RPAS Access to Controlled Airspace

Transcription

1 RPAS Access to Controlled Airspace Project CLAIRE

2 Contents Project CLAIRE Overview ATM safety assurance of exercises: ATC Procedures Simulation exercises Live flights planning Challenge of un-segregated integration Temporary Danger Areas Air Navigation Order Exemption Findings: ATM Safety Impact Findings: ATM Capacity Impact Recommendations Conclusions

3 Project Overview CLAIRE: Civil Airspace Integration of RPAS in Europe Objective: fly RPAS in controlled and non-segregated airspace. Comparable treatment with manned aviation Vehicle: Watchkeeper WK450 Mass: 450 Kg Wingspan: 10 m Endurance: 20 hours Incremental demonstrations: ATC & RPAS expert assessments Fast-time simulations Real-time simulations Airport Airspace Live flights

4 ATM safety assurance of exercises: ATC Procedures Standard ATC procedures supplemented with Temporary Operating Instructions Developed during workshops Information provided: Air vehicle performance Not compliance with rules of the air Contingency behaviour Comms back-up by telephone Air vehicle contingency behaviour Lost Link Routes & Emergency Recovery Locations update as flight progresses Requirement to remain in controlled or segregated airspace Tested in simulators Approved after ATC Procedures Safety Analysis

5 Simulation exercises Airport & TMA NLR En-route NATS Inform ATC Procedures Normal operations Emergency and contingency Loss of link with RPAS RPAS Comms failure RPAS SSR transponder failure RPAS engine problems RPAS control problems Weather/Traffic related issues

6 Live flights planning Test facility in West Wales run by NATS Military Test Area Routine integration of RPAS and manned aircraft Small incremental steps to safely push the boundary of RPAS operations Access into non-segregated airspace Impact of workload on ATC Assess the procedures and processes 3 flight scenarios: 1. En-route: Range Control to London ATC 2. Approach: As above plus Cardiff Approach 3. Aerodrome: As above plus Cardiff Tower

7 Challenge of un-segregated airspace integration To provide safety assurance To bridge lack of equivalency between RPAS and manned aviation Temporary Danger Areas to mitigate lack of Detect and Avoid function Exemption to Air Navigation Order due to navigation equipage

8 Temporary Danger Areas CAA requirement due to no Detect & Avoid capability Link between bottom of the airway and existing Danger Areas Engine failure resulting in the platform descent into uncontrolled airspace Provision of deconfliction service in uncontrolled airspace Allows flight trials in non-sterilised environment Published in AIC (Y011/2015)

9 Air Navigation Order Exemption Exemption to Air Navigation Order, Schedule 5 Radio Communication and Radio Navigation Equipment to be carried in Aircraft Air Traffic Service Units in NATS assessed the vertical and horizontal navigation capability The air vehicle s performance is acceptable for the intended flights

10 Findings: ATM Safety Impact Premise: safety shall not be compromised nor impacted in any way Temporary Danger Areas Slow speeds description in the Temporary Operating Instructions Misjudgement of RPAS performance Mitigated by ATC briefing More time to react Increased workload Vehicle spends more time in sectors

11 Findings: ATM Capacity Impact Additional traffic movements Increase in complexity and controller workload Differential performance characteristics and mission types Sector occupancy increments Non-conventional flight patterns

12 Recommendations RPAS pilots entering CAS should be familiar with R/T phraseology Avoid R/T channel overload European-wide license Unusual Climb and Descent performance Stepped climbs recommended Clearance to level above current airspace base GCS-GCS transfers: Transparent to ATC Away from ATC sector boundaries 20 minutes comms check Check filtering rules of radar speed gates Additional safety layer in comms loss Ground lines Increased complexity for ATC

13 Conclusions Temporary Danger Areas and exemptions to Air Navigation Order are not acceptable for routine operations No issues identified indicating an impact on safety Capacity issues should be further assessed Standard process to validate lost link routes Further work required to assess Emergency Recovery Locations and Lost Link Routes sharing with ATC and commonality amongst them

14 Many thanks