Disaster Risk Analysis Guidance for Local Governments

Transcription

1 Realizing a child s right to protection from the risks of disasters Guidance Note Disaster Risk Analysis Guidance for Local Governments Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) December 2013

2 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Purpose of the Guide 1.2 UNICEF s Interest in Disaster Risk Analysis in CEE and CIS 1.3 Target Level and Target Group 1.4 Key Underlying Concepts for Disaster Risk Analysis 1.5 What is Disaster Risk Reduction? 1.6 What is a Disaster Risk Analysis? 1.7 Why and when should local governments conduct a Disaster Risk Analysis? The Risk Analysis Process 2. Preparing for the Risk Analysis 2.1 Determining authority to assess and plan 2.2 Establishing a Working Group 2.3 Determining the scale and objectives of analyses 2.4 Agree on analytical framework and terminology 2.5 Establishing an Assessment Work Plan 3. Collecting General Information on Reference Area 4. Identifying and Characterizing Hazards 5. Identifying Potential Impact and Vulnerability 5.1 Scenario Development 5.2 Vulnerability and Impact Analysis 5.3 Classifying Vulnerability/ Impact from various Hazards 5.4 Analyzing vulnerability factors or the Why? Understanding the vulnerability of children to hazards Analyzing vulnerability from the angle of capacity 6. Analyzing Risks: Determining level and spatial distribution 6.1 Risk Matrix 6.2 Mapping Vulnerability and Risk 6.3 Writing the Risk Analysis Report 7. Evaluating and Acting upon Risk Analysis Results Annex I: Work Plan Risk Analysis/ Example Annex II: Disaster History/ Example Bijeljina Floods Annex III: Assessing Impact and Vulnerability to Hazard Scenarios Annex IV: Reference Literature 1

3 1. INTRODUCTION This guide is the result of a pilot project in 2012/2013 that supported disaster risk analyses in four districts/ municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova. The current version is the revision of a guide that was used to conduct these assessments and is based upon a review of the assessment process and results, feedback from local governments and UNICEF country offices. The guide was commissioned by UNICEF and prepared by Alexandra Galperin. 1.1 Purpose of the Guide This guide intends to support local governments in the Eastern European/ CIS region to undertake a disaster risk analysis. A risk analysis allows local governments to identify, prioritize, plan and implement measures that help to reduce vulnerability and risks from natural and technological hazards. The guide familiarizes the user with the basic components of disaster risk analysis. It also provides tips on how to manage the assessment and planning process. The guide describes a general approach to analyzing risks that focuses upon key steps rather than distinct methodologies or technical tools. These may vary from country to country depending upon prevailing hazards and risks, legislation and governance context, technical capacity as well as the availability and format of relevant data. Recognizing the scarcity of time and resources at the local government level the guide focuses upon the analysis of existing data and information (rather than on the generation of new data). The guide points out, however, how to address some possible gaps and blind spots in disaster risk analysis. In Eastern Europe and the CIS (as in many other regions in the world) many local governments have never engaged in a risk analyses for natural hazards. Assessments that have been conducted in the past have often focused upon hazards and the identification of areas and settlements that are hazard- prone. The guide acknowledges that moving from these types of assessments to an analysis of vulnerability and risks is a significant leap and that it is likely progress will be initially slow and incremental 1. However even if assessments are only successful at identifying and characterizing impact and some vulnerable groups (without analyzing underlying conditions and causes) this will mark significant progress. 1.2 UNICEF s Interest in Disaster Risk Analysis in Eastern Europe and CIS Disasters expose and exacerbate existing inequities within societies; women are more likely to die in disasters than men and it is estimated that children make up 50-60% of those affected by disasters annually 2 Since 2008 UNICEF has systematically engaged in promoting Disaster Risk Reduction to contribute to the 1 Particularly in those local government areas where capacity is low the use of this guide and analysis process will have to be supported by various learning events and workshops. 2 UNICEF and Disaster Risk Reduction, brochure, pages 2 and 3 2

4 well being of children in Eastern Europe and the CIS. This work has involved working at the national level to influence policy (especially in the education sector) and working at the community level to address school safety and promote the awareness of children and their families. UNICEF s engagement at the sub- national level i.e. an intermediary level between the national and the very local level is informed by the need to help translate policy into local plans while ensuring that resulting activities do not remain sporadic and isolated. UNICEF takes an interest in promoting risk analyses at the sub- national level in order to a) advocate for the safety and protection of children who are often the most vulnerable to hazards, b) promote working partnerships between agencies to address vulnerabilities and risks of children and c) ensure that local government plans and budgets address issues that are important to safeguard the welfare and rights of children. Disaster risk analysis is the first step to identify strategies, programmatic priorities and inform interventions in disaster risk reduction. 1.3 Target Level and Target Group This manual targets primarily the second level 3 of devolved local governments overseeing a larger number of settlements/ people and having the authority to plan/ establish a budget for development and delivery of services. This manual is primarily written to orient and guide staff playing a key role in facilitating or supporting disaster risk analysis such as local government planning officers; Civil Protection officers and/or consultants hired to assist with certain aspects of the assessment as well as project officers. A shortened 4- page version will be elaborated for members of the working group and stakeholders. 1.4 Key Underlying Concepts for Disaster Risk Analysis We speak of a disaster when a calamitous event seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes widespread human, material, economic and/ or environmental losses exceeding the ability of a community or society to cope using its own level of resources. 4 In other words disasters occur when hazards such as earthquakes, landslides or floods have a significant destructive impact on a vulnerable population and overwhelm their capacity to cope on their own. A disaster is always the result of two inter- acting components: hazards and vulnerability. When we talk about disaster risk we talk about something that has not happened yet but that is likely to happen in the future. The following definitions serve as an orientation to the interrelated concepts of hazards, vulnerability and disaster risk. 3 Depending upon context the second level of local government may refer to county, district, raion, commune or municipality (the first level would be regions, oblast, provinces etc.). 4 See UNISDR Terminology (2004) 3

5 A hazard is a potentially damaging physical phenomenon (i.e. flood, landslide or transport accident), which may cause the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. In other words hazards describe the probability of a harmful event occurring. Vulnerability: A set of conditions and processes resulting from physical, social, economic, and environmental factors, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of a given hazard. In the context of Disaster Risk Reduction vulnerability does not exist as a general, static condition but is defined in relation to specific hazards. 5 Vulnerable conditions can be broadly distinguished as follows: Human vulnerability can be summarized as the lack of physical, social and economic capacity of a person or community to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a given hazard. Vulnerability is contingent upon exposure to hazards (e.g. living or working in an area threatened by earthquakes, drought episodes etc.). It describes difficulty in withstanding, coping with and recovering from them. Poverty and social marginalization are often at the root of what makes people vulnerable to the impact of hazards. Structural or physical vulnerability is the extent to which a structure or service (electricity, water etc.) is likely to be damaged or disrupted by a hazard event. For instance, a building is said to be vulnerable to earthquake tremors if its construction lacks elements, which would resist the effects of such tremors. Capacities: A combination of all the strengths and resources available within a community, society or organization that can reduce the level of risk, or the effects of a disaster. Capacity may include physical, institutional, social or economic means as well as attributes such as leadership and management skills. The concepts of hazard, vulnerability and disaster risk are dynamically related i.e. hazards and vulnerability have to be both present in the same location to create risk. The relationship of these elements can be expressed as a simple formula 6 that illustrates the concept that the greater the potential occurrence of a destructive hazard and the more vulnerable an exposed population, then the greater the risk. It is also important to note that human vulnerability to disaster is inversely related to human capacity to withstand the effects of disasters i.e. the more capacities a community has the less vulnerable it is. Figure 1 Risk Formula Risks = Hazard x Vulnerability 6 This is not the only formula in use but certainly the most widely spread. It is relatively straightforward to apply (subsuming exposure and capacity under vulnerability) and at the core of risk matrices produced in many European countries. 4

6 Disaster Risk refers to the probability of a particular level of harmful consequences, or expected losses (lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services), which could occur at a particular location resulting from interactions between natural or human induced hazards and vulnerable conditions. Essentially, disaster risk is about the probability of disasters happening in the future, what kind of losses and damage they are likely to cause to humans, their assets and infrastructure. 1.5 What is Disaster Risk Reduction? According to the UN Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) describes systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wiser management of land and the environment and improved preparedness for adverse events. 7 Disaster Risk Reduction consists of the following three components: I. Risk Analyses that identify options for II. Risk Prevention/ Mitigation and III. Disaster Preparedness. Figure 2 Three Components of Disaster Risk Reduction Disaster Risk Prevention or Mitigation includes activities to prevent or mitigate the risk by reducing if possible - the hazard or more commonly vulnerability. This 7 See UNISDR Terminology

7 can be achieved through political, legal, administrative, planning and infrastructural measures (i.e. regulating land use; managing river basins; strengthening social structures for prevention activities). Disaster Preparedness seeks to reduce the loss of life and damages in case an event occurs (i.e. by strengthening self- help capacities, introducing early warning systems, training and exercises). An important principle of Disaster Risk Reduction is that it needs to involve multiple relevant sectors (health, education, agriculture etc.), the private sector and civil society. Disaster Risk Reduction is a cross cutting responsibility and not the sole job of Civil Protection or Ministries of Emergency Situations. 1.6 What is a Disaster Risk Analysis? A Disaster Risk Analysis is a comparative analysis of the nature and extent of risks linked to different kinds of hazards and vulnerable conditions that could harm people, assets, livelihoods, infrastructure and services in a given locality. The result of risk assessment is an evaluation of the likelihood and magnitude of potential losses as well as an understanding of why these losses occur and what impact they have. Common results of risk assessments (besides the risk analysis report) are hazard and risk maps, risk matrices that compare and rank risks from different hazards, scenarios and prioritized action- plans for DRR (this will be further elaborated in the guide). 1.7 Why and when should local governments conduct a Disaster Risk Analysis? Disaster Risk Reduction aims to make populations safer; and disaster risk analysis is a critical step in DRR. Disaster risk analyses show where, how and what kind of risks are of highest priority within a local government area, so that local government staff and stakeholders can plan targeted and effective disaster risk reduction activities. Without understanding the highest risks faced by a population, and their capacity to cope with these risks, it is not possible to make effective plans and development decisions that promote the safety of the population. Therefore, the results of risk analyses should be a fundamental reference point for local government development and planning, policy and resource allocation. It is important to see Disaster Risk Analysis as an opportunity to raise citizens awareness of disaster risks but also to establish a dialogue about their priority concerns. Ideally a risk analysis offers opportunities for vulnerable groups to participate and communicate their experience of disasters risks and related issues that affect them in order to establish viable and relevant solutions. This includes the need to engage with those who will not only be most affected by future events but also participate in the making of that future i.e. children and young people. Hazards and even more so vulnerability change over time. Therefore risk analysis is not a one- off exercise but an ongoing process that needs to feed into decision and policy- making. This process requires the participation of different sectors and parts of society to result in a shared understanding of what the risks are and agreed priorities for risk reduction. Though it is challenging risk analysis can help to develop better coordination between different sectors such as health, education, child protection or social services, emergency services and water and irrigation. The 6

8 active commitment and leadership of local governments is important to maintain momentum and support all stakeholders throughout the process, as well as to implement recommendations from the analysis. Disaster Risk Analysis should be prioritized in local government areas that have a history of frequent and destructive disaster episodes. Otherwise it is unlikely that sufficient commitment to the process and follow- up can be generated. It is best to time risk assessments so conclusions and action points can be incorporated into local plans (common development and/ or sector- specific plans and programming documents). In some countries Disaster Risk Analysis may be a requirement for local governments to fulfill legal requirements imposed by national government (i.e. civil protection planning cycles) or inter- governmental norms and conventions. For example, the European Union is in the process of establishing guidelines and requirements for DRR and risk analyses 8. Prerequisites for risk analyses Risk analyses require a minimum capacity to collect, review and analyze data as well as organize, facilitate and document discussions and decision- making processes. They also require the existence of or access to a minimum of relevant data on major hazards, population, infrastructure and critical services in the area. Furthermore risk analyses as outlined in this guidance note require legal authority to assess and plan interventions i.e. a minimum of devolution of government authority to the local level. It is also important to ascertain that risk analyses at the local level conform to possibly existing national level regulations or standards. Last but not least risk analyses require dedicated funding and support from local government leaders. 8 European Commission, 2011, Commission Staff Working Paper Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management, , SEC (2010) 1626 final 7

9 THE RISK ANALYSIS PROCESS In the following the guide takes the reader through six stages of the risk analysis process, which are illustrated above. These stages describe a logical order of data- collection, analysis and follow- up action. They can be followed in chronological order even though in practice several steps may be undertaken in parallel (i.e. preparing and collecting reference information or identifying key hazards and vulnerability). It is recommended to document all steps of the risk analysis process in order to ensure results can be traced and validated. 2. Preparing for the Risk Analysis 2.1 Determining authority to assess and plan Risk analyses should ultimately feed into local government plans and programs to reduce risks through prevention and preparedness in relevant sectors. Before starting a risk assessment it needs to be clear that the local government has the legal authority to assess, plan and implement DRR interventions. Principal responsibilities of local governments in this regard might be defined in national civil protection legislation. Tip No Establishing a Working Group Vulnerabilities and Disaster Risks are complex phenomena that cut across multiple spheres of expertise. This guide therefore encourages a team- based approach to the analysis i.e. the local government should form a working group that is composed of representatives from different backgrounds and sectors that are relevant to the task. Working groups should also attempt to involve representatives from particularly vulnerable groups to ensure that their experience and perspectives of risks are captured. The size and composition of the working group (including the establishment of several working groups) depends upon objectives, needs and available resources. 8

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11 Example No 1: Working Group in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina During a risk analysis in 2013 Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina) the municipality established a working group that included representatives from the mayor s cabinet, civil protection; urban planning; social work; fire- services; public security; education and health institutions and the local Red Cross. After the analysis the working group concluded that it would have been useful to include representatives of a particularly vulnerable group, the Roma community, in the working group to jointly explore the risks they are facing and risk reduction options. Overall, the Working Group is there to manage the data- collection and analytical process, to keep the momentum going and to report achievements to the local government leader and other stakeholders. Working groups can be informal or formal. Some governments have found that appointing members officially to working groups and defining clear Terms of Reference increased the commitment of participating institutions. In order to facilitate linkages between analyses and decision- making it is recommended that a leader of the local government be continuously involved in the process either acting as the head of the working group or via a steering committee. Tip No Determining the scale and objectives of analyses The scale objectives of the analysis may be prescribed by law or left to individual local governments and be fine- tuned by working groups. In any case it is very important that the level and degree of detail, the objectives and expected results of the analysis are clarified at the start of the process. An analysis may choose to combine several objectives or focus more narrowly on one or two. It is important the selection of objectives considers the available time, resources and capacities very carefully. Various scales could be: a) Macro- overview of major hazards and vulnerable settlements, critical services (water, electricity etc.) and key- infrastructure in the local government area with limited community involvement. b) More detailed studies of selected locations within the local government area Risk analyses can provide information that may then allow a local government to: Identify which hazards are a priority in different parts of the local government area and which areas or neighborhoods suffer the highest levels of risk; Identify investment priorities for disaster risk reduction Involve communities and vulnerable groups in disaster risk reduction and raise the awareness of disasters they are facing Support and promote preparedness planning 10

12 Prepare for a specific expected hazard event (seasonal floods or landslides) Identify relevant resources within the jurisdiction of local government Establish a base- line for the monitoring of hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities Establish an early- warning system Tip No Agree on analytical framework and terminology The way of working and the DRR approach may be new to the local government including members of the Working Group. Before starting the analysis it is therefore important that the working group meets to discuss the analytical framework and terminology of risk reduction. For instance while the differences between disasters and hazards seem academic disagreeing on their meaning will lead to misunderstandings and negatively impact the risk analysis. These discussions require a mix of instruction and competent facilitation to generate agreement. 2.5 Identify Key Sources of Information This guide recognizes that many local governments face a shortage of time and resources. It therefore recommends prioritizing the identification, collection and review of existing data on general characteristics of the local government area, hazards and vulnerability. Information gaps may require further original research or may be compensated by reasonable assumptions and informed estimates. 9 Information of key interest to the analysis will be discussed in the following sections on stages 2, 3 and 4 of the risk analysis. When making a list of potential sources of information, various institutions may hold up- to- date information about risk, including information about hazards (for example, the meteorological office); vulnerabilities and capacities (for example, social protection and health services; local NGOs and community groups and planning departments). Tip No 4 If it is difficult to find information locally, consulting national government and non- government agencies or international partners (for example UN agencies or the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement) might be useful. These agencies might hold or might know of information that local governments might not be aware of. For 9 Since even scientific data about risk has a measure of uncertainty it is important to strike a pragmatic balance. 11

13 example, UNICEF may have sponsored surveys focusing upon children or have looked at social protection patterns to identify exclusion and marginalized groups and this information may be available in a suitable format. Tip No Identify Key Stakeholders Working groups are usually small and do not have all the necessary expertise and experience to undertake and complete the risk analysis. Key stakeholders need to be selected with a view to a) ensure access to information, b) add their specific expertise and experience and c) ensure that recommendations for follow- up action is realistic and reflects the views of those who have to act on them. The identification of stakeholders is very context- specific and depends after all on objectives and the composition of the working group. It should not be forgotten that local communities, their leaders and representatives of vulnerable groups are particularly important stakeholders. Some stakeholders may reside at the national level. Example No. 2 Stakeholders in Stefan Voda (Moldova) In Stefan Voda (Moldova) the following government agencies and utilities were key stakeholders in a risk analysis in 2013: Cadastral Office; Department of Statistics; Ecological Inspection Department; Centre of Public Health; Social Assistance and Family Protection Department; Communication (Mobile Phone Companies); Emergency Situations Department; Police Department; District Department of Youth and Sport; District Architect; Road Construction; Culture Department; Local Administration (City Halls); Red Cross; Hydro meteorological Service; Agriculture Department; Moldova Waters; Red Nord (Energy); Moldsilva (Forestry); Ungheni Gaz (Gas); members of local parliament 2.7 Establishing an Assessment Work Plan At the beginning of the process the Working Group may find it useful to draft a Disaster Risk Analysis Management Plan. The Management Plan will provide a more detailed overview on how objectives of the analysis will be reached, list relevant tasks and describe when and how they will be done and who will take a lead role. Tasks that may be written into the Management Plan can include: Defining key steps of the process (sensitization and training; data collection and review; data analysis; communicating results and defining follow-up action) and related roles and responsibilities of working group members and others Undertaking DRR and disaster risk analysis sensitization and awareness raising amongst local representatives of line departments, local government staff and other key stakeholders, including high risk communities 12

14 Drawing up a budget and a timeline, building in some flexibility to account for unforeseen events, such as key stakeholders leaving their positions or resourcing issues Tip No 6 As well as key tasks, the Management Plan contains the contact details of key people and key milestone to measure progress. Annex I shows an example for such a plan. 3. Collecting General Information on Reference Area Risk analysis always refers to a clearly defined reference area or territorial unit such as a district, raion, commune or municipality. Consequently the first step of the analysis compiles the important demographic, environmental, social and economic characteristics of the territorial unit under review. This information will help to make informed estimates on impact and risk in the later stages of the analysis. The following Table 1 provides an overview of information required to start the analysis. Further information will be collected as the analysis proceeds. Table 1 Key Information on Reference Area CATEGORY INFORMATION POSSIBLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION DEMOGRAPHY ENVIRONMENT LAND USE ECONOMY AND Number of population Number of households Population density Age Distribution Urban areas/ rural areas Agricultural lands Industrial/ commercial areas Protected areas Employment (Migration) Economic performance Poverty Rate o Statistical (Census Data) o Local Registries o Ecological Inspectorates o Department Offices of Agriculture o Land Use/ Planning Departments o Chambers Commerce o Statistical Offices o Labor Offices o Social Services o Department Agriculture of of 13

15 o Tax and Economic Authorities INFRASTRUCURE Water Supply Network Electricity Network Irrigation and Drainage Sewage Network Transport Network Telecommunication KEY SERVICES Schools (Number, Capacity and Types) Health Clinics (Number, Capacity and Types) Social Institutions (orphanages; homes for the elderly) o Water Authorities/ Providers o Agricultural Departments o Road and Transport Departments o Telecommunication Providers o Education Authorities o Health Authorities o Social Protection Services This table only provides a general orientation, individual assessments may decide to modify and/ or expand it depending upon context and needs. It is obviously of great value if corresponding maps exist (for instance in the land- use offices or cadaster) reflecting some of the data (and into which further information can be incorporated during the assessment process). 4. Identifying and Characterizing Hazards This crucial step identifies and characterizes hazards that will be under further investigation to determine disaster risks and potential impact. Hazards can be distinguished as follows. 10 Table 2 Hazard Categories and Types CATEGORY Hydro- meteorological hazards TYPE o Flash Floods o Riverine Floods o Landslides/ Mudslides (if triggered by torrential rains) o Storms and High Winds o Hail and Frost 10 We acknowledge that the classification of hazards may vary in different countries/ civil protection legislation. 14

16 Geophysical hazards Technological Hazards 11 o High Snow o Drought o Forest Fires o Earthquakes and secondary hazards: o Landslides (if triggered by seismic events) o Mudslides (if triggered by seismic events) o Rock- falls o Release of Hazardous Substances (nuclear, biological, chemical) o Explosions o Fires (causing substantial damages) o Traffic Accidents (substantial casualties) Tip No 7 Hazard Analysis seeks to predict the probability of an extreme event occurring at a specific time, in a specific location and with a specific intensity and duration. The hazard analysis therefore needs to characterize individual hazards in terms of: a) Where does the hazard occur and how far does it stretch (hazard location and size)? b) How frequently does the hazard occur (probability)? c) How strong is the hazard i.e. how much harm can it do (magnitude or intensity)? d) How long does the hazard last (duration)? Some of this information may be available if scientific studies have been conducted and hazard maps have been drawn. The table below specifies some sources of information in relation to hazard analysis and what that information tells us about the hazard. 11 This guide focuses on natural hazards. Technological hazards originating from certain industries and plants are primarily considered as possible secondary hazards triggered by damages from a flood or earthquake. 15

17 Table 3: Key Sources of Information on Hazard Characteristics HAZARD WHERE TO FIND WHAT THAT CHARACTERISTICS RELEVANT INFORMATION (Indicative) INFORMATION TELLS US (Examples) INTENSITY (effects) Hazard Maps Spatial distribution of or MAGNITUDE relative hazard intensity/ (physical strength) magnitude in the reference area. In other words these maps show which areas have a higher/ lower intensity of a given hazard. For several hazards these maps will reflect specialized units of measurement (i.e. Mercalli scale for earthquakes). It is important to understand what exactly these scales mean as they may describe the physical strength (speed, volume) and/or the effect of a hazard. In general these scales differentiate what harm a hazard can do. LOCATION & SIZE Hazard Maps Hazard Maps may show where a hazard originates and how big it is. For instance flood hazard maps tell us what areas are prone to flooding/ inundation. There are single and multi- hazard maps that combine different hazards and help to identify areas that are prone to multiple hazards. DURATION Disaster Data Bases It is important to understand the duration of certain hazards as the longer they last the more destructive they may be (floods; high snows; droughts etc.). FREQUENCY Assessments Disaster Data Bases Data on the frequency of certain hazards may allow making predictions/ estimations about their recurrence in the future (i.e. 16

18 how often damaging events occur and in what intervals). Some events may be tied to specific seasons. To be statistically significant this data has to go relatively far back in time especially for events that are rare (i.e. earthquakes). If there are no sufficiently specific and organized local disaster databases the analysis has to consult historical data on hazards/ disaster occurrence in the area or rely on the experience of experts and people in the field. In order to capture key hazards and make informed estimates the analysis may try to establish a local disaster history that contains information on the hazards, type, exact location, time and duration, if possible chain of events (what happened in what sequence) and the level of damages. Information may be gathered from civil protection records, local administration, newspaper archives and through workshops with relevant local experts, community representatives and civil protection. The longer the history goes back the more valuable it will be for analysis. Annex II shows a suggested structure for such a history and a variation/ example from Bijeljina in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Analyzing past hazard events and their properties will allow a) identifying and characterizing types of hazard events that are common and b) estimating their recurrence in the future or likelihood. Likelihood can be classified using qualitative or quantitative scales. Below is an example: Table 4: Classifying Likelihood of Hazard Events 12 Value Classification Likelihood of occurring 4 Very Likely Once every 10 years/ 3 Likely Once every 100 years 2 Somewhat likely Once every 1000 years 1 Unlikely Once every years Obviously it is good if the analysis of likelihood is backed up by scientific or statistical assessments. However knowledge gaps may be compensated by preliminary data (such as compiling a disaster history ) and the collective analysis and agreement of the working group and key stakeholders. In these cases i.e. when statistical analysis (as in column 3) has not been conducted to inform the 12 Adapted from Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, Methods of Risk Analysis for Civil Protection, Bonn, 2011, p

19 classification (in column 2) it is possible to focus on qualitative descriptions. For instance these may be based upon a comparison between hazards on how likely they are in relation to each other (i.e. floods are more likely than landslides followed by earthquakes etc.). The final report needs however to explain how the analysis distinguished between very likely, likely, somewhat likely, and unlikely and very unlikely events13. Later assessments need to be able to understand the underlying assumptions to update the analysis and if necessary adapt it. Tip No 8 Figure No 3 Flood Hazard Map, Clifden/Galway, Ireland14 13 Depending upon context, risk analysis may decide to go for scales i.e. with less (three) or more (five) values. Having more values increases the ability to differentiate more shades of grey. 14http:// endmentoftheclifdenlocalareaplan / Scale 1:

20 Hazard Maps are not only a source of information for risk analysis but also a possible product. Overlaying the information on intensity, location and (potential) size of hazards on topographical base- maps with general reference information on the area allows identifying those settlements, infrastructure and services that are in harm s way or exposed. Depending upon resolution and manipulation of these maps one may be capable of identifying settlements but also neighborhoods or even individual buildings, infrastructure components and plots of lands that are exposed to one or more hazards. Depending upon hazard context and capacity these maps may be produced at different scales capturing the entire reference area (i.e. medium scale such as 1:50.000) or focusing in on a particular area and/ or a particular hazard only (i.e. larger scale 1: or 1: and below). It is obviously great if this can be done in an electronic format since it will be easier to update maps later on. In the absence of electronic maps or GIS capacity, hazard- information may also be laid over hard copies of topographical maps and/or hand- drawn maps may be produced. Maps visualize the results of the hazard analysis and help to inform the focus of the vulnerability analysis. Example No 3: Introducing hazard information into land- use maps in Tuzla During a risk analysis in Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 2013 information on hazards was integrated into existing maps of the urban planning unit (1:25.000), which now identifies the location/ exposure of key public infrastructure and service institutions to four priority hazards as well as the demographic characteristics of individual social and educational institutions (number, gender and age of population attending these institutions). 5. Identifying Potential Impact and Vulnerability Hazard analysis has established the intensity, duration, location and likelihood of damaging hazard events that may occur in the area. Vulnerability analysis now focuses on those people and elements (economic assets, infrastructure, services etc.) that are in harms way. However being in harms way does not mean that an individual or element is automatically vulnerable. Vulnerability depends on physical, social, economic and environmental attributes and the presence or absence of certain capacities to avoid or withstand, cope and recover from a hazard. Tip No 9 19

21 Identifying vulnerability of people and elements allows making predictions about how a hazard event of a specific strength may affect a given community or area. Vulnerability analysis then attempts to establish the degree of losses and damages in relation to a hazard event of a particular strength. It also asks why these losses occur and why some communities and people get more affected than others. 5.1 Scenario Development In order to analyze vulnerability two principal approaches are commonly used. One investigates past disasters (i.e. data from disaster history ) based on the assumption that similar events may recur in the future. Another, increasingly popular 15, approach attempts to create hypothetical but realistic scenarios looking at likely hazards and how they might play out in the future. The principal questions to ask are who and what would be (most) affected and how? The advantage using scenarios for vulnerability analysis is that they are relatively easy to understand even for people who are no experts in disaster risk reduction. Scenarios have the added advantage that they can be developed collectively and that the analysis can consider the current status (the fact that a settlement has grown, that a factory has closed down or that a dyke has been repaired). They can also be combined with reference to past events. Scenarios would be developed for a number of events that the hazard analysis has identified. Everyday emergencies that do not pass the disaster threshold as well as highly unlikely worst case events should be excluded. A scenario would try to actually play out the unfolding of a given hazard event and combine information from the hazard analysis (i.e. location, intensity and duration) with information on the specific context of the chosen locality (see reference information). An example for scenario design is given below: 16 Table 5: Key Components to build a Scenario PARAMETER KEY QUESTIONS EXAMPLE (indicative!) Hazard Which hazard? Flash Floods Summary of events/ Development of hazard What is the chain of events leading to the hazard? (Is there a secondary hazard?) Torrential (thunderstorm)>flash floods rain 15 See Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland who all use similar approaches based upon scenario development (ETH 2011). 16 Adapted from Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, Methods of Risk Analysis for Civil Protection, Bonn, 2011, p. 26 and DEMA s RVA Model, p.24 20

22 Scene of occurrence Where does the hazard Hilly areas around originate? municipality x Geographic extent Which area is affected by the hazard? Villages a, b and c around municipality x. Time When does the hazard take Afternoon at place? Springtime. Duration How long does it last? 6 hours from start of heavy rainfall to end of flash floods. Intensity How strong is the hazard/ flash flood? Warning Is this an expected/ unexpected event? Is there any advance time to warn the population? People and elements potentially affected Reference for the Scenario Who and what is in harms way? (People, infrastructure, services etc.) Have there been similar hazard events in the past? In the local government area (or in other adjourning areas)? No data on flow/ volume. But within 2 hours a creek normally 20 cm deep swells to a torrent of 2 m. Weather forecast warns of chance of heavy rains in the wider region but warning is unspecific. There is no advance warning. 100 houses and gardens (small plots of agriculture) with households of 3-4 people on average. Majority of population is old people, children and teenagers (many adults in working age have migrated for work and live abroad). There is one (asphalted) intra- village road and three dirt roads. One aqueduct and two drainage channels. One school and two health posts. One village administration building. Yes in 1976, 85, 1992 and 2002, 2010 and In a similar event in 2010 for instance there were 2 fatalities, 15 houses were destroyed, 20 were badly damaged etc. etc. 21

23 A scenario would usually consist of a paragraph developing the hazard event and impact according to the elements illustrated above. Similar scenarios will be established for a variety of key hazards looking at a range of moderately to potentially highly damaging events. This includes mixing localized events that affect only a smaller number of villages and events that affect more or less the entire territory of the local government area (i.e. potentially earthquakes; large- scale floods). In the scenario development existing quantitative data on hazard intensity should be taken into account if it is available. If unavailable it will be good to refer to a real event in the past (see above). 5.2 Vulnerability and Impact Analysis In order to assess vulnerability or the expected impact of a hazard on a given territorial unit and population it is good to investigate key impact elements i.e. population, environment (buildings and lands), economy, services and infrastructure. The question is what would happen (to the elements in question) if the scenario occurred and why? The abbreviated table 17 below illustrates this step and helps to think through the possible impact of any given scenario. Table No 6: Assessing Impact and Vulnerability to Hazard Scenarios CATEGORY Damage Description Units Type People Deaths Persons who die as a Number consequence of the hazard Injuries Persons who are injured, or Number who become sick due to the incident Environment Houses Houses that have been Number (Buildings, destroyed totally or partially destroyed Waters and Agricultural Agricultural land that is Ha Lands) lands damaged/ cannot be used damaged because of the hazard and Number of number of people affected. farmers/workers Economy Physical Total sum of replacement National direct value of material damage Currency damage 18 Infrastructure Water supply network damaged Duration and spatial extent as well as number of people affected Number, days hours/ 17 A fuller version of the table can be found in Annex III. It is however also just an example, and should be adapted to country and local government context. 18 Most local government damage assessments focus upon direct damage only. If figures exist about indirect damages (loss of supply, delivery interruptions etc.) this should be considered too, though separately. 22

24 Services Roads and Bridges damaged and people isolated. Health facilities and services damaged Education facilities and services damaged Duration/ and spatial extent as well as number of people affected Duration and spatial extent as well as number of people affected Duration and spatial extent as well as number of students affected Number, days Number, days Number, days hours/ hours/ hours/ It is important to note that different types of damages and underlying vulnerabilities are inter- connected i.e. numbers of deaths may be related to the availability and preparedness (or lack thereof) of health services, poor quality of roads (that delays rescue services) or the poor quality of construction of houses. Tip No Classifying Vulnerability/ Impact from various Hazards As the analysis identifies expected damages from various prioritized hazard scenarios hazard events can be classified according to their impact and level of destructiveness. This should again be done on a scale, for instance by distinguishing four grades of impact as illustrated in the table below. As a result hazard events occurring in the area will be classified according to the anticipated level of destructiveness. Table No 7 Classifying Impact of Hazard Events Value Classification Underlying classification indicators (EXAMPLES!) 4 Highly destructive Impact could be classified using a 3 Destructive 2 Moderate 1 Minor combination of the following damage indicators: o Numbers of dead/ injured o Number of destroyed houses o Number of people affected by destroyed infrastructure o Duration of disruption of services It is important that the working group agrees on the indicators to be used and 23

25 defines threshold values (i.e. > 50 injured = highly destructive ). The final report needs to explain the indicators that were used to distinguish highly destructive, destructive, moderate, minor and insignificant events 19. Later assessments need to be able to understand the underlying assumptions to update the analysis and if necessary adapt it. 5.4 Analyzing vulnerability factors or the Why? The analysis so far has been able to identify and classify the expected impact from various hazards on various vulnerable elements i.e. people, environment, infrastructure etc. In other words vulnerability has already been identified, localized and to some degree characterized. In this following step the analysis digs deeper 20 and attempts to find out why people and their bases of life i.e. economic assets, resources, services and infrastructure are susceptible to specific hazard events. For some hazards this can be relatively straightforward but often it is a complex task so we will only provide some pointers. Understanding why somebody or something is vulnerable will inform what needs to be done to reduce this vulnerability and the potential impact. Vulnerability can be broadly distinguished as being related to physical, social, economic, and environmental factors. Initially vulnerability studies focused upon the physical side i.e. quantitative assessments of the vulnerability of structures (i.e. in relation to the expected damage to buildings and infrastructure). However, in the last 25 years other vulnerability factors have gained much more attention especially since physical vulnerability (as in low- quality or ill- maintained structures) has been found to often relate to socioeconomic as well as political and institutional factors (i.e. transition of political and economic systems, population growth or decline, poverty, overuse of natural resources etc.). In contrast to physical vulnerability, social vulnerability can only be assessed in qualitative terms. Below is a classification of vulnerability factors with examples under each category. 19 Depending upon context, risk analysis may decide to go for simplified scales i.e. with only three values. 20 It is likely that many local governments that conduct a risk analysis for the first time will find it more difficult to go beyond the identification of vulnerability into the analysis of causal factors. 24

26 Figure 4 Classification of vulnerability factors Environ- mental factors i.e. qualty of water & soil; vegetation and forests; bio- diversity Physical factors i.e. quality of constuction; basic infrastructure and population growth/ density Social factors i.e. education; health status; human rights; gender and age aspects Economic factors i.e. poverty; sources & structure of incomes; acess to services & resources; credit How these factors interact to influence the vulnerability of a population (group) is highly contextual and related to a given political, social and economic reality. Therefore analysis needs to come up with specific indicators that help to further pinpoint and characterize vulnerability. Thinking through concrete hazard scenarios can help to identify some obvious indicators, other situations will require the involvement of technical experts and/ or participatory and qualitative research in hazard- prone locations and communities. The following list contains examples of indicators for measuring vulnerabilities to floods. Table No 8 Indicators (examples) to identify vulnerabilities (to floods) Vulnerability Factors Indicators Social Factors: o Education o Income o Social and Age Structure o Health status o Access to Information o Citizen Organizations Physical Factors: o Buildings Length of schooling; enrolment and absence rates % of population below poverty lines; Access to social protection % of women, men, girls and boys; age Mortality (- bidity); % of special needs; food insecurity; access to health services Early warning systems Number of CBOs/ membership Age and type (quality) of buildings 25

27 o Settlements and Infrastructure o Energy, water, roads o Demographic trends Economic Factors: o Type of income source(s) o Production o Farms and ownership Environmental Factors: o Soil o Vegetation Spatial planning; construction codes; legality of settlements Access to energy, water, transport Population growth, migration % of income from agriculture/ o. sources Volume of agricultural/ industrial/ other production Size of farms; distribution of ownership Erosion; overuse; degradation Ground cover; (de- )forestation The vulnerability of people living in urban or rural areas may require different indicators as they often rely on different resources and services for their day- to- day existence. As vulnerability to different hazard scenarios is investigated it may occur that certain groups with certain characteristics are more vulnerable than others, and not only to one but to a range of destructive hazards. Identifying these highly vulnerable groups and understanding their vulnerability is an important result of vulnerability analysis. Understanding the vulnerability of children to hazards As stated in the introduction to this guide, 50-60% of all individuals affected by disasters worldwide are children. Disasters often exacerbate existing inequities. In the CEE/ CIS region children are more likely to be poor but less likely than adults to benefit from social assistance. Children that live in extreme poverty often come from families with four or more children, live in rural areas, have special needs, are from ethnic minorities such as the Roma or have been left behind as a result of migration. 21 It is reasonable to assume that poor households with children that share one or more of the above characteristics would be more vulnerable than others to existing hazards as they may lack the physical, social and economic attributes and resources to withstand or cope with a destructive event. Overlaying data on the deprivation of children with data on hazard(s) would help to identify highly vulnerable children. Local social protection services may have relevant data that would allow identifying these households. Indicators that are relevant to the specific context of the reference area should be designed in close cooperation with these services. Tip No UNICEF CEE/ CIS 2012 Report, page 3 26