have direct contact with any Jewish representative. The Arab department of the Jewish Agency did not recommend a comprehensive regional policy for most of this time period. It even wrongly assessed the impact of the religious factor on Ibn Saud s policy. It was not until November 1946 that the department suggested a policy in which it recommended active support for Abdullah s ambitions in the region, including the annexation to Jordan of Syria, parts of Palestine and Lebanon, in exchange for his agreement to the founding of a Jewish State in Palestine. Ibn Saud s policy included elements that could have served as the basis for a settlement with the Yishuv: 1. He recognized that the key to finding a solution to the dispute in the region was held by the super powers. It was clear to him that both Great Britain and the U.S.A. would not accept all of the Palestinian claims and ignore the power of the Yishuv and the Jewish Diaspora. 2. Maintaining stability in the region and preventing disputes was a key goal of his policy. 3. The Jewish settelments in Palestine would prevent Abdullah from taking over the entire land. 4. Ibn Saud knew the importance of borders between states. Despite this, he accepted for a long time his country having no fixed borders. He recognised that interim agreements could provide for stability. (This was the situation in Eastern Saudi Arabia as well as the border with Jordan. Saudi Arabia recognised the region of Aqaba-Ma an as part of Jordan only after Ibn Saud s death). 8

9 5. Ibn Saud knew first hand the rivalries and discord among the Arabs. He knew their military strength was limited and divided. Every Arab leader acted in accordance with his own interests. 6. Ibn Saud was first and foremost a political leader. As such he adopted a policy of realpolitik, a pragmatic willingness to accept reality. He acknowledged facts and did not let his feelings (his hatred of the Jews) interfere with the management of his policy. He himself always said that he could suppress his feelings for a political goal, and so he did. These elements can be found in the policies of his sons and heirs, with adjustments to the changing circumstances. In 1981 the Crown Prince Fahd, later to become King, published an eight-points plan for settling the dispute in Palestine. Section 7 of this plan includes an implied recognition of Israel and its right to peaceful existence in the region. The February 2002 initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah, who also became King, recognized Israel as a Jewish state. Basically, the initiative proposes that Israel return to the 1967 borders in exchange for a full normalization of its relationships with all Arab countries. Ibn Saud was a formidable leader not just by Middle Eastern standards. He had the natural talents of a leader and used them to fortify an unchallenged authority. His success in founding a state encompassing most of the Arab Peninsula, defeating his enemies, enforcing inner peace and developing his country all these awarded him prestige far beyond his borders. All those who had direct contact with him were charmed by his personality, power, presence and his level of influence. He had acute strategic perceptions based on a good understanding of the region and the forces working in it, but he was also knowledgeable in the happenings of the wider world. While running a pragmatic policy on the ground, he also used strong language - at times anti-semitic, stemming from his personal feelings as a means to influence discussions with the super powers and the Arab world according to his agenda. Zionist leaders, western diplomats and various researchers mistook Ibn Saud s attitude towards the Jews and the dispute in Palestine. Too much weight was given to his hateful words and his extreme Wahhabi image, and not enough to his strategic consideration. It was the benefit of his Kingdom, which guided Ibn Saud in conducting a moderate and calculated policy towards the dispute in Palestine. 9

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11 Ibn Saud's Attitude to the Jews and Zionism Thesis submitted for the degree Doctor of Philosophy by Michael Kahanov Submitted to the Senate of Tel Aviv University 11