TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE BY THE GOVERNMENT

Transcription

1 FILE:C:\WINDOWS\DESKTOP\MYBRIE~1\SLOBOGIN.WP 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM Dec TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE BY THE GOVERNMENT Christopher Slobogin * Many important aspects of our lives are inscribed in written and digitized records, housed in private businesses, government agencies and other institutions. These records include all sorts of information about us: reports on our medical status and financial condition; data about our purchases, rentals, real estate holdings, licenses, and memberships; logs listing the destination of our s and our Internet wanderings; and countless other bits of individual descriptors, ranging from salary levels to college grades to driver's license numbers. Whether the information memorializes our own version of personal activities or is created by the record-holder itself, there is often an explicit or implicit understanding that the information will be used or viewed by a limited number of people for circumscribed purposes. In other words, we consider the contents of many of these records private, vis-a-vis most of the world. Thus, it may be surprising that law enforcement officials can, perfectly legally, gain access to all of this information much more easily than they can search our houses or even our cars. While the latter types of actions require probable cause, government can obtain many of the records just described simply by asking (or paying) for them. 1 And, at most, all the S te p h e n C. O 'C o n n e ll P r o fe s s o r o f L a w, U n iv e r s ity o f F lo r id a F r e d r ic G. L e v in C o lle g e o f L a w. F o r th e ir c o m m e n ts o n th is p a p e r, I w o u ld lik e to th a n k J e r o ld Is r a e l, S c o tt S u n d b y, P e te r S w ir e, G e o r g e T h o m a s, a n d p a r tic ip a n ts in w o r k s h o p s o r sym p o s ia a t th e fo llo w in g s c h o o ls : M is s is s ip p i, D e P a u l, F lo r id a S ta te, O h io S ta te, a n d H a s tin g s. 1 S e e g e n e r a lly D a n ie l J. S o lo v e, A c c e s s a n d A g g r e g a tio n : P u b lic R e c o r d s, P riv a c y a n d th e C o n s titu tio n, 8 6 M. L. R E V ( ). 139

2 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 government needs to show in order get any of these records is that they are Arelevant@ to a government investigationba much lower, and much more diffuse, level of justification than probable cause. 2 This state of affairs might make sense when the records sought are truly public in nature. It might also be justifiable when the records involve an entity such as a corporation, professional service provider, or government department and are sought in an effort to investigate the entity and its members. But today, facilitated by the computerization of information and communication, government routinely obtains personal medical, financial and records, in connection with investigations that have nothing to do with business or governmental corruption. 3 That practice is much more questionable. This article explores the scope and regulation of what I will call Atransaction surveillance@ by the government. That term is meant to distinguish the subject of this article from both Aphysical surveillance@ and Acommunications surveillance.@ Physical surveillance is real-time observation of physical activities, using either the naked eye or enhancement devices such as binoculars or video cameras. Communications surveillance is real-time interception of the content of communications, relying on wiretapping, bugging, hacking, and various other methods of intercepting oral statements and wire and electronic transmissions. Transaction surveillance, in contrast, involves accessing already-existing records, either physically or through computer databanks. It also encompasses accessing, in real-time or otherwise, the identifying signals of a transaction (such as the address of an recipient). 4 2 S e e x t a c c o m p a n g n o s S e e S o v e, s u p r a n o 1. 4 T h a r d n o f s u r v e n c e w a s d e v e p e d b y e A m e r a n B a r A s s o c n T a s k F o r c e o n L a w E n r c e m e n t a n d T e c h n o g y a n d e x p a d r e r C h p h e r S b o g, T e c h n o g a - A s s d P h y s a l S u n c e : T h e A m e r a n B a r A s s o c n T e n e D r a S n d a r d s, 1 0 H A R V. J. L. & T E C H , in fra te yin te lo te is trip tite ivis io illa lo th ic ia tio 's fo lo is lic te fu th in ris to lo in lo ic lly is te ic rveilla ic ia tio 's ta tiv ft ta

3 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 141 Like physical and communications surveillance, transaction surveillance is a potent way of discovering and making inferences about a person's activities, character and identity. Yet, despite a bewildering array of statutorily created authorization requirements, transaction surveillance by the government is subject to far less regulation than either physical surveillance of activities inside the home or communications surveillance. 5 My principal argument is that transaction surveillance should be subject to much more legal monitoring than it is. To get to that conclusion, this article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains why government, and in particular law enforcement, finds transaction surveillance so attractive, and why it is so easy to carry out in this digital age. Part II describes the current law regulating transaction surveillance. Not only is this regulation minimal, it is confusing and contradictory; beyond the traditional subpoena, challengeable by the target of the investigation, current law recognizes a number of subpoena mutations that seem to have little rhyme or reason. If it contributes nothing else, this article should at least clarify the nature of today's regulatory framework. Part III criticizes this framework and outlines a more promising approach. The proposed reform recognizes, as does the current regime, that different sorts of records merit different levels of protection. But, in contrast to current law, the proposal would significantly increase the degree of protection in a number of situations, to the probable cause level for personal records held by private and public entities and to the ( ). 5 A s d is c u s s e d in fra te x t a c c o m p a n yin g n o te s , tra n s a c tio n s u r v e illa n c e n e v e r r e q u ir e s p r o b a b le c a u s e. In c o n tra s t, c o m m u n ic a tio n s s u r v e illa n c e r e q u ir e s a w a r r a n t,, w h ic h m a y b e is s u e d o n ly if th e r e is p r o b a b le c a u s e a n d o th e r m e th o d s o f o b ta in in g th e in fo r m a tio n h a v e fa ile d. S e e 1 8 U.S.C. ' (3 ). P h ysic a l s u r v e illa n c e o f th e h o m e r e q u ir e s a w a r r a n t u n le s s it c a n ta k e p la c e w ith th e n a k e d e ye fr o m a la w fu l v a n ta g e p o in t u s in g te c h n o lo g y th a t o n ly re p lic a te s s u c h n a k e d e ye v ie w in g o r it in v o lv e s te c h n o lo g y th a t is in g e n e r a l p u b lic u s e. K yllo v. U n ite d S ta te s, U. S. 2 7, ( ).

4 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 reasonable suspicion level for personal records readily available to the public. Part IV concludes by examining alternatives to the proposal (and to the current regime). It rejects both an approach that requires probable cause for all records searches and, at the other extreme, an approach that would allow suspicionless records searches on condition that anything discovered is subject to strict limitations on disclosure. It also criticizes an approach that relies on the legislature, rather than the courts and the Fourth Amendment, to establish fundamental regulatory requirements. Not all recorded information warrants the maximum refuge from government intrusion. But much of it deserves much more protection than it receives today. I. THE CURRENT REACH OF TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE Transaction surveillance comes in many forms. This article divides it into two types: target-based and event-based. Using these categorizations, the following discussion relies on hypotheticals to flesh out the various ways transaction surveillance can assist law enforcement in investigating street crime.

5 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 143 A. Target-Based Transaction Surveillance Assume that I'm a federal agent, and that I'm suspicious of you for some vague reasonbperhaps you often pay for your airplane tickets with cash, 6 or you have been observed with accessories you shouldn't be able to afford, 7 or you are a young, Arab male who goes to the local mosque on a daily basis. 8 Under these types of circumstances, I clearly do not have sufficient suspicion for an arrest. 9 On the other hand, I feel I would be neglecting my obligation as a law enforcement official if I did not investigate you a bit further. So how do I find out more about you? I could confront you directly, either on the street or through a grand jury. 10 But neither approach is likely to net much information, and both will tip you off that I'm checking you out. Ditto with respect to going to your acquaintances and neighbors; they will probably not be complely forthcoming and they might let you know I've been nosing around. I could try the undercover agent approachbthere might be rich payoffs if I or one of my informants can weasel into your good graces. But success at that endeavor is rare, and spending so much effort 6 C f. F lo r id a v. R o ye r, U.S , n.2 ( ) (n o tin g th a t p a y in g fo r a n a irlin e tic k e t w ith c a s h is o fte n a n e le m e n t o f d r u g c o u r ie r p r o file s u s e d b y th e D r u g E n fo r c e m e n t A d m in is tra tio n ). 7 C f. S ta te v. C o o k s o n, S.W.2 d 6 8 3, (M o ) (in fo r m a n t, w h o a l- le g e d th a t d e fe n d a n ts h a d r o b b e d a ta v e r n, re p o r te d th a t At h e y h a d a la r g e s u m o f m o n e y a n d w e r e s p e n d in g fr e e ly@). 8 C f. M ic h a e l J. W h id d e n, U n e q u a l J u s tic e : A r a b s in A m e r ic a a n d U n ite d S ta te s A n tite r r o r is m L e g is la tio n, 6 9 F O R D H A M L. R E V , ( ) (rec o u n t in g F B I s u r v e illa n c e o f a B r o o k lyn m o s q u e ). 9 A n a r r e s t o r p r o lo n g e d q u e s tio n in g in th e s ta tio n h o u s e r e q u ir e s p r o b a b le c a u s e. C H A R L E S H. W H IT E B R E A D & C H R IS T O P H E R S L O B O G IN, C R IM IN A L P R O C E D U R E : A N A N A L Y S IS O F C A S E S A N D C O N C E P T S (4 th e d ). 1 0 N o te fu r th e r th a t e v e n q u e s tio n in g in th e fie ld th a t la s ts lo n g e r th a n a fe w m in u te s r e q u ir e s r e a s o n a b le s u s p ic io n, w h ic h e x is ts o n ly if th e r e a r e s p e c ific a n d a r tic u la b le fa c ts th a t th e p e r s o n is o r h a s b e e n e n g a g in g in c r im in a l a c tivity. Id.

6 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 on someone about whom I'm merely suspicious would usually be a waste of time. I could also surreptitiously follow you around for awhile, but that tactic is unlikely to produce much, especially if you make most of your contacts through technological meansbphones, brather than physical travel. Of course, I could tap your phone and intercept your s, but that requires a warrant based on probable cause, which I do not have. Thankfully there are other, much more efficient ways I can covertly acquire information about you, many of which I can carry out without leaving my desk and most of which, as the next section describes, require no or little legal authorization. The easiest way to get useful data is to contact one of the many companies, usually called commercial data brokers (CDBs), that use computers and the Internet to dig up Adirt@ from public and not-so public records. 11 One such company is LexisNexis, the legal research bohemoth, which operates Accurint, a program that allows Aorganizations to quickly and easily extract valuable knowledge from... tens of billions of data records on individuals and businesses,@ armed with no more than a name, address, phone number, or social security number. 12 Through this process, I can obtain information about a wide array of your transactions, including: bankruptcies and corporate filings, criminal convictions and criminal and civil court data (including marriage and divorce information), driver's licenses and motor vehicle information, firearms, hunting, fishing and professional licenses and permits, Internet domain names, property deeds and assessments, and 1 1 c e w e b s r o n e o f e s e c o m p a n s c a n b e u n d a t d o m T h e s e r v e s a r e o f u n e v e n q u a S e e P r e s n G r a, D l G u m s h o e s, a v a b a t h / w w w c m a g o m / a r 2 / s p o v. 1 3, ) e c o u n g e f r u s e v a r u s s e r v e s, c d g d d w m e d r e s u F o r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s, h o w e v e r, e p o t a t e p o n l r n s a c n s u r v e n c e e n o r m o u s. 1 2 S e e A c c u r t W e b s, a v a b a t w w w c c u r o m / a o u s t m l s t a c c e s s e d o n S e p 1 3, L e x N e x b o u g h t A c c u r t m S e t In fa t, th ite fo th ie fo Ad ig ic lity. to lia ig ita ila le ttp :/.p.c tic le,4,2,0.a (N (r tin fo ts to io ic in lu in ig irt, ith ix lts ). th in is th th ir te tia fo tra tio illa is in ite ila le.a in t.c tu.h (la t. ). is is in fro is In in

7 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 145 voter registration information. 13 For some states, the information held in Apublic by government bureaucracies and available via computer is immensely broader: some types of medical records, Social Security numbers, crime victim's names, credit card and account numbers, psychiatric evaluation reports, tax returns, payroll information, and family profiles. 14 For a time, all of this was made even more easily accessible to state law enforcement officials through MATRIX (Multi-State Anti-Terrorist Information Exchange), a multistate consortium that allowed police to use Accurint for investigative purposes until its federal funding was discontinued in The FBI and other federal agencies rely on equally powerful commercial data brokers, with perhaps the most popular being Choicepoint. 16 Under its contract with the federal government, Choicepoint can provide me, as a federal agent, with Acredit headers@ (information at the top of a credit report which includes name, address, previous address, phone number, social security number and employer); pre-employment screening information (including financial reports, education verification, reference verification, felony check, motor vehicle record and professional credential verification); Aasset location services@; information about neighbors and family members; licenses (driver's, pilot's and professional); business information compiled by state bureaucracies; and Aderogatory informa R o b e E S m, H e r e W h y P e o p A r e M a d, 2 9 P R A C Y J. 7, 7 a n ) g S p h e n G e s, a d m r o f e J u d l R e c o r d s C e n r R h o d e n d a v a b a t h / w w w r u r n a e. 1 5 S e e F. D e p L a w E n r c e m e n M A T R P t P r o c t C o n c d e s p 1 4, a v a b a t h / w w w s r e s s _ r e a s e s / _ m a _ p r o c t o g, h o w e v e r, a t F r a a n d s e v e r a l o e r s s m a y c o n u e n d g e p r o g r a m 1 6 S e e C h J a y H o o a g, B B r o e r L H e e r s : H o w C h o e P o t a n d O e r C o m m e r c l D a B r o k e r s C o c t a n d P a c k a g e Y o u r D a r L a w E n r c e m e n t, 2 9 N. J. I N T ' L & C O M M. R E 5 9 5, e s c r g e F B e c r e c s s d c o n c w C h o e p o Id rt llis ith 's le IV (J (c itin te rim in is tra to th ic ia te in Is la ), ila le ttp :/.p ivacyjo l.n t/ la 't fo t, IX ilo je lu (A ril ), ila le ttp :/.fd le.s ta te.fl.u.p le trix je (n tin th lo id th ta te tin fu in th ). ris fn le ig th 's ittle lp ic in th ia ta lle ta fo fo.c G. (d ib in th I's As t, la ifie tra t@ ith ic in t).

8 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 tion@ such as arrests, liens, judgments and bankruptcies. 17 If you think I wouldn't bother requesting such a check, think again; between 1999 and 2001, Choicepoint and similar services ran between 14,000 and 40,000 searches per month for the United States Marshall's Service alone. 18 The one drawback to the type of information I get from CDBs is that it is pretty general. I may want to know more about what you do on a daily basis. Fortunately, there are a number of services that can help me out. For instance, advances in data warehousing and data exchange technology in the financial sector allow very easy access to a virtual cornucopia of transaction-related information that can reveal, among other things, Awhat products or services you buy; what charities, political causes, or religious organizations you contribute to;... where, with whom, and when you travel; how you spend your leisure time;... whether you have unusual or dangerous hobbies; and even whether you participate in certain felonious activities.@ 19 If I jump through some pro forma legal hoops (detailed in Part II), I can also get records of all the phone numbers you dial and receive calls from, 20 and from your Internet Service Provider (ISP) I can get every website address you have visited (so-called Aclickstream data@) and 1 7 Id. a t N o te a ls o th a t o n c e a s o c ia l s e c u r ity n u m b e r a n d o th - e r id e n tifyin g in f o r m a tio n is o b ta in e d, o th e r p e r s o n a l in fo r m a tio n m ig h t b e c o m e m u c h m o r e e a s ily a c c e s s ib le. S e e L y n n M. L o P u c k i, H u m a n Id e n tific a tio n T h e o r y a n d th e Id e n tity T h e ft P r o b le m, 8 0 T E X. L. R E V. 8 9, ( ) (p o in tin g o u t th a t s c h o o ls, fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s a n d o th e r e n titie s m a k e p e r s o n a l in fo r m a tio n a c c e s s ib le b y a n y o n e w ith th e r ig h t S o c ia l S e c u rity n u m b e r, a d d r e s s, a n d m o th e r 's m a id e n n a m e ). 1 8 Id. a t 4-6. In , th e Im m ig r a tio n a n d N a tu r a lizatio n S e rvic e c o n d u c te d a p p r o x i m a te ly 2 3,0 0 0 s u c h s e a r c h e s a m o n th. Id. a t J a n e t D e a n G e rtz, T h e P u rlo in e d P e r s o n a lity: C o n s u m e r P r o filin g in F in a n c ia l S e rvic e s, 3 9 S A N D IE G O L. R E V , , ( ). 2 0 T h e E le c tro n ic C o m m u n ic a tio n s P rivacy A c t, 1 8 U.S.C. ' a llo w s p r o s e c u to r s to o b ta in th is in fo r m a tio n b y certifyin g to a c o u r t th a t it is Ar e le v a n t@ to a n o n g o in g in v e s tig a tio n. S e e in fra te x t a c c o m p a n yin g n o te s

9 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 147 every address you have contacted. 21 The latter information can be particularly revealing to the extent you transact your business over the Internet. Recently some ISPs, like America OnLine, have stopped maintaining clickstream data, precisely so they won't have to answer such law enforcement requests. 22 No worries. All I have to do is invest in something called Asnoopware.@ Bearing names like BackOrifice, Spyagent, and WinWhatWhere, 23 snoopware is to be distinguished from adware and spyware. The latter software tells the buyer of the program how to contact people who visit the buyer's website. Snoopware, in contrast, allows its buyer to track the target well beyond a single website; it accumulates the addresses of all the Internet locations the target visits, as well as the recipients of the target's s. The FBI has developed a similar program, once dubbed Carnivore, now called DCS-1000, that filters all s that pass through a particular server. 24 Although some transaction snoopware 2 1 T h e E le c tro n ic C o m m u n ic a tio n s P rivacy A c t a t m o s t req u ir e s a s h o w in g o f r e le v a n c e fo r th is in fo r m a tio n. S e e 1 8 U.S.C. ' ; in fra n o te s a n d a c c o m p a n yin g te x t; s e e a ls o G a vin S k o k, E s ta b lis h in g a L e g itim a te E x p e c ta tio n o f P rivacy in C lic k s tre a m D a ta, 6 M IC H. J. T E L E C O M M. & T E C H. L. R E V. 6 1, ( ) (d e ta ilin g th e typ e o f in fo r m a tio n g o v e r n m e n t c a n o b ta in th r o u g h c lic k s tre a m d a ta ). 2 2 C o n v e r s a tio n w ith P e te r S w ir e, P r o fe s s o r, O h io S ta te S c h o o l o f L a w, S e p te m b e r 2 0, T h e E le c tro n ic F r o n tie r F o u n d a tio n s h a s r e c o m m e n d e d th a t IS P s o n ly k e e p p e r s o n a lly id e n tifia b le c o m m u n ic a tio n s lo g s fo r As o lo n g a s it is o p e r a - tio n a lly n e c e s s a r y, a n d in n o e v e n t fo r m o r e th a n a fe w w e e k s.@ E le c tro n ic F r o n tie r F o u n d a tio n, B e s t D a ta P r a c tic e s fo r O n lin e S e rvic e P rovid e r s, fr o m th e E le c tro n ic F r o n tie r F o u n d a tio n a t h ttp :/ / w w w.e ff.o r g / o s p / _ O S P B e s tp r a c tic e s. p d f2 (J u n e 2 9, ). 2 3 S e e C a d e M e tz, S p yw a r e : It's L u r k in g o n Y o u r M a c h in e, P C M A G., A p r. 2 2, , a t 8 5, J e r e m y C. S m ith, T h e U S A P A T R IO T A c t: V io la tin g R e a s o n a b le E x p e c ta tio n s o f P rivacy P r o te c t e d b y th e F o u r th A m e n d m e n t W ith o u t A d v a n c in g N a - tio n a l S e c u rity, 8 2 N.C. L. R E V , ( ). R e c e n tly, th e F B I a n n o u n c e d th a t it w o u ld n o lo n g e r u s e D C S , b u t in s te a d r e ly o n Au n s p e c ifie d c o m m e r c ia l s o ftw a r e to e a v e s d r o p o n c o m p u te r tra ffic.@ F B I C u ts C a r n iv o r e In te r n e t P r o b e, a t h ttp :/ / w w w.c n n.c o m / / T E C H / in te r n e t/ 0 1 / 1 8 / fb i.c a r n iv o r e.a p / in d e x.h tm l (o n file w ith th e M is s is s ip p i L a w J o u r n a l).

10 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 requires access to the server or computer to install, other types, called Trojan Horses, can electronically worm their way onto the system disguised as something useful. 25 In short, even if you stay at home and conduct all your business and social life via phone, and surfing the `Net, I can construct what one commentator has called Aa complete mosaic@ of your characteristics. 26 And I can do all of this without you having a clue I'm doing it. It is also possible that I could surreptitiously obtain an even wider array of transactional informationbon matters ranging from medical treatment to financial decisionsbwith very little effort. But further discussion of that possibility, as well as of the huge amount of transactional information that government can obtain if it is willing to proceed overtly, will have to await Part II's explanation of the current legal regime. 2 5 M e tz, s u p r a n o te 2 3, a t 8 5. S o m e s n o o p w a r e, u s in g Ak ey lo g g e r@ te c h n o lo g y, c a n e v e n te ll th e u s e r th e c o n te n t o f o n e 's c o m p u te r s c r e e n. Id. D C S c a n a ls o b e p r o g r a m m e d to a c c e s s c o n te n t a s w e ll a s id e n tifyin g in fo r m a tio n. J o s e p h F. K a m p h e r s te in, In te r n e t P riv a c y L e g is la tio n a n d th e C a r n iv o r e S y s te m, 1 9 T E M P. E N V T L. L. & T E C H. J , ( ). B o th fu n c tio n s a r e fo r m s o f c o m m u n ic a tio n s s u r v e illa n c e th a t a r e b e yo n d th e s c o p e o f th is a r tic le. 2 6 A n th o n y P a u l M ille r, T e le in fo r m a tic s, T r a n s b o r d e r D a ta F lo w s a n d th e E m e r g in g S tru g g le fo r In fo r m a tio n : A n In tro d u c tio n to th e A rriv a l o f th e N e w In fo r m a tio n A g e, 2 0 C O L U M. J. L. & S O C. P R O B S. 8 9, ( ).

11 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 149 B. Event-Based Transaction Surveillance Now consider an entirely different type of scenario, one in which government has no suspicion of or even interest in a specific individual, but rather possesses information about a particular crime that has been or will be committed. Government efforts to obtain transactional data in this situation is not target-based, but event-based. Say, for instance, that the police know that a sniper-killer wears a particular type of shoe (thanks to mudprints near a sniper site), that he owns a particular type of sweater (because of threads found at another site), and that he reads Elmore Leonard novels (because of allusions to those books made in his communications to the police). Law enforcement understandably might want to peruse the purchase records of local shoe, clothing, and book stores as part of their investigation. Once police obtain the credit card numbers of those who bought, say, the type of sweater found at the murder scene, they can trace other purchases made with the same card, to see if the relevant type of shoe or book was bought by any of the same people. Of course, if there is a match on two or three of the items, the surveillance may then turn into a target-based investigation. Or say that a CIA informant reports that he believes Al Qaeda is considering blowing up a major shopping mall, using skydivers jumping from rental planes. 27 The FBI might want to requisition the records of all companies near major metropolitan areas that teach ski-diving and that rent airplanes, as well as the Acookie@ logs (records of cyberspace visitors) of all websites that provide information about manufacturing explosives, to see if there are any intersections between these three categories of data, in particular involving men with 2 7 T h a g a r y s c e n a r b o r r o w e d o m e s e c o n d M a r k R e p o M a r k F o u n d a n, C r e a t g a T r u s d N e o r k r H o m e n d S e c u r S e c o n d R e p o o f e M a r k F o u n d a n T a s k F o r c e, a p p. D a t a v a b a t h / w w w a r k s k r c e r g /. is im in io is fr th le rt. le tio in te tw fo la ity: rt th le tio (2 ), ila le ttp :/.m le ta fo.o

12 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 Arab-sounding names. If there are then, again, further targetbased surveillance investigation might take place. Although the first type of event-based surveillance is backward-looking and the second is forward-looking, both law enforcement efforts are a form of what has been called Adata mining@ or Aprofiling,@ that is, an attempt to look through transaction information to find patterns of behavior that permit police to zero in on possible suspects. 28 If the information sought is not digitized, which is likely with respect to records kept by ski-diving companies, for instance, then law enforcement may have to rely on good old-fashioned human snooping. In this day and age, however, a significant amount of data mining can be carried out using technology. For example, the Defense Department's Total Information Awareness program, before it was severely limited by Congress, would have used software developed by private companies Ato sift through virtual mountains of data of everyday transactions, such as credit card purchases, and travel itineraries, in an attempt to discover patterns predictive of terrorist activity.@ 29 Whether it relies on computers or humans, event-based data mining, like transaction surveillance of particular individuals, can easily be conducted unbeknownst to those whose records are surveilled. 2 8 F o r a g e n e r a l d e s c r ip tio n o f d a ta m in in g a n d its p r e v a le n c e, s e e A n d r e w J. M c C lu r g, A T h o u s a n d W o r d s A r e W o r th a P ic tu r e : A P rivac y T o r t R e s p o n s e to C o n s u m e r D a ta P r o filin g, 9 8 N W. U. L. R E V. 6 3, ( ). 2 9 Id. a t 6 4 ; s e e a ls o in fra n o te

13 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 151 C. Summary Technology has made transaction surveillance a particularly powerful law enforcement tool. Given the potential that transaction surveillance provides the government for creating personality mosaics and linking people to crime, it could well be even more useful than visual tracking of person's activities (physical surveillance) and eavesdropping on or hacking into a person's communications (communications surveillance). But the real beauty of transaction surveillance for the government is that, compared to physical surveillance of activities inside the home and communications surveillance, it is so lightly regulated. As Part II explains, under today's regulatory regime it is much easier for government to obtain information about our most intimate transactions, including medical and financial matters, than it is to intercept our communications about those transactions.

14 w F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 II. CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE Under the Fourth Amendment, the government usually cannot conduct a search of houses, persons, papers and effects without probable cause, 30 a relatively high level of certainty akin to a more-likely-than-not standard (which, in non-exigent situations, must be found by a magistrate pursuant to an application for a warrant). 31 For some less invasive actions (a frisk, for instance), police only need reasonable suspicion, which is a lower level of certainty than probable cause but still requires Aspecific and articulable facts@ that Acriminal activity may be afoot,@ to quote from the famous case of Terry v. Ohio. 32 Finally, in some Aspecial needs@ situations (searches of school children or employees; drug testing; health and safety inspections; roadblocks), the police need only act Areasonably,@ but that test still usually requires reasonable suspicion, 33 or at least a showing that those conducting the government action are pursuing some end other than criminal law enforcement S e e U. C O N S T. a m e n d S e e W H E B R E A D & S L O B O G, s u n o 9, a t U. 1, 2 1, S e e O o n n o r O g a, U , ) h e d e y c o r r e c g e e m p y e e m c o n d u c t c a u s e d b y e n e e d r p r o b a b c a u s e r a e r a n r e a s o n a b s u s p n w b e n s d n g a n d o n r e p a r a b d a m a g e e a g e n c w o r k, a n d u a e p u b r e s ; N e w J e r s e y v. T U , , ) o g a t s e a r c h o f a s d e n t b y a a c h e r o r o e r s c h o o l o l w b e s d a t c e p n ' w h e n e r e a r e r e a s o n a b g r o u n d s r s u s p e c g a t e s e a r c h w r n u p e v e n c a n d d g a t s n d a r d w a s m e t c a s e b e c a u s e e r e w a s r e a s o n a b s u s p n 3 4 S e e B d. o f E d u c. E a r, U , ) p h o g.s IV IT IN pra te.s (1 ). 'C v. rte.s (1 (AT la in tin th lo is th fo le th th le ic io ill tra la te in to ta ib le fte ir le to th y's ltim te ly to th lic in te t.@).l.o.,.s (1 (h ld in th Aa tu te th ffic ia ill `ju tifie its in tio th le fo tin th th ill tu id e@ fin in th th is ta in th is th le ic io ). v. ls.s (2 (u ld in a r r a n tle s s, s u s p ic io n le s s s c h o o l d r u g te s tin g, n o t in g th a t Ain th e c o n te x t o f s a fe ty a n d a d m in is trativ e r e g u la tio n s, a s e a r c h u n s u p p o r te d b y p r o b a b le c a u s e m a y b e r e a s o n a b le w h e n `s p e c ia l n e e d s, b e yo n d th e n o r m a l n e e d fo r la w e n fo r c e m e n t, m a k e th e w a r r a n t a n d p r o b a b le - c a u s e r e q u ir e m e n t im p r a c tic a b le '@) ; C ity o f In d ia n a p o lis v. E d m o n d, U.S. 3 2, 4 1 ( ) (AW e h a v e n e v e r a p p r o v e d a c h e c k p o in t p r o g r a m

15 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 153 In contrast, transaction surveillance, whether it is eventbased or target-based, never requires probable cause or reasonable suspicion, even when conducted by government agents whose primary goal is criminal investigation. At most, government agents seeking transactional information need a subpoenabeither a subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury, or an Aadministrative subpoena@ issued by a government agencybwhich is valid as long as the information it seeks is Arelevant@ to a legitimate (statutorily-authorized) investigation. Relevance, as defined by the Supreme Court, is an extremely low standard. In the grand jury context, a subpoena may be quashed on irrelevancy grounds only when the court Adetermines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation.@ 35 The relevancy standard in the administrative subpoena context is even lower, with the Supreme Court holding that A[e]ven if one were to regard the [subpoena] as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest.@ 36 In short, the link between the information a subpoena commands and the investigation the government is pursuing can be very tenuous indeed. Although a subpoena w h o s e p r a r y p u r p o s e w a s d e c t e v e n c e o f o r d a r y c r a l w r o n g d o g. R a e r, o u r c h e c k p o t c a s e s h a v e r e c o g n e d o n e d e x c e p n s e g e n e r a l a t a s e u r e m u s t b e a c c o m p a n d b y s o m e m e a s u r e o f d u a e d s u s p n. 3 5 U n d S s v. R. E n r s c U , ) m p h a s a d d e d 3 6 U n d S s v. M o r n S a C o U , s e e a o U n d S s v. P o w e U. 4 8, ) o g a t a d m e s u b p o e n a s a r e v a e r e c o r d s s o u g h t a r e e v a n a n v e s a n c o n d u c d r a g a p u r p o s ; U n d S s v. H u n n & W m s, F. S u p p , ) o g a t e P o w e q u m o r e d e r e n l a n e r b r y a n d c a p r i c u s n d a r d o f w r a g e n c y a c n u n d e r e A d m e P r o c e d u r e A c im to te id in im in in th in iz ly lim it tio to th rule th iz ie in ivid liz ic io.@) ite ta te te., In.,.S (1 (e is ). ite ta te to lt.,.s (1 ); ls ite ta te ll,.s (1 (h ld in th in is trativ lid if th Ar le t@ to in tig tio te fo Ale itim te e@) ite ta te to illia (D.D.C (h ld in th th ll in iry is fe tia th th Aa itra io s@ ta revie fo tio th in is trativ t).

16 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 may be challenged before it is executed, a successful challenge is exceedingly rare, whether the subpoena is issued by a grand jury or an administrative agency. 37 Furthermore, as we shall see, the law does not require even a traditional subpoena for most types of transaction surveillance. Instead, the government, in particular Congress, has either invented new forms of authorization that are even easier to obtain or has simply permitted unrestrained law enforcement access to transactional information. The following account of this incredibly weak regulatory regime starts with the law regarding transaction surveillance of identifying information, conducted in real-time, then describes regulation of government attempts to obtain public records, and finally describes transaction surveillance of records held by private entities. A. Interception of Transaction Information Real-time government interception of the content of communications (what I am calling communications surveillance) is prohibited unless authorized by a warrant based on probable cause. 38 In contrast, interception of the identifying features of the communicationbthe names of the communicators, their phone numbers or addresses, and the addresses of websites visitedbcan take place on a much lesser showing. The Fourth Amendment does not apply at all to this type of transaction surveillance, and statutory law places virtually no restrictions on it. 3 7 S e e W A Y N E R. L A F A V E, J E R O L D H. I S R A E L & N A N C Y J. K IN G, 3 C R IM IN A L P R O C E D U R E (2 d e d ) (AC o u rts g e n e r a lly g iv e g r a n d ju rie s c o n s id e r a b le le e w a y in ju d g in g r e le v a n cy.@) ; J A C O B A. S T E IN, G L E N N A. M IT C H E L L & B A S IL J. M E Z IN E S, 3 A D M IN IS T R A T IV E L A W ( ) (A[ S ]u b p o e n a s w ill b e e n fo r c e d a s to a n y d o c u m e n ts th a t `a r e n o t p la in ly im m a te ria l o r irrele v a n t to th e in v e s tig a tio n.'@) U.S.C. ' (3 ). T h e c o u r t m u s t a ls o fin d th a t An o r m a l in v e s tig a tiv e p r o c e d u r e s h a v e b e e n trie d a n d h a v e fa ile d o r r e a s o n a b ly a p p e a r to b e u n lik e ly to s u c c e e d if trie d o r to b e to o d a n g e r o u s.@ Id.' (3 )(c ).

17 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 155 The Fourth Amendment's justification requirementsbprobable cause and the likebonly apply if government engages in a Asearch or seizure.@ Although one might reasonably label government efforts to track down a person's phone and correspondents a search, the Supreme Court has held that a Fourth Amendment search occurs only when a government action infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy. 39 More importantly for present purposes, the Court has determined, in Smith v. Maryland, 40 that we do not have a reasonable expectation in the phone numbers we dial because we know or should know that phone companies keep a record of these numbers, and thus Aassume the risk@ that the phone company will decide to disclose this information to the government. 41 Because it is generally known that Internet service providers monitor, if only temporarily, our s and Internet surfing, the Court would probably also say that we assume the risk these providers will become government informants. Although Universal Resource Locators (URLs) can be more informative than a mere phone number, both because they are addresses (e.g., and because they allow access to the website and thus permit government to ascertain what the user has viewed, the lower courts applying Smith appear to see no difference between the two types of routing information. 42 Accordingly, the government can proba- 3 9 K v. U n d S s, U. 2 7, ) A ] F o u r A m e n d - m e n t s e a r c h o c c u r s w h e n e g o v e r n m e n t s a s u b c e e x p e c n o f p r a t s o c c o g n e s a s r e a s o n a b g K a U n d S s, U , ) a r n, J c o n c u r g U a t P n e r v o n r c o n v e y e d n u m e r a l r m a n e p h o n e c o m p a n y a n d x p o s e d ' a t r m a n e q u m e n t e o r d n a r y c o u r s e o f b u s e s s... e r e b a s s u m g ] e r k a t e c o m p a n y w o u r e v e a l p o e e n u m b e r s h e d d 4 2 C T h e s o n v. U. B a n c r o N o. C U S T W L O S e p 1 5, ) W e n e r m a n d e n d a n c o c t e d w a s o n e w e b s a d d r e s s e s, e r a n e a c a l c o n n t o f e w e b s s T h e s o n v e d, e s u r v e n c e ] a n a g o u s a p e n r e g s e a r c h, w h e r e yllo ite ta te.s (2 (A[ th th vio la te je tiv ta tio ivacy th ie ty re iz le.@) (c it in tz v. ite ta te.s (1 (H la., rin ))..S (1 ). Id (A[ ]e titio lu ta ily ic in fo tio to th te le `e th in fo tio to its ip in th i- in [th y] [in th is th th ld to lic th ia le.@) f. yg.s ft, (D r. t. (A[ ]h th in fo tio fe ts lle ly th ite ra th th th tu te th ite yg is it [th illa is lo to is try in

18 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 bly ignore the Fourth Amendment when intercepting phone numbers and Internet addresses. Congress has imposed some statutory restraints on this type of surveillance, but nothing approaching the usual Fourth Amendment protections. In the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), it created a new, streamlined type of authorization process for use of pen registers (technology which intercepts outgoing phone numbers) and trap and trace devices (technology which intercepts incoming numbers), a process that can be initiated by either a federal government attorney or a state law enforcement officer. All the government agent must do is certify to a court facts that show the information is Arelevant to an ongoing investigation@ and is Alikely to be obtained by [the surveillance].@ 43 If that certification is made, the court must issue the order. 44 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 expanded the definition of pen registers and trap and trace devices to include all devices e F o u r A m e n d m e n t c o n x c o u r h a v e h e a t d e n d a n h a v e n o r e a s o n a b e x p e c n o f p r e p h o n e n u m b e r s e y d l b e c a u s e e n u m b e r s a r e c o n v e y e d e p h o n e c o m p a n ; U n d S s v. K e n n e d 8 1 F. S u p p. 2 d , K a n ) h e n d e n d a n t e n r e d a n a g r e e m e n t w R o a d R u n n e r r r n e t s e r v e, h e k n o w g v e a d a r m a n c o n - n e c d e a d d r e s s.... ; s e e a o n o 4 6. B g r e c o r d s o f P s m a y a o b e u n p r o c d b y e F o u r A m e n d m e n U n d S s v. H a m b r k, F d C ) n p u b h e d o p n ) o g a t p e r s o n d o e s n o t h a v e a r e a s o n a b e x p e c n o f p r e a c c o u n t r m a n g e n e P o r d e r e s b h e e - m a a c c o u n e c a u s e n o n - c o n n t r m a d c s u r e o f w h h o a d p a r d e s y s t h e p r a c y e x p e c t n a t m h t h a v e e x d p r e v u s, a v a b a t U. A p p. L E X , a t * 1 2. d e e d, s o m e c o u r h a v e h e a t e c o n n t o f e m a m e s s a g e s, o n c e e y a r e o p e n e d, d e s e r v e n o F o u r A m e n d m e n t p r o c n b e c a u s e o n e a s s u m e s e r k e r e c n t w r e v e a l o e r s. U n d S s v. C h a r b o n n e a u, F. S u p p , O h S m v. P b u r y, F. S u p p. 9 7, P a U n d S s v. M a x w e 4 5 M , U ) U n d S s v. F r e g o s o, 6 0 F d , C ) e d l r o a p p r o v g u s e o f p a n d c e d e v e s m r l n a. th th te t, ts ld th fe ts le ta tio ivacy in th te le th ia th to th te le y.@) ite ta te y, (D (AW fe te in to ith fo In te ic in ly re le ll in fo tio te to th ls in fra te illin IS ls te te th th t. ite ta te ic.3 (4 th ir. (u lis in io (h ld in th le ta tio ivacy Ain th in fo tio iv to th IS in to ta lis th il t, [b it] is te in fo tio n@ is lo ic At th ir ty tro iv ta io th ig is te io ly@) ila le.s IS In ts ld th th te il th th te tio th is th ip ie ill it to th ite ta te (S.D io ); yth ills (E.D ); ite ta te ll,.j (C.A.A.F )..S.C ' (a )(1 (2 ). ite ta te.3 (8 th ir. (th Aju ic ia le in in tra tra ic is in is te ia in ture@)

19 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 157 that obtain Adialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information utilized in the processing and transmitting of wire or electronic 45 Thus, to use snoopware, DCS- 1000, and other means of ascertaining a person's correspondents and favorite websites, the government need only certify the relevance of this information to a current investigation. 46 Again, if this certification is made, the court must issue an order. Those of us who teach Fourth Amendment law sometimes joke about supposedly Aneutral and detached@ magistrates rubberstamping warrant applications, but we also assume that judicial independence is theoretically possible. 47 Here, in contrast, Congress has legislatively invented mandatory rubberstamping. It is tempting to call this type of authorization a Arubberstamp order,@ but I will instead use the more measured term certification order. Whatever one calls the authorization process, it amounts to minimal limitation on interception of transaction information U ) M o s t c o u r h a v e h e a t c o m p a n s a t a c q u e k s a m d a - a b o u t w h e r e a n r n e t u s e r g o e s o n e r n e t d o n o t E C P A b e c a u s e e w e b s s v d b y e u s e r h a v e a u o r e d e c o m p a n s a c c e s s r - m a n. S e e D o u b C k, c P a c y L F. S u p p. 2 d 4 9 7, C h a n c e A v e. A, c F. S u p p. 2 d , W a s h T o R U s, c P a c y L N o. C U. D L E X , a t * 2 8. C a O c 9, T h u s, g o v e r n m e n t c o u a o o b r o u t g r m a n o m e s e p r a c o m p a n s, w o u t u s g s n o o p w a r e. H o w e v e r, s o m e c o u r m h t c o n s e r a t a p p r o a c h b e a c c e s s g r e r m a n. S e e, e U n d S s v. S e r, F d , C s o, g o v e r n m e n t m a y h a v e o b a s u b p o e n a. S e e x t a c c o m p a n g n o s S e e R H A R D V A N D U E N D, L. P A U L S U T T O N & C H A R L O T T E A. C A R T E R, T H E S E A R C H W A R R A N T P R O C E S S : P R E C O N C E P T N S, P E R C E P T N S A N D P R A C T E S ) e s c r g s d y o f w a r r a n t p r o c e s s d a g v a r y g d e g r e e s o f d l r u b b e r s m p g a c r o s s r d n s.s.c ' (c (2 ). ts ld th ie th ir Ac lic tre ta@ In te th In te vio la te th ite is ite th th iz th ie to th is in fo tio In re le lic In., riv itig., (S.D.N.Y ); v. In., (W.D ); In re ys In., riv itig.,.s is t. IS (N.D l. t. ). ld ls ta in in in fo tio fr th iv te ie ith in ts ig id th to in As to d@ in fo tio.g., ite ta te te ig.3 (1 th ir. ). If to ta in in fra te yin te IC IZ IO IO IC (1 (d ib in tu in ic tin in ju ic ia ta in ju is ic tio ).

20 F IL E :C : \ S L O B O G IN.D T P D e c 1 2 / 1 3 / 0 5 T u e 1 2 :5 3 P M M IS S IS S IP P I L A W J O U R N A L [V o l. 7 5 B. Access to Publicly-held Records Most transaction surveillance does not involve real-time interception of information, but rather contemplates accessing already-existing records, held either by public or private institutions. Information in public records is particularly easy to secure. Under current law, law enforcement officials do not need even a certification order to use MATRIX, Choicepoint and similar vehicles for perusing public records. In fact, law enforcement officials need consult no other entity (certainly not a court, and not even a prosecutor) before obtaining such information. Again, the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures might appear to apply here, because looking for and through records is a search in the usual meaning of the word. But, as already noted, the Supreme Court has made clear that one cannot reasonably expect privacy in connection with information voluntarily given to third parties. Even more important than Smith in this regard is United States v. Miller, 48 decided three year earlier. There the Court held that once a person surrenders information to an agency or institution, he or she assumes the risk the third party will hand it over to the government. 49 The key declaration in Miller is worth quoting in full: A[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.@ 50 The Privacy Act, enacted by Congress in 1974, does bar or limit access to public records when they are sought by private individuals, and even when most government officials want U.S ( ). 4 9 M ille r, U.S. a t Id. a t (e m p h a s is a d d e d ).

21 FILE:C:\SLOBOGIN.DTP Dec 12/13/05 Tue 12:53PM 2005] TRANSACTION SURVEILLANCE 159 them. 51 But when law enforcement officials are after the records, the Act merely requires a letter from the head of the agency that is seeking the information, detailing the law enforcement reasons a particular person's records are needed. 52 No court is involved, and neither individualized suspicion or even a relevance showing is required, just the sayso of the law enforcement department. I will call this kind of authorization an extrajudicial certification. Not even this level of authorization is necessary for government access to most public records, however. The Privacy Act only applies to federal documents. Unless there is similar legislation at the state level, law enforcement access to state public records is unrestricted. 53 Furthermore, the federal government takes the position that when it obtains information from a commercial data broker like Choicepoint, the Privacy Act does not apply at all, because the Act literally only refers to law enforcement efforts to get records from other government agencies and from private companies that are adminis- 5 1 S e e 5 U a ) ) o a g e n c y s h a d c s e a n y r e c o r d w h h c o n e d a s o f o r d s... u n s s g 1 2 e x c e p - n s a ) e r m g d c s u r e o a n o e r a g e n c y o r a n s e n o f a n y g o v e r n m e n l d n w o r u n d e r e c o n l o f e U n d S s r a c o r c r a l w e n r c e m e n t a c e a c a u - o r e d b y w, a n d e h e a d o f e a g e n c y o r s e n h a s m a d e a w n r e q u e s t e a g e n c y w h h m a s e o r d s p e c g e p a r u r p o r n d e s e d a n d e w e n r c e m e n t a c r w h h e r e c o r d s o u g h. 5 3 S e e P a u l M. S c h w a r P a c y a n d P a a n : P e r s o n a l r m a n a n d P u b S e c r R e g u n e U n d S s, 8 0 I O W A L. R E 5 5 3, ) o s t s s c k m n u s d a p r o c n w s b u t e r h a v e c a r e d w s a p r o v e o n d p r o c n s r p e r s o n a l r m a n e p u b s e c. O n e r e a s o n F r a a n a c e p c e b a s e a n o p e r a n e M A T R a t p u b r e c o r d s w q u e x n s e. S e e F L S T A T e t s e q. t e p o y o f s a t a s, c o u n a n d m u n a l r e c o r d s s h a b e o p e n r p e r s o n a l s p e c n b y a n y p e r s o n. R e c o g n g p r o b m, e F a S u p r e m e C o u c e n o r d e r e d a m o r a r m o n e d a n o f F r a p u b o r d s. J a s o n K r a u s e, T o o M u c h r m a n? C o u n C r k s T u s s w N e r v o u s S O O P o s g C o u R e c o r d s O n e, A. J., A p , a t 2 4..S.C ' (b (2 (AN ll is lo ic is ta in in ystem rec le [lis tin tio ].@) Id ' (b )(7 (p ittin is lo At th to in trum ta lity ta ju ris ic tio ith in th tro th ite ta te fo ivil im in la fo tivity if th tivity is th iz la if th th in trum ta lity ritte to th ic in ta in th rec ifyin th tic la tio ir th la fo tivity fo ic th is t@) tz, riv rtic ip tio In fo tio lic to la tio in th ite ta te V. (1 (m ta te la Ao ib ta te tio la,@ ra th As tte la [th t] id ly lim ite te tio fo in fo tio in th lic tor.@) lo id is ttra tiv la to tio lik IX is th its lic la is ite te iv A. '.0 (AI is th lic th is ta te th ll ta te ty ic ip ll fo in tio.@) izin th is le th lorid rt re tly to iu th ig itiz tio lo id 's lic rec In fo tio ty le le ith ta te ffic ia ls ver tin rt lin.b.a ril