SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY

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1 SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA CERTIFICATE POLICY Document Classification: Public Version Number: 2.5 Issue Date: June 25, 2015 National Center for Digital Certification Policies and Regulations Department Digitally signed by National Center for Digital Certification Policies and Regulations Department DN: c=sa, o=national Center for Digital Certification, ou=government CA, ou=ncdc CSP, cn=national Center for Digital Certification Policies and Regulations Department Date: :13:51 +03'00' Copyright 2015 National Center for Digital Certification, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This document is intended for use only by the National Center for Digital Certification and authorized Saudi National PKI participants. This document shall not be duplicated, used, or disclosed in whole or in part for any purposes without prior consent.

2 Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION Overview CERTIFICATE POLICY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CP AND THE CPS INTERACTION WITH OTHER PKI S SCOPE Document Name and Identification Saudi National PKI Participants NCDC SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY CA POLICY AUTHORITY CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY REGISTRATION AUTHORITY SUBSCRIBERS RELYING PARTIES ONLINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL RESPONDER Certificate Usage APPROPRIATE CERTIFICATE USES PROHIBITED CERTIFICATE USES Policy Administration ORGANIZATION ADMINISTERING THE DOCUMENT CONTACT PERSON PERSON DETERMINING CPS SUITABILITY FOR THE POLICY CPS APPROVAL PROCEDURES Definitions and Acronyms PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES Repositories REPOSITORY OBLIGATIONS Publication of Certification Information PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATES AND CERTIFICATE STATUS PUBLICATION OF CA INFORMATION INTEROPERABILITY Time or Frequency of Publication Access Controls on Repositories IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION Naming TYPES OF NAMES NEED FOR NAMES TO BE MEANINGFUL ANONYMITY OR PSEUDONYMITY OF SUBSCRIBERS RULES FOR INTERPRETING VARIOUS NAME FORMS UNIQUENESS OF NAMES RECOGNITION, AUTHENTICATION AND ROLE OF TRADEMARKS Initial Identity Validation METHOD TO PROVE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE KEY AUTHENTICATION OF ORGANIZATION IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY NON-VERIFIED SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION CRITERIA FOR INTEROPERATION Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR ROUTINE RE-KEY IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY AFTER REVOCATION Version Number: 2.5 Page 2 of 54 Public

3 3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Certificate Application WHO CAN SUBMIT A CERTIFICATE APPLICATION ENROLMENT PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Certificate Application Processing PERFORMING IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FUNCTIONS APPROVAL OR REJECTION OF CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS TIME TO PROCESS CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS Certificate Issuance CA ACTIONS DURING CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE NOTIFICATION TO SUBSCRIBER BY THE CA OF ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE Certificate Acceptance CONDUCT CONSTITUTING CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE PUBLICATION OF THE CERTIFICATE BY THE CA NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES Key Pair and Certificate Usage SUBSCRIBER PRIVATE KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE RELYING PARTY PUBLIC KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE Certificate Renewal Certificate Re-Key CIRCUMSTANCE FOR CERTIFICATE RE-KEY WHO MAY REQUEST CERTIFICATION OF A NEW PUBLIC KEY PROCESSING CERTIFICATE RE-KEYING REQUESTS NOTIFICATION OF RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE TO SUBSCRIBER CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE OF A RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE PUBLICATION OF THE RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE BY THE CA NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES Certificate Modification Certificate Revocation and Suspension CIRCUMSTANCES FOR REVOCATION WHO CAN REQUEST REVOCATION PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION REQUEST REVOCATION REQUEST GRACE PERIOD TIME WITHIN WHICH CA MUST PROCESS THE REVOCATION REQUEST REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENT FOR RELYING PARTIES CRL ISSUANCE FREQUENCY MAXIMUM LATENCY OF CRLS ONLINE REVOCATION CHECKING/STATUS AVAILABILITY ONLINE REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENTS OTHER FORMS OF REVOCATION ADVERTISEMENTS AVAILABLE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO KEY COMPROMISE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SUSPENSION WHO CAN REQUEST SUSPENSION PROCEDURE FOR SUSPENSION REQUEST LIMITS ON SUSPENSION PERIOD CIRCUMSTANCES FOR TERMINATING SUSPENDED CERTIFICATES PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATING THE SUSPENSION OF A CERTIFICATE Certificate Status Services End of Subscription Key Escrow and Recovery FACILITY, MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS Physical Controls SITE LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION PHYSICAL ACCESS Version Number: 2.5 Page 3 of 54 Public

4 5.1.3 POWER AND AIR CONDITIONING WATER EXPOSURE FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION MEDIA STORAGE WASTE DISPOSAL OFF-SITE BACKUP Procedural Controls TRUSTED ROLES NUMBER OF PERSONS REQUIRED PER TASK IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR EACH ROLE ROLES REQUIRING SEPARATION OF DUTIES Personnel Controls BACKGROUND, QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS BACKGROUND CHECK AND CLEARANCE PROCEDURES TRAINING REQUIREMENTS RETRAINING FREQUENCY AND REQUIREMENTS JOB ROTATION FREQUENCY AND SEQUENCE SANCTIONS FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED TO PERSONNEL Audit Logging Procedures TYPES OF EVENTS RECORDED FREQUENCY OF PROCESSING LOG RETENTION PERIOD FOR AUDIT LOG PROTECTION OF AUDIT LOG AUDIT LOG BACKUP PROCEDURES AUDIT COLLECTION SYSTEM (INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL) NOTIFICATION TO EVENT-CAUSING SUBJECT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS Records Archival TYPES OF EVENTS ARCHIVED RETENTION PERIOD FOR ARCHIVE PROTECTION OF ARCHIVE ARCHIVE BACKUP PROCEDURES REQUIREMENTS FOR TIME-STAMPING OF RECORDS ARCHIVE COLLECTION SYSTEM (INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL) PROCEDURES TO OBTAIN AND VERIFY ARCHIVE INFORMATION Key Changeover Compromise and Disaster Recovery INCIDENT AND COMPROMISE HANDLING PROCEDURES COMPUTING RESOURCES, SOFTWARE, AND/OR DATA ARE CORRUPTED ENTITY PRIVATE KEY COMPROMISE PROCEDURES BUSINESS CONTINUITY CAPABILITIES AFTER A DISASTER CA or RA Termination CA TERMINATION RA TERMINATION TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS Key Pair Generation and Installation KEY PAIR GENERATION PRIVATE KEY DELIVERY TO SUBSCRIBER PUBLIC KEY DELIVERY TO CERTIFICATE ISSUER CA PUBLIC KEY DELIVERY TO RELYING PARTIES KEY SIZES PUBLIC KEY PARAMETERS GENERATION AND QUALITY CHECKING KEY USAGE PURPOSES Private Key Protection and Cryptographic-Module Engineering Controls Version Number: 2.5 Page 4 of 54 Public

5 6.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE STANDARDS AND CONTROLS PRIVATE KEY MULTI-PERSON CONTROL PRIVATE KEY ESCROW PRIVATE KEY BACKUP PRIVATE KEY ARCHIVAL PRIVATE KEY TRANSFER INTO OR FROM A CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE PRIVATE KEY STORAGE ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE METHOD OF ACTIVATING PRIVATE KEY METHODS OF DEACTIVATING PRIVATE KEY METHODS OF DESTROYING PRIVATE KEY CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE RATING Other Aspects of Key Pair Management PUBLIC KEY ARCHIVAL CERTIFICATE OPERATIONAL PERIODS AND KEY PAIR USAGE PERIODS Activation Data ACTIVATION DATA GENERATION AND INSTALLATION ACTIVATION DATA PROTECTION OTHER ASPECTS OF ACTIVATION DATA Computer Security Controls SPECIFIC COMPUTER SECURITY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS COMPUTER SECURITY RATING Life Cycle Technical Controls SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS SECURITY MANAGEMENT CONTROLS LIFE CYCLE SECURITY CONTROLS Network Security Controls Time Stamping CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES Certificate Profile VERSION NUMBERS CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS ALGORITHM OBJECT IDENTIFIERS NAME FORMS NAME CONSTRAINTS CERTIFICATE POLICY OBJECT IDENTIFIER USAGE OF POLICY CONSTRAINTS EXTENSION POLICY QUALIFIERS SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS PROCESSING SEMANTICS FOR THE CRITICAL CERTIFICATE POLICIES EXTENSION CRL Profile VERSION NUMBERS CRL AND CRL ENTRY EXTENSIONS OCSP Profile VERSION NUMBERS OCSP EXTENSIONS COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS Frequency or Circumstances of Assessments Identity and Qualifications of Assessor Assessor s Relationship to Assessed Entity Topics Covered By Assessment Actions Taken As A Result of Deficiency Communication of Results OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS Fees CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL FEE Version Number: 2.5 Page 5 of 54 Public

6 9.1.2 CERTIFICATE ACCESS FEES REVOCATION OR STATUS INFORMATION ACCESS FEE FEES FOR OTHER SERVICES REFUND POLICY Financial Responsibility INSURANCE COVERAGE OTHER ASSETS INSURANCE OR WARRANTY COVERAGE FOR END-ENTITIES Confidentiality of Business Information SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION INFORMATION NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Privacy of Personal Information PRIVACY PLAN INFORMATION TREATED AS PRIVATE INFORMATION NOT DEEMED PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PRIVATE INFORMATION NOTICE AND CONSENT TO USE PRIVATE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS OTHER INFORMATION DISCLOSURE CIRCUMSTANCES Intellectual Property Rights Representations and Warranties SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT-CA REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES CA REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES RA REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES SUBSCRIBER REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES RELYING PARTIES REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES Disclaimers of Warranties Limitations of Liability Indemnities Term and Termination TERM TERMINATION EFFECT OF TERMINATION AND SURVIVAL Individual Notices and Communications with Participants Amendments PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT NOTIFICATION MECHANISM AND PERIOD CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH OID MUST BE CHANGED Dispute Resolution Provisions Governing Law Compliance with Applicable Law Miscellaneous Provisions ENTIRE AGREEMENT ASSIGNMENT SEVERABILITY ENFORCEMENT (ATTORNEY FEES AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS) FORCE MAJEURE Other Provisions FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES APPENDIX - A: CERTIFICATE TYPES EXTENSION DEFINITIONS ROOT CA CERTIFICATE EXTENSION DEFINITIONS GOVERNMENT CA CERTIFICATE Version Number: 2.5 Page 6 of 54 Public

7 1. INTRODUCTION The Government of Saudi Arabia has embarked on an ambitious e-transaction program, recognizing that there is a tremendous opportunity to better utilize information technology to improve the quality of care/service, lower the cost of operations, and increase customer satisfaction. To ensure the secure, efficient transmission and exchange of information electronically, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has created a National Public Key Infrastructure. Named the National Center for Digital Certification (NCDC), NCDC is created by an act of law and its mandate is stipulated in the Saudi e-transactions Act and its bylaws. NCDC provides trust services to secure the exchange of information between key stakeholders. Participants include: Government Citizens Business NCDC owns and operates the Saudi National Root-CA of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Approved Certification Authorities (CAs) shall be issuers of NCDC Digital Certificates to Subscribers, Relying parties and Registration Authorities through Certification Service Providers (CSPs) if expressly approved by NCDC. Together all of these components and participants form the Saudi National PKI. NCDC operates as a closed business system model. NCDC Digital Certificates support Authentication, Digital Signature, Encryption and Non-Repudiation services for access and processing of electronic information, documents and transactions. Moreover, this CP shall be used to cross-certify the Saudi National Root-CA with other CAs as per NCDC Cross Certification Policy. A new service delivery model has been created whereby a shared National PKI Center has been created. The National Center for Digital Certification - Shared Services Center (NCDC- SSC) will consolidate and manage CSP s CAs and related operations for outsourced CA s joining the Saudi National PKI. This CP shall define the policies by which the Saudi National Root-CA operates. This CP complies with the Saudi National PKI Policy and in line with Internet Request for Comment (RFC) 3647 [RFC 3647]. The terms used in this document shall have the meanings as defined in NCDC Glossary section which can be found at OVERVIEW This CP defines a high level of trust and assurance for use by all Saudi National PKI participants. Assurance level is defined as the: Strength of the binding between a Public Key and the individual whose Subject name is cited in the Certificate, Mechanisms used to control the use of the Private Key, Security provided by the PKI itself. This CP defines one assurance level for use by Saudi National Root-CA participants: Version Number: 2.5 Page 7 of 54 Public

8 A stringent Identity proofing process through Registration Authority before issuance of certificate, The Digital Certificates issued to Subscribers (CAs or Saudi National Root-CA supporting functions) are on hardware, The assurance level Certificates defined in this CP apply to the following entities: Relying Parties (RPs) who are permitted to rely upon Digital Certificates meeting NCDC standards for purposes set forth by this CP, Other authorities (e.g., Subordinate CAs expressly approved by NCDC, Registration Authorities (RAs) or OCSP Responders) certified or used by the CSP operated by the Issuer. This CP has been developed under the direction of NCDC and has the responsibility for directing the development, approval and update of the Saudi National Root-CA CP. Any use of or reference to this CP outside the context of the Saudi National Root-CA and Saudi National PKI is completely at the using party s risk. The terms and provisions of this CP shall be interpreted under and governed by the Saudi National Root-CA CPS and NCDC Operations Policies and Procedures. As described in this CP, PDS and supporting Certification Practice Statement (CPS), NCDC will establish a self-signed off-line Root CA. It is the responsibility of all parties applying for or using a Digital Certificate issued under this CP, to read the Saudi National Root-CA CP and to understand the practices established for the lifecycle management of the Certificates. Any application for Digital Certificates or reliance on OCSP validation of NCDC issued Certificates signifies understanding and acceptance of this CP and its supporting policy documents CERTIFICATE POLICY X.509 certificates will contain a registered OID in the certificate policy extension that in turn shall be used by a Relying Party to decide whether a Certificate is trusted for a particular purpose. Certificates issued by the Saudi National Root-CA will identify the applicable policy in the certificate policies extension by including applicable OID(s) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CP AND THE CPS This CP states what assurance can be placed in a certificate issued by the Saudi National Root-CA by relying parties participating in the Saudi National PKI. The Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) states how Saudi National Root-CA meets the requirements of this CP INTERACTION WITH OTHER PKI S NCDC will decide on issues related to cross-certification with other Certification Authorities as per NCDC Cross Certification Policy SCOPE This CP applies to all certificates issued by the Saudi National Root-CA. The Saudi National Root-CA shall issues certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) only to NCDC approved CAs and supportive functions for the Saudi National Root-CA operations within Version Number: 2.5 Page 8 of 54 Public

9 Saudi National PKI. The Saudi National Root-CA also cross-certifies with CAs at international level as per NCDC Cross Certification Policy. 1.2 DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION This document is the Saudi National Root-CA Certificate Policy (CP), and is identified by the object identifier (OID): NCDC will also issue OIDs to the approved CAs. The approved CAs (level one CAs) will then choose to assign OIDs for different purposes under this scheme. Please refer to the latest OID Allocation document available on SAUDI NATIONAL PKI PARTICIPANTS The following are roles relevant to the administration and operation of the Saudi National Root-CA NCDC NCDC approves and maintains the practices, policies and procedures under which the entire Saudi National PKI operates. NCDC is also responsible for the governance and enforcement of the policies. Regarding the CP, NCDC approves the Saudi National Root-CA Certificate Policy (CP), PKI Disclosure Statement (PDS) and Certification Practice Statement (CPS), including their revisions. NCDC is responsible for establishing and administering the requirements and procedures for entities wishing to become a Certification Service Provider (CSP) within the Saudi National PKI. CITC license is required for commercial, non-governmental CSPs. NCDC tasks include: Establishment and maintenance of the Saudi National Root-CA CP, Review and approval of the Saudi National Root-CA CPS as being in conformance with this CP, Review and approval of the Saudi National Root-CA PDS as being in conformance with this CP, Ensuring the operation of the Saudi National Root-CA comply with the requirements of the Saudi National Root-CA CP, CPS and the NCDC Operations Policies and Procedures, Decision on the admittance of new CAs, Decision on the admittance of new CSP s, Establish and approve Cross-Certification criteria and entities, and Arbitration on all claims or disputes between all Saudi National PKI participants as per the NCDC Dispute Resolution Policy SAUDI NATIONAL ROOT CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY The Saudi National Root-CA acts as the trust anchor for the entire Saudi National PKI. It is self-signed CA and operated by NCDC. Saudi National Root-CA tasks include: Generation and issuance of cross certified CA certificates, Version Number: 2.5 Page 9 of 54 Public

10 Publication of cross certified CA Certificates, Revocation of cross certified CA Certificates, Re-key of the Saudi National Root-CA and NCDC approved CAs signing keys, Establishment and maintenance of the CPS in accordance with the Saudi National Root-CA CP, Performance of all aspects of the services, operations and infrastructure related to Certificates issued under this CP, in accordance with the requirements, representations, and warranties of the Saudi National Root-CA CP and CPS, and Issuance of certificates to approved entities wishing to cross certify with the Saudi National PKI as per NCDC Cross Certification Policy CA POLICY AUTHORITY The CA Policy Authority (PA) is responsible for the governance of CA. CA Policy Authority members are appointed by NCDC. Its tasks include: Ensuring the operation of the CA comply with the requirements of the Saudi National PKI Policy, CA CP,PDS, CPS and relevant Operations Policies and Procedures, Customize the Subscriber Agreement, Relying Party Agreement and Registration Authority based on the CA s specific business requirements, Seeking resolution of disputes between participants operating in its domain, Establishing and implement their own CP, PDS and CPS in conjunction with the Saudi National PKI Policy, and Act as liaison with NCDC CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY The term CA refers to any entity approved by NCDC to join the Saudi National PKI, directly under the Saudi National Root-CA. On successfully joining the Saudi National PKI ; CA is entitle to issue certificates after mapping to one of the policy OIDs listed in the NCDC OID Allocation document, which can be found at CAs will issue subscriber certificates, OCSP responder certificates and other certificates required by PKI components. CAs, acting on behalf of CSPs, will issue certificates to Subscribers in accordance with their CSP Agreement, Subscriber Agreement, Relying party Agreement, their respective CP/CPS, and the Saudi National PKI Policy. The CAs will describe which subscriber types they will support, which certificate types they will issue and determine the level of warranties and liabilities. A CA is responsible for: Control over the designation of RAs, Control over the designation of CSPs, The Certificate generation process, Publication of Subscriber Certificates, Revocation of Subscriber Certificates, Publication of revocation information, Re-key of Subscribers, Version Number: 2.5 Page 10 of 54 Public

11 Conduct regular internal security audits, Conduct compliance reviews of its CSPs, Assist in audits conducted by or on behalf of NCDC, and Performance of all aspects of the services, operations and infrastructure related to the respective CA REGISTRATION AUTHORITY Saudi National Root-CA may, subject to the approval of NCDC, designate specific RAs to perform the Subscriber Identification and Authentication and Certificate request and revocation functions defined in the Saudi National Root-CA CP and related documents. RA is obligated to perform certain functions pursuant to an RA Agreement including the following: Process Certificate application requests in accordance with the Saudi National Root- CA CP and applicable RA Agreement, and other policies and procedures with regard to the Certificates issued, Maintain and process all supporting documentation related to the Certificate application process, Process Certificate Revocation requests in accordance with this CP, applicable RA Agreement, and other relevant operational policies and procedures with respect to the Certificates issued. Without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, the RA shall request the revocation of any Certificate that it has approved for issuance according to the conditions described later in section 4.9.1, Comply with the provisions of its RA Agreement and the provisions of the Saudi National Root-CA CP including, without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, compliance with any compliance audit requirements, and Follow Privacy policy in accordance with the Saudi National Root-CA CP and applicable RA Agreement SUBSCRIBERS Subscribers are individuals (end users), entities (organizations) or devices to whom certificates are issued. The subscribers of Saudi National Root-CA would be the approved CAs by NCDC. However, the subscribers and relying parties who use the certificates issued by approved CA under Saudi National PKI need to be assured that the CA is licensed by the Saudi National Root- CA RELYING PARTIES A Relying Party is any entity that places comfort on information provided by Certificate Service Providers regarding a specific electronic transaction that the Relying Party uses to accept or reject its participation in the transaction. The Relying Party is responsible for deciding whether or how to check the validity of the certificate by checking the appropriate certificate status information. The Relying Party can use the certificate to verify the integrity of a digitally signed message, to identify the creator Version Number: 2.5 Page 11 of 54 Public

12 of a message, or to establish confidential communications with the holder of the certificate. A Relying Party may use information in the certificate (such as certificate policy identifiers) to determine the suitability of the certificate for a particular use ONLINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL RESPONDER Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Responders and Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) status providers may provide revocation status information or full certification path validation services respectively. The Saudi National Root-CA may make their certificate status information available through an OCSP responder in addition to any other mechanisms they wish to employ. The Saudi National Root-CA shall publish status information for the certificates it issues in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL). 1.4 CERTIFICATE USAGE APPROPRIATE CERTIFICATE USES The use of Certificates supported by the Saudi National PKI is restricted to parties authorized by contract to do so. Entities and persons other than those authorized by contract may not use certificates for any purpose. The Saudi National Root-CA shall issue certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) only to NCDC approved CAs under Saudi National Root-CA, cross certified CAs outside Saudi Arabia and certificates required by the PKI components and supportive functions for the Saudi National Root-CA operations within Saudi National PKI PROHIBITED CERTIFICATE USES Certificates issued under this CP shall not be authorized for use in any circumstances or in any application which could lead to death, personal injury or damage to property, or in conjunction with on-line control equipment in hazardous environments such as in the operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or communications systems, air traffic control or direct life support machines and the Saudi National Root-CA shall not be liable for any claims arising from such use. 1.5 POLICY ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATION ADMINISTERING THE DOCUMENT This CP is administered by NCDC (see Section 1.3.1) CONTACT PERSON Queries regarding the Saudi National Root-CA CP shall be directed at: Telephone: Fax: Any formal notices required by this CP shall be sent in accordance with the notification procedures specified in section of this CP. Version Number: 2.5 Page 12 of 54 Public

13 1.5.3 PERSON DETERMINING CPS SUITABILITY FOR THE POLICY NCDC is responsible for approving the Saudi National Root-CA CPS and establishing that the Saudi National Root-CA conforms to the requirements of this CP in accordance with NCDC policies and procedures CPS APPROVAL PROCEDURES Changes or updates to the Saudi National Root-CA CPS document must be made in accordance with the stipulations of Saudi e-transactions act and bylaws, and the provisions contained in this CP and are subject to NCDC approval. 1.6 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS The terms and acronyms used in this document shall have the meanings as defined in NCDC Glossary section which can be found at Version Number: 2.5 Page 13 of 54 Public

14 2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 REPOSITORIES The NCDC-SSC shall operate Repositories to support the Saudi National Root-CA operations. The repositories shall be directories that provide access through an appropriate standard-based access protocol REPOSITORY OBLIGATIONS Repositories shall support: An appropriate standard-based access protocol, Availability of the information as required by the certificate information posting and retrieval stipulations of the Saudi National Root-CA CP, and Access control mechanisms, when necessary to protect the repository availability and information as described in later sections. 2.2 PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATION INFORMATION PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATES AND CERTIFICATE STATUS The Saudi National Root-CA shall publish in the appropriate repository, the Saudi National Root-CA Certificate, cross certified CA certificates, supportive functions certificates and CRLs as described under same section in the CPS PUBLICATION OF CA INFORMATION This CP shall be made available to all Saudi National PKI participants at NCDC website This web site is the only source for up-to-date documentation and NCDC reserves the right to publish newer versions of the documentation without prior notice. Additionally, Saudi National Root-CA will publish an approved, current and digitally signed version of the Saudi National Root-CA CP and its PDS. NCDC Public LDAP directory and NCDC website ( are the only authoritative sources for: All publicly accessible certificates issued by Saudi National Root-CA. The certificate revocation list (CRL) for Saudi National Root-CA INTEROPERABILITY Repositories used to publish CA certificates and CRLs, shall employ standard-based scheme for directory objects and attributes, at least LDAPv TIME OR FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION Saudi National Root-CA shall publish certificate promptly following their generation and issuance. CRL information shall be published as set in section Version Number: 2.5 Page 14 of 54 Public

15 This CP and any subsequent changes should be made available to the Saudi National PKI participants as set forth in section within two weeks of approval by NCDC. 2.4 ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES Certificates and certificate status information in the repository shall be made available to Saudi National PKI participants and other parties on a 24X7 basis as determined by the applicable agreements and NCDC Privacy Policy, and subject to routine maintenance. The Saudi National Root-CA will protect repository information not intended for public dissemination or modification through the use of strong authentication, access controls, and an overall Information Security Management System that prevents unauthorized access to information. The controls employed by NCDC-SSC shall prevent unauthorized persons from adding, deleting or modifying repository entries. Access restrictions shall be implemented on directory search to prevent misuse and unauthorized harvesting of information. Version Number: 2.5 Page 15 of 54 Public

16 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION 3.1 NAMING TYPES OF NAMES Each CA certificate must have a unique and readily identifiable Distinguished Name (DN) according to the X.500 standard. Naming conventions for CAs are approved by the Saudi National Root-CA. Details of these are found in the Certificate Types under Appendix-A in this CP NEED FOR NAMES TO BE MEANINGFUL The CAs certificates issued pursuant to this CP are meaningful only if the names that appear in the certificates are understood and used by Relying Parties. Names used in the certificates must identify the CA in a meaningful way to which they are assigned. The subject name contained in a CA certificate must be meaningful in the sense that the Saudi National Root-CA is provided with proper evidence of the association existing between the name and the entity to which it belongs. The Saudi National Root-CA DN (LDAP Notation) in the Issuer field of all certificates and CRLs that are issued will be: OU=Saudi National Root CA, O=National Center for Digital Certification, C=SA ANONYMITY OR PSEUDONYMITY OF SUBSCRIBERS Saudi National Root-CA does not support issuing anonymous certificates RULES FOR INTERPRETING VARIOUS NAME FORMS The naming convention used by the Saudi National Root-CA is ISO/IEC 9595 (X.500) Distinguished Name (DN) UNIQUENESS OF NAMES All distinguished names shall be unique across the Saudi National Root-CA RECOGNITION, AUTHENTICATION AND ROLE OF TRADEMARKS Where permitted or required, the use of a trademark is reserved to the holder of that trademark. Version Number: 2.5 Page 16 of 54 Public

17 3.2 INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION METHOD TO PROVE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE KEY The Certificate applicant must demonstrate that it rightfully holds the private key corresponding to the public key to be listed in the certificate. The method to prove possession of a private key shall be established by NCDC AUTHENTICATION OF ORGANIZATION IDENTITY Applicants wishing to join or cross certify with the Saudi National PKI are authenticated in accordance with NCDC specifications as described in NCDC Cross Certification Policy and Saudi National PKI Policy AUTHENTICATION OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY The Saudi National Root-CA does not issue end-entity certificates NON-VERIFIED SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION Non-verified information shall not be included in certificates issued by Saudi National Root- CA CRITERIA FOR INTEROPERATION Any CA wishing to cross certify with the Saudi National Root-CA, shall adhere to the following requirements: Issue Certificates compliant with the Certificate profile described later in this CP, Make Certificate information and CRL available within the Saudi National PKI community in accordance with the Saudi National Root-CA CP, and Provide an accessible directory that interoperates with the NCDC Repository defined forth in this CP. 3.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR ROUTINE RE-KEY An authorized representative should request re-key of CA, in compliance with the Saudi National Root-CA Operations Policy IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY AFTER REVOCATION If a CA certificate is revoked, an authorized representative of the CA shall provide sufficient information before Saudi National Root-CA initiates generation of the new CA certificate. 3.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUEST Revocation requests shall be authenticated to verify that the revocation has been requested by an authorized entity. Acceptable procedures for authenticating the revocation requests are described in the CPS. Version Number: 2.5 Page 17 of 54 Public

18 4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 4.1 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION This section specifies the requirements for initial application for certificate issuance by NCDC WHO CAN SUBMIT A CERTIFICATE APPLICATION For CA licensing process, an application must be submitted and approved by NCDC. In addition, for commercial CAs, a license must be obtained from CITC after an application is approved by NCDC. Entities wishing to cross certify with the Saudi National PKI apply to NCDC and receive approval before the Saudi National Root-CA proceeds with exchanging certificates ENROLMENT PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITIES All applicants shall agree to the terms and conditions of the applicable Agreements which may include, but are not limited to, Subscriber Agreement, CSP Agreement, Relying Party or RA Agreement. NCDC shall set up enrolment process for the certificates issued under the Saudi National Root-CA. 4.2 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING PERFORMING IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FUNCTIONS The identity-proofing of the CA and cross certifying entity shall meet the requirements specified in Saudi National PKI Policy and NCDC Cross Certification Policy APPROVAL OR REJECTION OF CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS NCDC may accept or reject a Certificate application of the CA or cross certifying entity as described in the CA Licensing Process TIME TO PROCESS CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS The time to process certificate applications is specified in the relevant Agreement between the PKI participants. 4.3 CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE CA ACTIONS DURING CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE The Saudi National Root-CA Certificate has been self-generated and self-signed. When the Saudi National Root-CA receives a request for a CA Certificate or an entity wishing to cross certify with the Saudi National PKI, the Saudi National Root-CA does not issue a Certificate before the applicant accepts the terms of a Agreement (for CAs), agrees to adapt to the Saudi National PKI Policy, successfully completes the CA or Cross Certifying Entity Version Number: 2.5 Page 18 of 54 Public

19 application form, obtains the required license from the CITC (for commercial CAs), and gets final approval from NCDC NOTIFICATION TO SUBSCRIBER BY THE CA OF ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE Saudi National Root-CA must notify the CA Applicant of Certificate issuance using secure mechanisms as defined in Saudi National Root-CA Operations Policy. 4.4 CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE CONDUCT CONSTITUTING CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE Certificate acceptance is governed by the Agreements set out between the Saudi National Root-CA and CA s. The use of a Certificate or the reliance upon a Certificate signifies acceptance by the CA of the terms and conditions of the Saudi National Root-CA CP by which they irrevocably agree to be bound PUBLICATION OF THE CERTIFICATE BY THE CA Once Saudi National Root-CA accepts and generates entity certificate it shall be published in the appropriate repository NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES NCDC and CA PA shall be informed when a CA has been cross certified with the Saudi National Root-CA. 4.5 KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE SUBSCRIBER PRIVATE KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE Subscribers (CAs) shall use their Certificates exclusively for legal and authorized purposes in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement, this CP, PDS, CPS and applicable laws. CAs shall protect their Private Keys from access by any other party and shall notify NCDC upon the compromise of the private key or any reasonable suspicion of compromise RELYING PARTY PUBLIC KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE Relying parties shall use public key certificates and associated public keys for the purposes as constrained by the extensions (such as key usage, extended key usage, certificate policies, etc.) in the certificates. The Relying Party is solely responsible for deciding whether or not to rely on the information in a certificate provided to accept or reject their participation in the transaction. 4.6 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate without changing the public key or any other information in the certificate. The Saudi National Root-CA CP does not support certificate renewal. Version Number: 2.5 Page 19 of 54 Public

20 4.7 CERTIFICATE RE-KEY Re-keying (key update) a certificate consists of creating new certificates with a different Key pair while retaining other Subject information from old certificate. The new Certificate may be assigned a different validity period and/or signed using a different issuing CA private key CIRCUMSTANCE FOR CERTIFICATE RE-KEY Certificate re-key shall take place after a certificate is revoked and the subscriber information is still accountable or after a certificate has expired or nearing expiry WHO MAY REQUEST CERTIFICATION OF A NEW PUBLIC KEY In accordance with the conditions specified in section 4.7.1, an authorized representative of the CA may request re-key of its CA certificate PROCESSING CERTIFICATE RE-KEYING REQUESTS Only after verifying re-key request from authorized representative of CA, processing of certificate re-keying request shall be initiated NOTIFICATION OF RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE TO SUBSCRIBER Notification of issuance of a re-keyed certificate to the Subscriber shall be using secure mechanisms as defined in Saudi National Root-CA Operations Policy CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE OF A RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate is same as listed in section PUBLICATION OF THE RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE BY THE CA After successful completion of the re-key process, certificate shall be published in appropriate repositories NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES Generally, Saudi National Root-CA does not notify other entities of a re-keyed certificate apart from requesting CA. 4.8 CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION Certificate modification for all applicants will be accomplished through Certificate re-key as specified in section 4.7. The Saudi National Root-CA CP does not support other forms of Certificate modification. Version Number: 2.5 Page 20 of 54 Public

21 4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION A Certificate shall be revoked/ suspended when the binding between the Subject and the Subject s Public Key defined within a Certificate is no longer considered valid CIRCUMSTANCES FOR REVOCATION The Saudi National Root-CA shall revoke Certificate whenever: failed to comply with the terms and conditions subject to which the licence was granted; contravened any provisions of the Electronic Transactions (e-transactions) Act and Bylaws made there under; The Subject has failed to meet its obligations under its agreements with the Saudi National Root-CA, those of any applicable CP,PDS and CPS or any other applicable Agreements; The private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate has been lost, disclosed without authorization, stolen or compromised in any way; NCDC suspects or determines that revocation of a Certificate is in the best interest of the integrity of the NCDC; and there has been an improper or faulty issuance of a certificate due to: o o A material prerequisite to the issuance of the Certificate not being satisfied; A material fact in the Certificate is known, or reasonably believed, to be false. Whenever any of the above circumstances occur, the associated certificate shall be revoked and placed on a CRL and specified as revoked by an OCSP Responder. The Saudi National Root-CA publishes a revocation notice on its Web Site if any issuing CA certificate is revoked WHO CAN REQUEST REVOCATION The following entities can request revocation of a Certificate: NCDC can request the revocation of any certificates issued by any CA participating in the Saudi National PKI, The authorized signatory of the CA, A legal, judicial or regulatory agency in Saudi Arabia. The authority to revoke the Saudi National Root-CA certificate rests with NCDC. If any request for revocation cannot be resolved, the request is subject to the Dispute Resolution process described in the NCDC Dispute Resolution Policy PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION REQUEST A request to revoke certificate shall identify the certificate to be revoked, explain the reason for revocation, and allow the request to be authenticated (e.g., digitally or manually signed). The Saudi National Root-CA shall authenticate the request as well as the authorization of the requester in accordance with the applicable Agreements. Version Number: 2.5 Page 21 of 54 Public

22 4.9.4 REVOCATION REQUEST GRACE PERIOD There is no revocation grace period once a revocation request has been verified TIME WITHIN WHICH CA MUST PROCESS THE REVOCATION REQUEST Authorized Certificate revocation should be processed within 24 hours REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENT FOR RELYING PARTIES Relying Parties should comply with the signature validation requirements defined in the Relying Party Agreement CRL ISSUANCE FREQUENCY The Saudi National Root-CA will publish its CRL no less frequently than once every twelve months and at the time of any Certificate revocation of certificate issued by it MAXIMUM LATENCY OF CRLS CRLs shall be published in the Repositories within 10 minutes of Certificate revocation. Certificate status information is updated within 30 minutes of certificate revocation ONLINE REVOCATION CHECKING/STATUS AVAILABILITY Saudi National Root-CA may provide access to an OCSP Responder covering the certificates it issues ONLINE REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENTS The Saudi National Root-CA may make its Certificate status information available through an OCSP responder. OCSP requests and responses comply with the profiles specified later in this CP OTHER FORMS OF REVOCATION ADVERTISEMENTS AVAILABLE No stipulation SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO KEY COMPROMISE If NCDC discovers, or has a reason to believe, that there has been a compromise of the private key of the Saudi National Root-CA or any other approved CA, NCDC will immediately declare a disaster and invoke NCDC business continuity plan. NCDC will (1) determine the scope of certificates that must be revoked, (2) publish a new CRL at the earliest feasible time, (3) use reasonable efforts to notify CSPs, subscribers and potential relying parties that there has been a key compromise, and (4) generate new CA key pair as per NCDC operations policies and procedures. Version Number: 2.5 Page 22 of 54 Public

23 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SUSPENSION The Saudi National Root-CA has the option to suspend certificates under the circumstances described in section WHO CAN REQUEST SUSPENSION The following entities can request suspension of a Certificate: NCDC can request the suspension of any certificates issued by any CA participating in the Saudi National PKI, The authorized signatory of the CA A legal, judicial or regulatory agency in Saudi Arabia If any request for suspension cannot be resolved, the request is subject to the Dispute Resolution process described in the Dispute Resolution Policy PROCEDURE FOR SUSPENSION REQUEST A request to suspend a certificate shall identify the certificate to be suspended, explain the reason for suspension, and allow the request to be authenticated (e.g., digitally or manually signed). The Saudi National Root-CA shall authenticate the request as well as the authorization of the requester in accordance with the applicable Agreements LIMITS ON SUSPENSION PERIOD The maximum period for which a certificate can be suspended will be defined by the policy authority but shall not exceed ninety (90) days CIRCUMSTANCES FOR TERMINATING SUSPENDED CERTIFICATES A suspended certificate is reactivated when the entity which requested the suspension of a certificate is satisfied that the circumstances leading to the suspension are no longer valid. Once reactivated, the certificate will be valid for the remainder of its initial life time. A suspended certificate is revoked when the entity which requested the suspension of a certificate is satisfied that the circumstances leading to the suspension are indeed valid. When the period for suspension has reached its maximum duration without resolution, the certificate will be revoked PROCEDURE FOR TERMINATING THE SUSPENSION OF A CERTIFICATE A request to unsuspend a certificate shall identify the certificate to be unsuspended, explain the reason for unsuspension, and allow the request to be authenticated (e.g., digitally or manually signed). The CA or RA shall authenticate the request as well as the authorization of the requester in accordance with the applicable Agreements CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES The status of public certificates is available from CRL s in the repositories and via an OCSP responder, if supported. Version Number: 2.5 Page 23 of 54 Public

24 4.11 END OF SUBSCRIPTION No stipulation KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY No keys will be escrowed for the Saudi National Root-CA. Version Number: 2.5 Page 24 of 54 Public

25 5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS 5.1 PHYSICAL CONTROLS The Saudi National Root-CA is collocated in the NCDC-SSC and follows the physical security requirements specified as below: The NCDC-SSC systems are protected by seven tiers of physical security, with access to the lower tier required before gaining access to the higher tier. Progressively restrictive physical access privileges control access to each tier. Sensitive CA operational activity, any activity related to the lifecycle of the certification process such as authentication, verification, and issuance, occur within very restrictive physical tiers. Physical access is automatically logged and video recorded. Additional tiers enforce individual access control through the use of two factor biometric authentication. Unescorted personnel, including un-trusted employees or visitors, are not allowed into such secured areas. The NCDC has implemented policies and procedures to ensure that the physical environments in which the CA systems are installed maintain a high level of security: NCDC-SSC systems are installed in a secure facility that is isolated from outside networks, with all access controlled; The NCDC-SSC is separated into a series of progressively secure areas; and The entrances and exits from the secure areas are under constant video surveillance and all systems that provide authentication, as well as those that record entry, exit and network activity, are in secured areas. The security techniques employed are designed to resist a large number and combination of different forms of attack. The mechanisms the NCDC-SSC uses include: Perimeter alarms Closed circuit television Two-factor authentication using Biometrics and dual mechanical rotary locks Mantraps Radio frequency attenuation shielding and reinforced walls Motion detectors Human guards All the Networking and systems components including the certification components are installed in secure Data cabinets with pin locks from both sides. To prevent tampering, cryptographic hardware is stored in a most secure area of the NCDC- SSC, with access limited to authorized personnel. The NCDC uses human guards to continually monitor the facility housing the CA equipment on a 7x24x365 basis. The NCDC-SSC facility is never left unattended SITE LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION The location and construction of the facility housing the Saudi National Root-CA and other CAs, the NCDC-SSC, equipment is consistent with facilities used to house high value, Version Number: 2.5 Page 25 of 54 Public

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