Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks

Transcription

1 International Negotiation 2: , c 1997 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands. Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks DEAN G. PRUITT Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY USA Abstract. Readiness theory, an adaptation of ripeness theory, helps to resolve some problems with the latter set of ideas. Readiness theory holds that all kinds of progress toward conflict resolution result from the existence, on both sides, of: motivational ripeness (motivation to achieve de-escalation) and optimism about finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The motivational ripeness that led to the Oslo agreements resulted from the circumstances that obtained in the Middle East just prior to the talks. But optimism mainly developed during the talks themselves, by a circular process that involved: a steady growth in working trust, a perception that the other side was represented by a valid spokesman, and perceived common ground. Given the high level of motivational ripeness on both sides, good offices by a small country Norway were exactly what was needed. The critical elements of the Norwegian intervention were: assurance of absolute secrecy, provision of facilities that encouraged intimacy between the delegates, and arranging for meetings over a long enough period of time for the components of optimism to emerge and a possible agreement to be developed. Another source of the Oslo breakthrough was the existence of several critical bridge people prior to the emergence of the motivationally ripe moment. Key words: Oslo, Israel, PLO, ripeness, negotiation, mediation, conflict, trust The Oslo agreements of 1993 were a major turning point in Israeli-Palestinian relations in three ways: they produced mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), they led to establishment of the Palestinian Self-Government Authority, and they embodied a commitment to and an agenda for future negotiations. To understand the success of the Oslo talks, it is useful to turn to ripeness theory (Touval and Zartman, 1989; Zartman 1989, 1996, this issue; Zartman and Aurik, 1991). According to Zartman (1996), ripeness usually results from a mutually hurting stalemate in which both parties realize that they have reached the point where they can no longer escalate their way to victory and the sunk costs plus the countering efforts of the other side make for a costly deadlock Dean G. Pruitt is a distinguished professor in the Department of Psychology at State University of New York at Buffalo. He is author or editor of Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981), Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986, 1994), Mediation Research (San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass, 1989), and Negotiation in Social Conflict (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1994). He is a past-president of the International Association for Conflict Management and is a winner of its Life Time Achievement Award as well as the International Society of Political Psychology s Harold D. Lasswell Award for Distinguished Scientific Contribution to Political Psychology.

2 238 DEAN G. PRUITT (p. 276). Such ripeness is augmented if there is also a recent, narrowly avoided, or impending catastrophe that further dramatizes the cost of the conflict. Occasionally, ripeness derives instead from a mutually enticing opportunity, in which the parties perceive an opportunity... to gain a favorable outcome (p. 277). Two additional elements are essential for the development of a ripe moment: a perceived way out (a way of resolving the conflict that does not require sacrificing the parties basic objectives) and valid spokesmen on both sides (people who can commit both sides to a negotiated agreement). A Critique of Ripeness Theory Though powerful and well grounded in case material, ripeness theory has four problems: (1) Ripeness theory only seeks to explain entry into negotiation. Yet it makes sense that conditions which encourage entry into negotiation should, if strong enough, also encourage all of the following: throwing large human resources into the negotiation, taking significant risks (e.g., risks of political exposure) to achieve agreement, making deep concessions, and thus moving toward or (if the conditions are sufficiently favorable) to agreement. (2) Ripeness is viewed as a state rather than a variable; situations are either ripe or unripe. This is fine for an initial, heuristic set of ideas but departs from the usual structure of social science theory. Viewing ripeness as a variable allows us to postulate that as ripeness strengthens, negotiation is more likely to start, more resources will be devoted to it, more risks will be taken, deeper concessions will be made, and agreement is more likely to be reached. Propositions of this sort help understand the breakthrough at Oslo, as will be shown below. (3) The antecedents of ripeness are viewed as joint states that simultaneously affect both parties to the conflict; for example, mutually hurting stalemates and mutually enticing opportunities. A more flexible theory would analyze the motives and perceptions of each party separately. This would make it easier to explain the asymmetric patterns that are often found in reality, in which one party (e.g., the PLO in 1993) is more motivated to settle a conflict than the other (e.g., Israel), or different forces produce ripeness on the two sides (Pruitt and Olczak, 1995: 70). An example of the latter would be the forces that produced the Vietnam Accords of January 27, 1973, which amounted to a hurting stalemate for the United States and an enticing opportunity for North Vietnam. Zartman and Aurik (1991: 164) explain the Vietnam negotiations in this way, but their theory does not explicitly allow this kind of explanation.

3 RIPENESS THEORY AND THE OSLO TALKS 239 (4) Ripeness theory has a list-like quality that does not distinguish between types of antecedents. It would be richer if the antecedents of ripeness were organized on the basis of some broader theory. Readiness Theory: An Adaptation of Ripeness Theory To address these problems and make ripeness theory more useful for analyzing the Oslo case, the present author has developed a variant, which is tentatively called readiness theory. The substantive content of readiness theory is mainly derived from ripeness theory, but its structure comes from a psychological model of strategic choice, the author s goal/expectation theory of cooperation in the prisoner s dilemma (Pruitt, 1981, 1997; Pruitt and Kimmel, 1977). The latter postulates two broad antecedents of cooperative behavior: (a) a goal or motive of achieving mutual cooperation and (b) optimism that the other party will reciprocate one s cooperation. The goal of achieving mutual cooperation is assumed to be the driving force behind cooperative behavior, while optimism about the other party s reciprocity is a gating variable that determines the extent to which this goal will affect behavior. The stronger a party s optimism, the more fully will it act on its goal. Without optimism, no conciliatory action will be taken, however strong the goal of achieving mutual cooperation. Readiness theory asserts, analogously, that a party will move toward resolution of a heavily escalated conflict (entering negotiation, making concessions, etc.) to the extent that it is (a) motivated to achieve de-escalation and (b) optimistic about finding a mutually acceptable agreement that will be binding on the other party. The motivation to achieve de-escalation is the driving force behind conciliatory behavior, but optimism about the outcome of negotiation is also necessary because of the danger that unilateral conciliatory efforts will be exploited by the opponent and viewed as weak or even treasonous by one s supporters. As in goal/expectation theory, optimism is a gating variable that determines the extent to which the motivation to achieve de-escalation will be exhibited in behavior. As stated so far, this is a theory about the behavior of only one partytoa conflict. Full readiness for conflict resolution is attained when the situation is symmetrical, such that both parties are motivated to achieve de-escalation and both are optimistic about reaching agreement. Sometimes both parties are motivated to achieve de-escalation but are uncertain about whether an agreement can be reached. This can be called a motivationally ripe moment. Motivational ripeness sometimes encourages the development of optimism about reaching agreement, because the parties exchange information about their common motivation and eventually become

4 240 DEAN G. PRUITT convinced that an agreement is feasible. But this is not an inevitable development, and periods of motivational ripeness can easily come to naught despite strong desires and even vigorous efforts on both sides. Readiness theory is related to ripeness theory in that the five components of the latter can be sorted into the two bins specified by the former. Thus, a hurting stalemate, a recent or impending catastrophe, and an enticing opportunity all make conflict seem unattractive and, hence, can be viewed as encouraging the motive to achieve de-escalation. Likewise, the perception that the other side has a valid spokesman 1 and the belief that there is a way out can be viewed as fostering optimism about reaching an acceptable agreement. This sorting provides parsimony to the theory and is based on a distinction that is by no means idle, since motives and perceptions (optimism is a perception) have very different sources and functions. Levels of Analysis It may seem obvious or even tautological to trace progress in conflict management to motivation to achieve de-escalation and optimism about doing so. Shouldn t social scientists be dealing with less obvious, environmental variables such as the extent to which there is a balance of power or the success or failure of alliances? One answer to this question recognizes that the psychological variables identified by readiness (and ripeness) theory are at a different level of analysis than environmental variables of this kind. They represent proximal antecedents of strategic decision making whereas environmental variables represent distal antecedents, whose impact is presumed to be mediated by the proximal antecedents. This means that both kinds of variables are needed for a full explanation of historical cases and a full theory of broader phenomena. But why waste time with proximal analysis if it simply explains the impact of more profound environmental forces? The answer to this question is two-fold: (1) Generalizations at the proximal level of analysis are usually more universal and more valid than those at the distal level; consider, for example, the sad state of balance of power theory as a way of explaining contemporary international relations. (2) If we can develop a truly valid set of propositions at the proximal level of analysis, they should serve as a powerful heuristic for discovering useful generalizations at the distal level, just as an understanding of the nature and impact of germs has helped produce many useful insights into how to organize public health.

5 RIPENESS THEORY AND THE OSLO TALKS 241 Antecedents of Motivation to Achieve De-escalation The motive to achieve de-escalation develops because an existing conflict is producing unacceptable costs (including opportunity costs) or risks. However, unacceptable costs and risks can sometimes produce the exact opposite result, a decision to escalate further in an effort to achieve victory over the adversary. For example, in 1968, the Mexico City police, faced with a student rebellion which threatened the forthcoming Olympic games, chose escalation to victory and killed a large number of student demonstrators. There are three conditions under which unacceptable costs or risks are likely to lead to a desire for deescalation rather than further escalation: Victory seems unobtainable. Thus after the TET offensive, further US escalation in Vietnam was ruled out because a sufficient number of Americans concluded that victory was unlikely. This is the kind of thinking that occurs in a hurting stalemate. By contrast, victory was possible for the Mexico City police. Further escalation seems likely to increase the already unacceptable costs and risks. Such was the case for both the Soviet Union and the US during the Cuban Missile crisis. After a period of mutual escalation, both sides concluded that the risks associated with further escalation were far too great. The result was movement toward settlement. Similar risks were apparently not seen by the Mexico City police. The other party s existence or voluntary cooperation is needed to overcome the costs or avert the risks. A well known instance of this is when a common enemy threatens to overwhelm both parties if they do not support each other. Such was the case for Israel and the PLO in the period just preceding the Oslo negotiations. Both sides feared the rise of Hamas, a recently organized Palestinian political group with a philosophy of militant Islam, which threatened the PLO s leadership in Palestine (Corbin, 1994: 36; Makovsky, 1996: 113). The two sides were thus interdependent, and they eventually discovered that this was true. The police were not dependent on student cooperation in Mexico City. Readiness theory draws a firmer distinction between enticing opportunity and perceived way out than does ripeness theory, which often equates the two. An enticing opportunity is a positive outcome of de-escalation, an improvement in the status quo that is only available if the conflict can be ended and hence is capable of encouraging a motive to de-escalate. When there is an enticing opportunity, conflict carries opportunity costs (rather than real costs, as in the case of a hurting stalemate), which motivate a desire to end it. An example is the promise of US aid that encouraged negotiation and signing of the mutual recognition treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1978.

6 242 DEAN G. PRUITT By contrast, a perceived way out is a possible agreement and hence a means of de-escalating the conflict. The psychological perspective employed here may help solve a puzzle posed by Zartman (1996: 277), why conflict resolution is so seldom motivated by mutually enticing opportunities. Restated in psychological terms, the question is why the motivation to achieve de-escalation is so seldom due to a perceived opportunity to improve one s situation. There are three problems with perceived opportunities as a source of motivation. One is that they involve the expectation of gain, which has been shown to be less motivating than the expectation of loss (Bazerman et al., 1985). The second is that they are usually more abstract and less absorbing than costs and failures like those often associated with ongoing conflict. The third is that they seldom impose the kind of time pressure that is produced by a deteriorating economic, political, or military situation. One can wait until next year to make the desert green but not to stem the rise of Hamas. Antecedents of Optimism about Finding a Mutually Acceptable Agreement The most important source of optimism about finding a mutually acceptable agreement is working trust, a belief that the other party is motivated to achieve de-escalation and hence ready to make concessions in the interest of settlement. 2 Working trust is a narrowly defined concept. It does not mean a belief the other side has one s interests at heart but only that there seems to be motivational ripeness on the other side. Even when both sides are strongly motivated to escape a conflict, working trust often does not develop. Each side sadly and erroneously believes that it is the only one with a genuine interest in settlement, and the moment of ripeness is squandered (Pruitt and Olczak, 1995: 72). This misunderstanding is often due to the enemy image, the strong stereotypes about the other party s menacing and evil nature that so often develop in intractable conflicts (see Rubin et al., 1994: 85). Another source of optimism is perceived common ground, the belief on both sides that a substantive formula is available if not immediately apparent that satisfies both parties minimal aspirations (see Rubin et al., 1994: 38 40). This is equivalent to ripeness theory s perceived way out. A third source of optimism is having a perceived valid spokesman, a belief on both sides that they are dealing with people who can commit the other side. This concept is adapted from ripeness theory.

7 The Oslo Negotiations RIPENESS THEORY AND THE OSLO TALKS 243 To apply readiness theory to the Oslo case, we must explore the sources of motivational ripeness and optimism and try to explain how these sources came into being. Sources of Motivational Ripeness Motivational ripeness the desire to end the conflict had been growing on both sides in the period just before the negotiations. Both sides were experiencing a hurting stalemate. The PLO had been politically and economically weakened by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and by Arab retaliation for the PLO s support of Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, curtailing its capacity to continue an effective campaign against Israel. And the costs experienced in containing the intifada had caused many Israelis, including the leaders of the new Labor government, to question the wisdom of trying to maintain full control over the West Bank and Gaza (Lundberg, 1996: 4; Makovsky, 1996: 95). Both sides were also aware of an impending catastrophe in the rise of militant Islam. The growing Hamas movement threatened to unseat the PLO as leader of the Palestinians, an obvious source of concern for PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat (Corbin, 1994: 36). Israel s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin also feared this development (Makovsky, 1996: 113), and foresaw the possibility that a fundamentalist Palestinian leadership would make common cause against Israel with militant Iran or a revitalized Iraq, producing a larger military threat to Israel than currently existed (Makovsky, 1996: ; Rabin, 1992). These concerns made the two sides interdependent. Arafat became dependent on Israel to recognize him as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and to help him fulfill his goals of liberating Palestine; and Rabin needed a stable, friendly government on the West Bank which only Arafat could provide. (It took Rabin a while to learn that Arafat was the only possible leader of such a government.) Arafat s motivation to achieve de-escalation was clearly stronger than Rabin s, since his political life was at stake. This probably accounts for his putting more resources into the initial negotiation, sending his trusted lieutenant, Abu Ala, in contrast to a couple of lowly Israeli professors. Sources of Optimism PLO optimism about reaching a mutually acceptable agreement was somewhat augmented by the 1992 election of the dovish Labor government in Israel (Corbin, 1994: 26), and Israeli optimism was strengthened by the PLO s financial and political weakness (Bruck, 1996: 72; Peres, 1995: 284). But the main

8 244 DEAN G. PRUITT growth in optimism took place over the course of the Oslo meetings, by a circular incremental process. As optimism grew, more human resources were devoted to the meetings and more concessions were made, which produced even greater optimism. Part of this rise in optimism involved Israel s growing conviction that it was dealing with a valid spokesman of the Palestinians in the person of Abu Ala. In the early months of his government, Rabin had nurtured the hope that he could strike a deal with non-plo Palestinian leaders. But he abandoned this illusion in May 1993 because of lack of progress in the Washington talks with these leaders and became convinced that he would have to negotiate with the PLO (Makovsky, 1996: 39; Peres, 1995: 285). The Oslo meetings offered a possible location for this negotiation, but it was not at first clear whether Abu Ala had sufficient access to and influence over Arafat to negotiate a binding agreement. Hence, Abu Ala was tested in April to see whether he could arrange for the Palestinian delegation to stop boycotting the Washington talks and for the removal of one member of that delegation, and he passed these tests (Peres, 1995: 284). 3 Rabin, finally convinced that he was dealing with a valid spokesman for the Palestinians, then sent trusted government officials to Oslo and began monitoring the discussions. The entry of valid Israeli spokesmen into the talks encouraged greater optimism on the part of the PLO, producing a true negotiation that paved the way to agreement. Clearly, a key to this development was Arafat s early decision to send a high level delegate to the talks. Had he sent a person below Abu Ala s rank, these talks might well have ended in meaningless resolutions, as had so many prior informal meetings. This decision violated a common practice in negotiation to provide a delegation of comparable status to that provided by the other side. Yet it was surely the right move given Rabin s strong desire for agreement, because Israel soon followed suit and increased its level of representation. Working trust, another component of optimism, also developed incrementally during the Oslo discussions. At first, a belief in the potential for agreement was mainly resident in the heads of the Norwegians who had started the process. But Israel began to see the seriousness of Arafat s purpose as it became clear that Abu Ala was a valid spokesman and as Abu Ala made concession after concession (Makovsky, 1996: 65). Later the high level of Israeli representation and Rabin s clear interest in the talks made the same point for the Palestinians (Corbin, 1994: 104; Makovsky, 1996: 46). As each side became increasingly confident of the other s seriousness of purpose, it threw more human resources into the talks and made more concessions, thus increasing the other s working trust. The result was a benevolent circle of progressive confidence building.

9 RIPENESS THEORY AND THE OSLO TALKS 245 The atmosphere in the meetings also contributed to the development of working trust. The meetings were informal and usually quite friendly, allowing formation of personal ties between the delegates (Bruck, 1996: 70 72; Corbin, 1994: 60, 87). Such ties foster a view of the other side as composed of normal human beings rather than demons, and an understanding of and empathy for the other side s concerns. Perceived common ground, the third component of optimism, also developed over the course of the talks through a circular incremental process. As working trust grew and more and more concessions were made, it became increasingly clear that a substantive agreement was possible that there was a viable way out. We must be careful not to overstate the steadiness of the growth of optimism during these meetings. A good deal of hard bargaining took place and there were two major setbacks that produced considerable, temporary concern about the future of the talks. But the overall pattern involved a steady growth of optimism, with the behavior produced by each party s optimism encouraging optimism on the other side. Norwegian Good Offices Producing the conditions that allowed optimism to grow during the negotiations was the genius of the Norwegian intervention. This intervention was mainly a matter of good offices rather than mediation. The Norwegians sponsored and paid for 8 months of talks but always stayed outside the negotiation room providing facilities to the delegates (Corbin, 1994: 48; Makovsky, 1996: 22). These facilities included common meals and recreation that increased the intimacy level between the delegates (Corbin, 1994: 60, 87, 111; Makovsky, 1996: 22). The Norwegians also made the talks totally secret from the outside world, with results that will be explored below. In addition, they passed messages between the negotiators when the talks were not in session (Corbin, 1994: 97; Makovsky, 1996: 22) and occasionally helped to smooth over differences between the parties and keep the negotiation going (Corbin, 1994: 133, 152). The main effect of these interventions was to encourage free and full discussions between the delegates over an extended period of time. This suggests two related generalizations. One is that when there is strong motivation to achieve de-escalation on both sides, well orchestrated good offices will tend to be sufficient for producing an agreement. This is a variant on the well documented proposition that when the circumstances are more propitious for reaching agreement, less forceful third party intervention is needed (Pruitt, 1997). The other is that when there is strong motivation to de-escalate on both sides, economically and militarily weak third parties can be effective. Norway is a small country with limited economic and military

10 246 DEAN G. PRUITT capability, but it was quite successful in this situation. Had the motivation to de-escalate been weaker, a stronger third party would have been needed to provide incentives to encourage this motivation. Privacy and Secrecy The fact that the Oslo meetings were private and secret contributed greatly to the development of working trust and the emergence of a viable agreement. Private negotiations encourage informal interpersonal processes and tend to eliminate grandstanding, which often locks participants into premature commitments. Secrecy contributes to privacy by eliminating the prying eyes of reporters and opposition leaders. Secrecy is especially important in situations where one or both parties are heavily factionalized, with hawks and doves at each other s throats. When super-hawks abound, as they did in Israel and the Arab world in 1993, even the act of meeting a representative of the other side may be seen as treasonous back home because it seems to accord legitimacy to the enemy. Hence, negotiation can only take place in secret. Heavy factionalization of this kind often develops at a time when severe conflicts have become counterproductive. The hawks are looking to the past and the doves to the future. Another argument for secrecy is that well publicized negotiations tend to become hostage to the very conflict they are trying to solve. A hostile move by either side is likely to cause the other to break off public negotiations as a protest that will be seen at home and abroad. But secret negotiations tend to be unperturbed by such events. A case in point is the Palestinian reaction to the Israeli deportation of 415 Hamas activists in December The Palestinian delegates to the public Washington talks began a boycott that lasted until April 1993 (Abbas, 1996: 95 97; Makovsky, 1996: 237), but the secret Oslo talks began and continued during this period without incident. Secrecy sometimes has a downside in negotiation, making it harder to sell an agreement back home once it has been reached. This appears to have happened in Israel after the signing of the Oslo Accords, when a great deal of public opposition developed; and the Palestinian negotiators were criticized for not having consulted experts on various issues (Aggestam, 1996: 27). As Aggestam (1966: 8 13) points out, secret international negotiations, while often essential for concluding an agreement, run counter to the ideology of democracy, which is becoming stronger in the modern world.

11 The Availability of Bridge People RIPENESS THEORY AND THE OSLO TALKS 247 Though motivational ripeness was followed by optimism about reaching agreement, which led to successful negotiation at Oslo, this is not an inevitable progression. Motivationally ripe moments are often squandered. Under what conditions do they produce a more hopeful outcome? One possible answer to this question gives importance to the availability of bridge people on both sides who have sufficient contact with and understanding of each other to spring into action when a period of motivational ripeness arrives. These people s actions then encourage the incremental process that leads to working trust. They are a resource that can be accessed when the (motivationally) ripe moment arrives (Pruitt and Olczak, 1995: 84). This point is richly illustrated by the success of the Oslo process. Yair Hirschfeld, the initial Israeli representative to the negotiations, was part of a peace movement and had been meeting with prominent Palestinians for several years before the talks (Lundberg, 1996: 6). The case also suggests the importance of prior contact between these citizens and members of their own government. Hirschfeld was quite close to Yossi Beilin, who became Deputy Foreign Minister in Israel s Labor government and was also a bridge person (Lundberg, 1996: 6). Having both sets of contacts made him a key bridge person when the motivationally ripe moment arrived. Terje Larsen, the Norwegian scholar who got the negotiations going, was another bridge person, who knew prominent Israelis and Palestinians because of his research in Gaza. He was also close to the Norwegian foreign ministry because his wife was an officer in that ministry (Corbin, 1994: 20). Hence when the moment of ripeness arrived, he was able to provide the good offices that allowed a healthy negotiation to take place. The point is not that the participation of Hirschfeld, Beilin, or Larsen was essential for success in this case. Given the degree of motivational ripeness in 1993, secret meetings might well have been organized and held by another cast of characters. But it seems likely that these characters would also have been bridge people who had previously established good relations with both sides. Had bridge people not existed, the motivationally ripe moment might well have been squandered. Conclusions A number of generalizations and informed speculations are suggested by the Oslo case just presented. None of these is proven by the case. Rather, they emerged as possible conclusions from an effort to explain the case.

12 248 DEAN G. PRUITT Most of the components of ripeness specified by Zartman (1996) hurting stalemate, impending catastrophe, enticing opportunity, valid spokesman, and perceived way out are powerful tools for the analysis of this case. However, the theory is more flexible if these components are viewed as perceptions by each party separately rather than as joint perceptions, though overall ripeness must be a joint phenomenon. It is useful to separate these components of ripeness into two groups: those that encourage the motive to achieve de-escalation, which we have called motivational ripeness, and those that encourage optimism about reaching an acceptable and binding agreement. This is because these two components are produced by different sorts of forces and have different functions. Optimism is a gating variable, in the sense that it allows the motive to achieve deescalation to be expressed in behavior. In the Oslo case, motivational ripeness was produced by circumstances that obtained before the beginning of the Oslo negotiations, while optimism about reaching agreement was largely produced by the processes that transpired in the Oslo discussions. Impending catastrophes involving a common enemy, such as Hamas, make the parties dependent on each other in a way that fosters the peace process whether or not a hurting stalemate exists. Because both sides worried about Hamas, Israel became dependent on the survival and success of the PLO, and the PLO became dependent on Israel s willingness to give it legitimacy and political authority. Working trust a conviction on both sides that the other side is serious about the negotiations and ready to make concessions in the interest of settlement is a major source of optimism and is essential for moving toward agreement. Optimism about reaching agreement can develop incrementally, by a circular process, over a period of time. Valid spokesmen are gradually identified, working trust becomes progressively stronger, and a substantive way out eventually becomes apparent. This progression is only likely to occur when there is motivational ripeness, but motivational ripeness does not guarantee its occurrence. Having valid spokesmen on both sides is critical to successful conflict resolution. But it is equally important that valid spokesmen be recognized as such by both sides. Ambiguity about the identity of valid spokesmen is especially common when one or both parties are loosely organized ethnic groups like the Palestinians, an increasingly common phenomenon in the world today.

13 RIPENESS THEORY AND THE OSLO TALKS 249 The stronger the motivation to achieve de-escalation on both sides, the more effective are small countries and the more useful is a good offices approach to third party intervention. When both sides are highly motivated to de-escalate, it is a good idea to send a high status spokesman (as did Arafat) regardless of the level of representation on the other side. This is a sign of seriousness of purpose, which is likely to evoke working trust in the other side and thus lead the other side to increase its level of representation. Secret negotiation is particularly important for the resolution of longstanding, bitter conflicts that leave the parties highly antagonistic toward each other. This is because highly polarized hawks on one or both sides are likely to block progress if they know what is going on. Once an agreement has been reached in secret, it becomes a fait accompli that can often be sold to the public as a balanced package involving substantial concessions by the other side. Moments of motivational ripeness are most likely to produce agreement if there have been extensive contacts between people on both sides in a prior time period. Such contacts produce a corps of knowledgeable bridge people on both sides who can swing into action once the period of ripeness arrives and start an incremental process of confidence building. Prior contacts with potential third parties can also be useful. Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank Michele Gelfand, Saadia Touval, and I. William Zartman for their critiques and useful ideas. Notes 1. Zartman s (1996: 276) ripeness theory talks about the existence of valid spokesmen on both sides rather than a perception that one is dealing with a valid spokesman. The existence of valid spokesmen is necessary for an agreement to actually bind both sides, but it is the perception on both sides that the other side is represented by a valid spokesman that encourages movement toward such an agreement. 2. An extensive discussion of the sources of working trust will be found in Pruitt and Olczak (1995: ) and Rubin et al. (1994: 41). The concept was called trust in those publications but has been relabeled working trust here to differentiate it from other kinds of trust. The term working trust originates with Kelman (this issue). 3. The first of these tests was also described by Avi Gil, an Israeli official who monitored the Oslo negotiations, in an interview conducted by Michael Watkins (Watkins and Lundberg, 1996).

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