The Euro Area Crisis. Athanasios Orphanides MIT. March 2013
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1 The Euro Area Crisis Athanasios Orphanides MIT March 2013
2 The management of the crisis in the euro area
3 What crisis?
4 What crisis?
5 What crisis?
6 What crisis?
7 GDP per person in the US vs the euro area Real GDP Per Capita (1999=100) Euro Area United States February EC forecasts for 2013 and 2014 shown with dots.
8 Unemployment in the US vs the euro area Percent Euro Area United States February EC forecasts for 2013 and 2014 shown with dots.
9 Divergence in unemployment in the euro area Percent France Germany Italy Spain February EC forecasts for 2013 and 2014 shown with dots.
10 The disintegration of sovereign markets Percent France Germany Italy Spain 0 Ten year government bond yields
11 The disintegration of sovereign markets Percent France Germany Italy Spain Two year government bond yields
12 The most troubled member states so far Basis Points Spain Greece Cyprus Ireland Portugal Five-year CDS on sovereign, as of end February
13 How did the crisis reach the euro area? August 2007: A disturbance in money markets in the USA September 2008: The collapse of Lehman Caused a global banking crisis and recession in 2009 Morphed into a sovereign debt crisis in the euro area
14 Symptoms, contributing factors and causes Fiscal? Competitiveness? Growth? Banking? Economic governance? Politics?
15 A fiscal problem? Euro Area U.S.A Japan U.K. Deficit (%GDP) Debt (%GDP) IMF Fiscal monitor, October 2012
16 Fiscal? Percent of GDP Germany Spain United Kingdom 20 Debt to GDP ratios
17 Divergent government financing costs Percent Germany Spain United Kingdom 0 Ten year sovereign yields
18 The governance problem of the euro area The first phase of the global crisis uncovered weaknesses in the construction of the euro area The incomplete design of the euro area Lack of a crisis management framework Mismanagement of the problem since 2009 has turned it into an existential threat for the euro area. At least half a dozen euro area member states currently under stress: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Slovenia...
19 How could things get so bad? Mismanagement of the crisis by euro area governments damaged sovereign markets of euro area member states perceived to be weak. As a result, some euro area member states face much higher government bond yields than countries with worse public finances that are not in the euro area. Holdings of government bonds by banks weakened the capital position of banks in member states perceived to be weak. Negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns continues to damage the economies of several euro area member states.
20 How was the damage done? The incomplete design of the euro area The lack of a crisis management framework The politics of delayed resolution
21 Economic governance problems in the euro area In a monetary union, strong economic governance, including a clear crisis management framework is a prerequisite for stability in all states of the union. When the European Union was created, countries joining committed to follow rules that limited fiscal profligacy by member states Member states agreed to a Stability and Growth Pact that should have ensured sound fiscal policy. Deficits should stay below 3 percent of GDP Debt should stay below 60 percent of GDP, and if it exceeded that, member states should follow policies to reduce it.
22 Governance problems in the euro area: 2010 The crisis revealed significant gaps in monitoring and enforcement and insufficient respect for the rules by euro area governments. Greece proved to be the worst offender. The realization of the fiscal problems in Greece at the beginning of 2010 made it necessary to consider in a hurry: How to complete the monetary union. How to design a crisis management framework.
23 Was the Greek problem insurmountable? Evidence of misreporting certainly damaged trust among govenrments and people But Greece only about 2 percent of euro area And debt was sustainable by usual criteria. Problem should have been manageable in 2009, 2010,... How did it become a crisis for the euro area as a whole?
24 EC debt sustainability analysis June 2011 Graph 1. Debt sustainability assessment (baseline and alternative scenarios) % of GDP Baseline scenario Baseline + lower growth (-1p.p.) Partial consolidation Baseline + unsuccessful privatisation Baseline + higher interest rate (+2p.p.) Baseline + higher growth (+1p.p.)
25 Constraints in managing the crisis The Treaty prohibits member states from assuming the debts of other member states and prohibits monetary financing by any central bank in all member states. As a result, a crisis management framework should be designed to ensure that any assistance would not transfer resources from other states to the state in need. It should be temporary and should be repaid in full. But how could the framework avoid moral hazard? If governments knew that whenever they needed assistance other states would easily provide financing, they might again break the rules.
26 Political constraints Europe is not a federal state there is no single government that can enforce solutions. Solutions on key issues that may involve adjusting the Treaty, require unanimous agreement by governments of the member states. But governments of member states must face their own electorate and some element of any solution may be unpopular to the electorate in some state. Election cycles vary from state to state and at any given moment some government may prefer to postpone decisions.
27 Two approaches to moving forward The cooperative approach: Strengthen governance so that future governments of all member states are bound to respect the rules and show solidarity when needed. Only legitimate accidents could cause a liquidity crisis. But the required strengthening in governance should imply constraints, potentially limiting sovereignty e.g. restricting a government s ability to increase spending. The non-cooperative approach: Make temporary assistance extremely costly to the government requesting help as a deterrent. Raise the cost of financing of weak governments that have high debts or deficits so nobody wants to be in that situation. No moral hazard issues would be present. But it shows poor solidarity and is inefficient.
28 A wrong turn in 2010 During 2010, governments tried to improve governance. But some could not accept imposing stricter rules on their conduct. Cooperative approach seemed out of reach. In October 2010, the governments of Germany and France moved the euro area to the non-cooperative approach. The idea was to raise costs on weak governments. ECB objected and voiced concerns but was ignored. Unfortunately, other governments went along.
29 Four damaging government meetings October 18, 2010: PSI concept introduced July 21, 2011: PSI, up to 21% haircut on Greek debt October 26, 2011: PSI 50% haircut February 21, 2012: PSI, 53.5% haircut (about 80%)
30 October 18, 2010: Deauville Private Sector Involvement (PSI) doctrine introduced. Whenever a euro area member state faced liquidity pressures (not necessarily solvency concerns), the imposition of losses on private creditors would be demanded before euro area governments agreed to provide any temporary assistance. Message to potential investors: Euro area sovereign debt should no longer be considered a safe asset with the implicit promise that it would be repaid in full. Implication: Raise the cost of financing for euro area governments perceived to be relatively weak.
31 Five-year CDS on sovereigns Oct 18 Jul 21 Oct 26 Feb Basis Points France Germany Italy Spain 0
32 July 21, 2011 Summit Statement We reaffirm our commitment to the euro and to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and its Member States. The financial sector has indicated its willingness to support Greece on a voluntary basis through a menu of options further strengthening overall sustainability. As far as our general approach to private sector involvement in the euro area is concerned, we would like to make it clear that Greece requires an exceptional and unique solution.
33 October 26, 2011 Summit Statement The euro is at the core of our European project of peace, stability and prosperity. We agreed today on a comprehensive set of measures to restore confidence and address the current tensions in financial markets. These measures reflect our unwavering determination to overcome together the current difficulties and to take all the necessary steps towards a deeper economic union commensurate with our monetary union. The Private Sector Involvement (PSI) has a vital role in establishing the sustainability of the Greek debt. Therefore we welcome the current discussion between Greece and its private investors to find a solution for a deeper PSI.... To this end we invite Greece, private investors and all parties concerned to develop a voluntary bond exchange with a nominal discount of 50% on notional Greek debt held by private investors.
34 February 21, 2012 Eurogroup meeting The Eurogroup acknowledges the common understanding that has been reached between the Greek authorities and the private sector on the general terms of the PSI exchange offer, covering all private sector bondholders. This common understanding provides for a nominal haircut amounting to 53.5%. The Eurogroup considers that this agreement constitutes an appropriate basis for launching the invitation for the exchange to holders of Greek government bonds (PSI)
35 March 2, 2012 Euro Summit [Euro area Heads of State or Government] welcome the progress made on the new Greek programme, and notably the agreement reached by the Eurogroup on the policy package and the offer made to private creditors Euro area Heads of State or Government recall their determination to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, and their readiness to act accordingly.
36 Five-year CDS on sovereigns Oct 18 Jul 21 Oct 26 Feb Basis Points France Germany Italy Spain 0
37 The effect on the banks and the economy As government debt holdings were branded risky : First, banks needed to raise new capital to be considered well-capitalized. This meant a rentrenchment of credit expansion equivalent to massive monetary policy tightening. Second, banks needed to dump some of the government debt they help (a firesale of government debt). This meant yields on government debt of states perceived to be weak rose even more.
38 The role of the ECB The ECB cannot solve what is fundamentally a political problem. The ECB has the capacity to buy more time for governments by ensuring the threat of immediate collapse is averted for a while. ECB intervention gives the option to governments to postpone resolution of the crisis. By postponing resolution governments raise the costs for the euro area as a whole.
39 The role of the ECB: Four controversial decisions May 10, 2010: SMP August 7, 2011: SMP phase II December 8, 2011: 3-year LTRO September 6, 2012: OMT
40 Five-year CDS on sovereigns May10 Aug07 Dec08 Sep Basis Points France Germany Italy Spain 0
41 The OMT-induced posponement Words continue to suggest a strong desire for a solution. Actions suggest continued bias towards postponement. June 29, 2012 EU Summit: Significant progress in improving governance, setting up a banking union to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. December 14, 2012 EU Summit: Postponement of key decisions that could resolve the crisis into the future.
42 Euro Area Summit Statement: 29 June 2012 We affirm that it is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. The Commission will present Proposals on the basis of Article 127(6) for a single supervisory mechanism shortly. We ask the Council to consider these Proposals as a matter of urgency by the end of When an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, involving the ECB, for banks in the euro area the ESM could, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalize banks directly... We affirm our strong commitment to do what is necessary to ensure the financial stability of the euro area, in particular by using the existing EFSF/ESM instruments in a flexible and efficient manner in order to stabilise markets...
43 Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union This report lays down the actions required to ensure the stability and integrity of the EMU and calls for a political commitment to implement the proposed roadmap. The urgency to act stems from the magnitude of the internal and external challenges currently faced by the euro area and its individual members. December 5, 2012 Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the Eurogroup Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank
44 Four presidents report towards a genuine EMU Stages Towards a Genuine EMU Ensuring fiscal sustainability and breaking the link between banks and sovereigns Completing the integrated financial framework and promoting sound structural policies at national level Establishing a EMU country- specific shock absorption function SSM and Single Rulebook Integrated financial framework Harmonised national DGS Harmonised national resolution frameworks ESM direct bank recapitalisation Single Resolution Mechanism with appropriate backstop arrangements Six pack, Two pack, TSCG Integrated budgetary framework Temporary/flexible/ targeted support Financial incentives linked to contractual arrangements Conditional participation based on entry criteria/compliance Country-specific shock absorption Conditions of participation depend on ongoing compliance Integrated economic framework Framework for ex-ante coordination of economic policy reforms (TSCG, Art. 11) Arrangements of a contractual nature integrated in European Semester Political accountability Commensurate progress on democratic legitimacy and accountability Stage I Completed end Stage II Start 2013 completed 2014 Stage III Post 2014
45 Key elements needed to break the vicious circle Common banking supervision Common deposit guarantee scheme Common resolution mechanism
46 December 14, 2012: Further postponement It is imperative to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns. Further to the June 2012 euro area Summit statement and the October 2012 European Council conclusions, an operational framework, including the definition of legacy assets, should be agreed as soon as possible in the first semester of 2013, so that when an effective single supervisory mechanism is established, the European Stability Mechanism will, following a regular decision, have the possibility to recapitalise banks directly. This will be done in full compliance with the Single Market.
47 Why is everything pushed beyond the end of 2013? The german election in September 2013 has become a constraint on action Elements needed to make progress unpopular in Germany Proposing solution now would compromise Angela Merkel s reelection OMT provides safeguard in the meantime
48 Latest blunder? Cyprus Cyprus: 0.2% of the euro area, entered euro in 2008 Large banking system with large Greek exposure Stable currency and finances before euro entry Communist government: March 2008 February 2013 Overspending government lost market access in May 2011 Avoided seeking help until banks needed temporary capital Avoided agreeing on help until election Run election on a platform of bashing banks Lost election but left huge problem behind
49 Could you see this coming? Basis Points Spain Greece Cyprus Ireland Portugal Five-year CDS on sovereign, as of end February
50 Could you see this coming? Basis Points Spain Greece Cyprus Ireland Portugal Markers show when assistance was sought and agreed.
51 Proposed solution by governments on March 16 Banks lost 25% of GDP due to write-down of Greek debt Cypriot government agreed to help Greece in this manner but left its banks exposed. Eurogroup decided to impose haircut on all deposits, insured and uninsured, in all banks rebardless of capitalization, to replenish capital and solve problem. The proposal is opposite to any known framework. For example, bank bond holders were fully protected, only depositors were targeted for a hit.
52 Another Deauville? The PSI deal in Deauville (October 18, 2010) between Germany and France generated the credit risk in sovereign markets we still observe today. European officials keep repeating (even after the confirmation of the PSI concept with the haircut on Greek debt) that Greece was a unique and exceptional case, never to be repeated anywhere else in the euro area. It took some time for the full effect to sink in, as seen e.g. in the spreads between Spanish or Italian and German debt. Similarly, the confiscation of deposits decision (March 16, 2013) is described as a unique and exceptional case, never to be repeated anywhere else in the euro area.
53 Why this particular solution was proposed? Recall the German government faces reelection in September! Opposition party (SPD) signaled a tough stance on helping other countries. Without SPD, Merkel cannot pass anything. To create political cost to Merkel, SPD claimed that helping Cyprus is equivalent to giving away German taxpayer money to Russian oligarchs who have deposits in Cypriot banks. So the German government had to insist that any solution was an effective response to this argument to avoid any potential political cost.
54 Outcome Deposit haircut proposal rejected by parliament in Cyprus Bank holiday imposed to avoid a run Concern of contagion Everyone involved denies ownership of confiscation decision. A telling Bloomberg headline: Europe Plays I-Didnt-Do-It Blame Game on Cyprus Bank Tax Subsequent eurogroup meeting on March 25 changed program but damage to banking system irreparable.
55 The European project today
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