Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reduction
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1 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty
2 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Back to Risk We will mostly treat the category of risk/likelihoo/robabilities: Easiest to cature mathematically Sufficiently rofoun to erive interesting insights Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 5
3 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction oel: Two ossible outcomes Probability of amage e.g. Great Barrier reef ea by 050 ==5 with robability =Pr=5=.5 =0 with robability =Pr=0=.5 is ranom variable an is magnitue of ossible amage in $ Baseline consumtion = Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 6
4 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction oel: Two ossible outcomes Probability of amage e.g. Great Barrier reef ea by 050 ==5 with robability =Pr=5=.5 =0 with robability =Pr=0=.5 is ranom variable an is magnitue of ossible amage in $ Baseline consumtion = Execte utility of lottery Examle of Risk neutrality where =: 3 Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 7
5 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction The Economics of Climate Change C 75 tility of lottery SALL Change in risk: > *=+Δ SALL Change in risk: > =+Δ ] [ ] [ * * * ] [ ] [ So the change Δ causes a welfare change: * * Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 8
6 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction The Economics of Climate Change C 75 tility of lottery Similarly : Similarly : SALL Change in baseline consumtion/money: >*=+ Δ * * * ' With ste intuition: small amount of consumtion change Δ times execte marginal utility erive from Δ So the change Δ causes a welfare change: ' * Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty
7 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction Question: How much Δ willing to sen at most to reuce risk by Δ? Answer: Welfare change cause by Δ together with welfare change cause by Δ shoul leave agent inifferent to no change Hence: From which follows: 0 ' ' Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 30
8 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction ' Interretation: The willingness to ay for a risk reuction Increases in the utility loss cause by the amage ecreases in the execte value of money which agent has to give u Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 3
9 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction: Examle The Economics of Climate Change C 75 ' Risk neutral agent =: 5 Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 3
10 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction: Examle The Economics of Climate Change C 75 ' Risk neutral agent =: 5 Risk averse agent = : Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 33
11 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction: Homework The Economics of Climate Change C 75 ' Assume =Pr=5=. Risk neutral agent =: Risk averse agent = : Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 3
12 Willingness to Pay for a Risk Reuction: Homework The Economics of Climate Change C 75 ' Assume =Pr=5=. Risk neutral agent =: 5 Risk averse agent = : Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty
13 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Intuition Risk Neutral vs. Risk Averse ' Without loss of generality: if you woner why that is without loss > office hour Assume that an coincie for risk averse an risk neutral agent Then enominator ecies: Risk neutral agent has same marginal utility at an Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 36
14 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Intuition Risk Neutral vs. Risk Averse ' Without loss of generality: if you woner why that is without loss > office hour Assume that an coincie for risk averse an risk neutral agent Then enominator ecies: Risk neutral agent has same marginal utility at an Risk averse agent has Higher marginal utility at than risk neutral agent Lower marginal utility at than risk neutral agent > > ore weight on high outcome ecreases execte marginal utility that risk averse agent erives from the ollar he has to give u to reuce > ore weight on low outcome increases execte marginal utility that t risk ik averse agent erives from the ollar he has to give u to reuce Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 37
15 The Economics of Climate Change C 75 Intuition Risk Neutral vs. Risk Averse Risk averse ecision maker relative to risk neutral ecision maker: In the ba state the risk averse ecision maker is hurt relatively more by the money he gives u for the risk reuction which makes him even worse off than in the former ba state In the goo state the risk averse ecision maker is hurt relatively less by the money he gives u for the risk reuction concave utility > refers less in goo state in orer to avoi ba state It eens on robability weight of goo vs. ba state magnitue of marginal utility ifference in goo vs. ba state with resect to risk neutral agent whether risk averse agent is willing to ay more or less for risk reuction Sring 0 C Berkeley Traeger 5 Risk an ncertainty 38
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