1 Equens Certificate Policy WebServices and Connectivity Final H.C. van der Wijck 11 March 2015 Classification: Open Version 3.0
2 Version history Version no. Version date Status Edited by Most important edit(s) Final H.C. van der Wyck Final H.C. van der Wyck Length RSA-key changed to 2048 bits and lay-out document Final H.C. van der Wyck References to PinkRocccade changed to KPN, and reedited according to KPN s CPS version 3.5 Copyright Equens SE and/or its subsidiaries. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be copied or reproduced, sold or transferred to any person, in whole or in part, in any manner or form or on any media, without the prior written permission of Equens. The recipient is, however, authorised to copy or reproduce this publication within its own organisation as may be reasonably necessary for the purpose for which it is supplied. Any such copy or reproduction will include the following: acknowledgement of the source, reference and date of the publication, and all notices set out on this page.
3 Content 1 Introduction Overview Document name and identification PKI participants Certificate Usage Policy administration Definitions and acronyms 8 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities Repositories Publication of certification information Time or frequency of publication Access controls on repositories 9 3 Identification and Authentication Naming Initial identity validation Identification and authentication for re-key requests Identification and authentication for revocation request 13 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements Certificate Application Certificate application processing Certificate issuance Certificate acceptance Key pair and Certificate usage Certificate renewal Certificate re-key Certificate modification Certificate revocation and suspension Certificate status services End of subscription Key escrow and recovery 22 5 Facility, Management and Operational Controls Physical controls Procedural controls Personnel controls Audit logging procedures Records archival Key changeover Compromise and disaster recovery CA or RA termination 27 6 Technical Security Controls Key pair generation and installation Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls Other aspects of key pair management Activation data Computer security controls Life cycle Technical controls 30 FINAL Version March 2015 Page 3 of 43
4 6.7 Network security controls Time-stamping 30 7 Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profiles Certificate profile CRL profile OCSP profile 33 8 Compliance Audit and other Assessments Frequency or circumstances of assessment Identity/qualifications of assessor Assessor's relationship to assessed entity Topics covered by assessment Actions taken as a result of deficiency Communication of results 35 9 Other Business and Legal Matters Fees Financial responsibility Confidentiality of business information Privacy of personal information Intellectual property rights Representations and warranties Disclaimers of warranties Limitations of liability Indemnities Term and termination Individual notices and communications with participants Amendments Dispute resolution provisions Governing law Compliance with applicable law Miscellaneous provisions Other provisions 42 Annex 1 Acronyms and Definitions 43 FINAL Version March 2015 Page 4 of 43
5 1 Introduction The Equens Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a private PKI with the objective to provide a secure infrastructure between Equens and the banks, and between Equens and bank clients i.e. the corporates. The Equens Private PKI is to enable and accommodate financial transactions and related financial information of web-applications using the Equens Portal via this secure infrastructure. This document "Equens Certificate Policy" is the principal statement of policy governing this Equens Private PKI. The CP sets forth the business, legal, and technical requirements for approving, issuing, managing, using, revoking and renewing digital certificates to be used within this Private PKI, and providing associated trust services for all participants within this Private PKI. These requirements protect the security and integrity of the Equens Private PKI and comprise a single set of rules that apply consistently Private PKI-wide, and thereby providing assurances of uniform trust throughout this Private PKI. The CP is not a legal agreement between Equens and Private PKI participants; rather, contractual obligations between Equens and Private PKI participants are established by means of agreements with such participants. This document is targeted at: The Equens Private PKI service provider, KPN, who has to operate in terms of their own Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) and to comply with the requirements laid down by this CP, The Registration Authority (RA) organisation at Equens, which organisation is responsible for validating certificate requests and approving the issuing of certificates according to this CP, Private PKI Certificate Subscribers who need to understand how they are authenticated and what their obligations, Relying parties who need to understand how much trust to place in a private-pki certificate, or a digital signature using that certificate. This CP conforms to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 3647 for Certificate Policy and Certificate Practice Statement. 1.1 Overview This CP sets out the policies under which the Private PKI participants must operate. In particular this CP is relevant for KPN that operates the Equens Private PKI Certificate Authority (CA) and provides the infrastructure for the Managed PKI Service for the Equens Private PKI. The Managed PKI Service enables the Managed PKI Equens RA (Registration Authority) at Equens to validate certificate requests, approve the issuing of certificates, request the revocation or renewal of Certificates according to the CP. The Managed PKI Administrator(s) at Equens are authorised to operate the Managed PKI Equens RA at Equens. KPN performs all the back-end Certificate issuance, management, revocation, and renewal functions. This is described in detail in the KPN, Getronics Certificate Practice Statement, version 3.5, dated September 30 th, Equens Certificate Policy Overview Equens Private PKI offers according to the Equens Certificate Policy the following types of certificates depending on certificate usage and how the subscriber is authenticated by Equens: Organisational Managed PKI Certificates issued to organisations; these organisations can be the processor Equens, banks and bank clients (corporations), FINAL Version March 2015 Page 5 of 43
6 Class 3 Managed PKI Administrator Certificates. Organisational Managed PKI Certificates are issued to devices to provide authentication; message, software, and content integrity; and confidentiality encryption. Organisational Managed PKI Certificates provide assurances of the identity of the Subscriber based on a confirmation that the Subscriber organisation does in fact exist, that the organisation has authorised the Certificate Application, and that the person submitting the Certificate Application on behalf of the Subscriber was authorised to do so. The Class 3 Managed PKI Administrator Certificates are issued to the individuals responsible for operating the Managed PKI RA at Equens. These Organisational Managed PKI Certificates are to be used for the Equens services called WebServices and Connectivity. These services consist currently of the following: WebServices offered by Equens at the Equens Portal (for example AIS (Advanced Information Service), SIB (Block Selected Direct Debit Mandates), etc. Payments from banks using transport channels such as I-Connect Direct, I-Connect 2 FTP, Secure File Transfer. WebServices will also use the Certificates issued by DigiCert as the Equens host Server SSL Certificate. The management of these Server Certificates is according to the DigiCert Certificate Policy. The CP of the Equens Private PKI will therefore not describe the Certificate Policy of Equens host Server SSL Certificates. 1.2 Document name and identification This document is the Equens Certificate Policy (CP). Equens acting as the policy-defining authority has not assigned an object-identifier value extension for the different types of certificates. 1.3 PKI participants Certification authorities The term Managed PKI Equens Certificate Authority (CA) is a term that refers to the entity, called Root Certificate Authority, authorized to issue public key certificates to end-user subscribers within the Equens Private PKI. This Root CA does not have a superior CA but has a self-signed root Certificate Registration authorities The Managed PKI Equens Registration Authority (RA) is an entity that performs identification and authentication of certificate applicants for end-user certificates, initiates or passes along revocation requests for end-user certificates, and approves applications for renewal or re-keying certificates on behalf of the Equens Private PKI. Equens acts as RA for certificates that are being issued. This is affected by the RA-Administrators at Equens using the Managed PKI Equens RA. The Managed PKI Equens RA consists of workstations for RA-Administrators at Equens, which are connected via a secured https-connection to the Equens Private PKI CA Subscribers Subscribers under the Equens Private PKI are all end-users (including entities) of certificates issued by the Managed PKI Equens CA. A subscriber is the entity named as the end-user Subscriber of a certificate. End-user Subscribers may be individuals, organisations, or infrastructure components such as firewalls, trusted servers or other devices used to secure communications within an Organisation. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 6 of 43
7 Two different terms are used in this CP to distinguish between two roles. The term "Subscriber" is the entity that has a contract with Equens for the issuance of the credentials in the certificate, and the term "Subject" is the person to whom the credential is bound. The Subscriber bears ultimate responsibility for the use of the credential but the Subject is the individual that is authenticated when the credential is presented Relying parties A Relying Party is an individual or an entity that acts in reliance of a certificate and/or a digital signature issued under the Equens Private PKI. A Relying Party may or may not also be a Subscriber within the Equens Private PKI Other participants The Processing Centre of KPN is an entity that facilitates the secure issuing of Certificates for the Equens Private PKI. It is responsible for the secure housing of among other things of cryptographic modules for the issuing of these certificates. KPN acts as the CA within the Equens Private PKI and performs all Certificate lifecycle services such as issuing, revoking and renewing of certificates upon the request of Equens acting as RA. 1.4 Certificate Usage Appropriate certificate uses The Equens Private PKI uses organisational certificates which are issued to Equens and either to banks or to bank clients as organisations. The certificates are issued only after it has been verified by Equens that the organisation legally exists and that the person who requests the certificate on behalf of the organisation is known at the organisation. While the most common usages are included in the Table below, an organisational certificate may be used for other purposes provided that a Relying party is able to reasonably rely on that certificate and the usage is not otherwise prohibited by law, by this CP, by any CPS under which this certificate has been issued and any agreement with subscribers. Certificate type Issued to Usage Organisational Managed PKI Equens, Banks and Bank clients Content Signing To be used for WebServices Usage Key Encryption for Secure SSL session To be used for Connectivity Specialized confirmation procedures using Managed PKI. Class 3 Administrator Certificates Managed PKI Administrator To validate the identity of MPKI Administrator To validate the identity of MPKI Administrator Table 1: Description of Certificates types Prohibited certificate uses The certificates are to be used only within the Equens Private PKI. Further the certificates shall be used only to the extent the use is consistent with applicable law, and to the extent permitted by Dutch export and import laws. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 7 of 43
8 1.5 Policy administration Organization administering the document Equens SE Postbus AH Utrecht The Nederlands Contact person The Equens Certificate Policy Manager Equens Policy Management Authority Department Equens Risk Management c/o Equens SE Postbus AH Utrecht The Netherlands Tel.: Web-address: Person determining CP suitability for the policy The Equens Policy Management Authority (PMA) determines the suitability and applicability of this CP CP approval procedures Approval of this CP and subsequent amendments shall be made by the PMA. Amendments shall either be in the form of a document containing an amended form of the CP or an update notice. Amended versions or notices shall be located at Updates supersede any designated or conflicting provisions of the referenced version of the CP. The PMA shall determine whether changes to the CP require change in the Certificate Policy object identifiers corresponding to each type of Certificate. 1.6 Definitions and acronyms See Appendix A for a table of acronyms and definitions. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 8 of 43
9 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities 2.1 Repositories KPN publishes, as part of their contract with Equens, Certificates for the Equens Private PKI based on the information provided by Managed PKI Equens RA. KPN publishes also in a repository as part of that same contract revocation information concerning such Certificates. 2.2 Publication of certification information KPN hosts the following repository on behalf of the Equens Private PKI: https://cert.managedpki.com/services/interpaynederlandbv001/digitalidcenter.htm. In this repository, KPN publishes the Certificates which are issued by the CA of Equens Private PKI and the Certificates of the CA itself. Upon revocation of an end-user Subscriber's Certificate within the Equens Private PKI, KPN will publish notice of such revocation in this repository. In addition KPN shall publish a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) regarding bankclient-type certificates in the following CRL-distributionpoint 2.3 Time or frequency of publication KPN shall publish a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) at least once a day. Whenever a CA-certificate is revoked, a CRL concerning the revocation of CA Certificates will be issued immediately. Expired certificates are removed from the CRL starting thirty (30) days after the Certificate's expiration. The CRL's are signed by the CA of the Equens Private PKI that issued the Certificate. 2.4 Access controls on repositories KPN shall not intentionally use technical means of limiting access to the Certificates, Certificate status information, or CRL's related to the Equens Private PKI. KPN shall implement controls to prevent unauthorized persons from adding, deleting, or modifying repository entries. KPN as an affiliate of Verisign shall require persons to agree to a Relying Party Agreement or CRL Usage Agreement as a condition to accessing Certificates, Certificate status information, or CRL's related to the Equens Private PKI. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 9 of 43
10 3 Identification and Authentication 3.1 Naming Unless indicated otherwise in this CP, the relevant CPS or the content of the digital certificate, names appearing in Certificates issued under the Equens Private PKI are authenticated Types of names The Certificates issued under the Equens Private PKI contain X.501 Distinguished Names in the Issuer and Subject fields. The Equens Private PKI CA Distinguished Name consists of the following components specified in the Table below. Attribute Country (C) Organisation (O) Organisational Unit (OU) State (S) Locality (L) Common Name (CN) Value "NL" "Interpay Nederland B.V." Not used Not used Not used "Interpay Root CA" Table 2: Equens Private PKI CA Distinguished Name The end-user Subscriber Certificates issued under a CA for the Equens Private PKI contain a X.501 distinguished name in the Subject Name field and consist of the components specified in the Table below. Attribute Country (C) Organisation (O) Organisational Unit (OU) State (S) Locality (L) Common Name (CN) Value "NL" Subscriber organisational name (for web server Certificates using http-based application) Subscriber organisational unit Indicates the Subscriber Province Not used Domain name (for web server Certificates using http-based application) Table 3: End-user Subscriber Certificates Distinguished Name The Common Name (CN) component of the Subject distinguished name of the end-user Subscriber Certificates under the Equens Private PKI is authenticated Need for names to be meaningful The end-user Subscriber Certificates issued by the Equens Private PKI CA contain names with commonly understood semantics permitting the determination of the identity of the organisation that is the Subject of the Certificate. For such Certificates, pseudonyms of end-user Subscriber Certificates (names other than a Subscriber's true organisational name) are not permitted Anonymity or pseudonym of subscribers See above. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 10 of 43
11 3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms No stipulation Uniqueness of names The Managed PKI Equens RA ensures that Subject Distinguished Names are unique within the Equens Private PKI through automated components of the Subscriber enrolment process Resolving Name Claim Disputes In cases where parties do not agree on the usage of names, KPN will decide which name to use after taking into account the interests of the parties, in far as this is not covered by imperative Dutch law or other relevant laws Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Certificate Applicants shall not use names in their Certificate Applications that infringe upon the Intellectual Property Rights of others. KPN acting as CA and Equens acting as RA do not verify whether a Certificate Applicant has Intellectual Property Rights in the name appearing in a Certificate Application or to arbitrate, mediate, or otherwise resolve any dispute concerning the ownership of any domain name, trade name, trademark, or service mark. KPN and Equens are entitled without liability to any Certificate Applicant to reject, or suspend any Certificate Application because of such dispute. 3.2 Initial identity validation Method to prove possession of private key The Equens Private PKI CA verifies the Certificate Applicant's possession of a private key through the use of a digitally signed certificate request pursuant to PKCS#10 (Certificate Signing Request) Authentication of organization identity See KPN CPS Authentication of an Organizational Identity Authentication of individual identity See KPN CPS Class 3 Administrator Certificates Non-verified subscriber information Non-verified subscriber information includes: Organisational Unit Any other information designated as non-verified in the certificate Validation of authority See KPN CPS Class 3 Administrator Certificates Criteria for interoperation The Equens Private PKI is a private PKI that is only used for services provided by Equens to entities within this private PKI. Therefore, the Equens Private PKI cannot provide interoperation services that allow a non-equens Private PKI CA to unilaterally certify the Managed PKI Equens PKI CA in order to interoperate with that CA. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 11 of 43
12 3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests Identification and authentication for routine re-key Prior to the expiration of an existing Subscriber's Certificate, it is necessary for the Subscriber to obtain a new certificate to maintain continuity of Certificate's usage. The Equens Private PKI requires for end-user Subscriber Certificates that the Subscriber generates a new key pair to replace the expiring key pair (technically defined as "rekey"). However for other type Certificates, the Equens Private PKI permits that a new certificate is requested for an existing key pair (technically defined as "renewal"). The Table below describes the requirements for routine rekey and renewal. Certificate Type Organisational Managed PKI (within 30 days before and 30 days after Certificate expiration) Organisational Managed PKI (beyond 30 days after Certificate expiration) Class 3 Administrator Certificates CA Certificates Routine Rekey and Renewal Requirements The Managed PKI process at Equens authenticates Subscribers seeking Certificate replacement through the use of a Challenge Phrase. As part of the initial registration process, Subscribers choose and submit a Challenge Phrase with their enrolment information. Upon rekey of a Certificate within the specified timeframe, if a Subscriber correctly submits the Subscriber's Challenge Phrase (or equivalent thereof) with the Subscriber's enrolment information, or proves possession of the private key, and the enrolment information (including contact information) has not changed, a new Certificate is automatically issued. After rekeying in this fashion and on at least alternative instances of subsequent rekeying or renewal, the Equens Private PKI shall reconfirm the identity of the Subscriber in accordance with the requirements specified in the KPN CPS for the authentication of an original Certificate Application. In this scenario, Re-key requests are reauthenticated as an original Certificate Application for replacing an end-user Subscriber certificate as described For this type of Certificates, Subscriber key pairs are browser generated as part of the online enrolment process. The Subscriber does not have the option to submit an existing key pair for renewal. Accordingly for this type of certificates only rekey is supported. Renewal of CA Certificates is permitted as long as the cumulative certified lifetime of the CA key pair does not exceed the applicative maximum CA key pair lifetime specified in the KPN CPS The CA's may also be rekeyed in accordance with the CPS Accordingly, for CA Certificates both rekey and certificate renewal are supported. The renewal requests are created and approved by authorised KPN personnel through a controlled process that requires the participation of multiple trusted individuals. Table 4: Routine Rekey and Renewal requirements per Certificate type Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Rekey after revocation is not permitted if: the Certificate was issued to a person other than the one named as the Subject of the Certificate, or the Certificate was issued without the authorization of the person or entity named as the Subject of such Certificate, or the entity approving the Subscriber s Certificate Application discovers or has reason to believe that a material fact in the Certificate Application is false, or FINAL Version March 2015 Page 12 of 43
13 For any other reason deemed necessary by KPN to protect the STN (Symantic Trust Network) Subject to the foregoing paragraph, End-user Subscriber's Certificates such as Organisational Managed PKI Certificates for banks and bankclients which have been revoked, may be replaced (i.e. rekeyed) in accordance with the table below. Timing Prior to Certificate expiration After Certificate expiration Requirement For replacement of an organisational or individual Certificate following revocation of the Certificate, the RA-process at Equens verifies that the person seeking certificate replacement, is in fact the Subscriber (for individuals) or an authorised organisational representative (for organisation) through the use of a Challenge Phrase as described in Other than this procedure, the requirements for the validation of an original Certificate Application as defined in 3.2 are used for replacing a certificate following revocation. Such Certificates contain the same Subject distinguished name as the Subject distinguished name of the Certificate being replaced. In this scenario, the requirements as specified in 3.2 for the authentication of an original Certificate Application are used for replacing an end-user Subscriber certificate. Table 5: Replacement revoked end-user Certificates 3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request Revocation procedures ensure prior to any revocation of a Certificate that the revocation has in fact been requested by the Certificate's Subscriber, Equens acting as RA, or KPN acting as CA. Acceptable procedures for authenticating Subscriber revocation requests include: Having the Subscriber submit the Subscriber's Challenge Phrase and revoking the Certificate automatically if is matches the Challenge Phrase on record. Receiving a message purporting to be from the Subscriber that requests revocation and contains a digital signature verifiable with the Certificate to be revoked, and Communication with the Subscriber providing reasonable assurances in light of the Class of Certificate that the person or organisation requesting revocation is in fact the Subscriber. Depending on the circumstances such communication may include one or more of the following: telephone, facsimile, , postal mail, or courier service. The Equens Private PKI CA authenticates the identity of Administrators via access control using SSL and client authentication before permitting them to perform revocation functions. The requests by Equens using a Managed PKI system to revoke a CA certificate are authenticated by KPN to ensure that the revocation has in fact been requested by the Managed PKI Equens CA. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 13 of 43
14 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements 4.1 Certificate Application Who can submit a certificate application Below is a list of people who may submit certificate applications: Any individual who is the subject of the certificate, Any authorised individual of an organisation or entity, Any authorised individual of Equens as RA Enrolment process and responsibilities End-user Certificate Subscribers All end-user Certificate Subscribers shall manifest assent to the relevant Subscriber Agreement that contains representations and warranties described in and undergo an enrolment process consisting of: Completing a Certificate Application and providing true and correct information, Generating, or arranging to have generated a key pair in accordance with KPN CPS 6.1.1, Delivering his, her, or its public key through the Managed PKI Equens as RA to KPN as CA in accordance with KPN CPS 6.1.3, Demonstrating to the Equens Private PKI CA in accordance with possession of the private key corresponding to the public key delivered to the Managed PKI Equens RA CA Certificates Equens as Subscriber of the Equens Private PKI CA Certificate with CommonName "Interpay Root CA" for the Equens Private PKI enters into a contract with KPN that issues the CA. The CA Certificate Applicants from Equens provide their credentials as required by the KPN CPS to demonstrate their identity and provide contact information during the contracting process. During this contracting process or at the latest prior to the Key Generation Ceremony to create a CA key pair for the Equens Private PKI, Equens shall cooperate with KPN to determine the appropriate distinguished name and the content of the Equens Private PKI CA Certificates to be issued to Equens. For these CA's within the Equens Private PKI certificate requests are created and approved by authorised KPN personnel through a controlled process that requires the participation of multiple trusted individuals Managed PKI Equens RA Certificates KPN operates an Administrative CA which issues certificates to Managed PKI Equens personnel (Managed PKI Administrators) who process Certificate Applications on behalf of the Managed PKI Equens RA. For the Managed PKI Equens RA as subscriber to the relevant Administrative CA the requirements for Class 3 Administrator Certificates specified in KPN CPS apply. 4.2 Certificate application processing Performing identification and authentication functions The Managed PKI Equens RA shall perform identification and authentication of all Subscriber information in terms of Section Approval or rejection of certificate applications If the identification and authentication of all required Subscriber information in terms of Section 3.2 is successful, the Managed PKI Equens RA will approve a Certificate Application. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 14 of 43
15 The Managed PKI Equens RA will reject a Certificate Application if: Identification and authentication of all required Subscriber information in terms of Section 3.2 cannot be completed, or The Subscriber fails to furnish supporting documentation upon request, or The Subscriber fails to respond to notices within a specified time, or Equens as RA believes that issuing a certificate to the Subscriber may bring the Equens Private PKI into disrepute Time to process certificate applications The Managed PKI RA and CA together will process Certificate Applications within a reasonable time of receipt. There is no time stipulation to complete the processing of a Certification Application unless indicated in the Subscriber Agreement, Equens CPS or other agreement between Equens Private PKI participants. 4.3 Certificate issuance Issuance of End-user Subscriber Certificates CA actions during certificate issuance A Certificate is created and issued by the Managed PKI CA following the approval of a Certificate Application by the Managed PKI Equens RA. The Managed PKI CA creates and issues to a Certificate Applicant a Certificate based on the information in a Certification Application following the receipt from the Managed PKI Equens RA to issue such a Certificate Notification to Subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate The Managed PKI CA issuing Certificates to end-user Subscribers shall notify Subscribers through the Managed PKI Equens that they have created such Certificates, and provide Subscribers the Certificates via a message sent to the Subscriber containing the Certificate as described in Issuance of Equens Private PKI CA and RA Certificates KPN authenticates the identity of the Equens CA and RA Applicant in accordance with the KPN CPS and, upon approval issues the Certificates needed to perform the CA and/or RA functions for the Equens Private PKI. Before KPN enters into a contract with Equens under KPN CPS , the identity of the Equens CA and RA Applicant is confirmed based on credentials presented. The execution of such a contract indicates the complete and final approval of the application by KPN. The decision to approve or reject application of the Equens application is solely at the discretion of KPN. Following such approval, KPN issues the Certificate(s) to the Equens Private PKI CA and corresponding Managed PKI Equens RA. 4.4 Certificate acceptance Conduct constituting certificate acceptance The Managed PKI Equens RA sends the Subscriber a PIN which the Subscriber enters into the enrolment web page to obtain the Certificate. Downloading all the Certificates in the CA Chain including the CA Certificate by the Subscriber constitutes acceptance of all the Certificates in the CA Chain Publication of the Certificate by the CA The Managed PKI CA publishes the Certificates they issue in a public accessible repository for the Equens Private PKI. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 15 of 43
16 The CA Certificate of the Equens Private PKI is not published but downloaded in the Certificate Chain Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities The Managed PKI Equens RA automatically receives notification from the Managed PKI CA of the actual issuance of the Certificates that have been approved by the Managed PKI Equens RA. The issued Certificates are available at the repository for the Equens Private PKI. The CA Certificates are automatically downloaded in the CA Chain. 4.5 Key pair and Certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage Use of the Private key corresponding to the public key in the Certificate shall only be permitted once the Subscriber has agreed to the Equens Subscriber Agreement and accepted the Certificate. The Certificate shall be used lawfully in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement in terms of this CP and the relevant CPS. Certificate use must be consistent with the KeyUsage field extensions included in the Certificate (e.g. if Digital Signature is not enabled then the Certificate must not be used for signing). Subscribers shall protect their private keys from unauthorised use and shall discontinue use of the private key following expiration or revocation of the Certificate Relying party public key and certificate usage Relying parties shall assent to the terms of the applicable relying party agreement as a condition of relying on the certificate (Legal). Reliance on a Certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the Relying Party must obtain such assurances for such reliance to be deemed reasonable. Before any act of reliance, Relying Parties shall independently assess: The appropriateness of the use of the Certificate for any given purpose and determine that the Certificate will, in fact be used for an appropriate purpose that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP, that the certificate is being used in accordance with the KeyUsage field extensions included in the certificate (e.g. if Digital Signature is not enabled then the certificate may not be relied upon for validating a Subscriber's signature), the status of the certificate and all the CA's in the chain of the Equens Private PKI that issued the certificate. If any of the Certificates in the Certificate Chain have been revoked, the Relying party is solely responsible to investigate whether reliance on a digital signature performed by the end-user Subscriber Certificate prior to the revocation of a Certificate in the Certificate Chain is reasonable. Any such reliance is made solely at the risk of the Relying Party. Assuming that the use of the Certificate is appropriate, Relying Parties shall utilize the appropriate software and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification or other cryptographic operations they wish to perform, as condition of relying on Certificates in connection with each such operation. Such operations include identifying a Certificate Chain and verifying the digital signatures on all Certificates in the Certificate Chain. 4.6 Certificate renewal Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to the Subscriber without changing the existing key pair. The Equens Private PKI permits renewal for CA Certificates but not for end-user Subscriber Certificates. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 16 of 43
17 4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal Prior to the expiration of an existing CA Certificate, it is necessary to renew the Certificate to maintain continuity of Certificate usage. A certificate may also be renewed after expiration Who may request renewal The request of renewal of CA Certificates follows the same procedure as generation of CA certificates as described in KPN CPS Processing certificate renewal requests See 3.3 of this CP. Renewal of the CA certificate is done according to KPN CPS 4.7 and Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber See Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate See Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA See Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities See Certificate re-key Certificate re-key is the application for the issuance of a new certificate with a new key pair to replace the expiring key pair. The Equens Private PKI requires Certificate re-key for end-user Subscriber Certificates and for CA Certificates Circumstance for certificate re-key Prior to the expiration of an existing end-user Subscriber Certificates and/or CA Certificate, it is necessary to renew the Certificate to maintain continuity of Certificate usage. A Certificate may also be renewed after expiration Who may request certification of a new public key Only the subscriber for an individual Class 3 Managed PKI Administrator Certificate or an authorised representative for an Organisational Managed PKI Certificate may request Certificate re-key Processing certificate re-keying requests See and Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber See Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate See Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA See Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities See FINAL Version March 2015 Page 17 of 43
18 4.8 Certificate modification Circumstance for certificate modification Certificate Modification refers to the application of the issuance of a new certificate due to changes in the information in an existing (other than the subscriber's public key). Certificate Modification is considered a Certificate Application in terms of Who may request certificate modification See Processing certificate modification requests See and Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber See Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate See Publication of the modified certificate by the CA See Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities See Certificate revocation and suspension Circumstances for revocation Circumstances for Revoking End-User Subscriber Certificates Reasons for revocation of an end-user Subscriber Certificate are: Equens or a Subscriber has reason to believe or strongly suspects that there has been a Compromise of a Subscriber's private key, Equens has reason to believe that the Subscriber has materially breached a material obligation, representation, or warranty under the applicable Subscriber Agreement, The Subscriber Agreement with the Subscriber has been terminated, Equens or the Subscriber of the Certificate has reason to believe that the Certificate was issued in a manner not materially in accordance with the procedures required by the applicable CPS, the Certificate was issued to a person other than the one named as the Subject of the Certificate, or the Certificate was issued without the authorization of the person named as the Subject of such Certificate, Equens or the Subscriber of the Certificate has reason to believe that a material fact in the Certificate Application is false, Equens or KPN determines that a material prerequisite to Certificate Issuance was neither satisfied nor waived, The information within the Certificate is incorrect or has changed, The Subscriber requests revocation of the Certificate in accordance with KPN CPS , The private key is corrupt. KPN may also revoke an Administrator Certificate if the Administrator's authority to act as Administrator has been terminated or otherwise has ended. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 18 of 43
19 (Equens Subscriber Agreements require end-user Subscribers to immediately notify KPN of a known or suspected compromise of its private key in accordance with the procedures in KPN CPS ) Circumstances for Revoking CA or RA Certificates KPN will revoke CA or RA Certificates of the Equens Private PKI if: KPN discovers or has reason to believe that there has been a compromise of the relevant CA or RA private key, The agreement between Equens with KPN with respect to the Equens Private PKI has been terminated, KPN discovers or has reason to believe that the Certificate was issued in a manner not materially in accordance with the procedures required by this Equens CP and CPS, the Certificate was issued to an entity other than the one named as the Subject of the Certificate, or the Certificate was issued without the authorization of the entity named as the Subject of such Certificate, KPN determines that a material prerequisite to Certificate issuance was neither satisfied nor waived, or The Managed PKI Equens requests revocation of the Certificate of the Equens Private PKI CA or RA. KPN requires that the Managed PKI Equens notifies KPN when revocation is required in accordance with the procedures in KPN CPS Who can request revocation Who Can Request Revocation of an End-User Subscriber Certificate The following entities may request revocation of an end-user Subscriber Certificate: The Managed PKI Equens RA which approved the Subscriber's Certificate Application may request the revocation of any end-user Subscriber or Administrator Certificates in accordance with For the Organisational Managed PKI Certificates, only a duly authorized representative of the organization is entitled to request the revocation of Certificates issued to the organization. The duly authorized representative of the Managed PKI Equens RA whose Administrator received an Administrator Certificate is entitled to request the revocation of an Administrator's Certificate Who Can Request Revocation of a CA or RA Certificate The following entities may request revocation of a CA or RA Certificate of the Equens Private PKI: KPN may initiate the revocation of the Equens Private PKI CA or RA Certificate in accordance with CPS The Managed PKI Equens RA is entitled, through their duly authorized representatives, to request the revocation of the relevant CA and RA Certificates belonging to the Equens Private PKI Procedure for revocation request For Managed PKI customers, the end-user Subscriber is required to communicate the request to the Managed PKI Administrator who will communicate the revocation request to KPN for processing. Communication of such revocation request shall be in accordance with the KPN CPS Procedure for Requesting the Revocation of an End-User Subscriber Certificate The end-user Subscriber requesting revocation is required to FINAL Version March 2015 Page 19 of 43
20 communicate the request to the Managed PKI Administrator who will communicate the revocation request to the Equens Private PKI CA at KPN for processing. In case the Managed PKI Equens RA initiates revocation of an end-user Subscriber Certificate upon its own initiative, it will instruct as such the Equens Private PKI CA at KPN to revoke the Certificate. Prior to the revocation of a Certificate, the Equens Private PKI CA verifies that the revocation has been requested by the Certificate's Subscriber, or by the Managed PKI Equens RA. Acceptable procedures for authenticating Subscriber revocation requests include: Having the Subscriber submit the Subscriber's Challenge Phrase and revoking the Certificate automatically if it matches the Challenge Phrase on record, Receiving a message purporting to be from the Subscriber that requests revocation and contains a digital signature verifiable with reference to the Certificate to be revoked, and Communication with the Subscriber providing reasonable assurances in light of the Class of Certificate that the person or organization requesting revocation is, in fact the Subscriber. Depending on the circumstances, such communication may include one or more of the following: telephone, facsimile, , postal mail, or courier service. The Equens Private PKI CA and RA shall process the revocation requests and reports upon receipt. The Equens Private PKI CA at KPN authenticates the identity of Administrators via access control using SSL and client authentication before permitting them to perform revocation functions. The Subscriber whose Certificate was revoked shall be informed of the revocation. Certificates that are revoked shall not be reinstated as valid Certificates. Certificates that are revoked will not be reinstated as valid Certificates. (Managed PKI Equens using the Automated Administration Software Module may submit bulk revocation requests to KPN. Such requests are authenticated via a request digitally signed with the private key in the Managed PKI Equens Automated Administration hardware token.) Procedure for Requesting the Revocation of the Equens Private PKI CA or RA Certificate The Equens Private PKI CA or RA requesting revocation of its CA or RA Certificate is required to communicate the request to KPN. This request is authenticated by KPN to ensure that the revocation has in fact been requested by the Managed PKI Equens. KPN will then revoke the Certificate. KPN may also initiate revocation of the Equens Private PKI CA or RA Certificate Revocation request grace period Revocation requests must be submitted as promptly as possible within a commercially reasonable period of time Time within which Equens Private PKI CA must process the revocation request Commercially reasonable steps are taken to process revocation requests without delay by the Managed PKI Equens CA Revocation checking requirement for relying parties Relying Parties must check the status of Certificates on which they wish to rely on. The Equens Private PKI CA communicates via a CRL-distributionpoint in the Certificate the specific repository for the Equens Private PKI where CRL's are posted: CRL issuance frequency (if applicable) The Equens Private PKI CA publishes CRL's showing the revocation of Certificates for the Equens Private PKI. CRL's for the Equens Private PKI CA that issue end-user Subscriber Certificates are published at least once per day. Expired Certificates are removed from the CRL starting thirty (30) days after the Certificate's expiration. CRL's are signed by the Equens Private PKI CA that FINAL Version March 2015 Page 20 of 43
21 issued the Certificate. A new CRL may be published before the stated time of the next CRL to be issued Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable) CRL's are posted to the repository within a commercially reasonable time after generation. This is generally done automatically within minutes of generation On-line revocation/status checking availability In addition to publishing CRLs, the Equens Private PKI CA provides Certificate status information through web-based query functions accessible through the Equens Private PKI repository at: https://mpki.pinkroccade.com/services/interpaynederlandbv001/digitalidcenter.htm On-line revocation checking requirements If a Relying Party does not check the status of a Certificate on which the Relying Party wishes to rely by consulting the most recent relevant CRL, the Relying Party must check Certificate status using the applicable method specified in Other forms of revocation advertisements available Not applicable Special requirements regarding key compromise Equens shall be notified by KPN, as responsible party for operating the Managed PKI Equens CA, of an actual or suspected Equens Private PKI CA private key Compromise using commercially reasonable efforts. Equens shall commercially reasonable efforts to notify Relying Parties of the Equens Private PKI if it discovers or is being notified or has reason to believe that there has been a Compromise of the private key of the Managed PKI Equens CA Circumstances for suspension The Equens Private PKI does not offer suspension services for CA or end-user Subscriber Certificates Who can request suspension Not applicable Procedure for suspension request Not applicable Limits on suspension period Not applicable Certificate status services Operational characteristics As described in and the Managed PKI CA provides the status of certificates via a CRL through the repository mentioned in the Certificate as CRL-distribution point, or at the Equens Private PKI LDAP directory for web-based query functions Service availability The Managed PKI CA shall provide Certificate Status Services 24*7 hours without scheduled intervention Optional features Not applicable. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 21 of 43
22 4.11 End of subscription A Subscriber may end a subscription for his Certificate of the Equens Private PKI by: Allowing his Certificate to expire without renewing or re-keying that Certificate, or Revoking of his Certificate before certificate expiration without replacing the Certificates Key escrow and recovery It is not possible within the Equens Private PKI to escrow the private keys of the Equens Private PKI CA and RA, and/or end-user Subscribers Key escrow and recovery policy and practices Not applicable Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices Not applicable. FINAL Version March 2015 Page 22 of 43
VeriSign Trust Network Certificate Policies Version 2.8.1 Effective Date: February 1, 2009 VeriSign, Inc. 487 E. Middlefield Road Mountain View, CA 94043 USA +1 650.961.7500 http//:www.verisign.com - 1-
Advantage Security Certification Practice Statement Version 3.8.5 Effective Date: 01/01/2012 Advantage Security S. de R.L. de C.V. Prol. Paseo de la Reforma # 625 Int 402, Col Paseo de las Lomas. Del Alvaro
THE RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE Certification Practice Statement For RSA Certificate Authorities (CAs) Last Revision Date: June 28, 2007 Version: 3.0 Published By: RSA Security Inc. Copyright 2002-2007 by
Gandi CA Certification Practice Statement Gandi SAS 15 Place de la Nation Paris 75011 France Version 1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.INTRODUCTION...10 1.1.Overview...10 1.2.Document Name and Identification...10
FernUniversität in Hagen: Certification Authority (CA) Certification Practice Statement VERSION 1.1 Ralph Knoche 18.12.2009 Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Overview... 4 1.2. Scope of the Certification
Globe Hosting Certification Authority Globe Hosting, Inc. 501 Silverside Road, Suite 105, Wilmington, DE 19809, County of New Castle, United States www.globessl.com TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION...
TCS Server and Code Signing Personal CA CPS Version 2.0 (rev 15) Page 1/40 Trusted Certificate Service TCS Server CAs, escience Server CA, and Code Signing CA Certificate Practice Statement Version 2.0
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATE POLICY July 2011 Version 2.0 Copyright 2006-2011, The Walt Disney Company Version Control Version Revision Date Revision Description Revised
TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.3 May 15, 2014 Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS:... 2 1. INTRODUCTION... 7 1.1 OVERVIEW... 7 1.2 DOCUMENT
TR-GRID CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE POLICY AND CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.1 January, 2009 Table of Contents: TABLE OF CONTENTS:...2 1. INTRODUCTION...7 1.1 OVERVIEW...7 1.2 DOCUMENT
Fraunhofer Corporate PKI Certification Practice Statement Version 1.1 Published in June 2012 Object Identifier of this Document: 184.108.40.206.4.1.7220.127.116.11.1 Contact: Fraunhofer Competence Center PKI Fraunhofer
Certification Practice Statement of the Federal Reserve Banks Services Public Key Infrastructure 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview The Federal Reserve Banks operate a public key infrastructure (PKI) that manages
SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY Document Classification: Public Version Number: 2.5 Issue Date: June 25, 2015 National Center for Digital Certification Policies and Regulations Department Digitally
TREND MICRO SSL CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT Version 2.0 Effective Date: 14 April 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview 1.2 Document name and identification 1.3 PKI participants 1.3.1
Certification Practice Statement Date: February 21, 2008 Version: 1.0.1 Table of Contents Document History... 1 Acknowledgments... 1 1. Introduction... 2 1.1 Overview... 3 1.2 Ford Motor Company Certificate
COMPANY INFO 1 (23) Ericsson Group Certificate Value Statement - 2013 COMPANY INFO 2 (23) Contents 1 Ericsson Certificate Value Statement... 3 2 Introduction... 3 2.1 Overview... 3 3 Contact information...
Apple Inc. Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 2.0 Effective Date: April 10, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Trademarks... 4 1.2. Table of acronyms... 4 1.3.
Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.8 Effective Date: June 11, 2012 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 1.1. Trademarks... 4 1.2.
Apple Inc. Certification Authority Certification Practice Statement Worldwide Developer Relations Version 1.14 Effective Date: September 9, 2015 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 5 1.1. Trademarks...
The Boeing Company Boeing Commercial Airline PKI Basic Assurance CERTIFICATE POLICY Version 1.4 PA Board Approved: 7-19-2013 via e-mal PKI-233 BCA PKI Basic Assurance Certificate Policy Page 1 of 69 Signature
(CP) (For SSL, EV SSL, OSC and similar electronic certificates) VERSION : 09 DATE : 01.12.2014 1. INTRODUCTION... 10 1.1. Overview... 10 1.2. Document Name and Identification... 11 1.3. Participants...
SwissSign Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for Gold Certificates Version March 2004 Version 2004-03 SwissSign Gold CP/CPS Page 1 of 66 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...9 1.1 Overview...
HKUST CA Certification Practice Statement IN SUPPORT OF HKUST CA CERTIFICATION SERVICES Version : 2.1 Date : 12 November 2003 Prepared by : Information Technology Services Center Hong Kong University of
Malaysian Identity Federation and Access Management Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 2.2 Document OID: 18.104.22.168.4.1.36322.214.171.124.2 February 2012 Contents
SWIFT SWIFT Qualified Certificates Certificate Policy This Certificate Policy applies to Qualified Certificates issued by SWIFT. It indicates the requirements and procedures to be followed, and the responsibilities
Class 3 Registration Authority Charter Version 1.0 applicable from 09 November 2010 Building A, Cambridge Park, 5 Bauhinia Street, Highveld Park, South Africa, 0046 Phone +27 (0)12 676 9240 Fax +27 (0)12
SYMANTEC NON-FEDERAL SHARED SERVICE PROVIDER PKI SERVICE DESCRIPTION I. DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this Service Description, capitalized terms have the meaning defined herein. All other capitalized
thawte Certification Practice Statement Version 3.7.5 Effective Date: 4 June, 2012 (All CA/Browser Forum-specific requirements are effective on July 1, 2012) thawte Certification Practice Statement 2012
thawte Certification Practice Statement Version 2.3 Effective Date: July, 2006 thawte Certification Practice Statement 2006 thawte, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Revision
[Draft] Bangladesh Bank Certification Authority (BBCA) Certification Practice Statement (CPS) Version: 1.00 August, 2015 Bangladesh Bank Page 2 of 42 Document Reference Title Document Type Bangladesh Bank
Document no 1/011 01-AZDA 102 213 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Certification Practice Statement Rev A TeliaSonera Public Root CA Certification Practice Statement Revision Date: 2006-11-17 Version: Rev A Published
Certification Practice Statement Version 2.0 Effective Date: October 1, 2006 Continovation Services Inc. (CSI) Certification Practice Statement 2006 Continovation Services Inc. All rights reserved. Trademark
ESnet SSL CA service Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0 June 30, 2004 Table of Contents Table of Contents...2 1 Introduction...3 1.1 Overview...3 1.1.1 General Definitions...4
Certification Practice Statement 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 OVERVIEW The Federal Reserve Banks ( FRBs ), utilizing Public Key Infrastructure ( PKI ) technology and operating as a Certification Authority ( FR-CA
DigiCert Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement DigiCert, Inc. Version 3.03 March 15, 2007 333 South 520 West Lindon, UT 84042 USA Tel: 1-801-805-1620 Fax: 1-801-705-0481 www.digicert.com
Trustwave Holdings, Inc Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement Version 2.9 Effective Date: July 13, 2010 This document contains Certification Practices and Certificate Policies applicable
Document history Version Date Remarks 1.0 19-05-2011 finalized 1.01 15-11-2012 URL updated after web page restructuring. 2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction... 4 2. Policy administration... 4 2.1 Overview...
phicert Direct Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Statement Version 1. 1 Effective Date: March 31, 2014 Copyright 2013-2014 EMR Direct. All rights reserved. [Trademark Notices] phicert is a
HKUST CA Certification Practice Statement IN SUPPORT OF HKUST CA CERTIFICATION SERVICES Version : 1.1 Date : 3 March 2000 Prepared by : Information Technology Services Center Hong Kong University of Science
CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT UPDATE Reference: IZENPE-CPS UPDATE Version no: v 5.03 Date: 10th March 2015 IZENPE 2015 This document is the property of Izenpe. It may only be reproduced in its entirety.
CERTIFICATE POLICY KEYNECTIS SSL CA Date: 05/02/2009 KEYNECTIS SSL CA CERTIFICATE POLICY Subject: KEYNECTIS SSL CA Certificate Policy Version number: 1.1 Number of pages: 49 Status of the Project Final
Certificate Policy KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP Emmanuel Montacutelli 12/11/2014 DMS_CP_KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP_1.2 KEYNECTIS SSL CA CP Version 1.2 Pages 51 Status Draft Final Author Emmanuel Montacutelli OpenTrust
PKI Belgium Government CA Government AA Certification Practice Statement 126.96.36.199.1.1.3 188.8.131.52.184.108.40.206 220.127.116.11.18.104.22.168 22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199 188.8.131.52.1.1.6 184.108.40.206.220.127.116.11 18.104.22.168.1.1.3 22.214.171.124.126.96.36.199
TC TrustCenter GmbH Certification Practice Statement NOTE: The information contained in this document is the property of TC TrustCenter GmbH. This Certification Practice Statement is published in conformance
Comodo Certification Practice Statement Notice: This CPS should be read in conjunction with the following documents:- * LiteSSL addendum to the Certificate Practice Statement * Proposed Amendments to the
X.509 Certificate Policy for India PKI Version 1.4 May 2015 Controller of Certifying Authorities Department of Information Technology Ministry of Communications and Information Technology Document Control
Symantec Trust Network (STN) Certificate Policy Version 2.8.20 May 20, 2016 Symantec Corporation 350 Ellis Street Mountain View, CA 94043 USA +1 650.527.8000 www.symantec.com - i - Symantec Trust Network
Federal Reserve Certification Authority (FR-CA) Certification Practice Statement for United States Treasury Auctions 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 OVERVIEW The Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( FRBNY ) acts as
Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Certificate Policy Version 1.0 Updated May 5, 2015 Approved by ISRG Policy Management Authority ISRG Web Site: https://letsencrypt.org Page 1 of 83 Copyright Notice
Registration Authority Charter Version 3.0 is applicable from Effective Date Inyanda House 21 Wellington Road Parktown, 2193 Phone +27 (0)11 544 9368 Fax +27 (0)11 544 9599 Website: http://www.transnet.co.za/
Visa Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy (CP) Version 1.7 Effective: 24 January 2013 2010-2013 Visa. All Rights Reserved. Visa Public Important Note on Confidentiality and Copyright The Visa Confidential
Document no 4/011 01-AZDA 102 213 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Certification Practice Statement Rev. 1.0 Telia hardware based e-legitimation v2 Certification Practice Statement Revision Date: 10 th June 2009
Starfield Technologies, LLC Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) Version 3.8 April 15, 2016 i Starfield CP-CPS V3.8 Table of Contents 1 Introduction... 1 1.1 Overview... 1 1.2
X.509 Certificate Policy for the Australian Department of Defence Individual Software Certificates (Medium Assurance) Version 4.0 May 2014 Notice to all parties seeking to rely Reliance on a Certificate
Trustwave Subscriber Agreement for Digital Certificates Ver. 11JUL14 PLEASE READ THIS AGREEMENT AND THE TRUSTWAVE CERTIFICATION PRACTICES STATEMENTS ( CPS ) CAREFULLY BEFORE USING THE CERTIFICATE ISSUED
SWITCHaai Metadata CA Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version 1.0, OID 2.16.7188.8.131.52.7.1.0 July 15, 2008 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION...6 1.1 Overview...6 1.2 Document name
National Identity Exchange Federation (NIEF) Trustmark Signing Certificate Policy Version 1.1 February 2, 2016 Copyright 2016, Georgia Tech Research Institute Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS I 1 INTRODUCTION
REGISTRATION WWW..CO.ZA Eskom Registration Authority Charter Version 2.0 applicable from 20 November 2009 Megawatt Park Maxwell Drive Sunninghill, SOUTH AFRICA, 2157 Phone +27 (0)11 800 8111 Fax +27 (0)11
GlobalSign Subscriber Agreement for DocumentSign Digital ID for Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS) Version 1.1 PLEASE READ THIS AGREEMENT CAREFULLY BEFORE USING THE DIGITAL CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO YOU
Operational Research Consultants, Inc. Non Federal Issuer Certificate Policy Version 1.0.1 Operational Research Consultants, Inc. 11250 Waples Mill Road South Tower, Suite 210 Fairfax, Virginia 22030 June
Certification Practice Statement Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) Version 1.0 Updated May 5, 2015 Approved by ISRG Policy Management Authority Web Site: https://letsencrypt.org Page 1 of 11 Copyright
X.509 Certification Practice Statement for the Australian Department of Defence Version 5.1 December 2014 Document Management This document is controlled by: Changes are authorised by: Defence Public Key
Post.Trust Certificate Authority Certification Practice Statement CA Policy and Procedures Document Issue date: 03 April 2014 Version: 184.108.40.206 Release Contents DEFINITIONS... 6 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS...
ENTRUST CERTIFICATE SERVICES Certification Practice Statement for Extended Validation (EV) SSL Certificates Version: 1.3 February 28, 2011 2011 Entrust Limited. All rights reserved. Revision History Issue
Certification Practice Statement March 2009 1. Overview 1.1 What is a Certification Practice Statement? A certification practice statement is a statement of the practices that a Certification Authority
TC TrustCenter GmbH Certificate Policy for SAFE NOTE: The information contained in this document is the property of TC TrustCenter GmbH. This Certificate Policy is published in conformance with international
ING Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Practice Statement Version 5.3 - June 2015 Colophon Commissioned by Additional copies ING Corporate PKI Policy Approval Authority Additional copies of this document
Your consent to our cookies if you continue to use this website.