TeliaSonera Public Root CA. Certification Practice Statement. Revision Date: Version: Rev A. Published by: TeliaSonera Sverige AB

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1 Document no 1/ AZDA TeliaSonera Sverige AB Certification Practice Statement Rev A TeliaSonera Public Root CA Certification Practice Statement Revision Date: Version: Rev A Published by: TeliaSonera Sverige AB

2 Copyright TeliaSonera Sverige AB No part of this document may be reproduced, modified or distributed in any form or by any means, in whole or in part, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without prior written permission of TeliaSonera Sverige AB. However, permission generally applies for reproducing and disseminating this in its entirety provided that this is at no charge and that no information in the document is added to, removed or changed. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page II Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

3 Table of Contents Table of Contents...III Revision History... VII Certification Practice Statement Summary INTRODUCTION Overview Document name and identification PKI participants Certification authorities Registration authorities Subscribers Relying parties Other participants Certificate usage Appropriate certificate uses Prohibited certificate uses Policy administration Organization administering the document Contact person Person determining suitability for the policy approval procedures Definitions and acronyms PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES Repositories Repository Revocation information Repository Publication of certification information Time or frequency of publication Access controls on repositories IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION Naming Types of names Need for names to be meaningful Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers Rules for interpreting various name forms Uniqueness of names Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks Initial identity validation Method to prove possession of private key Authentication of organization identity Authentication of individual identity Non-verified subscriber information Validation of authority Criteria for interoperation Identification and authentication for re-key requests Identification and authentication for routine re-key Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Identification and authentication for revocation request CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Certificate Application Who can submit a certificate application Enrollment process and responsibilities Certificate application processing Performing identification and authentication functions Approval or rejection of certificate applications TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page III Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

4 4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications Certificate issuance CA actions during certificate issuance Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate Certificate acceptance Conduct constituting certificate acceptance Publication of the certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Key pair and certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage Relying party public key and certificate usage Certificate renewal Circumstance for certificate renewal Who may request renewal Processing certificate renewal requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate re-key Circumstance for certificate re-key Who may request certification of a new public key Processing certificate re-keying requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate modification Circumstance for certificate modification Who may request certificate modification Processing certificate modification requests Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate Publication of the modified certificate by the CA Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Certificate revocation and suspension Circumstances for revocation Who can request revocation Procedure for revocation request Revocation request grace period Time within which CA must process the revocation request Revocation checking requirement for relying parties CRL issuance frequency Maximum latency for CRL s On-line revocation/status checking availability On-line revocation checking requirements Other forms of revocation advertisements available Special requirements re-key compromise Circumstances for suspension Who can request suspension Procedure for suspension request Limits on suspension period Certificate status services Operational characteristics Service availability Optional features End of subscription Key escrow and recovery Key escrow and recovery policy and practices TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page IV Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

5 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES Certificate profile Version number(s) Certificate extensions Algorithm object identifiers Name forms Name constraints Certificate policy object identifier Usage of Policy Constraints extension Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension CRL profile Version number(s) CRL and CRL entry extensions OCSP profile Version number(s) OCSP extensions COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS Frequency or circumstances of assessment Identity/qualifications of assessor Assessor's relationship to assessed entity Topics covered by assessment Actions taken as a result of deficiency Communication of results OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS Fees Certificate issuance or renewal fees Certificate access fees Revocation or status information access fees Fees for other services Refund policy Financial responsibility Insurance coverage Other assets Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities Confidentiality of business information Scope of confidential information Information not within the scope of confidential information Responsibility to protect confidential information Privacy of personal information Privacy plan Information treated as private Information not deemed private Responsibility to protect private information Notice and consent to use private information Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process Other information disclosure circumstances Intellectual property rights Representations and warranties CA representations and warranties RA representations and warranties Subscriber representations and warranties Relying party representations and warranties Representations and warranties of other participants Disclaimers of warranties...32 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page V Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

6 9.8 Limitations of liability Indemnities Term and termination Term Termination Effect of termination and survival Individual notices and communications with participants Amendments Procedure for amendment Notification mechanism and period Circumstances under which OID must be changed Dispute resolution provisions Governing law Compliance with applicable law Miscellaneous provisions Entire agreement Assignment Severability Enforcement (attorneys fees and waiver of rights) Force Majeure Other provisions...34 Acronyms and Definitions...35 Acronyms...35 Definitions...36 TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page VI Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

7 Revision History Version Version date Change Author A First version of the TeliaSonera Public Root. Approved by the TeliaSonera Management Team. Petter Ljunggren Stefan Jacobsson Peter Döös TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page VII Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

8 Certification Practice Statement Summary This document defines the Certification Practice Statement for the TeliaSonera Public Root CA. The TeliaSonera Public Root CA will sign and issue certificates to TeliaSonera customers. A customer to TeliaSonera will host their CA at the TeliaSonera site or be a part of the TeliaSonera Managed CA Services. Any CA chained to the TeliaSonera Public Root CA shall and will confirm to this, the TeliaSonera Public Root CP and the RSA RSS CP. This document is intended for users, relying parties, customers and organizations that are interested in the TeliaSonera Public Root Services and how TeliaSonera conduct their CA Services in accordance with the RSA RSS CP. The TeliaSonera Public Root generally conforms to the IETF PKIX Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement Framework (also known as RFC 3647). This document is divided into nine sections: Section 1 - provides an overview of the policy and set of provisions, as well as the types of entities and the appropriate applications for certificates. Section 2 - contains any applicable provisions regarding identification of the entity or entities that operate repositories; responsibility of a PKI participant to publish information regarding its practices, certificates, and the current status; frequency of publication; and access control on published information. Section 3 - covers the identification and authentication requirements for certificate related activity. Section 4 - deals with certificate life-cycle management and operational requirements including application for a certificate, revocation, suspension, audit, archival and compromise. Section 5 - covers facility, management and operational controls (physical and procedural security requirements). Section 6 - provides the technical controls with regard to cryptographic key requirements. Section 7 - defines requirements for certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) formats. This includes information on profiles, versions, and extensions used. Section 8 - addresses topics covered and methodology used for assessments/audits; frequency of compliance audits or assessments; identity and/or qualifications of the personnel performing the audit or assessment; actions taken as a result of deficiencies found during the assessment; and who is entitled to see results of an assessment. Section 9 - covers general business and legal matters: the business issues of fees, liabilities, obligations, legal requirements, governing laws, processes, and confidentiality. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 8 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

9 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Overview This describes the procedures and routines which apply when completing a certificate for individuals, organizations, functions and devices and for revoking and revocation checking of such certificates. The describes TeliaSonera s application of the requirements and regulations in RSA Root Signing Service Certificate Policy. 1.2 Document name and identification The routines and roles resulting from this apply only in connection with certificates referring to the TeliaSonera Public Root Certificate Policy or RSA Root Signing Service Certificate Policy. The object identifier of the RSA Root Signing Service Certificate Policy (OID) is { }. The policy name of the TeliaSonera Public Root Certificate Policy is {SE-TELIASONERA- PUBLICROOT-POLICY-1} and the object identifier (OID) is { }. The name of this is {SE-TELIASONERA-PUBLICROOT--1} and the object identifier is { }. The TeliaSonera document number of this is 1/ AZDA This also refers to the TeliaSonera Production with the name {SE-TELIASONERA-EID- -1} and the object identifier { }. 1.3 PKI participants TeliaSonera will issue certificates mainly to customers of TeliaSonera but also to TeliaSonera employees. All of the participating organizations will have their CA hosted by TeliaSonera and all organizations shall undertake what s stated in the TeliaSonera Public Root CP and this Certification authorities TeliaSonera manages a PKI under the RSA RSS CP. The TeliaSonera Root CA signs sub CA certificates to organizations that contractually will adhere to this and to TeliaSonera Public Root CP or to TeliaSonera Service sub CA s CP. The TeliaSonera Public Root CA is responsible for managing the certificate life cycle of CAs signed by the TeliaSonera Public Root and end entity certificates signed by the sub CAs. This will include: creating and signing of certificates binding Subscribers, and PKI personnel with their public encryption key. promulgating certificate status through CRLs and/or OCSP responders; and creating, storing and recovering end entity confidential key pairs for organizations using the TeliaSonera key backup/restore service; requiring adherence to RSA RSS CP and this Registration authorities An RA Administrator or Vettor operating under this is responsible for all duties assigned to it by the issuing CA. An RA Administrator or Vettor may perform duties on behalf of more than one CA, providing that in doing so it satisfies all requirements of this TeliaSonera Public Root CP and it is not otherwise contractually prohibited from doing so Subscribers A subscriber may be: TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 9 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

10 an organization that is a customer of TeliaSonera hosting their CA at TeliaSonera. an individual employed by TeliaSonera or employed by a customer to TeliaSonera. An individual that is a customer of TeliaSonera a device situated at TeliaSonera or at a customer to TeliaSonera. a function at TeliaSonera or at a customer to TeliaSonera Relying parties A Relying Party may be either a Subscriber of any TeliaSonera CA or any other organization, person, application or device that is relying on a certificate issued by a CA that is chained to the TeliaSonera Public Root CA Other participants No stipulation 1.4 Certificate usage Appropriate certificate uses Certificates issued under this can be used for many various applications like business transactions (server to server), encrypted and signed s (S/MIME) and other applications where the need for integrity, authenticity and confidentiality is a strong requirement Prohibited certificate uses It is not recommended to use certificates for encryption if the private key of the certificate is not backed up. 1.5 Policy administration Organization administering the document TeliaSonera Management Team is the responsible authority for reviewing and approving changes to the TeliaSonera Public Root. Written and signed comments on proposed changes shall be directed to the TeliaSonera contact as described in Section Decisions with respect to the proposed changes are at the sole discretion of the TeliaSonera Management Team Contact person Any questions relating to this should be sent in writing to: TeliaSonera Sverige AB Customer Service Box Östersund, Sweden Telephone: +46 (0) Web: Person determining suitability for the policy RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE is the administrative entity for determining this Certification Practice Statement () suitability to the RSA RSS CP approval procedures The RSA ROOT SIGNING SERVICE will review any modifications, additions or deletions from all s that are obligated to be compliant with the RSA RSS CP, TeliaSonera Management Team will review any modifications, additions or deletions from all s that are obligated to be compliant with the TeliaSonera Public Root CP, and determine if modifications, additions or deletions are acceptable and do not jeopardize operations or the security of the CA environment. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 10 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

11 1.6 Definitions and acronyms A list of definitions and acronyms can be found at the end of this document. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 11 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

12 2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 Repositories Repository A full text version of this is published at Revocation information Repository Certificate Revocation Lists are published in an LDAP directory ldap://ldap.trust.telia.com. OCSP request can be made to In general OCSP requests need to be signed, i.e. a relying party who wants to validate certificates by OCSP needs to make an agreement with TeliaSonera. 2.2 Publication of certification information It is TeliaSonera s duty to make the following information available. a) This. b) Certificate Revocation lists of revoked certificates or revocation information via OCSP if agreed. c) Issued CA certificates. TeliaSonera may publish and supply certificate information in accordance with applicable legislation. Each published certificate revocation list (CRL) provides all available revocation information at the time of publication for all revoked certificates of which the revocation list is intended to give notification. TeliaSonera supplies CA certificates for all public CA keys provided these can be used for verifying valid certificates. Subscribers will be notified that a CA may publish information submitted by them to publicly accessible directories in association with certificate information. The publication of this information will be within the limits of sections 9.3 and Time or frequency of publication Revocation information of issued CA certificates will be published promptly or at least within 24 hours. Revocation information of issued end entity certificates will be published promptly or at least within 3 hours. Publication of revocation information may differ from the above if so agreed with a customer to TeliaSonera. 2.4 Access controls on repositories This is publicly available. CRLs are publicly available through the TeliaSonera LDAP directory. OCSP services are only available through an agreement with TeliaSonera. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 12 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

13 3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 3.1 Naming Types of names The name of the certificate holder will reside within the certificate subject distinguished name. The certificate subject name field in will be in accordance with PKIX Part 1 and will be in the form of a X.501 printablestring or UTF8String and will not be blank. The name will differ dependent on the application the certificate is used for. Examples of names are: legal names of individuals and organizations, domain names, addresses, social security numbers, employee numbers Need for names to be meaningful Individual certificates: A certificate for an individual will contain the legal name of the subscriber. Server/Device certificates: A certificate for a server or a device will contain the domain name of the server or the unique name of the device. Organizational certificates: A certificate for an organization will contain the legal name of the organization or a trademark tied to that organization Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers No stipulation Rules for interpreting various name forms No stipulation Uniqueness of names Within a CA the DN of the subscriber is unique. For individuals, if uniqueness cannot be achieved by the legal name, the subject DN in the certificate will contain a unique name such as employee number or social security number Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks The priority to entity names are given to registered trademark holders. The use of a Domain Name is restricted to the authenticated legal owner of that Domain Name. The use of an address is restricted to the authenticated legal owner of that address. TeliaSonera will validate an organizations right to use a specified name, domain name and trademark. 3.2 Initial identity validation Method to prove possession of private key Method to prove possession of private key is PKCS#10 or CRS (Certificate Request Syntax) Authentication of organization identity An application for an organization to become a Subscriber is made by a person authorized to act on behalf of the organization. The application includes details about the organization and includes a certified true copy of their incorporation papers. TeliaSonera will verify the identity of the individual making the application and their authority to receive the keys for that organization. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 13 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

14 TeliaSonera will keep a record of the type and details of the identification used for the authentication of the organization for at least the life of the issued certificate Authentication of individual identity An application for an individual to be a Subscriber will be made by the individual, or by another person or organization authorized to act on behalf of the prospective Subscriber. Background checks will be performed by TeliaSonera. TeliaSonera will keep a record of the type and details of identification used for the authentication of the individual for at least the life of the issued certificate. Identification and authentication of a prospective Subscriber will be through one of the following means: 1. In person where the TeliaSonera or an RA appointed by TeliaSonera will compare the identity of the individual with a picture identification (notarized copies or originals); or 2. On-line where the Subscriber agrees to the terms and conditions of an on-line Subscriber Agreement, the Subscriber completes an on-line form and TeliaSonera or a RA appointed by TeliaSonera performs an out-of-band validation check on the information submitted. The out-of-band validation will be performed in different ways depending on the entity that shall be validated. If TeliaSonera or a customer to TeliaSonera has a previously established identity check of the subscriber which meets the requirements of 1 or 2, certified key pairs, shared secrets or equivalent authentication mechanism can be used. For further information regarding the methods used see the s of the different services and customer CAs residing under the TeliaSonera Public Root Service Non-verified subscriber information All non-verified subscriber information will be specified in the of each sub CA signed by the TeliaSonera Public Root CA Validation of authority An application for a certificate will be made by an individual that is accountable and responsible for the component participating in the service. TeliaSonera or an RA, on behalf of TeliaSonera, will validate that the following have been verified: The identity of the individual making the application, The validity of that organization s business relationship with TeliaSonera, and The authority of the individual to receive the certificate(s) for that organization application service Criteria for interoperation Not applicable. Cross certification will not be a service within this. 3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests Identification and authentication for routine re-key Routine re-key is not supported. Prior to the expiry of a private key, a request for a re-key will only be made by the entity in whose name the keys have been issued. An issuing CA will authenticate all requests for re-key, and the subsequent response will be authenticated by the entity. An entity requesting re-key will authenticate the request for re-key using a digital signature generated with the private key corresponding to the certified public key. Where the digital signature private key has expired, the request for re-key will be authenticated in the same manner as the initial registration. In the case where there is a shared secret, the issuing CA will re-authenticate the Subscriber using the shared secret. In all cases re-key requires the replacement of the public key in the certificate. A new public/private key pair is generated and a new certificate is issued. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 14 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

15 3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation Where the information contained in a certificate has changed or there is a known or suspected compromise of the private key resulting in a revocation, TeliaSonera or an RA will authenticate a reissuance in the same manner as for initial registration pursuant to Section 3.2. TeliaSonera will verify any change in the information contained in a certificate before the certificate is issued. 3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request An authentication request for revocation will be done in one of the following manners: The key-holder makes a call to customer service to revoke the certificate. The key-holder uses a self administration GUI to revoke the certificate. TeliaSonera or an RA appointed by TeliaSonera will, if there is a suspicion of a compromised certificate; revoke the certificate on behalf of the key-holder. TeliaSonera will keep a record of all revocation requests. The record will hold information of the identity of the requesting person, the identity of the administrator revoking the certificate and the time the revocation was done. The records are included in the audit logs of the RA systems at TeliaSonera production facilities. For further information regarding the records see the TeliaSonera Production section 5.4 and 5.5. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 15 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

16 4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 4.1 Certificate Application Who can submit a certificate application An organization that has agreed to and executed an Agreement with TeliaSonera, and meets the requirements of the TeliaSonera Public Root Certificate Policy can have a hosted CA at the TeliaSonera site. The customer hosting their CA at TeliaSonera will only issue certificates to employees, devices, functions or servers within their organization or to a subscriber that has a valid contract with the organization and has a valid business relationship with the organization and are bound to comply with provisions of such business relationship and any applicable agreement or corporate policies. All subscriber information will be complete, validated and accurate with full disclosure of all required information in connection with a certificate request Enrollment process and responsibilities Subscribers registering for a certificate from a CA will be required to consent to an agreement with TeliaSonera, either at the time of registration or upon certificate acceptance. 4.2 Certificate application processing TeliaSonera will require that each application be accompanied by: 1. Proof of end entity identity; 2. Proof of authorization for any requested certificate attributes; 3. A signed agreement of the applicable terms and conditions governing the applicants use of the certificate; and 4. A public verification key generated by the end entity. In some occasions when keys and certificates reside on a smart card TeliaSonera will generate the public key on behalf of the entity Performing identification and authentication functions TeliaSonera or an RA appointed by TeliaSonera will always identify and validate the certificate application. How identification and validation is done will depend on the basis of the pre-identification made by a customer and will be a part of the agreement with the customer Approval or rejection of certificate applications TeliaSonera or an RA appointed by TeliaSonera will approve a certificate application if it meets the requirements of validation and identification. All other certificate applications will be rejected. The subscriber will be told why the certificate application was rejected and how to proceed to be approved Time to process certificate applications Processing time of a certificate application will differ depending on the steps taken in the validation plan. A certificate application in an automated process, the certificate will be issued promptly while a certificate application in a manual process, the certificate will be issued when the validation is done. 4.3 Certificate issuance CA actions during certificate issuance An approved certificate application will result in an issued certificate. An issued certificate will be delivered to the subscriber promptly or it will be delivered to the subscriber on a smartcard. In general, issued certificates will not be published to a public available repository. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 16 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

17 In specific cases certificates will be published to an internal directory of a customer depending on the agreement with the customer to TeliaSonera Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate The subscriber will be notified when the certificate is issued. This will be done depending on the application the certificate will be used for. Notification will be done via , mail, telephone or promptly via the web depending on the issuing/application process. 4.4 Certificate acceptance Conduct constituting certificate acceptance By accepting and using the certificate the Subscriber agrees to comply with the terms of any policies and s referenced within the certificate. The relevant CP and will be defined in the s of the different services and customers CAs residing under the TeliaSonera Public Root Service Publication of the certificate by the CA TeliaSonera will publish all CA certificates in the LDAP repository. TeliaSonera will not publish subscriber certificates to a public available repository if it s not agreed with the customer or subscriber. Publication will be done to internal directories or databases at the TeliaSonera site or at the customer site Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities No stipulation. 4.5 Key pair and certificate usage Subscriber private key and certificate usage The Subscriber will only use certificates, issued under the TeliaSonera Public Root CA, and their associated key pairs for the purposes identified in the TeliaSonera Public Root CP and identified in the agreement with TeliaSonera Relying party public key and certificate usage Prior to using a Subscriber's certificate, a Relying Party should verify that the certificate is appropriate for the intended use. 4.6 Certificate renewal Certificate renewal is the re-issuance of a certificate with a new validity date using the same public key corresponding to the same private key. TeliaSonera will only renew CA-certificates. TeliaSonera will not renew certificates to end user subscribers Circumstance for certificate renewal An organization that has a valid certificate with a shorter validity period than 10 years may extend the validity of the CA up to 10 years Who may request renewal An organization that has a valid agreement with TeliaSonera and a valid CA certificate issued under the TeliaSonera Public Root service may request for renewal Processing certificate renewal requests Renewal will be processed according to customer agreement. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 17 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

18 4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Notification will be processed according to customer agreement Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate No stipulation Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA The renewed certificate will be published in TeliaSonera LDAP repository (ldap://ldap.trust.telia.com) and according to the relevant customer agreement Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Not applicable. 4.7 Certificate re-key Circumstance for certificate re-key A re-key request will only be approved if the certificate has yet not expired. In general a subscriber will be notified within 30 days of certificate expiry and asked to make a re-key request using the private key connected to the certificate Who may request certification of a new public key An organization with a valid agreement with TeliaSonera can request certification of a new public key. An RA with a valid agreement with TeliaSonera can request certification of a new public key. A subscriber with a valid certificate can request certification of a new public key Processing certificate re-keying requests TeliaSonera will validate the existing name in the certificate against a corporate directory/database or other database containing information about the subscriber. This process is handled by RA personnel at TeliaSonera or at customers of TeliaSonera. The re-keying process may also be implemented as an automated process. A new certificate will be issued if the subscriber succeeds to make a positive identification and if the validation check does not fail. The identification and authentication processes regarding re-keying are described in section and further described in the s of the different services and customer CAs residing under the TeliaSonera Public Root Service Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber The subscriber will be notified when the certificate is issued. This will be done depending on the application the certificate will be used for. Notification will be done via , mail, telephone or promptly via the web depending on the issuing/application process Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate By accepting and using the certificate the Subscriber agrees to comply with the terms of any policies referenced within the certificate Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA TeliaSonera will publish all CA certificates in the LDAP repository. TeliaSonera will not publish subscriber certificates to a public available repository if it s not agreed with the customer or subscriber. Publication will be done to internal directories or databases at the TeliaSonera site or at the customer site Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Not applicable. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 18 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

19 4.8 Certificate modification Certificate modification is not supported by TeliaSonera Circumstance for certificate modification Not applicable Who may request certificate modification Not applicable Processing certificate modification requests Not applicable Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Not applicable Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate Not applicable Publication of the modified certificate by the CA Not applicable Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Not applicable. 4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension Circumstances for revocation A certificate will be revoked: 1. When any information in the certificate changes; 2. Upon suspected or known compromise of the private key; 3. Upon suspected or known compromise of the media holding the private key; 4. Upon termination of a Subscriber; or 5. When a Subscriber no longer needs access to secured organizational resources. TeliaSonera or an RA appointed by TeliaSonera in its discretion will revoke a certificate when an entity fails to comply with obligations set out in the TeliaSonera Public Root CP, this, any applicable agreement or applicable law. TeliaSonera will revoke a certificate at any time if TeliaSonera suspects that conditions may lead to a compromise of a Subscriber s keys or certificates Who can request revocation The revocation of a certificate will be requested by: 1. A Subscriber whose name the certificate is issued under; 2. An individual or organization that has made an application for a certificate on behalf of an organization, device or application; 3. Personnel of an RA associated with TeliaSonera; or 4. Personnel of TeliaSonera Procedure for revocation request A revocation request may be received by TeliaSonera in one of the three following ways: a) The RA makes the revocation request using the administration interface and signs this with a digital signature. b) The key holder makes the revocation request using a self-administration interface and signs this with a digital signature using TeliaSonera eid or other equivalent certificate from an issuer approved by TeliaSonera. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 19 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

20 c) If the revocation request cannot be carried out in accordance with a) or b), the RA, the authorized representative of the RA or the key holder may contact TeliaSonera Customer Service by telephone and make a revocation request. Authorized TeliaSonera Customer Service staff, or another authorized function within TeliaSonera, then makes the revocation request using TeliaSonera s CA system and signs this with a digital signature. When making a revocation request as above, TeliaSonera s CA system checks that the digital signature on the revocation request is valid and that the person signing the revocation request is authorized to do so. If both these criteria are met, the certificate in question is revoked. TeliaSonera will keep records of all revocation requests. The records will hold information of the identity of the requesting person, the identity of the administrator revoking the certificate and the time the revocation was done. For further information regarding the records see the TeliaSonera Production section 5.4 and Revocation request grace period On suspicion of a certificate being compromised or a certificate in any other way no longer is relevant for usage, the certificate subscriber must immediately make a revocation request for the certificate to TeliaSonera or any other RA appointed for the relevant service Time within which CA must process the revocation request The process of handling a revocation request will take maximum 1 hour Revocation checking requirement for relying parties Prior to using a certificate, it is the Relying Party s responsibility to check the status of all certificates in the certificate validation chain against the current CRL s or on-line certificate status server (OCSP). A Relying Party is also responsible for verifying the authenticity and integrity of CRL s or on-line certificate status responses. TeliaSonera will provide certificate status information identifying the access point to the CRL or on-line certificate status server in every certificate TeliaSonera issues CRL issuance frequency In general CRL s are issued once every hour with the latest revocation information. However the nextudate parameter in the CRL is normally set to 24 hours. For CA s hosted at the TeliaSonera site, update frequency of CRL s will be agreed upon with each customer and stated in their Maximum latency for CRL s CRL s are published to the TeliaSonera LDAP directory and updated immediately. Latency will be a matter of seconds On-line revocation/status checking availability TeliaSonera provides on-line revocation status checking via the OCSP protocol. The service is only accessible provided that the relying party has an agreement with TeliaSonera. Availability of the service will be provided in the agreement On-line revocation checking requirements In general all OCSP requests will be signed. All responses will be signed by a private key corresponding to a public key certified by the CA on which the OCSP request is made. A separate key pair will be used for the responses of each CA. The OCSP service is updated through the use of CRLs and deltacrls that are published on regular basis. The actual time intervals for the updates of the CRLs and deltacrls are described in the s of the different services and customer CAs residing under the TeliaSonera Public Root Service Other forms of revocation advertisements available No stipulation. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 20 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

21 Special requirements re-key compromise No stipulation Circumstances for suspension TeliaSonera does not support suspension of certificates Who can request suspension Not applicable Procedure for suspension request Not applicable Limits on suspension period Not applicable Certificate status services Operational characteristics Address to LDAP repository: Domain Name: ldap.trust.telia.com Port number: 389 Search base for attribute certificaterevocationlist: <issuer DN of CA> Service availability SLA is not a part of this Optional features No stipulation End of subscription The end of a subscription as a result of no longer requiring the service, compromise, or termination of employment (voluntary or imposed) will result in the immediate revocation of the certificate and the publishing of a CRL or other certificate status verification system Key escrow and recovery Key escrow and recovery policy and practices CA Private Signing Keys will not be escrowed. A Subscriber s digital signature private keys will not be escrowed. A Subscriber s confidentiallity private keys will be not be escrowed but TeliaSonera may keep a backup of the keys if so agreed between TeliaSonera and the customer. The keys are protected in an encrypted form and are protected in a level no lower than stipulated for the primary versions of the keys. The decryption key used to decrypt the key backups is stored in a HSM and the key backups are saved for a period that is agreed with the customer. A private key may be recovered for two separate reasons: a) The hard disc, the smart card or equivalent that holds the Subscriber s private key is corrupted and the Subscriber needs to make a recovery of his key. The process of authenticating the Subscriber is the same as at the initial certificate issuance. When a private key is recovered the certificate for the corresponding public key is automatically revoked, a new key pair is created and a new certificate is issued. b) The Subscriber is for some reason prevented from using his private key (the Subscriber may for instant be deceased, injured or has left the organization) and the Subscriber s organization needs to decrypt data encrypted by the Subscriber. The process of such a key recovery involves at least three persons from the Subscribers organization where all are authenticated TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 21 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

22 by certificates. When a private key is recovered the certificate for the corresponding public key is automatically revoked. More information regarding the processes for backup/recovery will be found in the s of the different services and customer CAs residing under the TeliaSonera Public Root Service Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices No stipulation. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 22 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

23 5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS All stipulations regarding chapter 5 Facility Management, and Operational Control are specified in TeliaSonera Production. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 23 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

24 6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS All stipulations regarding chapter 6 Technical Security Controls are specified in TeliaSonera Production. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 24 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

25 7 CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES 7.1 Certificate profile Version number(s) All issued certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates, in accordance with the PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile Certificate extensions Certificate extensions will be supported in accordance with RFC 3280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile dated April Standard Certificate Extensions Authority Key Identifier Subject Key Identifier Key Usage Certificate Policies Policy Mappings Subject Alternative Name Issuer Alternative Names Subject Directory Attributes Basic Constraints Name Constraints Policy Constraints Extended Key Usage CRL Distribution Points Freshest CRL Authority Information Access Subject Information Access Private Certificate Extension For issued smart cards one private extension is used to indicate the card serial number. The SEIS Card Number extension contains the ISO 7812 serial number of an EID card in a printable string. The OID of the SEIS Card Number extension is The Card Number extension is set as non-critical Algorithm object identifiers At least the following algorithms are supported for signing and verification: 1. RSA 1024 algorithm in accordance with PKCS#1; and/or 2. SHA-1 algorithm in accordance with FIPS PUB and ANSI X9.30 part2; and/or 3. Additional algorithms as supported by TeliaSonera CA-Services Name forms Every DN will be in the form of an X.501 DirectoryString Name constraints Subject and Issuer DNs comply with PKIX standards and are present in all certificates Certificate policy object identifier The certificate policy object identifier will be present in issued certificates Usage of Policy Constraints extension No stipulation. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 25 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

26 7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics No stipulation Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension No stipulation. 7.2 CRL profile Version number(s) All issued CRL s are X.509 version 2 CRL s in accordance with the RFC 3280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile dated April CRL and CRL entry extensions CRL extensions will be supported in accordance with RFC 3280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile dated April Standard CRL Extensions: Authority Key Identifier Issuer Alternative Name CRL Number Delta CRL Indicator Issuing Distribution Point Freshest CRL CRL Entry Extensions In general Authority Key Identifier extension, CRL Number extension and the Reason Code of the CRL Entry extension will be included in a CRL. 7.3 OCSP profile Version number(s) Version 1 of the OCSP specification as defined by RFC2560 (X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol) is implemented for the OCSP responders OCSP extensions OCSP Nonce extension should be used in requests. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 26 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

27 8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS 8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment An annual Compliance Audit will be performed by an independent, qualified third party. 8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor The Compliance Auditor must demonstrate competence in the field of compliance audits, and must be thoroughly familiar with the requirements which a CA service imposes on the issuance and management of certificates. The Compliance Auditor should perform such compliance audits as a primary responsibility. 8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity The Compliance Auditor should not have any financial, legal or organizational relationship with the audited party. A person cannot be Compliance Auditor if he/she: a. is owner to or joint owner to TeliaSonera or another company within the same group. b. is a member of the TeliaSonera management or the management of any subsidiary, or assists with TeliaSonera s bookkeeping or management of means, or TeliaSonera s control of them, or managing the issues regarding information security. c. is employed by or in other aspects in subordinate or dependant relation to TeliaSonera or any other company referred to in a) and b) above, d. is married to or co-habiter with or is sibling or close relative to a person that is referred to in a) and b) above, or e. is in debt to TeliaSonera or any other company referred to in a) to c) above. 8.4 Topics covered by assessment The purpose of the Compliance Audit is to verify that TeliaSonera and all engaged subcontractors are complying with the requirements of this. The Compliance Audit will cover all requirements that define the operation of a CA under this including: a. The CA production integrity (key and certificate life cycle management); and b. CA environmental controls. 8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency Depending on the severity of the deficiency, the following actions may be taken: a. The Compliance Auditor may note the deficiency as part of the report; b. The Compliance Auditor may meet with TeliaSonera and determine if the deficiency can be remedied and an action plan should be developed and steps taken to remedy the deficiency. Such steps could be to change applied procedures and/or updating this ; c. The Compliance Auditor may report the deficiency and if the TeliaSonera Public Root Service deems the deficiency to have risk to the operation of the TeliaSonera or customers CAs, the TeliaSonera Public Root Service operator may revoke the CA s certificate. Should this be updated in such a way that the new is deemed to involve an amended degree of security; a new with a new identity shall be drawn up (see section 1.2). 8.6 Communication of results The Compliance Auditor shall provide the TeliaSonera Public Root Service management with a copy of the results of the Compliance Audit. The results will not be made public unless required by law. TeliaSonera Sverige AB Page 27 Doc. no 1/ AZDA , Rev A

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