TAIWAN-CA INC. Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (Version 2.0)

Transcription

1 TAIWAN-CA INC. Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (Version 2.0) Effective Date: 23 November

2 Revision Record Rev Effective Date Issuer Note Apr 2001 TaiCA PMA CP first issue Jan 2002 TaiCA PMA Revised by integrating TaiCA CA PKI system documentation (CPS, CP etc) to combine with the TRAVAN EDI PAA CP Apr 2002 TaiCA PMA Revised according to the items to be specified in the Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) and Certification Authority Management Regulations (CAMR) established by the Department of Commerce, MOEA Aug 2008 TWCA PMA Approval of PMA change Mar 2009 TWCA PMA Supplementation made to the OID to indicates the different assurance level. Changed the public key validity Aug 2009 TWCA PMA Revised section according to the resolution made at the PMA meeting on 29 July Aug 2012 TWCA PMA Revised section 1.2 according to the resolution made at the PMA meeting on 22 Aug 2012 to modify OID of EC Security Certificate Nov 2012 TWCA PMA Modify OID of every CA. 2

3 Contents 1. Introduction Overview Document Name and Identification PKI Participants Certification Authority (CA) Registration Authority (RA) Subscriber Relying Parties Other Participant Certificate Usage Appropriate Certificate Uses Prohibited Certificate Uses Policy Administration Organization Administering the Document Contact Person Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy CPS Approval Procedures Publication and Repository Responsibilities Repositories Publication of Certificate Information Frequency of Publication Access Control of Repository Identification and Authentication Naming Types of names Need for Names to be Meaningful Anonymity and Pseudonymity of Subscribers Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms Uniqueness of Names Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks Identification, Authentication and Role of Trademarks Initial Identity Verification Method to Prove Possession of Private Key Authentication of Organization Identity Authentication of Individual Identity Non-Verified Subscriber Information Validation of Authority Criteria for Interoperation Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key Identification and Authentication for Re-Key After Revocation Request of Certificate Revocation Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements Certificate Application Submition of Certificate Application Enrollment Process and Responsibilities Certificate Application Processing Performing Identification and Authentication Functions Approval or Rejection of Certificate Application

4 4.2.3 Time to process Certificate Applications Certificates Issuance CA Actions During Certificate Issuance Notifications to Subscriber of Certificate Issuance Certificate Acceptance Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance Publication of the Certificate by the CA Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities Key Pair and Certificates Usage Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage Relying Party Public Keys and Certificates Usage Certificate Renewal Circumstances for Certificate Renewal Who May Request Renewal Processing Certificate Renewal Request Notification of New Certificate to Subscribers Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate Publication of Renewal Certificate by the CA Notification of Certificate issuance by the CA to Other Entities Certificate Re-Keys Circumstances for Certificate Re-Keys Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscribers Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA Other Entities Certificate Modification Circumstances for Certificate Modification Who May Request Certificate Modification Processing Certificate Modification Requests Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities Certificate Revocation and Suspension Circumstances for Certificate Revocations Who Can Request Revocations Procedure for Revocation Request Revocation Request Grace Period Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties CRL Issuance Frequency Maximum Latency for CRLs On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available Special Requirements Related To Key Compromise Circumstances for Suspension Who Can Request Suspension Procedures for Suspension

5 Limits on Suspension Period Certificate Status Service Operational Characteristics Service Availability Operational Features End of Subscription Key Escrow and Recovery Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices Facility, Management, and Operational Controls Physical Control Site Location and Construction Physical Access Power and Air Conditioning Water Exposures Fire Prevention and Protection Media Storage Waste Disposal Off-Site Backup Procedural Controls Trusted Roles Number of Persons Required per Task Identification and Authentication for Each Role Roles Requiring Separation of Duties Personnel Control Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements Background Check Procedures Training Requirements Retraining Frequency and Requirements Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions Independent Contractor Requirements Documentation Supplied to Personnel Audit Logging Procedures Types of Events Recorded Frequency of Processing Log Retention Period of Audit Log Protection of Audit Log Audit Log Backup Procedures Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External) Notification to Event-Causing Subject Vulnerability Assessments Record Archival Types of Records Archived Retention Period for Archive Protection of Archive Archive Backup Procedures Requirements for Time-Stamping of Records Archive Collection System (Internal or External) Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information Key Changeover

6 5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data Are Corrupted Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures Business Continuity Capabilities After a Disaster CA or RA Termination Technical Security Control Key Pair Generation and Installation Key Pair Generation Private Key Delivery to Subscriber Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer CA Public Keys Delivery to Relying Parties Key Sizes Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field) Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control Private Key Escrow Private Key Backup Private Keys Archive Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module Method of Activating Private Key Method of Deactivating Private Key Method of Destroying Private Key Cryptographic Module Rating Other Aspects of Key Pair Management Public Key Archival Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods Activation Data Activation Data Generation and Installation Activation Data Protection Other Aspects of Activation Data Computer Security Control Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements Computer Security Rating Life Cycle Technical Controls System Development Controls Security Management Controls Life Cycle Security Controls Network Security Controls Time-Stamping Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles Certificate Profiles Version Number Certificate Extensions s Algorithm Object Identifier Name Forms Name Constraints Certificate Policy Object Identifier

7 7.1.7 Usage of Certificate Policies Extension Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension CRL Profiles Version Number(s) CRL and CRL Entry Extensions OCSP Profiles Version Number(s) Online Certificate Status Protocol Expansion Field Compliance Audits and Other Assessments Frequency and Circumstances of Assessment Identity/Qualifications of Assessor Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity Topics Covered by Assessment Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency Communications of Results Other Businesses and Legal Matters Fees Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees Certificate Access Fees Revocation or Status Information Access Fees Fees for Other Services Refund Policy Financial Responsibility Insurance Coverage Other Assets Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities Confidentiality of Business Information Scope Types of Confidential Information Information Not Within the Scope of Confidential Information Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information Privacy of Personal Information Privacy Plan Information Treated as Private Information Not Deemed Private Responsibility to Protect Private Information Notice and Consent to Use Private Information Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process Other Information Disclosure Circumstances Intellectual Property Right Representations and Warranties CA Representations and Warranties RA Representations and Warranties Subscriber Representations and Warranties Relying Party Representations and Warranties Representations and Warranties of Other Participants Disclaimers of Warranties Limitations of Liability Indemnities Term and Termination Term

8 Termination Effect of Termination and Survival Individual Notices and Communications with Participants Amendments Procedures for Amendment Notification Mechanism and Period Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed Dispute Resolution Provisions Governing Law Compliance with Applicable Law Miscellaneous Provisions Entire Agreement Assignment Severability Enforcement (Attorney's Fees and Waiver of Rights) Force Majeure Other Provisions Appendix 2: Acronyms and Abbreviations

9 1. Introduction Taiwan-CA INC. (TWCA) is a joint-venture company formed by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE), Taiwan Depository and Clearing Corporation (TDCC) Financial Information Service Corporation (FISC), and HiTrust Inc (HiTrust). In order to build a secure and trusted network transaction environment; to ensure information transmitted over the network is not fabricated, interpolated or marauded; to authenticate the identity of both parties of transactions and to prevent the repudiation of transactions afterwards, TWCA has established a public key infrastructure (PKI) to be the root certification authority (RCA) for the trust anchor. TWCA has also established various subordinate certification authorities (Sub-CA) to provide the subscriber network identity and transaction certification services in order to build up the user s faith in e-commerce transactions and to ensure the rights and benefits of both parties. In order to provide subscribes the certification service required for transactions made over the Internet, TWCA has established the Internet certification service system equipped with the related certification security mechanism. The service system is equipped with the leading-edge public key cryptography with security standards complying with the Electronic Banking Security Control Standards for Financial Institutions announced by the Ministry of Finance. The feature includes the non-repudiation, subscriber identify authentication, verification of information integrity, information encryption, and other forms of security controls required in network transaction security. The system can be applied to e-banking, online ordering, as well as other e-commerce systems, such as insurance, bonds and notes, enterprise enquiries, purchasing, and payment. 1.1 Overview The certificate policy (CP) of the PKI established by TWCA, collectively known as TWCA PKI CP, or CP), is a technical policy document established in accordance with the Electronic Signature Act of the Republic of China and the relevant international standards (e.g. IETF RFC 3647) as a reference for the PKI CAs to establish the certification practice statement (CPS). In order to cope with the e-commerce security requirements of various businesses, the PKI has included different kinds of CAs. CAs should follow this PKI CP to carry out the operating procedures, usage of certificates, responsibility and authority, and certificate administration specific to their CAs. 9

10 Special considerations have been made to the following items when establishing this CP: (1) whether or not relying party can identify the associations between the certificate holder (individual subscriber, corporate subscribers or subscriber of relevant hardware, software and application systems) and the public key specified in the certificate. (2) whether or not relying party can identify if the certificate holder has the corresponding private key; (3) whether or not subscribers and the relying party trust the security of PKI CAs, and their systems, keys, and operating procedures; and (4) the specifications of the Electronic Signature Act. 1.2 Document Name and Identification Based on the security level of certificates issued, the contents of certificates, the type of certificate, and the usage of certificate, assurance level are established in this CP, and each assurance level has a corresponding object identifier (OID). 10

11 The OID of this CP is: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) CP(5) id-twca-pki-cp-policy(5) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) } Based on the type of certificates, the OID of corresponding CPs is as follows: Commercial XML Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)XML(8) id-cp-policy(5) } TWCA (40869) certificates(1) policies(1) XML(12) } Commercial EC Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EC(11) } Internet NB Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) NB(1) id-cp-policy(5) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) NB(13) } EC Security Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) ECSECURITY(24) } SSL: 11

12 { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)SSL(3) id-cp-policy(5) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) SSL(21) } EV SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EV(6) id-cp-policy(5) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EV(22) } InfoSec UCA: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) InfoSec(3) id-cp-policy(5) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) InfoSec(23) } Five assurance levels are defined in this CP, and their OIBs are as follows: assurance level OID Testing Class {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) CP(5) id-twca-pki-cp-policy(5) test(0)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) class0(0) }Commercial XML Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)XML(8) id-cp-policy(5) test(0)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) XML(12) class0(0) } Commercial EC Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) test(0)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EC(11) class0(0) } Internet NB Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) NB(1) 12

13 id-cp-policy(5) test(0)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) NB(13) class0(0) } EC Security Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) test(0)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) ECSECURITY(24) class0(0) } SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)SSL(3) id-cp-policy(5) test(0) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) SSL(21) class0(0) } EV SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EV(6) id-cp-policy(5) test(0) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EV(22) class0(0) } InfoSec UCA: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) InfoSec(3) id-cp-policy(5) test(0) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) InfoSec(23) class0(0) } Class 1 {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) CP(5) id-twca-pki-cp-policy(5) class 1 Assurance(1)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) class1(1) } Commercial XML Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)XML(8) id-cp-policy(5) class 1 Assurance(1)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) XML(12) class1(1) } 13

14 Commercial EC Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) class 1 Assurance(1)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EC(11) class1(1) } Internet NB Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) NB(1) id-cp-policy(5) class 1 Assurance(1)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) NB(13) class1(1) } EC Security Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) class 1 Assurance(1)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) ECSECURITY(24) class1(1) } SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)SSL(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 1 Assurance(1) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) SSL(21) class1(1) } EV SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EV(6) id-cp-policy(5) class 1 Assurance(1) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EV(22) class1(1) } InfoSec UCA: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) InfoSec(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 1 Assurance(1) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) InfoSec(23) class1(1) } Class 2 {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) CP(5) id-twca-pki-cp-policy(5) class 2 Assurance(2)} 14

15 TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) class2(2) } Commercial XML Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)XML(8) id-cp-policy(5) class 2 Assurance(2)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) XML(12) class2(2) } Commercial EC Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) class 2 Assurance(2)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EC(11) class2(2) } Internet NB Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) NB(1) id-cp-policy(5) class 2 Assurance(2)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) NBCA(13) class2(2) } EC Security Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) class 2 Assurance(2)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) ECSECURITY(24) class2(2) } SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)SSL(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 2 Assurance(2) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) SSL(21) class2(2) } EV SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EV(6) id-cp-policy(5) class 2 Assurance(2) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EV(22) class2(2) } 15

16 InfoSec UCA: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) InfoSec(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 2 Assurance(2) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) InfoSec(23) class2(2) } Class 3 {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) CP(5) id-twca-pki-cp-policy(5) class 3 Assurance(3)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) class3(3) } Commercial XML Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)XML(8) id-cp-policy(5) class 3 Assurance(3)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) XML(12) class3(3) } Commercial EC Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) class 3 Assurance(3)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EC(11) class3(3) } Internet NB Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) NB(1) id-cp-policy(5) class 3 Assurance(3)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) NB(13) class3(3) } EC Security Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) class 3 Assurance(3)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) ECSECURITY(24) class3(3) } SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)SSL(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 3 Assurance(3) } 16

17 TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) SSL(21) class3(3) } EV SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EV(6) id-cp-policy(5) class 3 Assurance(3) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EV(22) class3(3) } InfoSec UCA: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) InfoSec(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 3 Assurance(3) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) InfoSec(23) class3(3) } Class 4 {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) CP(5) id-twca-pki-cp-policy(5) class 4 Assurance(4)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) class4(4) } Commercial XML Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)XML(8) id-cp-policy(5) class 4 Assurance(4)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) XML(12) class4(4) } Commercial EC Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) id-cp-policy(1) class 4 Assurance(4)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EC(11) class4(4) } Internet NB Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(886) TWCA(3) CA(1) NB(1) id-cp-policy(5) class 4 Assurance(4)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) NB(13) class4(4) } EC Security Certificate: {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EC+(3) 17

18 id-cp-policy(1) class 4 Assurance(4)} TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) ECSECURITY(24) class4(4) } SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1)SSL(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 4 Assurance(4) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) SSL(21) class4(4) } EV SSL: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) EV(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 4 Assurance(4) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) EV(22) class4(4) } InfoSec UCA: { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) Taiwan(158) TWCA(3) CA(1) InfoSec(3) id-cp-policy(5) class 4 Assurance(4) } TWCA(40869) certificates(1) policies(1) InfoSec(23) class4(4) } CAs under this PKI should specify and use in their CPS the OIDs specified in this CP. Where new OIDs are needed to identify with the new items in the certificate usage, CAs must expand these new OIDs according to the certificate OIDs defined in this CP. 1.3 PKI Participants All individuals applying this CP shall be the participants of this PKI. When using on application transaction systems, the public key certificates for a natural person or legal person specified in this CP provides the identification and authentication of the identify of both the activator and recipient of the transaction; authentication of information integrity; information privacy protection; the applicability and the rights and obligations of the non-repudiation mechanism; and the rules for certificate usage. 18

19 1.3.1 Certification Authority (CA) A CA is mainly responsible for the issue and administration of certificates. Based on the characteristics of operations, the CA falls into the RCA (root certification authority) and Sub-CA (subordinate certification authority). All CAs established under this PKI must follow the rules specified in this CP and must establish a contact window. When a CA is also a Sub-CA of other PKIs, this CP shall not apply to its up level of CA. As the trust anchor of this PKI, the RCA shall maintain the highest credibility and operate according to the highest assurance level of security specified in this CP. The Sub-CA is a Level 2 or Level 3 CA under this PKI. The certificate of a Level 2 CA is issued by the RCA, and the certificate of the Level 3 CA is issued by the Level 2 CA. for: As the highest certificate administration authority of the TWCA, the RCA is responsible (1) the issue and administration of the Sub-CA certificates; (2) the administration and publication of the certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRL) of Sub-CA stored in the repository; and (3) maintaining the stability and operations of the repository. The main duties of Sub-CAs are: (1) issue and administration of subscriber certificates; (2) issue and administration of registration authority (RA) certificates; (3) administering and publishing the certificates and CRLs stored in the repository; and (4) maintenance of the stability and operations of the repository. Sub-CAs issuing certificates to its Sub-CAs shall also be responsible for: (1) the issue and administration of Sub-CA certificates; and (2) the administration and publication of the certificates and CRLs of the Sub-CAs stored in the repository 19

20 1.3.2 Registration Authority (RA) The responsibilities of RA is to authenticate the identity of subscribers and the required information of the certificate for CAs to issue the subscriber certificate. CAs under this PKI shall specify the responsibilities of RAs in their CPS. When issuing a Sub-CA certificate, CAs under this PKI must be the RA and carry out the RA responsibilities specified in their CPS Subscriber The subscriber is the end entity specified in the CA certificate subject and the holder of the private key corresponding to the certificate public key. The usage of subscriber certificates shall be specified in the CPS. When issuing a certificate to an entity without the capacity specified by the law for the purpose of identification in the application system, such subscribers shall be the natural or legal person applying for the certificate Relying Parties A relying party means the acceptance the certificate of others (subscribers) for verifying the validity of the signature information or delivery of encryption information to the subscriber after encrypting the information of the subscriber certificate in order to maintain the privacy of the information contents of both parties in communication. Based on the information specified in the certificate, the relying party shall determine the reliability of certificate or if the certificate is intended for special usage Other Participant New members wishing to join this PKI shall be approved by the Policy Management Authority (PMA) center of the TWCA. For example, when it is necessary for the CAs of this PKI to cross certifued with the CAs of other PKIs. 20

21 1.4 Certificate Usage The assurance level of certificate specified in this CP and their appropriate uses are as follows: Testing Class: Testing assurance level is for the certificate testing of subscribers or relying party, and usage other than certificate testing is not guaranteed. Class 1: Basic assurance level is for identifying data integrity in network environments of very low threat of malicious interpolation. Class 2: Preliminary assurance level is for basic identity authentication suitable for use in network environments of lower risk of malicious interpolation but still with potential threat of information interpolation. Class 3: Intermediate assurance level is suitable for use in network environments of higher risk of malicious information interception or interpolation. Class 4: High assurance level is suitable for use in network environments of high risk of malicious information interpolation requiring a high recovery cost. When applying the assurance level and their limitations on the scope of these guarantees specified in this CP to certificates, CAs shall specify them in their CPS. Subscribers and relying party shall select the appropriate certificates according to the assurance level and their scopes of usage specified in the CPS Appropriate Certificate Uses Subject to the CPS of individual CAs Prohibited Certificate Uses Subject to the CPS of individual CAs. 1.5 Policy Administration Organization Administering the Document The Policy Management Authority (PMA or TWCA PMA), of the TWCA is responsible for the establishment, update, and publication of this CP. 21

22 1.5.2 Contact Person Subscribers may or mail their suggestions, description of suggestions, and contact information to the following contact window if they have any opinions on the certificate policy: Company TAIWAN-CA INC. (TWCA) Contact Window Policy Management Authority (PMA) Address 10th Floor, 85 Yen-Ping South Road, Taipei City, Taiwan, R.O.C Phone Fax Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy The certification practice statement (CPS) established by CAs under this PKI must be approved by the PMA CPS Approval Procedures CAs shall establish the CPS and ensure their consistency with this CP. Also, according to the Electronic Signature Act, CPSs established by CAs must be approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) before they are allowed to issue certificates. 22

23 2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities 2.1 Repositories The repositories shall offer the enquiry and download of information relating to certificate operations, such as certificates, CRLs, certificate status, CP, and CPS. Each CA under this PKI must provide at least one external repository, and its universal resources location (URL) shall be specified in the CA s CPS. The CA shall ensure the availability, accessibility, and information integrity of the repository. 2.2 Publication of Certificate Information CAs shall publish the information required by subscribers and relying party, including but not limited to the CPS and CRL. The CA information to be published shall be subject to the CPS of respective CAs. 2.3 Frequency of Publication The frequency of publication of the CA information shall be subject to the CPS of respective CAs. The frequency of publication of the CRL shall be published in the CPS. 2.4 Access Control of Repository CAs shall establish the specifications for repository access control in their CPS. 23

24 3. Identification and Authentication CAs under this PKI shall establish in their CPS and registration specifications the procedures for identifying and authenticating the subscriber identity. 3.1 Naming Types of names CAs shall be able to issue the X.509 certificate using the X.500 unique identifier as subject name. CAs shall specify in the CPS the types of names. CAs may use the expanded subject alternate name extension field where necessary, provided that the subject name field must not be null, and the subject alternate name shall comply with the X.500 standard Need for Names to be Meaningful The subject identity name specified in the certificate shall be able to identify the particular organization, unit or individual, and shall be readily identifiable by the relying party Anonymity and Pseudonymity of Subscribers The CA shall not issue anonymous or pseudonymous certificates Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms The interpretation rules for subscriber name shall be subject to the relevant rules and regulations specified by the competent authorities. For example, the identifier of an Internet account shall be processed according to the rules governing the bank code and the user account for banks assigned by the Financial Data Center, Ministry of Finance; the uniformed identifier for the citizen identity card of individuals shall be processed according to the rules specified by the Ministry of the Interiors; the identifier of the profit business tax code shall be processed according to the rules specified by the MOEA; and the rules for interpreting other subscriber identifiers shall be subject to the CPS of respective CAs Uniqueness of Names CAs shall ensure the uniqueness of the name in the certificates issued by them, and shall 24

25 specify in their CPSs the nominalization rules and rules for ensuring name uniqueness Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks When identical identifiers are detected, CAs shall assign the identifier to the first applicant. However, when another applicant requests the same identifier with the documents issued by the relevant competent authorities, CAs shall settle the dispute over such identifier. CAs shall specify in the CPS the procedures for settling disputes over identifier Identification, Authentication and Role of Trademarks Subject to the CPS of respective CAs. 3.2 Initial Identity Verification Method to Prove Possession of Private Key If the private key corresponding to the certificate public key is generated by the subscriber, a CA shall request the subscriber to submit the prove possession of the private key, such as verify the signature information signed by private key (e.g. using the methods specified in the RFC 2314, RFC 2510 and RFC 2511 standards). It will be no need to verify private key possession when the private key is generated by the RA, CA or other authorized third-party, provided that the security measures for private key delivery shall be specified in the CPS Authentication of Organization Identity When authenticating the status of organizations, the organization shall submit documents issued by the competent authorities or other certifications proving its existence. The identity and authorization of its statutory representative shall be verified. If the application is made by the authorized agent of an organization, this agent shall also submit his/her identify certifications. All documents and/or certifications shall be submitted in writing or carried to the count by the agent in person. The following shows the requirements for the identity authentication of organization under 25

26 various assurance level: Testing Class: To be specified by CAs in their CPS. Class 1: Limited verification of the subscriber name and information with simple procedures by . Class 2: In addition to organization name clearance, subscribers shall submit legal and correct certifications, without completing the procedures over the counter. Class 3: In addition to the information clearance specified in Class 2, an authorized agent carrying a valid letter of assignment shall make the application over the counter, and the agent shall submit his/her own certifications of identity or any procedures valid for authenticating the true identity of subscribers. Class 4: In addition to the information clearance specified in Class 3, the application shall be made by the statutory representative in person over the counter, and the statutory representative shall submit certifications valid for identifying his/her identity. When performing the initial verification of the information or communication hardware and software equipment of an organization (e.g. routers, firewalls, and servers), the equipment administrator shall submit the following registration information: equipment identification (e.g. serial number) or service name (e.g. domain name); equipment public key; the licensing usage and attributes of equipment (e.g. the licensing usage or attributes shall be only be specified when it is included in the certificate); the contact information of administrators for contacts made by the RA or CA; CAs shall verify registration data with methods corresponding to the assurance level of certificates being applied for. The verification methods shall include, but not limited to, the methods specified in this part for authenticating the identity or the digital signature of subscribers (signature certificates shall be issued according to this CP). 26

27 3.2.3 Authentication of Individual Identity The following show the requirements for the identity authentication of individual subscribers under various assurance level: Testing Class: To be specified by CAs in their CPS. Class 1: Limited verification of the subscriber name and information with simple procedures by . Class 2: In addition to individual name clearance, subscribers shall submit legal and correct certifications, without completing the procedures over the counter. Class 3: In addition to the information clearance specified in Class 2, the individual subscriber or his/her agent carrying a valid letter of assignment shall make in person the application over the counter Class 4: In addition to the information clearance specified in Class 3, the application shall be made by the individual subscriber in person over the counter. For the information or communication hardware and software equipment held by individual subscribers, the individual subscribers shall be deemed as the administrator of such equipment and shall complete the verification according to section Non-Verified Subscriber Information No applicable Validation of Authority The certifications of identity of an individual, organization agent and organization shall be issued by the relevant government agencies. The RA shall validate the authenticity of the letter of assignment submitted by an agent. 27

28 3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation No applicable. 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests Subscribers of CAs shall follow the identity authentication requirements below to perform the subscriber identity identification and authentication for re-key request. Testing Class: No stipulation. Class 1: No stipulation. Class 2: The key identify authentication shall be performed with the password of the authorized account or the use of current signature key. Class 3: The key identify authentication shall be performed the use of current signature key. Class 4: The initial verification shall be performed for every re-key request Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key The longer the time of use of a key, the higher the risk of key discloser or compromise. For this reason, it is necessary to change over the key for certificate subscribers to ensure key security. The changeover of certificate keys means to re-generate a public key and private key pair and to apply new certificate from the CA with the old registration data. The features and assurance level of the new certificate issued after re-key shall remain the same as the old certificate. CAs shall specify in the CPS the requirements of routine re-key for the subscriber identity identification and authentication. 28

29 3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key After Revocation After revoking a certificate, subscribers shall repeat the initial verification specified in section 3.2 in order to apply new certificate. 3.4 Request of Certificate Revocation CAs shall authenticate the request of certificate revocation. In authenticating a request of certificate revocation, CAs may verify the signature generated with the private key of the corresponding certificate, whether or not the private key has been compromised. 29

30 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1 Certificate Application Submition of Certificate Application When the certificate user is a natural person, he/she is the certificate applicant. When the certificate user is an orgnization, the statutory representative or his/her agent is the certificate applicant Enrollment Process and Responsibilities Certificate applicants shall read through the terms of use (TOU) in advance. After agreeing to the TOU, applicants shall complete the application form together with the signed TOU to the RA. CAs shall specify in the CPS the methods for delivering the public key to the certificate issuer. 4.2 Certificate Application Processing Performing Identification and Authentication Functions The RA shall follow the procedures below to handle the certificate application. To acquire the relevant data of certificate application of applicants is described in section 3.2. To verify and record the identification data of applicants is described in section 3.2. To acquire the public key of applicants and check its associations with the private key of applications is described in section 3.2. To validate the authenticity of information specified in the certificate. 30

31 CAs shall establish and specified the steps for completing the above procedures in the CPS. These procedures shall be completed prior to the issue of certificates Approval or Rejection of Certificate Application After completing the Identification and authentication Procedures described in section 4.2.1, the application for certificates shall be deemed as accepted. When it is unable to complete the above identification and authentication procedures, the certificates application shall be rejected Time to process Certificate Applications No stipulation. 4.3 Certificates Issuance CA Actions During Certificate Issuance The identity authentication shall be performed in communication of any forms between the RA and the CA. The communication shall be made either online or offline. The integrity and privacy of information shall be maintained during the communication. When delivering the public key of certificate applicants to the CA, the CA shall ensure that the application data are correctly linked with public key. The CA may ensure the linkage with cryptographic methods or the non-cryptographic physical or procedural methods. These shall include, but not be limited to, the use of diskette (or other storage devices) delivered by with registered mail or courier service. After receiving the request of certificate issue, the CA shall verify the identity of sender; examine the integrity of delivered data; validate the contents of the request of certificate issue and generate and issue the certificate after ensuring that the certificate contents meet the requirements Notifications to Subscriber of Certificate Issuance After issuing certificates, CAs shall notify the issue of certificates with appropriate 31

32 methods and deliver the certificate to the corresponding subscribers. When the issue of certificates is rejected, CAs shall notify subscribers with appropriate methods and inform subscribers of the reasons of rejection. The notification and delivery also can be made through the RA. Apart from the applicant s failure to pass the verification, CAs may disapprove the issue of certificates for other reasons. 4.4 Certificate Acceptance CAs shall specify the following in the CPS: procedures of subscriber certificate acceptance; certificate applicants have accepted and understood the responsibilities and obligations for using the certificate; how to inform certificate applicants of the contents of certificates; and when a certificate applicant rejects the certificate issued after reviewing the certificate contents, the RA shall notify the CA to revoke the certificate Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance Subscribers shall validate if the contents registered in the certificate are correct and understand the TOU before start to use the certificate Publication of the Certificate by the CA CAs may publish the issued certificates to the repository Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities Apart from delivery the certificate to the subscriber, CAs may deliver the certificate to the RA after the issue. 4.5 Key Pair and Certificates Usage Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage The subscriber is the holder of the private key corresponding to the certificate public key. Restrictions in the intended scope of usage for a private key are specified through certificate extensions, including the key usage and extended key usage extensions, in the associated certificate. 32

33 CAs shall specify in the CPS the scope of certificates usage they issue. When there are doubts of private key fraud, disclosure, compromise or loss, subscribers shall report to the RA or CA according to the procedures specified in the CPS of respective CAs. The usage and constrain of subscriber s certificate and private key shall follow the rule specified in this CP and the CA s CPS Relying Party Public Keys and Certificates Usage The examination steps for relying party to determine a trustee certificate are not specified in this CP. When examining a certificate, relying party shall follow the rules in the CPS of respective CAs to create a trust path and to verify the certificate status as a reference for determining to trust or not a certificate. The relying party shall only apply a certificate to examine the correctness of a digital signature in the electronic documents and the identity of the signature holder after trusting a certificate. 4.6 Certificate Renewal Circumstances for Certificate Renewal A certificate renewal means the issue of a new certificate using the same subscriber information and containing the same key but a different serial number and an extended validity. not. CAs under this PKI shall determine independently whether to accept certificate renewal or Who May Request Renewal All certificate subscribers are eligible for renewing a certificate Processing Certificate Renewal Request Prior to the expiration of a certificate, subscribers shall apply for the issue of a new certificate to the RA or CA with the original registration information and public key. After receiving an application for certificate renewal, the CA shall validate the 33

34 correctness of the registration information and public key of the applicant. The CA shall issue a new certificate as described in section Notification of New Certificate to Subscribers See section Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate See section Publication of Renewal Certificate by the CA See section Notification of Certificate issuance by the CA to Other Entities See section Certificate Re-Keys Circumstances for Certificate Re-Keys The certificate re-key means the generation of a new public and private key pair and apply a new certificate to the CA with the origin registration information. CAs under this PKI shall specify independently the certificate re-key procedures Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key All certificate subscribers are eligible for request the certification of a new public key Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests CAs shall perform the identification and authentication of subscriber identity as 34

35 described in section 3.3. CAs shall issue the certificate as described in section Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscribers See section Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate See section Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA See section Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA Other Entities See section Certificate Modification A certificate modification means the issue of a new certificate after changing the identification information of the subscriber name, without changing the public key of the certificate Circumstances for Certificate Modification Subject to the rules specified in the CPS of respective CAs Who May Request Certificate Modification Subject to the rules specified in the CPS of respective CAs Processing Certificate Modification Requests Subject to the rules specified in the CPS of respective CAs. 35