For a hundred years, Arabs living in Palestine and Jews coming to live there

Transcription

1 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations LOUIS KRIESBERG Maxwell Professor of Social Conflict Studies Syracuse University For a hundred years, Arabs living in Palestine and Jews coming to live there have been in conflict about that land and their relations with each other. The conflict has often been waged destructively. Several attempts to resolve the conflict by partitioning Palestine have been made, but these have failed. In recent years, the seemingly intractable conflict has been transforming to a difficult, but tractable, one. A mutually agreed upon partition is likely, and it could be the basis for increasingly beneficial relations between Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians. In May 1993, representatives of the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began direct, secret negotiations in Oslo. They prepared a Declaration of Principles (DOP) that was signed on September 13, 1993 at a public ceremony in Washington, D.C. There the late prime minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, and the chairman of the PLO, Yassir Arafat, met and shook hands. In accordance with the DOP, Israeli forces withdrew from the Jericho area and from much of the Gaza Strip, and Palestinian authorities took control. Since then, successive Israeli governments and the Palestinian Authority have conducted a series of negotiations, making detailed agreements to implement the provisions of the DOP. At times, as during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu s administration, the negotiations were stalled, and active U.S. mediation was required to reach any agreement. The negotiations seem to be moving toward a new division of Palestine. After reviewing previous partitions, I will examine the initiation and Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 63

2 Louis Kriesberg character of the present negotiations. This will help assess the likely resulting partition and its implications for future relations between Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians. 1 Historical Background Partition usually refers to a political division of territory, with the inhabitants of each part having sovereignty. The inhabitants of each area of the partitioned territory are often severely separated, but they need not be. People within an unpartitioned territory containing different religious, racial/ethnic or linguistic communities may also be highly separated, as was the case in apartheid South Africa. The kind and extent of separation and partition in Palestine warrant attention. Past Partitions of Palestine Palestine has undergone several attempts at partitions in the twentieth century. Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the League of Nations conferred the mandate over Palestine, including Trans-Jordan, to Britain. In 1922 Trans-Jordan was divided from Palestine along the Jordan River, the Dead Sea and the Wadi Araba and established as a protectorate of Britain. Abdullah was named Emir of Trans-Jordan and later king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from 1946 until his assassination in The Jordanian border has generally had international recognition. 2 Jewish immigration into Palestine, begun many years earlier, continued after World War I; Jews objected that the immigration was constrained by the British, and Arabs protested that it was too much. Jews and Arab Palestinians lived and worked in relatively separate economies and localities. This was consistent with the dominant Zionist view that the Jews should redeem the land with their own hands. It was also consistent with the self-interest of some Palestinian absentee landowners, but this resulted in unemployed Palestinian tenant farmers and other Palestinians who experienced economic hardship from Jewish competition. 3 The Jewish-Arab struggle over the Jewish immigration of Jews into Palestine increased in the 1930s and resulted in the Arab Revolt of In 1937 Britain proposed a partition plan, developed by the Peel Commission. 4 According to this plan, a small Jewish state would be established, Jerusalem and a narrow swath to the sea would remain under British mandate, and the rest of Palestine would be an Arab state, merged with Trans-Jordan. This was accepted in principle by the Zionist leaders but rejected by Palestinian and Arab leaders, except for Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. The partition was not implemented and the strife continued. 64 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

3 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations In 1939, Britain moved in a different direction and issued a White Paper that limited Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchases. The White Paper also proposed an independent state of Palestine, with an Arab majority, after a ten-year transition. 5 Although meeting many of the Arab Palestinian goals, it did not satisfy the aspirations of Palestinians who wanted an immediate and unconditional end of the British mandate over Palestine. This was articulated by the Arab Higher Commission, headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem. From the Jewish side, the plan seemed contrary to the British commitment, made in the 1917 Balfour Declaration, to a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Jews opposed the White Paper strenuously and resisted it with illegal immigration, illegal land purchases, and terrorist actions against British personnel. Jewish pressure for immigration into Palestine escalated sharply with the end of World War II and the desire of Holocaust survivors to come to Palestine. Failing to find any compromise between Zionist and Arab claims, the British turned the problem over to the United Nations. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly passed Resolution 181, dividing Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states and placing Jerusalem under an international regime. The partition plan was opposed by the Arab governments, arguing that it gave the Jewish minority over half of the territory, including the citrus and cereal land and much of the Arab industry; furthermore, in the new Jewish state, there would be practically as many Arabs as Jews. 6 The Jews accepted the plan and the Arabs bitterly denounced it. Jews and Palestinian Arabs attempted to seize territory as the British withdrew; violence between the opposing sides was widespread. British military units completed their withdrawal from Palestine on May 15, The Jewish Agency declared the establishment of the State of Israel as a Jewish state, and Arab military forces invaded. Israeli forces managed to establish control over a more extensive territory than envisaged in UN General Assembly Resolution 181. The war stopped with bilateral armistices between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, reached sequentially in The armistice lines established a partition of Palestine: Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, while Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine were divided between Israel and Jordan. 8 Jordan annexed the territory it controlled and the Palestinians became Jordanian citizens. Neither the other Arab governments nor the international community accorded legitimacy to the Jordanian annexation. The 1949 de facto partition survived until war broke out in June of 1967, after which the Israeli military forces occupied all of Palestine west of the Jordan River, as well as the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Israel immediately annexed the eastern parts of Jerusalem previously governed by Jordan and in 1981 extended Israeli law to the Golan Heights; but it ruled the other lands as occupied territories. This militarily imposed partition was not accepted as legitimate by the inter- Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 65

4 Louis Kriesberg national community, as indicated in the 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242. After the war of October 1973, negotiations between Egypt and Israel resulted in the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sinai. The 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt established full diplomatic relations, withdrew Jewish military forces from the Sinai, and dismantled all Jewish settlements. Nevertheless, the 1967 de facto partition of Palestine survived for a quarter of a century with violent and nonviolent Palestinian resistance. Varieties of Partition and Separation Even the brief listing of proposed and enacted partitions of Palestine indicates that Palestine might be divided in many ways. Consideration of those variations can help in assessing the implications of the partition that is emerging. I focus on two factors: who determines the partition, and the degree and nature of the separation entailed. Partitions may be more or less unilaterally imposed. The imposition may be by one of the parties to the partition and/or outside actors. The Palestinians had no significant direct engagement in constructing the partitions previously noted. The partitions were typically The partition of 1949 did not satisfy the aspirations of any of the major parties in the Israeli-Arab conflict, nor was it accepted as legitimate or permanent. established by the actions of the Israeli government, limited to some extent by the actions of the neighboring Arab governments. External parties, such as the United Kingdom, the United Sates, and the members of the UN General Assembly and Security Council, played a variety of other roles. Outside parties sometimes lent significant support to one or another of the adversaries, or admonished one or more of the adversaries to change their conduct, or mediated between them. The partition of 1949 did not satisfy the aspirations of any of the major parties in the Israeli-Arab conflict, nor was it accepted as legitimate or permanent. For many Palestinian and other Arab leaders, any plan of partition that included the existence of a Jewish state was not acceptable, as indicated by the National Charter, promulgated by the PLO in 1964 and amended in Zionist leaders wanted the whole of Jerusalem to be part of Israel, and some hoped for much of what had been British-mandated Palestine. King Abdullah of Jordan wanted an even greater Jordan, incorporating more territory. Nevertheless, the partition was minimally acceptable to Israeli and Jordanian leaders and Jordan did not join the war of But it entered the war of June 1967, which ended the partition of Palestine west of the Jordan River. 66 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

5 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations Figure 1. Israeli Territorial Gains Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 67

6 Louis Kriesberg While the Israeli government and its armed forces were able to impose de facto partitions, they could not gain their acceptance by the Palestinians nor make them receive international legitimacy. The great superiority in military, economic, and other resources possessed by Israel relative to the PLO continues. In the traditional tough bargaining that has usually characterized the PLO-Israeli negotiations, that asymmetry tends to be reflected in the terms of the agreements reached. If that asymmetry produces a largely imposed agreement, the legitimacy of the agreement will likely be undermined; and without legitimacy, stability will be threatened. Partitions also vary in the kind and degree of separation between the peoples on each side of the partition line. One kind of separation is physical segregation of the peoples, in accordance with ethnicity, religion, language or other communal quality. The 1948 war that ended in the de facto partition of Palestine was accompanied by massive demographic changes. Most of the Arabs living in the areas that became part of Israel as designated by the armistice lines fled from or were driven out by the Israeli armed forces. 10 Estimates of the numbers involved vary but of the approximately 896,000 Arab Palestinians living in what became Israel, 726,000 became refugees, the others remaining in Israel. Most of the refugees fled to other areas of Palestine: 38 percent to the West Bank and 26 percent to the Gaza Strip. The others fled to Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere. 11 The number of Jews in Israel at the time of independence was 649,700. Large numbers of Jews immediately began coming to Israel; from 1948 to 1964, the Jewish population grew to 2,115,600, with 68 percent of the increase due to immigration. 12 More than half of the Jewish immigrants during this period came from Asia and Africa, largely from Arab countries. The social, cultural, and economic barriers between the members of different communities constitute another kind of separation. Leaders and the rankand-file members of each group tend to identify and characterize themselves relative to the members of other groups and to identify members of those other groups. Typically, each he regards the other as inferior in significant ways. Furthermore, the members of different communities may reside, work and conduct other aspects of their lives in segregated spaces. Segregation may reflect self-made choices, but usually reflects some degree of imposition by one group upon another (de facto or de jure), or economic and other social constraints. The Jews and Arabs of Palestine, after the 1948 partition, were greatly divided from each other. Physical separation decreased as Jews established settlements in greater Jerusalem and the occupied territories. 13 The social distance, however, remained great. Jewish settlers were and are protected by Jewish occupation forces. Even within the pre-1967 boundaries, Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs lived highly separated lives. Israeli Arabs, although full citizens, suffered from discriminatory governmental policies and laws. 14 Social and cultural separation 68 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

7 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations has been sustained and buttressed by the ongoing struggle over the control of Palestine, by histories of victimization, by ethno-nationalist ideologies, and by different cultural, religious, and ethnic identities. The economic status of Israel s denizens has been superior to that of the people living in the West Bank and Gaza since the establishment of the State of Israel. 15 Most of the Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza lived in refugee camps and expected this to be temporary. The United Nations special relief agency, UNWRA, provided emergency relief, not assistance for economic development. During the time the West Bank was part of Jordan, the Jordanian government contributed much more of its funds to the East Bank than to the West Bank. Under the Israeli occupation, the Palestinian economy was integrated into the much larger Israeli economy, but in a subordinated relationship. In the first period of the Intifada, beginning in December 1987, Palestinians sought to disengage their economy from the Israeli economy, and succeeded in some areas. The separation of Jews and Arabs in Palestine as was closely related to their deeply felt identities and profound aspirations that seemed to be incompatible. They wanted the same land and feared the other s control of it. Many Arabs and some Jews rejected the idea of partition. When it occurred, its terms were not accepted as legitimate. None of the concerned parties could impose a partition that would have legitimacy and international recognition. The Beginning of Direct Negotiations The shift to direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations occurred as a result of the transformation of the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. It reflected the convergence of many changes within each of the primary adversaries and in their political, economic and social environment. 16 On the Arab side, the changes occurred at different rates and to varying degrees for the diverse constituent members. For example, Jordan s leadership had long practiced a kind of tacit accommodation with Israel. 17 King Hussein, grandson of King Abdullah, from time to time met secretly with high Israeli officials. But Jordan abandoned the claim to represent the Palestinians in 1974, joining the Arab League in recognizing the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The centrality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was thus recognized. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, following the Camp David Accords, further transformed the Arab-Israeli conflict. 18 With Egypt technically at peace with Israel, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict tended to have greater salience and increased the pressure for the Palestinians to directly settle their relations with Israel. Many PLO leaders gradually came to accept the inevitability of a permanent Jewish State in Palestine and to view their conflict with Israel as a struggle to establish a Palestinian state along side Israel. The Intifada, breaking out in December 1987, was waged by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 69

8 Louis Kriesberg Bank, and directed at shaking off the Israeli occupation. It contributed to the emphasis on Palestinians liberating themselves, but not trying to destroy Israel. The PLO leaders, in Tunisia after being driven out of Lebanon, perhaps believed that they needed to attend more to the Palestinians engaged in this struggle and give less priority to the Palestinians in the diaspora. Many diaspora Palestinians, especially those in refugee camps, wanted to return to Palestine based on the right of return enunciated in UN resolutions. The increased attention to the people in the occupied territories, then, made it easier for the PLO to accept the permanence of Israel. In addition, the increasing interactions with Israeli Jews helped foster a more sophisticated understanding of the diversity of Jewish views and the possibility of reaching an acceptable accommodation with many of them. 19 During this period, important contradictory developments were evident among Israeli Jews. Some Jews, for nationalist and/or religious reasons, moved to settle permanently in the occupied territories. Furthermore, nearly all Israeli Jews were committed to maintaining a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. Significantly too, unlike the weakening of moral certitude among the supporters of Apartheid in South Africa during the later 1980s, Israeli Jews remained committed to Zionism. On the other hand, maintaining Israel as a Jewish state and also a democracy would be problematic if Palestinian Arabs were to be incorporated into a greater Israel. Partition was increasingly regarded as a way of resolving the dilemma and gaining security. 20 Furthermore, Israeli Jews were coming to view the Palestinians as a people and to acknowledge the basis of their claims, the Intifada having contributed to that recognition. Finally, Jewish analysts and scholars increasingly published work that undercut previous Israeli views, such as the account that in the war, Palestinians who fled were following the instructions of Arab governments to temporarily leave areas in which Israeli military forces were moving. 21 The social and political environment of the Arab-Israeli conflict radically changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union lessened the support that Palestinians and Israelis might expect to receive. For the PLO and its Syrian and Iraqi supporters, the collapse of the Soviet Union diminished any prospect of defeating Israel; the PLO would have to turn to the United States for assistance. The end of the Cold War also reduced Israel s value to the United States and lessened Israel s reliability on the U.S. government for support in all its disputes with Arabs. The Iraqi attempt to incorporate Kuwait exacerbated Arab disunity, as many Arab governments joined the U.S.-led coalition to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. The PLO s failure to join that coalition left it isolated and vulnerable; it had little alternative but to turn to the United States. 22 The military success of the coalition enhanced U.S. preeminence in the region, and also generated some 70 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

9 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations American obligation to Saudi Arabia and other allied Arab governments. Consequently, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III undertook an intense effort to settle the Israeli-Arab conflict. 23 Combining many previous peacemaking ideas, Baker constructed a threetrack peace process. First, a general Middle East peace conference was convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991, co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union. Representatives of Israel, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinians made opening statements. Subsequently bilateral meetings were begun between Israeli and Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian-Palestinian representatives, separately. The selection of the Palestinian representatives was negotiated with difficulty; the Israeli, Jordanian, and U.S. governments, and the PLO and other Palestinian groups were involved in the selection. In addition, multilateral regional meetings were later undertaken regarding arms control, economic development, water, refugees, and the environment. The primary negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian representatives soon stalled. At the time Yitzhak Shamir, heading the Likud party, was the Israeli prime minister. The Israeli government preferred the status quo to any terms the Palestinians were about to accept. Even after the Labor party led by Yitzhak Rabin won the elections in June 1992, the official negotiations did not make progress, in part because the Palestinian delegation was not able to negotiate any settlement unless Yasser Arafat openly directed it. 24 The public character of the negotiations was also an obstacle to progress. In this context, another channel of negotiations was secretly opened. 25 This channel was initiated in unofficial conversations between an Israeli academic, Yair Hirschfeld and a prominent PLO official, Ahmad Qurai (also known as Abu Alaa), Arafat s director of finances. They first met in London, in December 1992, as arranged by the Norwegian sociologist, Terje Rod Larsen. Hirschfield s previous contacts with Palestinians and with Israeli government officials made the meeting possible. The Norwegian government began supporting regular meetings between Hirschfeld and the historian Ron Pundik with Abu Alaa and two aides. The Israelis sent reports of their meetings to Yossi Beilin, the newly appointed deputy foreign minister. Over time, reports of the meetings were made to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Prime Minister Rabin. Then, in May 1993, Rabin appointed Foreign Minister Director-General Uri Savir to the Oslo talks. 26 The negotiations were now official, but still secret until all the details were agreed upon. Current Negotiations The DOP was designed to set in motion a multi-step peace process in which higher levels of agreement would be reached as parties established mutual trust at earlier levels. Leaders on each side felt the need to mobilize constituency support Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 71

10 Louis Kriesberg and neutralize rival leaders who hampered the process. Thus, the Israeli Labor party leaders held out the prospect of greater Israeli security (personal and collective) with PLO cooperation, and PLO leadership held out the prospect of finally having a state within much of the Palestinian area not controlled by Israel at the advent of the 1967 A peace agreement between Israel and Palestine could foster regional economic development, benefiting the economies of Israel and Palestine. war. Terrorist attacks on Jews by P a l e s t i n i a n rejectionists undermined the promises of Israeli government leaders. The expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and greater Jerusalem undermined PLO leaders promises. The first set of negotiations to implement the DOP was conducted with great difficulty, mutual recriminations and numerous delays. The resulting Interim Accord was belatedly signed on September 28, The Accord set forth the procedures for Palestinians to elect a Palestinian Council and Executive Authority and so establish a Palestinian Authority. Israeli forces were to be removed from populated areas in the West Bank prior to the elections. 27 On November 4, 1995, as the implementation of the Interim Accord began, a Jewish religious extremist assassinated Rabin. Shimon Peres became prime minister and moved ahead to implement the Interim Accord. Prior to the May 1996 elections in Israel, a wave of suicide bomber attacks, for which Hamas took responsibility, claimed many lives. In that context, Peres narrowly lost to Benjamin Netanyahu, who formed a Likud-led coalition government. Implementation was held up; intense U.S. mediation efforts were needed to arrange the removal of Israeli forces from Hebron while continuing to protect Jewish settlers there. 28 Afterwards, the process again stalled. The U.S. government actively worked to reach a new Israeli-Palestinian understanding to implement the Interim Agreement. The result was the Wye River Memorandum, signed by Arafat and Netanyahu on October 23, But this agreement was not implemented by Netanyahu, who suspended the agreement he had signed. Elections were set for May 17, Led by Ehud Barak, the Labor Party won the elections and formed a broad government coalition. The Wye Accord was modified in negotiations with Arafat. In September 1999, the Israeli government and the PLO agreed in the Sharm el- Sheikh Memorandum on an implementation timeline for prior agreements, which had not been implemented. They also agreed to the resumption of Permanent Status negotiations in an accelerated manner. The result of the Permanent Status negotiations may be a peace treaty in the near future. Or, the result may be an- 72 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

11 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations other set of agreements about stages leading to the signing and step-by-step implementation of a comprehensive treaty. The result may also be incremental moves toward accommodation, but no overall peace treaty for decades. Assuming that a peace agreement will be reached in a year or two, let us consider its possible shape and consequences. Implications of Agreement The terms of the peace agreement that will be reached between the Palestine Authority and the Israeli government are not known at this time. The negotiators must find ways to resolve issues relating to the borders, Palestinian statehood, water allocations, Jewish settlements, the status of Jerusalem and the rights of former refugees and their families. Many ingenious ideas have been proposed to satisfy the very different claims made by many Israelis and many Palestinians. 28 Hopefully, the negotiators will search widely for possible options that would provide some degree of mutual satisfaction. I will not discuss such solutions here, but rather I will sketch out some aspects of the agreement s likely basic parameters. Within the territory that was Palestine under the British mandate in 1948, a Palestinian State will be established alongside Israel. Many Palestinian refugees and their descendants likely will be able to return to live in the new Palestinian State, and many of them will do so; but many more will remain among the diaspora. Some Palestinian refugees will return to Israel, probably under family reunification provisions and UN resolutions affirming the right of return to their homes in Palestine. Perhaps, a measure of compensation for Palestinians who do not return will be provided. They may also have the option of holding a Palestinian passport. The 1967 armistice lines are likely to be modified to incorporate the Jewish settlements close to the 1967 lines. The continuing expansion of Jewish settlements has been part of the policy to shape the ultimate borders. 29 This has embittered Palestinians and pressured them to settle sooner rather than later. In a final agreement, the borders might be drawn and the settlements consolidated so that Jewish settlements beyond Israeli borders would be dismantled. Possibly, the borders would not be so extended and some Jews would continue to live in Jewish settlements within the territory of the new Palestinian State, but exist in more circumscribed conditions. The societies probably will be separate to a high degree. Some Jews even speak of building a fence along the entire border. In a Tel Aviv University poll taken in November 1999, 65 percent of Israeli Jews were in favor of a closed border, while only 18 percent of Israeli Arabs were in favor of closed borders. 30 However, in regards to transportation, labor, trade and water, the peoples are too intertwined to be entirely separated. Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 73

12 Louis Kriesberg A peace agreement between Israel and Palestine could foster regional economic development, benefiting the economies of Israel and Palestine. This growth is crucial for the economic and political viability of the new Palestinian State. In addition, Israeli-Palestinian integration in the economic sphere is particularly important for the economic advancement of both countries. To this end, it would be appropriate to negotiate a free trade agreement with elements of a custom union and common market added to it. 31 Furthermore, provisions for joint economic ventures by Israelis and Palestinians might be encouraged. Water allocations will need to be made jointly. Water is in short supply, but can be adequately supplemented through developing desalinization facilities. 32 The costs of such facilities may be shared with external donors, particularly if the agreement is regarded as legitimate. The de facto segregation of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem may be recognized with a significant degree of political autonomy. Perhaps, too, the Palestinian State will have its capital in Abu Dis, and connected to other Arab neighborhoods and villages of greater Jerusalem. 33 Immediate Developments Of course the short-term implications of the final status agreement will depend greatly on the specific terms of the agreement. If the agreement does not allow the Palestinians to claim some locality as their capital that will be regarded as part of Jerusalem as their capital or that severely limits their access to water or that denies the rights of any Palestinian refugees to return to what is now Israel, then Arafat s legitimacy and the legitimacy of the agreement will be problematic for many Palestinians. In any event, living conditions will be severe in Palestine for most Palestinians. Assistance from donor countries and from Palestinians in the diaspora will be essential for economic progress. Conditions for Palestinians in the diaspora probably will improve, as their political status is normalized in Syria and other Arab Countries. 34 Their improved conditions may well increase their material support for the Palestinian State. Diaspora Palestinians in the United States and elsewhere may cooperate with Diaspora Jews to joint investments in the new Palestinian state. The terms of the agreement will also affect its implications for Israelis. An agreement that did not seem to assure the continued and secure residence of many of the Jews living in settlements located within the new state of Palestine, or that would not severely limit the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their former homes, would result in considerable resistance, even if the agreement were ratified. In general, the impact of the peace agreement will be less for Israelis than for the Palestinians. Still, there will be important, far-reaching effects. Within 74 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

13 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations Israel, tensions based on differences between the ultra-orthodox and more secular Jews, may well assume greater prominence. Jews living in settlements within Palestine are likely to decline in number. The prospect that they are settling land that would lead to the expansion of Israel would no longer be credible. Their circumstances would be more circumscribed and less attractive than earlier. The Israeli government may well offer them inducements to leave and so reduce the burden they would constitute to Israel. Despite considerable separation, Jews and Palestinians will begin some cooperative ventures. These likely will include tourism, linking tourist sites in Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt and other neighboring countries. More specialized business interdependence may include Jews going to Palestinian localities for entertainment, as some are already going for gambling to Jericho, and also Palestinians using recreational facilities in Tel Aviv and other places in Israel. 35 Long-Run Effects on Israeli-Palestine Relations Changes will be ongoing; whatever the terms negotiated, the accommodation reached will not freeze the relations between Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians. The social, political and economic relations will change due to factors inherent in the peace agreement and due to developments external to it. A negotiated peace between Israel and Palestine will have profound effects on each party, on the relations of each with other countries in the region and on the relationship between them. Within Palestine, the salience of issues dividing Palestinians is likely to increase. These include differences by religion (Muslims and Christians), class, family, and locality. However, many Palestinians also hold strong democratic sentiments, and those sentiments are more likely to flourish once peace with Israel has been formally achieved. 36 The development of strong democratic institutions can help the constructive management of differences. The open discussion of different interpretations of the past, as well as of the present, will contribute to reconciliation with Palestinian and Jewish former adversaries. Within Israel, the social and political conditions of Israeli Palestinians are likely to improve. The Jews are likely to view the Israeli Arabs with less suspicion and more respect. The Israeli Palestinians active engagement in Israeli politics is likely to grow as they become freer to make such claims. 37 Arabs and others constitute 20 percent of Israel s population, and their rate of increase is greater than the Jewish rate of increase. These developments will tend to enhance the secular and democratic quality of Israeli politics. As they become official partners in building peace, Israeli Jews are likely to reduce their negative stereotypes of the PLO and of Palestinians outside of Israel. As more balanced reports about the founding of the State of Israel become avail- Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 75

14 Louis Kriesberg able and discussed, chauvinism will decline. Some developments that tend to support these changes are well underway. For example, in 1994 the Israeli Ministry of Education undertook the development of new textbooks for Israeli schoolchildren that would recognize realities for Palestinians that previously had been denied. 38 The project continued under the Netanyahu administration, and, after the Labor Party regained power, the textbooks became available in September Although there is no sentiment among Israeli Jews to abandon Zionism, discussions have begun about Israel after Zionist goals largely have been achieved. 39 Predominantly Jewish in population, post-zionist Israel would retain Hebrew as its national language and Jewish culture, religion, and history would largely shape the country s institutions. In post-zionist Israel, however, citizenship rights would be less related to ethnicity and the democracy would become more pluralistic. This development may be fostered by differences about who is a Jew and by recent immigration flows. Statistics released in October 1999 reported that 53 percent of the immigrants in the last year were not Jewish, defined as having a Jewish mother or having undergone an Orthodox conversion. 40 In the region, with peace agreed upon between Israel and Palestine, the peoples in each neighboring country will be freer to devote their attention and energies to economic, cultural, and social development. The potentialities of multilateral regional meetings to deal with issues such as refugees, arms control, water, economic development, and the environment will more likely be realized. Regional institutions to deal with some of these matters on an ongoing basis are likely to become established. All these developments will tend to improve the relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinians and other Arabs, because they will tend to have increasingly egalitarian interactions. Other developments are aspects of increasing globalization of the world. These include the increasingly integrated character of the world economy, the thickening and quickening of the means of communication, the ever greater openness of state borders, and the growing importance of many non-state actors. Furthermore, many norms are increasingly shared throughout the world; these include honoring individual and collective human rights and respecting multiculturalism. The effects of regional and global interactions and transnational institutions will partially overcome the barriers to Israeli and Palestinian interactions. Conclusion The partition of Palestine resulting from the current negotiations can be the product of a different process than the previous partitions and partition plans. Because Palestinians and Israelis will have ratified it and due to its grounding in UN Reso- 76 The Brown Journal of World Affairs

15 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations lutions 244 and 338, this partition will have greater legitimacy. Furthermore, the engagement of the United States, Arab governments, the European Union, and other governmental and nongovernmental actors in the international community will reduce the inequities that might otherwise be incorporated into the agreement. They also can provide assistance to help fulfill the promises of the agreement. Nevertheless, many Arab Palestinians and Israeli Jews will be bitter about the terms of the partition, and some may even try to oppose it by acts of violence. Most members of each side, however, will recognize that no viable alternative exists. A major point in this analysis is that whatever the peace terms may be, they are not immutable. Those who are unsatisfied can work to make them more satisfactory. If legitimate, after institutionalized methods for doing so have been constructed, even many rejectionists can be brought into the never-ending process of building a more peaceful and just relationship. The emerging negotiated accommodation will reflect the basic features of the contemporary reality, with its inequities, fears and hopes. This reality will change as Israeli and Palestinian societies change, and also as the world and the region become more globalized. Global economic integration will continue to increase and foster cooperative ventures, as well as competitive ones, between Jews and Arabs. The intensification of the means of communication will reduce some of the segregation in the cultural, intellectual and social lives of Jews and Arabs. As the separation between Israeli Jews and Arab Palestinians decreases, the significance of the borders between Israel and Palestine also will decline. I have sketched out many implications of a negotiated partition of Palestine. They may seem overly optimistic, and many may prove to be so. However, all are possible, and many are quite plausible. Whether or not they are actualized and possible destructive developments can be avoided depends on the policies pursued by a great number of persons and groups. The consequences will tend to be more constructive insofar as the members of each side of the old conflict take the other side into account in striving for their goals and they are careful not to overreach when tempted to do so. 41 Finally, some members of the adversary sides, largely non-officials, are taking steps toward interpersonal and collective reconciliation. They are striving to learn the truth as understood by other communities, they are trying to advance social justice, they seek to ensure peace and security for all the people and some ask for forgiveness and offer it. 42 Different people in different sequences make such efforts. 43 Consequences that help foster at least some aspects of reconciliation across many levels of all communities also should be developed so that this partition may be a step toward peace, justice and security among the peoples of Palestine and Israel. Steps toward reconciliation will foster mutually beneficial W integration and reduce mutually damaging separation. A Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 77

16 Louis Kriesberg Notes I want to thank the people who read an earlier draft of this paper for their comments and suggestions. Many of their observations were incorporated in the paper. Even when I did not agree with an observation or simply was unable to incorporate it due to space and time constraints, it helped me clarify my thinking and writing. The readers cannot be held responsible for any of the remaining problems here. I thank Donna E. Arzt, Raymond Cohen, Shaw Dallal, Rami G. Khouri, Irving Kriesberg, John S. Murray, Richard D. Schwartz, and David Shomar. 1. This discussion of partition does not mean that it is the only possible way for the peoples of Palestine to share the land. Indeed, there are excellent arguments for living together in the same state, one which is not an ethnic nor a theocratic state, but is democratic and secular. (See Edward W. Said, The Politics of Partition, The Progressive 63 (1999): ) I focus on partition here because it is so likely. The discussion indicates how the partition can be better or worse. 2. This was part of the division of the Arab territories, largely shaped by the British and French governments. Boundaries were drawn and influence allocated for Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine. See Fred J. Kouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1985). 3. Ran Greenstein, Genealogies of Conflict: Class, Identity, and State in Palestine/Israel and South Africa (Hanover: Wesleyan UP, 1995). 4. A Royal Commission, chaired by Earl Peel, was appointed in 1936 to investigate the causes of the disturbances and to make recommendations for removing and preventing their recurrence. 5. Avi Shlaim, The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine, (New York: Columibia UP, 1992). 6. Khouri. 7. Iraq, one of the invading powers in 1948, never has signed an armistice agreement. 8. In October 1956, Israel, in coordination with England and France, attacked Egypt and quickly occupied the Sinai. Under pressure from the United States, Israel was forced to withdraw its military forces from the Sinai and UN peacekeeping forces were placed at Sharm al Sheikh, to ensure shipping could reach Elath, Israel without hindrance. Furthermore, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, calling upon the parties concerned to implement Security Council Resolution Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel s Response (New York: The Free Press, 1977). 10. Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, (New York: Cambridge UP, 1987). 11. Donna E. Arzt, Refugees into Citizens: Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997). 12. Eisenstadt Geoffrey Aronson, Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians & the West Bank (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987). 14. Zelia T. Zureik, The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism. (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). 15. Simcha Bahiri and Samir Huleileh with Daniel Gavron, Peace Pays: Palestinians, Israelis & the Regional Economy (Jerusalem: Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information, 1993). 16. Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg, Getting to the Table in Oslo: Driving Forces and Channel Factors, Negotiation Journal 14 (1998): ; Karin Aggestam, Reframing and Resolving Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations, (Lund: Lund UP, 1999); Herbert C. Kelman, Some Determinants of the Oslo Breakthrough, International Negotiation 2 (1997): The Brown Journal of World Affairs

17 Negotiating the Partition of Palestine and Evolving Israeli-Palestinian Relations 17. Yehuda Lukacs, Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process (Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1997). 18. Louis Kriesberg, International Conflict Resolution: The U.S. USSR and Middle East Cases (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992). 19. Herbert C. Kelman, Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli-Palestinian Breakthrough, Negotiation Journal 11 (1995): Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983). 21. Harkabi. 22. The PLO was financially weakened by the withdrawal of Saudi assistance and the loss of income from the Palestinians who were driven out of Kuwait in James A. Baker with Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace (New York: G. P. Putnams, 1995). 24. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government s Road to the Oslo Accord (Boulder: Westview, 1996). 25. Louis Kriesberg, forthcoming, Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinean Conflict, Journal of Peace Research. 26. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), head of the PLO Israel desk, did not attend the Oslo meetings, but was regarded as its architect by the participants. He signed the agreement in September 1993, at the White House Ceremony. 27. How and when the redeployment of Israeli military forces and the transfer of Israeli control to the Palestine Authority would be implemented was set forth in great detail. Three areas were distinguished. Area A comprised six cities (Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Kalkilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem, with special security arrangements in Hebron). The Palestinian Council has full responsibility for civil matters and for internal security and public order. Area B comprised the towns and villages of the West Bank. The Palestinian Council was granted full civil authority, and Israel would have overall security authority. In area C, comprising the unpopulated areas, areas of strategic importance to Israel, and Jewish settlements, Israel would retain full responsibility for security and public order. 28. For example, see the work of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), P.O. Box 51358, Jerusalem. Also available at Aronson. 30. Arieh O Sullivan, Most Israelis want separation from Palestineans poll, Jerusalem Post Internet Edition This is the recommendation of a working group of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information. See Samir Huleileh and Gil Felier, with Gershon Baskin and Zakaria al Qaq, Guidelines for Final Status Economic Negotiations Between Israel and Palestine (Jerusalem: Israel- Palestine Center fo Research and Information, 1998). 32. Jerome Slater, The Israeli-Palestinean Peace Process, Tikkun 14 (1999) Ian Lustick, Memo to Barak, Tikkun 14 (1999) The political status of the Palestinians in Lebanon seems difficult to normalize and their immigration to Palestine, Israel, and other Mideast and non-mideast countries would need to be part of a comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem. See Arzt Deborah Sontag, The Wheel of Fortune in a Biblical Town, New York Times The Center for Palestine Research and Studies regularly conducts public opinion surveys in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians indicate support for democracy and human rights, as they generally evaluate democracy and human rights positively in Israel but not in Palestinian areas. 37. Nadim N. Rouhama, Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict (New Haven: Yale UP, 1997). 38. Ethan Bronner, Israel s History Textbooks Replace Myths with Facts, New York Times Winter/Spring 2000 Volume VII, Issue 1 79

18 Louis Kriesberg Herbert C. Kelman, Israel in Transition from Zionism to Post-Zionism, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 555 (1998): The large influx of immigrants from Russia contributes greatly to this phenomenon, since intermarriage rates are high and adherence to religious practices low. Debates about the nature of the Law of Return guaranteeing Israeli citizenship to Jews from anywhere are underway. Yuli Tamir, the immigration minister, asks, What will the nature of Israel be? A Religious Jewish state? A state of all its citizens? A secular, democratic, and Jewish state? It is a debate that will engage us for many, many years. See Deborah Sontag, Debate in Israel: Jewish State or Now a Multicultural State? New York Times Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998). 42. Louis Kriesberg, Coexistence and Reconciliation of Communal Conflicts, Eugene Weiner, ed., Handbook on Coexistence (New York: Continuum Press, 1998), Louis Kriesberg, Paths to Varieties of Inter-Communal Reconociliation, Ho-Won Jeong, ed., From Conflict Resolution to Peacebuilding (Fitchburg: Dartmouth, 1999). 80 The Brown Journal of World Affairs