Price setting in the electricity markets within the EU single market

Transcription

1 PricesettingintheelectricitymarketswithintheEUsingle market AreportbyEASACtotheCommitteeonIndustry,ResearchandEnergyoftheEuropean Parliament February2006 Forfurtherinformation: FionaSteiger EASACSecretariat TheRoyalSociety 6-9CarltonHouseTerrace London SW1Y5AG tel:+44(0) fax:+44(0)

2 EASAC EASAC theeuropeanacademiesscienceadvisorycouncil isformedbythenationalscienceacademiesofthe EUMemberStatestoenablethemtocollaboratewitheachotherinprovidingadvicetoEuropeanpolicy-makers. ItthusprovidesameansforthecollectivevoiceofEuropeansciencetobeheard. Itsmissionreflectstheviewofacademiesthatscienceiscentraltomanyaspectsofmodernlifeandthatan appreciationofthescientificdimensionisapre-requisitetowisepolicy-making.thisviewalreadyunderpinsthe workofmanyacademiesatnationallevel.withthegrowingimportanceoftheeuropeanunionasanarenafor policy,academiesrecognisethatthescopeoftheiradvisoryfunctionsneedstoextendbeyondthenationalto coveralsotheeuropeanlevel.hereitisoftenthecasethatatrans-europeangroupingcanbemoreeffective thanabodyfromasinglecountry.theacademiesofeuropehavethereforeformedeasacsothattheycan speakwithacommonvoicewiththegoalofbuildingscienceintopolicyateulevel. ThroughEASAC,theacademiesworktogethertoprovideindependent,expert,evidence-basedadviceaboutthe scientificaspectsofpublicpolicytothosewhomakeorinfluencepolicywithintheeuropeaninstitutions. Drawingonthemembershipsandnetworksoftheacademies,EASACaccessesthebestofEuropeansciencein carryingoutitswork.itsviewsarevigorouslyindependentofcommercialorpoliticalbias,anditisopenand transparentinitsprocesses.easacaimstodeliveradvicethatiscomprehensible,relevantandtimely. EASACcoversallscientificandtechnicaldisciplines,anditsexpertsaredrawnfromallthecountriesofthe EuropeanUnion.Itisfundedbythememberacademiesandbycontractswithinterestedbodies.Theexpert membersofprojectgroupsgivetheirtimefreeofcharge.easachasnocommercialorbusinesssponsors. EASAC'sactivitiesincludesubstantivestudiesofthescientificaspectsofpolicyissues,reviewsandadviceabout policydocuments,workshopsaimedatidentifyingcurrentscientificthinkingaboutmajorpolicyissuesorat briefingpolicy-makers,andshort,timelystatementsontopicalsubjects. TheEASACCouncilhas24individualmembers highlyexperiencedscientistsnominatedoneeachbythe nationalscienceacademiesofeveryeumemberstatethathasone,theacademiaeuropaeaandallea.itis supportedbyaprofessionalsecretariatbasedattheroyalsocietyinlondon.thecouncilagreestheinitiationof projects,appointsmembersofprojectgroups,reviewsdraftsandapprovesreportsforpublication. TofindoutmoreaboutEASAC,visitthewebsite 2

3 Contents Introduction Summary 1 Characteristicsofthemainelectricitymarkets 1.1 Mainelectricitymarkets 1.2 Internationalinterdependence 1.3 Competition 1.4 Networkunbundling 1.5 Publicvsprivatesectors 1.6 Regulation 1.7 Conclusions 2 Europeanpricestructuresandtrends 2.1 Pricestructures 2.2 Pricetrends 2.3 Conclusions 3 Impactonelectricitypricesofemissionstrading 3.1 Background 3.2 ElectricitypriceeffectsoftheEU-ETS:theory 3.3 ElectricitypriceeffectsoftheEU-ETS:evidence 3.4 EfficiencyofpricerisesduetoEU-ETS 3.5 Conclusions 4 Long-termcontracts 4.1 Background 4.2 Benefitsoflong-termcontracts 4.3 Risksoflong-termcontracts 4.4 Otherfactors 4.5 Conclusions 5 Conclusions Bibliography Tables 1 KeycharacteristicsofEUelectricitymarkets 2 Internationalinterdependence 3 Competitioninretailandgenerationmarkets 4 Levelofcustomersswitchingsupplier 5 Networkunbundling 6 Marketopening 7 Regulatoryrole 8 Electricityforhouseholds averagepricebycountryofonekwh 9 Coefficientsofvariationforregionalelectricitymarkets 10 Estimatesofpriceimpactsofemissionstrading Figures 1 Regulatoryindependence 2 DevelopmentoftheaveragepriceofonekWhfordomesticelectricityconsumption 3 DevelopmentoftheaveragepriceofonekWhforindustrialelectricityconsumption 4 Priceconvergence coefficientofvariation 5 Estimatedbreakdownofexpectedelectricityprices EvolutionofthepriceofanEUemissionsallowance 7 Differencesbetweenmarginalcostsandwholesalepowerprices 8 SparkspreadsofUK,DE,andNLbeforeandafterEU-ETS 3

4 Introduction ThisreportwascommissionedfromEASACbytheEuropeanParliamentCommitteeonIndustry,Researchand Energyaspartofitsover-archingframeworkcontract. TheEuropeanCommissionrecentlyputforwardadetailedreportdescribingprogressinthecreationofthe internalelectricity(andgas)market 1 andisplanninganotheroneoncompetitiveness in gas and electricity to comeinthefirsthalfof2006.inpreparationforthis,atleastwhereitreferstotheelectricitymarket,the EuropeanParliamenthasrequestedananalysisofsomeimportantissues,namely: 1 thecharacteristicsofthemainelectricitymarketswithintheeusinglemarket 2 anassessmentofthepricingstructuresandcomparisonbetweenmarkets,showingpricetrends 3 theimpactonpricestoend-usersofemissionstradingcertificates/allowances 4 theimpactoflong-termcontractsontheefficiencyofelectricitymarkets Ourreportisbasedonthecontributionsandinputofthefollowingexperts,workingonavolunteerbasis: ProfessorJohnFitzGerald,EconomicandSocialResearchInstitute,Dublin,Ireland ProfessorJean-MichelGlachant,UniversityParisSud,France ProfessorFerdinandGubina,UniversityofLjubljana,Slovenia ProfessorDavidNewbery,UniversityofCambridge,UK ProfessorWolfgangPfaffenberger,BremenEnergyInstitute,InternationalUniversity,Germany ProfessorPekkaPirilä,HelsinkiUniversityofTechnology,Finland TheexpertsweresupportedbyasecretariatconsistingofChrisDoyle,StephenHansenandFionaSteiger.The reporthasbeenreviewedbytheeasaccouncil. 1 COM(2005)568final,CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheCouncilandtheEuropeanParliament,Reporton Progressincreatingtheinternalgasandelectricitymarket,{SEC(2005)1448} 4

5 Summary ThroughthelegislationbeingimplementedatEuropeanUnionleveltheEUwillhavethemostintegratedenergy marketintheworld:from1july2007boththedomesticandindustrialmarketswillbefullyopen.additionally, thelegislationseekstheunbundlingofproductionandsupplyactivitiesintheenergymarkets. ThisreporthasbeencommissionedtofacilitatefurtherconsiderationoftheelectricitymarketswithintheEUby themembersoftheindustry,researchandenergycommitteeoftheeuropeanparliament.itconsidersfour areas:themaincharacteristicsoftheeuelectricitymarkets,theirpricestructures,howtherecentlyimplemented emissionstradingallowancesschemewillimpactonthepriceschargedtoend-users,andhowlong-term contractswillimpactontheefficiencyoftheelectricitymarkets. ElectricitymarketswithintheEUarehighlydiverse.However,ingeneralitisclearthatinterconnectivityislow andthatpricingiscomplexanddependentontheregulatoryframework,capacityandglobalenergyprices. EmissionTradingAllowancesarealsocomplexandhavethecapacitytoaffectpricesandgeneratingmix,though itistooearlyforanysucheffectstobeclear.long-termcontractsarenecessaryforimprovedstability,efficiency andcompetitiveness. Characteristics of the electricity markets TheelectricitymarketsoftheEUaregenerallydividedintosixregions,someofwhich,suchastheBalticregion orthenordicregion,arerelativelyhomogenousentitieswithanoperatingregionalmarket,whileothers,suchas thewesterneuropeanregion,arenotyetveryintegratedbutsharesimilarcharacteristics.cross-bordertrade currentlyaccountsforonlyabout8%ofeuelectricityconsumption,afigurethatcanbeattributedtoalowlevel ofinterconnectingcapacitybetweenmemberstatesandtherelativeisolationofnationalmarkets. Thecharacteristicsofthemarketsconsideredinourstudyare Internationalinterdependence Competition Networkunbundling Publicvsprivatesectors Regulation ItisnotpossibletomakebroadgeneralisationsabouttheEUelectricitymarketsacrossanyofthese characteristics,andevenataregionallevelthemarketsareoftenmoreconceptualthanactualfunctioning entities.however,oneparameterwheremoreofadistinctiveregionalsimilaritycanbeseenisintheopeningup ofthemarkets,withthenewaccessioncountriesgenerallyshowinglowerdegreesofmarketopeningthanthe EU-15states.Buteventhatdistinctionisnotaclearone.ThoughtheultimateaimofEuropeanelectricitypolicy istocreateaneu-widemarketforelectricity,thereiscommonagreementthatthisisstillsomewayoffandthat atthisstageitwouldbeprematuretotalkofan EUmarket forelectricity. Pricing structures ExaminingpricestructuresintheEUelectricitymarketsisnotsimplebecauseofthemarketliberalisationthathas alreadytakenplace,whichhasledtomanymorecompetingtariffsandcompaniesnotbeingeagertoshare commerciallysensitiveinformation.however,theeuelectricitymarketssharemanysimilarpricingstructures, includingmoreflexibletariffsforindustrialusers. 5

6 6 Whilethepricestructuresarelargelysimilar,areasofdifferencedoexist,includinganumberofMemberStates offeringsocialtariffstodomesticcustomers,usuallythepoorordisadvantaged.valueaddedtaxischargedon electricityinallthememberstates,thoughtheaccessionmemberstendnottohaveanyextrataxesonelectricity whiletheeu-15largelydo.notsurprisingly,unregulatedmarketsoffermoretariffs,structuresandservicesto customers. Themediantrendforprices,exclusiveoftaxes,wasdownwardbetween1995and2000forbothdomesticand industrialusersofelectricity.priceswerethenstableforfiveyearsbeforebeginningtorisein2005.theprice decreasesafter1995wereconsistentwiththepredictedeffectsofmarketliberalisation,butitshouldalsobe appreciatedthatenergypricesfellandproductivityrose,bothofwhichwouldcontributetofallingelectricity prices.itisnotjustmarketliberalisationthatcancauselowerprices.conversely,thestabilityinpricesandthen therecentrisesdonotmeanthatliberalisationhasceasedtobeeffective;risesinthepriceofgasandoilhave impactedonelectricitypricesinthepastyear.moreover,whenliberalisationbegantheeuropeanelectricity markethadexcesscapacity;thishasnowdwindled,leadingtoanupwardpressureonprices. Interconnectionofelectricitysupplyandprovisionwouldlogicallyseemtoleadtoaconvergenceofprices.The evidenceseemstosupportthisastheregionsacrosstheeuhavemoreconvergenceinpricesthantheeu-25as awhole.however,thesamepricecanhaveadifferentimpactindifferentcountrieswhenenergypricesare convertedtoapercentageofthecostofliving. Insummary,theformatofelectricitypricesiscommontomostEUcountries,withindustrialconsumershavinga widerchoiceoftariffsthandomesticcustomers.priceshavedroppedsinceliberalisationbegan,butdidincrease in2005,foranumberofreasons.sincethemarketsbegantoopenpriceshavebeguntoconvergeatregional level,thoughnotacrosstheeuasawhole. Emission trading allowances AnewimpactonpricesistheEmissionsTradingSchemewhichstartedin2005aspartoftheEU scommitment tomeetingitskyototargets.underthescheme,businessesthatemitcarbondioxidemustholdallowancesat theendofeachyearequaltothevolumeofco 2 emitted.iftheydonothavesufficienttocovertheiremissions theymustbuyextraallowancesontheopenmarket,butconverselytheyarealsoabletosellunusedallowances ontheopenmarket.thepriceoftheallowancesisnotfixedbutwillrespondtothedemandsofthemarket place.inthesecondhalfof2005thepriceofanallowancestabilisedaftershootingupinthesummer.the factorsbehindthesuddenrisewouldseemtobetherapidincreaseingasprices,thedroughtsinsouth-west Europeandextremeweatherinspringandearlysummerleadingtounexpectedlyhighdemandforenergy. OnlyayearintotheschemeithasbeendifficulttoquantifytheeffectthatEmissionsTradingAllowances(ETAs) havehadonthepriceofelectricity,buttheirimpactseemstobedifferentonwholesalepricesthanonend-user prices.theorysuggeststhatcostswillbepassedontoconsumers,unlessasignificantproportionofenergy comesfromzero-emissionssources.buttherearealsoscenariosthatsuggestthatnosignificantrisechangeswill result.thereiscertainlythepotentialfortheschemetoalterthegeneratingmix,however,ifcostsforcheapbut environmentallyintensivesourcesriseabovethoseformoreexpensivebutcleanertechnologies. AnalysisbyDavidNewberyhasledtotheconclusionthatmostoftheallowancecosthasbeenpassedthrough intothewholesaleprice.theimpactonend-userpricesseemstobelessthanonthewholesaleprice,because mosteuropeanhouseholdsareonregulatedtariffswhichareprotectedfromcostsarisingfromtheetas. Industrialcustomers,althoughgenerallyoperatinginfreemarkets,can,insomecountries,switchbackto regulatedtariffs.thelong-termcontractsthatsomeindustrialusersareonareonlypartiallylinkedtothe wholesalemarkets;sofar,thishaslessenedtheimpactofetasonindustrialend-userprices.atthisstage, though,wewouldemphasisethatitisstilltooearlyinthelifetimeoftheetastoconductmeaningfulanalysis.

7 Long-term contracts Althoughlong-termcontractsareusedintheEUitisdifficulttosayexactlyhowmuchofthemarketiscovered bythem.long-termcontractsarethemeansforindustrialelectricityuserstoshieldthemselvesfromthevolatility ofthemarket.thisstabilitypersuadesplayersinthemarkettotaketheriskofparticipating.thelackoflongtermcontractsisconsideredtobethesolereasonbehindthecaliforniaelectricitycrisisin Themainadvantageoflong-termcontractsisthattheyencourageinvestmentinaverycapital-intensive,slowreturnindustrybyallowinginvestorstomanagetheirinvestmentrisk.Ifcustomersarenotpreparedtosign contractsformorethanacoupleofyearsthennewentrantswillnotbeencouragedtoenterthemarket.by beingabletolockinasecurerevenuefromlong-termcontractsnewfirmsarelikelytobepreparedtoenterthe market,whichpromotesfurthercompetitiveness. Aswellasgivingnewproviderstheincentivetoentertheelectricitymarket,long-termcontractsservetoaid efficienttimingofessentialmaintenanceworktoelectricityplantsasgeneratorsscheduletheirworkforthe cheapesttimesinthemarket,whichiswhenthereareplentyofothersourcesofelectricityavailablefor customers. Contracttradingwouldbefundamentaltotheefficiencyimpactoflong-termcontractsontheelectricity markets:withaliquidandfunctioningmarketforlong-termcontractsitislikelythattheriskreducingand efficiencyenhancingconsequencesofthecontractswoulddominate.however,inasmall,staticmarketitwill haveanegativeeffect. Anotherargumentinfavouroflong-termcontractsisthattheycoulddiscouragecollusionashighrewardsgive theprovideranincentiveto cheat onacartel.astheshort-term, spot,marketbecomeslessofasourceof incomeforproviders,thequantityofincomegainedthroughcollusiondeclinesandsocollusiveactivitybecomes lessattractive. Theconclusionamongcommentatorsisthatlong-termcontractswouldimproveefficiencyintheelectricity industryduetothreemainbenefits:stabilityofprices,encouraginginvestmentandunderminingexploitationof marketpower.however,long-termcontractswillnotsolvemismatchesbetweenmarketdemandandsupply. 7

8 1 Characteristics of the main electricity markets ThissectionofthereportwillfirstlistthekeycharacteristicsofthemainEUelectricitymarkets.Afterconsidering whatwemeanby maineuelectricitymarkets,wethenexaminethemarketsbyarangeofindicators includinginternationaldependence,competitivenessandnetworkunbundling. 1.1 Main electricity markets InitsMarch2004strategypaperMedium-term vision for the internal electricity market,theeuropean Commissionsetoutitscurrentpolicywhichisbasedonaregionalstepping-stoneapproachtowardselectricity integration.themedium-termaimissuccessfulintegrationofcountriesintolocalregionalmarkets;withthis thenultimatelybeingfollowedbyfurtherintegrationintoafully-fledgedeuropeanmarket. Currently,cross-bordertradeisrelativelylowatabout8%ofEUelectricityconsumption.Thiscanbeattributed tothepreviousrelativeisolationofnationalmarkets.therehasalsobeenanhistoricallackofinterconnecting capacitybetweencountries,withcriticalbottlenecksinsomeareas,thoughtheeuropeancouncilmeetingin Barcelona2002attemptedtotacklethisbyinsistingthatcountriespossessinterconnectingcapacityequaltoat least10%oftheirgeneratingcapacity. ThoughtheultimateaimofEuropeanelectricitypolicyistocreateanEU-widemarketforelectricity,thereis commonagreementthatthisisstillsomewayoffandthatatthisstageitwouldbeprematuretotalkofan EU market forelectricity. Itmakessensetotalkof regionalmarkets ontwolevels.first,thereareexamplesofregionswherecountries do,tosomeextentatleast,haveanoperatingregionalmarket suchasthenordicmarketandtoalesser extenttheiberianmarket.secondandmorebroadly, regionalmarkets tendtogroupcountriestogetheronthe basisofsimilarmarkets,commonregionalcharacteristicsandculturalandphysicallinkswhereitisimagined that,intime,thesecountriescouldlikelyformthebasisoftrueregionalmarkets. Thus,itisimportanttonotethelimitationofdiscussingregionalmarkets-thatnotall regionalmarkets actually functionastruemarketsatthistime(easterneuropeforexample).itremainsnecessarytoexaminecountries individuallyaswellascollectively,asformostcountriestheelectricitymarketwouldmostcorrectlybedefinedon anationalratherthanaregionalbasis. Thereexistsroughlybroadagreementonregionalmarketdefinitions,thoughthereisnotunanimityonthe classifications.herewediscusssixareasandthedegreetowhichtheyarefunctionalasaregionalmarket: (i) (ii) Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Thisrepresentsthemajor(nascent)regionalmarketforelectricitywithintheEU.Thoughitdoesnotyet representatrueintegratedmarket,therearealreadysignsofitdeveloping forexampleinaustriaand somepartsoffranceandgermanyacommonwholesalepriceareahasdevelopedbecauseofthehigh leveloflocalinterconnection. Iberia: Spain and Portugal MovestowardsasingleIberianelectricitymarketstartedin1998.November2001sawthesigningofa CollaborationProtocolinwhichitwasstatedthattheaimwastocreateasingleIberianmarketfor electricity.thefirststageoftheprocesswillbetheestablishmentofacommonwholesaleelectricity market,withconvergenceoftheretailmarketstofollowlater.althoughitwasinitiallyintendedforthe 8

9 (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) Iberianmarkettobeginoperatingon1January2003,thishasbeendelayedbecauseofchangesinthe politicalsituation thoughfurtheragreementshavebeensignedsincethen. UK and Ireland Thoughtherearelinkagesbetweenthem,anddiscussionsofextendingtheseinthefuture,theUKand Irelanddonottrulyformasinglemarket,buttheydostandtogetherasisolatedislandsinNorthwest EuropewithlimitedscopeforconnectiontotherestofEuropeintheimmediatefuture.Therehasalso beensignificantprogressinachievingintegrationwithinthisregion,ieimprovinginterconnection betweentherepublicofirelandandnorthernireland,andbetweenengland,walesandscotland. Nordic: Denmark, Finland and Sweden (and also Norway) TheNordicmarketrepresentsthegreatestdegreeofintegrationofanyoftheregionalEUmarkets.This integrationhasbeendevelopingoveranumberofyears,andtheregionnowboaststheremovalof separatebordertariffsandacommonwholesalemarketforelectricitysharedbetweendenmark, Finland,SwedenandNorway the NordPool.TheshareoftradingthroughtheNordPoolhasrisento 40%oftotalelectricityconsumptionin2004,withtherestthroughbilateraltradesdirectlyorusing over-the-counterservices.thelevelofpricesettinginthepoolisgenerallydominatedbyhydropower producersbecauseoftheirlowmarginalcostsandtypicalstatusasmarginalproducers;thoughthis dependsuponhydrologicalconditionswhich,whenpoor,candrivepricessignificantlyhigher. UndernormalloadconditionstheinterconnectionsbetweendifferentareasoftheNordicpowersystem aresufficienttofulfillalltransmissionneeds,butundervariouscircumstancesbottleneckslimit transmission.therefore,bynomeansarethesecountriesfullyintegrated;infactforabouthalfofthe hoursoftheyearthemarketareaissplitintoseveralpriceareasasthetransmissionnetworkcannot cope.whenthissortofsplittingoccurs,pricesaredeterminedseparatelyforeachpriceareaassuming thattheinterconnectionsbetweeneachareaareusedfully.thereareplanstoreinforcethenetworkat severalkeypoints,asthesesplitssignificantlycompromiseoperationofthemarket;inaddition,thefact thatthisproblemissoacuteinsuchastronglyinterconnectedareathrowsdoubtuponplanstoextend themarkettoareaswithmuchweakerconnectionsanytimesoon. Baltic: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania InFebruary2000,Estonia,LatviaandLithuaniadecidedtocreateacommonBalticelectricitymarketand establishtransmissionlinksbetweenthethreecountries;thethreecountriesnowhaveajointpower poolknownas BalticIPS.OneofthemajorobjectivesoftheBalticIPSsystemistheenhancementof regionalcooperationanditsintegrationintothewesterneuropeanelectricitymarket.thereareplans forimprovementstothetransmissiongrid,throughinterconnectingitwiththepolishelectricitysystem. Ithasbeennotedthatthiscross-bordertransmissionprojectbetweenLithuaniaandPolandisofgreat importanceforthedevelopmentofanintegratedeuelectricitymarketandfortheimprovementofthe reliabilityofsupply. Eastern Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia TheEasternEuropeancountriesareintheearlystagesofelectricitymarketreformandhavesomeway togobeforetheyformatrueregionalmarket.however,havingelectricitymarketsinsimilarstatesof evolutiontheycanconceptuallybeusefullygroupedtogether. AdaptationoflawswithinthereformsandtheirinterpretationindifferentEasternEuropeanmarkets varies,leadingtodifferentmarketdevelopments.asanexample,coordinatedexplicittransmission capacityauctionsbetweenthepolish,czech,slovakandgermantransmissionsystemoperatorsare 9

10 takingplace.similarly,sloveniawithitsadoptionoftheeuropeanmarketmodelinfluencesthebalkan powerregion. ThecentralEuropeannetworkgetscongestedbecauseoftheprioritygiventorenewables.With20GW ofelectricityingermanyrequiredtobesourcedfromwindenergy,atcertaintimes(windpeak,low electricitydemandandwindnotbehavingasprojected)plannedtransactionshavetoberescheduled andtheeffectsarefeltoutsidethegermanborders.thisisanobstacletotradeinthenetwork.experts agreethatfluctuatingwindenergyhastobeintegratedintothesystemmanagement.atpresentthat wouldbeillegal. Inaddition,thereareseveralcountriesthatdonotfitintoanyoftheseregionalmarketsneatly:Malta,Greece andcyprusfallintothiscategorybecauseoftheirisolatedgeographiclocations.herewealsoincludeitaly, whichdoesnotfitwellintoanyonemarket somecommentatorsplaceitintheiberian( SouthernEurope ) market,somethewesterneuropean,whileothersargueitisaspecialcaseforvariousreasonssuchasits locationanditsrelativelaginestablishingacompetitivegenerationmarketandnationalelectricitypool. Weusethesedefinitionsofregionalmarketswhereitmakessensetodoso,butfocusuponnationalmarkets wherethisprovidesamoreaccuratescopeofanalysis.therefore,whereitappearstherearemeaningfulregional trends,weprovideregionalfigures. Table1givessomekeyfiguresonelectricityproductionandconsumptionfortheEUonacountrybycountry basis.whatisimmediatelystrikingisthevariation,particularlybyfuelmix.notealsothatthisvariationshowsno regionalpattern:thereisasmuchvariationwithinregionsasbetweenregions. ForexampleintheNordiccountries,Swedenusesverylittlecoal,whileFinlandandDenmarkaresignificantusers ofitasafuelsource.ineasterneurope,polandisalmostentirelyreliantuponcoal,whilstothercountriesinthe regionuseitfarless:slovakiaandsloveniaaremuchlargerusersofnuclearenergy,whilsthungaryisalso significantlydependentupongas.nuclearenergyhasavarieduseacrosstheeu:franceandlithuania,for example,useover77%and79%respectivelyastheirsourceofelectricityproduction,while12countries, includingaustria,cyprusandpolanddonotuseanynuclearenergy.twoofthenewestandsmallesteu countries,maltaandcyprusareentirelydependentonoilfortheirenergyproductionbutafewcountries, includingtheczechrepublicandestoniauselessthan1%oil. Onusage,againthereisnoconsistencyacrosstheEU-25countries,withsomecountries,suchastheUK, HungaryandFrancehavingtheirhighestusageamongresidentialcustomerswhileinotherssuchasGermany, FinlandandPolandindustryusesmostelectricity. 10

11 Table 1 Key characteristics of EU electricity markets Total electricity production* (GWh) Totalfinal consumption* (GWh) Coal % Oil % Gas % Electricityproductionfuelmix Biomass % Waste % Nuclear % 11 Hydro % Other % Industry % Transport % Consumptionusage Agriculture % Commercial andpublic services% Residential % Austria 63,173 60, % 2.8% 17.8% 2.6% 0.6% 0.0% 60.7% 0.6% 40.3% 5.4% 2.0% 25.0% 27.2% 0.0% Belgium 84,630 79, % 1.2% 25.5% 0.7% 1.3% 56.0% 1.6% 0.1% 50.2% 1.9% 0.4% 14.9% 32.6% 0.0% Cyprus 4,044 3, % 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.9% 0.8% 3.1% 44.9% 35.6% 1.6% CzechRepublic 83,227 52, % 0.4% 3.7% 0.6% 0.0% 31.1% 2.2% 0.0% 39.2% 4.2% 2.1% 24.0% 27.7% 2.8% Denmark 46,264 32, % 5.1% 21.2% 3.6% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 12.2% 30.1% 1.1% 5.9% 31.3% 31.7% 0.0% Estonia 10,159 5, % 0.4% 6.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 36.4% 1.7% 3.7% 29.5% 28.6% 0.0% Finland 84,228 80, % 1.1% 16.6% 11.2% 0.9% 27.0% 11.4% 0.1% 54.8% 0.8% 1.1% 18.1% 25.2% 0.0% France 566, , % 1.5% 3.0% 0.3% 0.6% 77.8% 11.3% 0.2% 32.5% 2.9% 0.8% 27.5% 34.5% 1.7% Germany 599, , % 0.8% 9.8% 0.7% 1.5% 27.5% 4.1% 3.2% 45.5% 3.2% 1.5% 22.4% 27.4% 0.0% Greece 58,478 48, % 14.9% 13.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 9.1% 1.7% 29.1% 0.5% 5.7% 30.8% 33.8% 0.0% Hungary 34,145 31, % 4.8% 34.8% 0.4% 0.2% 32.3% 0.5% 0.0% 30.5% 3.3% 3.4% 27.5% 35.2% 0.0% Ireland 25,235 22, % 9.7% 51.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 1.8% 31.5% 0.1% 0.0% 34.8% 33.6% 0.0% Italy 293, , % 25.9% 39.9% 0.5% 1.1% 0.0% 15.1% 2.6% 49.5% 3.2% 1.8% 23.1% 22.3% 0.0% Latvia 3,979 5, % 2.1% 38.5% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 57.0% 1.2% 30.9% 2.6% 3.1% 35.9% 27.3% 0.2% Lithuania 19,488 7, % 1.7% 12.9% 0.0% 0.0% 79.5% 5.1% 0.9% 36.6% 1.3% 2.3% 33.4% 26.4% 0.0% Luxembourg 3,620 6, % 0.0% 72.1% 0.5% 1.3% 0.0% 25.3% 0.7% 66.1% 1.7% 1.3% 18.4% 12.5% 0.0% Malta 2,236 1, % 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 30.8% 0.0% 0.0% 34.8% 34.4% 0.0% Netherlands 96, , % 3.0% 58.8% 1.3% 2.7% 4.2% 0.1% 1.6% 40.5% 1.6% 4.0% 30.8% 23.2% 0.0% Poland 151,631 98, % 1.6% 1.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.0% 2.2% 0.1% 40.7% 4.8% 4.3% 27.8% 22.3% 0.0% Portugal 46,852 43, % 13.2% 16.5% 2.6% 1.2% 0.0% 34.3% 1.3% 39.0% 1.0% 2.1% 30.5% 27.4% 0.0% Slovakia 31,178 22, % 2.3% 7.7% 0.3% 0.1% 57.3% 11.8% 0.1% 49.4% 3.2% 4.0% 21.5% 22.0% 0.0% Slovenia 14,019 12, % 0.4% 2.6% 0.9% 0.0% 37.1% 22.5% 0.0% 52.6% 1.4% 1.1% 13.2% 24.0% 7.6% Spain 260, , % 9.2% 15.1% 1.1% 0.3% 23.7% 16.8% 4.6% 44.2% 2.4% 2.3% 26.3% 24.9% 0.0% Sweden 135, , % 2.9% 0.4% 3.9% 0.3% 49.7% 39.3% 0.5% 42.9% 2.2% 1.5% 21.8% 31.6% 0.0% UK 398, , % 1.8% 37.3% 1.3% 0.4% 22.2% 1.5% 0.3% 33.8% 2.5% 1.2% 28.2% 34.3% 0.0% EU25 3,118,560 2,610, % 5.2% 17.7% 1.2% 0.8% 31.2% 10.4% 1.7% 41.1% 2.7% 1.8% 25.2% 28.8% 0.4% Source: IEA Energy Statistics data * Production and consumption differ because of imports and exports, transformation (ie electricity used by heat pumps and electricity used by electric boilers), the energy sector (ie own use by plant and electricity used for pumped storage), and distributional losses. ** This is against total domestic production. The EU figure is weighted by electricity production for fuel mix, and electricity consumption for use. Other %

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13 1.2 International interdependence ByinternationalinterdependencewemeanthedegreetowhichEUcountriesdependuponeachotherfor electricitythroughinternationaltrade;wealsodiscussthecurrentlimitationsontradeimposedbyscarce interconnectioncapacities.thereisanotherdimensiontothisissuethatwedonotdiscusshere,whichisthe degreetowhichcountriesdependupononeanotherforfuelresourcesthattheythenusetogenerateelectricity withintheirownborders. TheImportsandExportscolumnsofTable2showfiguresforactualcross-bordertradeinelectricity,normalised againstdomesticproductionintherelevantcountry.theregionalandeufiguresintable2donotrepresentthe Table 2 International interdependence Imports % Exports % ImportCapacityas a%ofinstalled Capacity* Austria 30% 21% 24% Belgium 17% 10% 29% Cyprus 0% 0% 0% CzechRepublic 12% 32% 23% Denmark 15% 34% 50% Estonia 1% 20% 66% Finland 14% 8% 14% France 1% 13% 13% Germany 8% 8% 11% Greece 7% 4% 12% Hungary 41% 21% 38% Ireland 5% 0% 6% Italy 18% 0% 8% Latvia 67% 1% 100% Lithuania 21% 60% 50% Luxembourg 179% 77% 90% Malta 0% 0% 0% Netherlands 21% 4% 17% Poland 3% 10% 10% Portugal 13% 7% 8% Slovakia 28% 35% 37% Slovenia 43% 41% 68% Spain 4% 3% 4% Sweden 18% 8% 29% UK 1% 1% 3% WesternEurope 9% 10% 15% Iberia 5% 4% 5% UK&Ireland 1% 1% 3% Nordic 16% 12% 27% Baltic 28% 30% 69% EasternEurope 16% 21% 23% EU 10% 8% 13% Source: Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market (2005) - Technical Annexes UCTE July 2003 forecast, Nordel winter forecast, NGC and ESBNG 7 year statement, ETSO Winter NTC data, includes capacity from Switzerland and South East Europe, excludes Morocco Ukraine and Russia; IEA Energy Statistics data. Averages for regional blocks and for the EU are weighted by electricity consumption in each country 13

14 14 blockasawhole,buttheaveragesofallthecountriesinthatblock.so,forexample,thebalticfiguresrepresent theaverageimportandexportsofallthecountriesinthebalticarea(includingwitheachother),nottheimports andexportsofthebalticareawithotherareas. TheimportcapacitycolumnshowsdatafortheNetTransferCapacities(NTC)ofallcountriesprovidedbyETSO (EuropeanTransmissionSystemOperators).Thisfiguregivesanindicationofthemaximumlevelofexchange betweenagivencountryandallofitsneighboursthatispossibleatonetime.thesentcfiguresarerelatedto installedcapacity,whichistypicallymuchhigherthanpeakload relatingittothiswouldgivehigherfigures. ThefigureforNetherlands,therefore,representsthemaximumthecountrycouldexchangewithBelgiumand Germany-adjacentcountriestowhichitisconnected.Thisindicatesthesizeofphysicalconnections,andhas nothingtodowitheconomicfactorssuchashowmuchpoweritactuallydoesimport,orwhetherlocal countrieswouldbewillingtotradethismuch. TheImportcapacityfigurethereforeillustrateshowinterconnectedacountryiswiththerestofEurope,andto whatdegreeitcouldrelyonimportingelectricityinsteadofgeneratingitlocally.weseeawidevariation.some countriessuchasluxembourgandlatviaaresowellconnectedtheyhavethecapabilitytoimportalmostall theirpower,whilemoregeographicallyperipheralcountriessuchasirelandanditalyhavemuchlowerfigures. Attheregionallevel,theNordicandparticularlytheBalticcountriesonaverageshowrelativelyhighlevelsof internationalinterdependence,whilstukandirelandshowverylittle.theeasterneuropeancountriesshow higherinternationalinterdependencethanwesterneuropeancountries. 1.3 Competition ThekeyaimofelectricityregulationandofrecentDirectiveshasbeentoprovideacompetitiveandsustainable electricitymarket.itisincreasinglywidelyagreedthatthebestwaytoachievethisisthroughanopen, competitivemarket,withentrybyanumberofprivatefirms.thedegreetowhichthishasbeenachievedvaries widelyacrosstheeu;insomecountriessuchastheukthemovetoacompetitiveindustryhasbeenbroadly completed,whileinmanyeasternstatestheprocessisjustbeginning. Forafullycompetitiveelectricitymarket,boththegenerationandretailmarketsneedtobecompetitive.Afirm withadominantpositioninthegenerationmarketcouldperhapsforeclosetheretailmarket,projectingits dominancefromonesectortotheother. Table3giveskeyindicatorsofcompetitivenessinbothgenerationandretailmarkets.Inthegenerationmarket weseethemarketshareofthelargestproducerandlargestthreeproducerscombined;andintheretailmarket weexaminethecombinedshareofthelargestthreeproducersandthenumberofsignificantsuppliers. Itishardtodiscernnotabletrendsamongstthesefigures forexampletheczechrepublicappearstohavea highlycompetitivemarket,butslovakialessso;franceappearstohavearelativelyuncompetitivemarket,while Austriaappearstobetheopposite.Inassessingthecompetitivenessofamarket,however,itisnotonlythe concentrationfiguresthatareimportant:theextentofnetworkunbundling,whichweexamineinthenext section,iscrucialindetermininghoweasilyrivalscanentertheindustrytotackleanyexcessivelevelsofprofit. ItisalsonotablethatelectricitycompaniesintheEUhaveengagedinsignificantmergerandacquisitionactivity inrecentyears,drivinghigherconcentrationlevels.althoughmovestowardslargerregionalmarketsoraneuwidemarketcouldcountertheserisingconcentrationlevelsinthelongerterm,intheshortertermthistrend couldbeacauseofconcernasitcouldgivecompaniesmarketpowertoraiseprices. However,notallintegrationhasbeenhorizontalinnature.Recentyearshavealsoseenatrendinvertical integration,withgeneratorsandretailerscombining.thishasalogicaleconomicreasonbehindit,inthatit allowsfirmssignificantlytoreduceriskasreturnsatonelevelareinverselyrelatedtoreturnsattheother:higher

15 electricitypricesimplygreaterreturnforgenerators,butlowerreturnsforretailers.therefore,combiningthe twocanclearlyeliminatemuchofthisvariationandrisk,providingagoodargumentforallowingthesetypesof mergers. Infact,asJamasbandPollittnote,inpre-liberalisationdaysthemarketwasorganisedonthebasisofvertically integratedorganisations,withrestructuringoftenattemptingtoreducethis,onlytoseeprivatisedutilities attemptingtoreversethisandre-integrate.thereasonforlesserefficiencyofthehorizontalstructuremayliein theinadequatemarketdesignwithnumerousflawsandcrosssubsidies,leadingtofrequentchangesofthe marketmodel. Table 3 Competition in retail and generation markets Numberofsuppliers withmarketshare >5% Retailmarket Top3suppliers'share (allconsumers)* 15 Generationmarket Largestproducerby capacity** Top3producersby capacity** Austria 4 67% 45% 75% Belgium 2 ~90% 85% 95% Cyprus 1 100%(1) 100% 100% CzechRepublic 8 46% 65% 75% Estonia 1 n/a 90% 100% France 1 88% 85% 95% Germany 3 50% 30% 70% Greece 1 100% 100% 100% Hungary 7 56% 30% 65% Ireland 4 88% 85% 90% Italy 6 35% 55% 75% Latvia 1 99% 95% 100% Lithuania 1 100%(1) 50% 80% Luxembourg 2 100%(2) n.a. n.a. Malta 1 100%(1) 100% 100% Netherlands 3 88% 25% 80% Poland 3 32% 15% 35% Portugal 3 99% 65% 80% Slovakia 4 84% 75% 85% Slovenia 6 71% 70% 95% Spain 5 85% 40% 80% UK 6 60% 20% 40% Nordicmarket- Denmark 5 67% Finland 6 30% 15% 40% Sweden 4 70% Source: Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market (2005) - Technical Annexes. The figures for the generation market for Denmark, Finland and Sweden include Norway. *Includes both eligible and non-eligible markets **Rounded to nearest 5% For household customers Consolidation is currently occurring in Poland Anotherimportantstatisticrelatedtocompetitioniscustomerswitching,whichdemonstratesthetendencyof customerstomovebetweenrivalsuppliers.highlevelsofswitchingdrivecompetitionbetweencompetitors,as firmsknowtheywillrapidlylosemarketshareiftheypriceuncompetitively,sotheymustconstantlystriveto delivervaluetocustomersandestimatetheirdegreeofsatisfactionwithservices.

16 Table4showsthedegreeofconsumerswitchingforbothlargeindustrialandsmallercommercialordomestic usersoverarangeoftimeframes.aclearregionaltrendisinitiallyvisiblehere allthecountriesinthenordic anduk&irelandregionshaveseenover50%ofindustrialswitchingsincemarketopening howeverthismost probablyreflectsthefactthatthesemarketshavebeenopenlongerthanthoseofsomeotherregions.during 2003,thehighestswitchingcountriesincludedtheNordiccountriesofDenmarkandFinland,butalsothe EasternEuropeancountriesofHungaryandLithuania:inotherwordsitisdifficulttoidentifymeaningfulregional trendsinthesefigures. Table 4 Level of customers switching supplier Largeeligibleindustrialusers* Smallcommercial/domestic Sincemarket opening During Sincemarket opening During2003 Austria 22%** 7% 3% 1% Belgium 35% 8% 19% 19% Cyprus 0% 0% CzechRepublic Denmark >50% 22% 5% 5% Estonia 0% 0% Finland >50% 16% 4% France 22% Germany 35% 6% Greece 0% 0% Hungary 24% 19% Ireland >50% 6% 1% 1% Italy ~15% Latvia 0% 0% Lithuania 17% 17% Luxembourg 10% Malta 0% 0% Netherlands 30% 35% n.k. Poland 10% 7% Portugal 9% 7% 1% 1% Slovakia 10% 3% 4% Slovenia 10% 10% Spain 18% 5% 0% 0% Sweden >50% 5% n.k. 10% UK >50% >50% 22% Source: Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market (2005) - Technical Annexes; Regulators. * In general this refers to clients consuming more than 1GWh/year ** 100% have renegotiated with their existing supplier Flanders region only The remaining approximately 65% have renegotiated with their existing supplier A further approximately 25-50% have renegotiated with their existing supplier Corresponds to 19% of high voltage customers consumption Approximately 18% have renegotiated with their existing supplier Consumerswitchinghaslimitationsasanindicatorofthestateofcompetitioninamarket.Inmanymarketswe observelowratesofconsumerswitchingbecauseofhighlevelsofcompetition,whichensuresallproducers pricelowsothatthereisnoneedforconsumerstoswitchtoanotherproducer.thereforewewouldtypically expecthighlevelsofswitchinginthebeginningofamarketopeningprocess,andhighratesforlargeconsumers becausesmallpricedifferencescanbefinanciallyimportant.intheoftenregulatedresidentialmarket,regulation itselfcankeepswitchingrateslowbecauseitleadstopriceconvergence.

17 1.4 Network unbundling Networkunbundling theprovisionofopenthird-partyaccesstothegridincludinglegalseparationofmarketorientedactivitiesandtransmission/distributionnetworkownershipandoperation isgenerallyrecognisedasan essentialstepincreatingefficientandcompetitiveelectricitymarkets.transmissionanddistributionnetworks are,bytheirverynature,naturalmonopolieswherethereislittlescopeforcompetition.itisthereforeimportant thatthesefunctionsareverticallyseparatedfromthepotentiallycompetitivegenerationandretailsupplysectors, andthataccesstothesenetworksisnon-discriminatoryandcost-reflective.thisfacilitatescompetitionandthe entryofrivalfirms,whichneedtousethesenetworkstocompete,andalsopreventscross-subsidyofgeneration bytransmission.theevidencetodateisthatverticalseparationofnetworkscanyieldsignificantbenefits. Itisimportanttodistinguishbetweentheverticalseparationofthenetworkfunctionsfromothersectorsinthe verticalchain,andseparationofgenerationandretailingfunctionsfromeachother.verticalintegrationofthe latterkindhasajustifiedeconomicreason,inthatitallowsfirmstoreduceriskexposure,whichiswhyitisa commonlyseenphenomenon:generatorsandretailersareexposedtooppositepricerisks whenelectricity pricesrisegeneratorsgainandretailerslose(iftheyhavesoldtofinalconsumersatanagreedprice),andvice- Table 5 Network unbundling Ownershipunbundling Transmission system operator Distribution systemoperator 17 Unbundlingindex(5max) Transmission systemoperator Distributionsystem operator Austria Legal Legal 4 3 Belgium Legal Legal 4 3.5* Cyprus Management None 2 1 CzechRepublic Legal Accounting 3 2 Denmark Legal Legal 4 3 Estonia Legal Legal 3 3 Finland Ownership Accounting France Legal Management 4 1 Germany Legal Accounting Greece Legal None 1 0 Hungary Legal Accounting 3 1 Ireland Legal Management 3 3 Italy Ownership Legal 5 3 Latvia Accounting Accounting 3 3 Lithuania Legal Legal 4 4 Luxembourg Management Management 1 1 Malta ** - 1 Netherlands Ownership Legal 5 3 Poland Legal Accounting 3 0 Portugal Ownership Accounting 5 3 Slovakia Legal Management 3 1 Slovenia Legal Accounting 3 1 Spain Ownership Legal 5 4 Sweden Ownership Legal 5 4 UK Ownership Legal Source: Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market (2005) - Technical Annexes *Brussels region not yet legally unbundled and no compliance officer in Flanders region ** Single buyer model

18 versa.byintegrating,thesetworiskswilllargelyoffseteachother;themergershouldnotraiseanti-trustissues providedthatbothgenerationandretailmarketsaresufficientlycompetitive. Table5showstheextentofownershipunbundling thatiswhetherthenetworkoperatorshaveaseparate ownershiporlegaltreatment,whethertheyaresimplyunderseparatemanagementormerelyhaveadistinct accountingtreatment.theunbundlingindexfollowsjamasb&pollittinassessingarangeoffactorstocreatea scorereflectingthedegreeofunbundlinginacountry. 2 Thislooksatwhetherthesystemoperatorshave publishedaccounts,acomplianceofficer,separatecorporateidentities,separatelocations,andwhether transmissionsystemoperators(tsos)areownershipunbundledanddistributionsystemoperators(dsos)are legallyunbundled.ascoreofzeroindicatesaverylowlevelofunbundling,whileascoreof5demonstratesthat unbundlingisataveryadvancedstage. Noteagainthelowlevelsofregionalcorrelation,andthatWesternEuropeancountriesbynomeansalwayshave moreunbundledmarketsthanmorerecentmembersoftheeu. 1.5 Public vs private sectors AllEUelectricitymarketsaremovingtowardsfullmarketopening,andtheendingofstatemonopolies,though theydifferinhowfaralongthisprocesstheyhavegone.table6demonstrateshowthisvariesacrosstheeu, andillustrateshowthisvariesfromcompletemarketopeningtonoopeningwhatsoever.insomemarkets,such astheuk,thisprocessofmarketopeninghasbeencompletedforsometime.however,inothers particularly therecentmembers theprocessofliberalisationstillhassomewaytogo. ThisisillustratedinTable6,whichshowstheachievedextentofmarketopening.Thisstatisticdoesshowclear variationbyregionalmarket.themarketscontainingtheaccessioncountries,thatisthebalticandeastern Europeanmarkets,showmuchlowerdegreesofmarketopeningthantheothermarkets,wherethisismainlyor entirelycomplete. Table 6 Market opening Marketopening Marketopening Austria 100% Malta 0% Belgium ~90% Netherlands 100% Cyprus 35% Poland 52% CzechRepublic 47% Portugal 100% Denmark 100% Slovakia 66% Estonia 10% Slovenia 75% Finland 100% Spain 100% France 70% Sweden 100% Germany 100% UK* 100% Greece 62% WesternEurope 89% Hungary 67% Iberia 100% Ireland 56% UK&Ireland 97% Italy 79% Nordic 100% Latvia 76% Baltic 42% Lithuania EasternEurope 56% Luxembourg 57% EU 85% Source: Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market (2005) - Technical Annexes * In Northern Ireland, the electricity market is open to non-households 2 Jamasb,Tooraj,andMichaelPollitt.2005.Electricity market reform in the European Union: review of progress toward liberalisation and integration.theenergyjournalspecialissue,

19 Fullmarketopeningandstateownershiparenotmutuallyexclusive.Forexample,theNordicregionboasts completemarketopeningyetitisincreasinglymovingtowardsanoligopolyofthefour nationalchampions Vattenfall,Fortum,StatkraftandElsam. Infact,asJamasbandPollittpointout,theEUelectricityDirectivessaynothingabouttheneedforprivate ownership.ukandportugalhaveseenthegreatestinstancesofprivatisation,whileitalyhasseenprivatisationto alesserextent. 1.6 Regulation Regulationiskeyinanindustrynaturallycharacterisedbyextremelyinelasticdemandanddifficultentry,where firmscaneasilygainmarketpower.table7describesthekeyrolethatregulationplaysacrosstheeu,withthe roleoftheregulatorinlawandtheidentityoftheagencyresponsibleforoversightofthewholesaleand balancingmarket.inthetable, advisory meansthattheregulatorwillbeconsultedbuthasnolegalpowersof enforcement. Table 7 Regulatory role Roleofregulatorincompetition law Monitoringofwholesale& balancingmarket Austria Advisory Regulator Belgium Advisory Regulatorstudies Cyprus CzechRepublic Limitedornoformalrole None Denmark Limitedornoformalrole TSO(NordPool)&competition authority Estonia Limitedornoformalrole None Finland Limitedornoformalrole TSO France Concurrentpowers/regulator Regulator withincompetitionauthority Germany Limitedornoformalrole CompetitionAuthority(BKA) Greece Limitedornoformalrole None Hungary Ireland Advisory Regulator Italy Advisory Regulator Latvia Concurrentpowers/regulator None withincompetitionauthority Lithuania None Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Concurrentpowers/regulator Regulator withincompetitionauthority Poland Advisory Regulator Portugal Advisory Regulator Slovakia Slovenia Spain Advisory Regulator Sweden Advisory TSO UK Concurrentpowers/regulator Regulator withincompetitionauthority Source: Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Gas and Electricity Internal Market (2005) - Technical Annexes 19

20 Pricecapsforend-usersarecommoninmostMemberStatesasameansofregulationwherecompetitionisnot yetdevelopedenoughtoguaranteelowprices. GilardistudiestheindependenceofregulatorsinseveralindustriesacrossarangeofEuropeancountries,scoring theagenciesbyasystemhehasdeveloped.itisinspiredbysimilarindicesoftenseenforcentralbanksand consistsoftwenty-oneindicatorsgroupedunderfiveequallyweighteddimensions,namelythestatusofthe agencyhead,statusofthemembersofthemanagementboard,relationshipwithgovernmentandparliament, financialandorganisationalautonomy,andregulatorypowers. HisresultsarepresentedbelowinFigure1.8.UnfortunatelyhisanalysisdoesnotincludeBalticorEastern Europeancountriessowearenotabletogetafullpan-Europeanpicture,howeverthefindingsarestill instructive.notonlydoweseehowindependencevariesacrosstheeu,wealsoseethatcountrieswith regulatorsofsimilarindependenceachievetheirscorefordifferentreasons,suchasfranceanddenmark. Figure 1 Regulatory independence Source: Gilardi, Fabrizio, Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe: A Cross Sectional Comparison, Paper prepared for the workshop Delegation in Contemporary Democracies, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh (UK), 29 March - 2 April Conclusions ItisnotsimpletogeneraliseaboutthecharacteristicsofEUelectricitymarkets,andinattemptingtodosoitis likelyonewouldmissmuchimportantlocalvariation.so,despiteourdesiretoconceptualisetheeuasconsisting ofahandfulofregionalmarkets,itiskeythatwekeepanationalfocusuntiltalkofregionalmarketsismore reflectedbytherealitiesinpractice. NorcanwemakethebroadassumptionthatWesternEuropeancountrieshavemoredevelopedelectricity industriesthantheireasterncounterparts.infactonanumberofindicestheoppositeappearstobetrue:the 20

21 BalticcountrieshavemadestrongeradvancementsthanFranceandGermanyinformingatrueregionalmarket andinnetworkunbundling,thoughtheydolaginmarketopeningandincreatingcompetitivemarkets. Forthisveryreason,anyanalysisofEUelectricitymarketscannotbesimple,andthereisnotalwaysaclear unambiguousanswertopolicyquestions.however,thisdoesnotmeanthatnolightcanbeshedonthesubject: inthefollowingsectionswelookatpricingandpricingstructuresandtheeffectsofemissionstradingandlongtermcontractsupontheindustry. 2 European price structures and trends ThissectionofthereportoutlinesfirstelectricitypricestructureswithintheEUandthenpricetrends.Manyof theintendedbenefitsofelectricityliberalisationderivefromlowerprices,sounderstandingtheircurrentstateis importantwhenassessingprogresstowardaneucommonmarket.inturn,long-termtrendsofpricesreflect functioningofthemarket,whichshouldprimarilyincreasetheeffectivenessandproductivityofthepower systems,withlowerelectricitypricesasawelcomeby-product. 2.1 Price structures Data source and description TheEurostatpublicationElectricity price systems 2004describeselectricitypricestructuresforeachofthe twenty-fivememberstates,andthefollowingdrawsheavilyonthisdocument.itwaswritteninaccordwith CouncilDirective90/377/EECforimprovingpricetransparency,andisthemostthoroughandrecentofficial sourcedealingwithpricestructures. Marketliberalisationhasmadethetaskofsummarizingpricestructuresmoredifficult.Intheeraofstate electricitymonopolies,dataonpricingplanswasmostlystraightforwardandeasilyobtainablebythepublicat large.withmarketopeningneitherisnecessarilytrue(bower).first,liberalreformshavebroughtmanymore competingtariffsintothemarket.second,whereasbeforederegulation,priceinformationforelectricitywas quicklyandreliablypassedbypublicproviderstoeurostat,privatecompaniesnowhaveanincentivetowithhold thesameinformationfromcompetitors(bower). Electricity price systems 2004thereforesuffersfromsomelimitations.Itdetailsthepricingstructureforregulated markets,andinunregulatedmarketsitdescribessuchcontractconventionsashavearisenbetweensuppliers andconsumers.insomeunregulatedmarketsnopricestructureinformationisgiveneitherbecausesuppliers havewithheldinformation,orbecausecontractsaretooidiosyncratic Summary of common elements of price structures ThefollowingfeaturescapturethebasicstructureofEuropeanelectricityprices. Tariffsforindustrialusersaremoreflexibleandvariedthantariffsfordomesticusers. Industrialusersareoffereddifferenttariffsaccordingtothevoltageoftheirconnectiontothegrid. Industrialuserspayatariffwiththreedistinctelements:astandingcharge(measuredintimeunits),acharge basedonmaximumcontracteddemand(measuredinkw),andaconsumptioncharge(measuredinkwh). Industrialtariffsreflectthecostofprovidingelectricityservice,sothathigher-voltagecustomerspayahigher standingchargeandlowerper-unitconsumptionchargethanlower-voltagecustomers. Industrialtariffsarenotsectorspecific. Domesticusershaveatariffwithtwocomponents:astandingchargeandaconsumptioncharge. 21

22 TheconsumptionchargeforbothindustrialanddomesticuserscaneitherbethesameforeachkWh consumed,orvaryaccordingtonightandday,summerandwinter,andpeakandoff-peaktimes. Suppliersimposehigherstandingchargesinexchangeforofferingdiscountsonconsumptionduringcertain timeperiods. Justbecausecountriessharethesamegeneralpricestructureinnowayimplieshoweverthatcountriessharethe sameprices Differences in price structure across countries WhilepricestructuresinEuropearebroadlysimilar,somedifferencesdoexist.First,somecountries(including Belgium,France,Greece,Lithuania,andPortugal)offersocialtariffstocertaingroupsofcaptiveconsumers, usuallythepoorordisadvantaged;however,thispracticeisnotwidespread.second,whileallcountriescharge valueaddedtax(vat)onelectricity,theeasterneuropeandbalticregionsdonothaveanyextrataxeson electricityforthemostpart,whereastheeu-15countrieslargelydo.anotherinterestingaspectoftaxationis thatmanyeu-15countriesactuallyexemptenergy-intensivecompaniesfrompayingnon-vattaxesifthey improvetheirenergyefficiency;thusthetaxforcertainindustrialuserscreatesinvestmentincentives.by contrast,domesticconsumerscandolittletoavoidpayingtax. Finally,ofmostrelevanceforthisreportaredifferencesinpricestructurebetweenunregulatedandregulated markets.althoughsection2.1.2abovepointsoutfeaturescommontobothmarkets,unregulatedmarketsstand outforvariousreasons.liberalreformshavebroughtintothemarketmultiplecompanies,eachofwhichoffers tariffsthatarepotentiallymorenuancedthanthoseofstatemonopolies.forexample,inmostcountrieslarge industrialoperationsobtaintheirelectricitythroughbilateralcontractingwithserviceproviders,meaningthat eachcustomercouldintheorynegotiateadifferentpriceplan.also,inmostunregulatedmarkets,companies offerlong-termfixed-pricecontractsthatinsureconsumersagainstpricevolatility,alongwithflexiblebillingand energymanagementservices.moreover,infreemarketscustomerscanobtainnetworkandretailservicesfrom twoseparatecompanies,andpayadifferenttarifftoeach(althoughtheprinciplesofsection2.1.2applytoboth tariffs).aselectricitymarketreformscontinue,onewouldexpectmoreinnovativepricestructurestoemergeas companiesviefornewcustomers. 2.2 Price trends Themainimpactsonpricesthataliberalisedelectricitymarketissupposedtobringarereductionsand convergence;indeed,thesepriceeffectsare'thesinglemostimportantperformanceindicator'ofsuccessful liberalisation(jamasbandpollitt2005).accordingly,thissectionwilldeterminetowhatextentthetwo phenomenaareapparentinthedata Evidence of price reductions TheprimarysourceforthissectionistheEurostatpublicationGas and electricity market statistics Data Figures2and3chartEU-15real(adjustedforinflation)priceswithandwithouttaxesfordomesticand industrialusersovertheelevenyearperiodendingin2005.similareu-25chartsarenotavailablesincedataon theaccessioncountriesismissingbefore2004.theaveragepricewithouttaxesforonekwhofdomestic electricityconsumptionfell6%between1995and2000,atwhichpointitstabilisedbeforecreepingupin2005. Evenmorestrikingisthe12%dropintheaverageindustrialpriceoverthesametimeperiod,althoughmuchof thefallwaswipedoutby2005.moreover,between1997and2003,thepriceforsmallindustrialconsumersfell 20%whilethepriceforlargeconsumersfell9.5%(JamasbandPollitt2005).Whentaxesareincluded,both industrialanddomesticconsumershaveseenpricesrisefrom1995to2005owingtoswedish,german,and Dutchtaxincreasesin2000;however,priceswithouttaxesarethemostrelevantfordiscussingmarket liberalisationsincetaxescauseend-userpricestoriseandfallregardlessofreforms. 22

23 Figure 2 Development of the average price of one kwh for domestic electricity consumption, EU-15 (1995=100) based on price in Figure 3 Development of the average price of one kwh for industrial electricity consumption, EU-15 (1995=100) based on price in Table8displaysdomesticpricedataatacountrylevelinordertoillustratethattheEUaggregate-pricemasks considerableindividualcountryheterogeneity:denmark,ireland,hungary,thenetherlands,andslovenia experiencedpriceincreasesduring and ,whilebelgium,france,italy,andtheukallsaw pricesfallforbothperiods.furthermore,swedenandirelandbothhadlargepriceincreasesfrom Interpreting the evidence on price decreases Whilepricedecreasesfrom1995through2000arecertainlyconsistentwiththepredictedeffectsofliberal markets,otherhypothesesarealsoworthconsidering.first,energypricesfellgentlyoverthisperiod(jamasband Pollitt2005).Second,labourproductivitygrowthinthegas,electricityandwatersectorsgrew5.7%ayearfrom (ECCommissionReport2004).Inotherwords,fallingcostsofproductionmightexplainfalling prices.thesepointsdonotdiscredittheimpactofliberalisation,butdoshowthatmanydifferentfactorscan potentiallydriveelectricityprices. Alongthesamelines,theflatpricesafter2000andthepricerisesfrom donotinthemselves establishthatprogressinelectricitymarketshasstalledorreversed,thefearofwhichpromptedtheeuropean CommissiontolaunchaninquiryinJune2005intorestrictedordistortedcompetitionwithintheEU(EC CommissionReport2005).Forexample,gasandoilpriceshaveincreasedevenmorethanelectricitypricesinthe recentpast.sincegasplaysamajorroleineuropeanelectricitygenerationonecouldreasonably 23

24 Table 8 Electricity for households - average price by country of one kwh, without taxes - in cent Change (%) Change (%) EU EU Austria Belgium Cyprus CzechRepublic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden UK Note: Based on standard consumer Dc ( kwh/year) on 1 January of each calendar year. Source: Eurostat conjecturethatproducersarepassingontheirincreasedcoststoconsumers.taxincreasesaswellasthe introductionofemissionstradingmightalsohelpexplaintherecentpricerises. Anotherimportantmechanismbehindthepricetrendsiselectricitysupply.WhentheEUreformsbegan,the Europeanelectricitymarkethadexcesscapacity,meaningtherewasroomforcompetitiontopushpricesdown. Thisexcesscapacityhassincedwindled,leadingtoupwardpressureonprices.Onewouldexpectfirmsto respondtohigherpriceswithincreasedinvestmentincapacity,butnewinstallationstakeseveralyearsto becomeoperational,sopricesareslowtoadjusteveninfreemarkets. Onefinalpointtonoteisthatinmanycountries(especiallyScandinavia)electricitypricesaredeterminedinlarge partbyhydrologicalconditions,sopricetrendscanalsodependonweatherpatterns Evidence of price convergence SomeevidenceexistsofpriceconvergenceinEUmarkets.JamasbandPollitt(2005)computethecoefficientof variation(thestandarddeviationdividedbythemeanorcv[coefficientofvariation])forthreedifferentgroups overaneightyearperiod;theresultsareshowninfigure4.ahighercvmeanspricesaremoredivergent.as 24

25 seeninthefigure,small-scaleusershaveseenmoderatelyconvergingprices,whilelargeindustrialusershave not. Figure 4 Price convergence coefficient of variation (CV) Intheorypriceconvergenceshouldoccurinanopenelectricitymarketbecauseofastraightforwardmechanism thatthefollowingsimplifiedexampleillustrates.ifaconsumerinfranceisbuyingelectricityfromagreek supplier,andasloveniancompanyoffersalowerprice,thentheconsumerwillpresumablyswitchsupplier.the GreekcompanywilleitherhavetomatchtheSlovenianprice,orelsegooutofbusiness;eitherway,theprice gapwilldisappear.ofcourse,thisargumentrestsontheassumptionthatelectricitycanactuallyflowtofrance fromsloveniaandgreece.inotherwords,theelectricitysystemsofeuropeneedtobeinterconnectedforeuwidepriceconvergencetooccur.section1.2showsthatseriousgapsarepresentininterconnectedness,andso forthisreasonaloneonewouldnotexpecttoseepriceconvergence.toexaminefurthertheargumentthat interconnectionisthekeytoachievingpriceconvergence,onecantaketherawpricedatafromtable8, computethecvforregionalblocks,andexaminewhethertheresultingstatisticsarelowerthantheeu-widecv computedwiththesamedata.table9givestheresults. Table 9 Coefficients of variation for regional electricity markets EU Western Europe Iberia UKandIreland Nordic Baltic EasternEurope Source: Author s calculations ThemostinterestingfeatureofTable9isthateachregiontakenseparatelyshowssubstantiallymoreprice convergencethantheeuasawhole,meaningthatinterconnectedness(combinedwithotherformsof integration)doesindeedleadtopriceconvergence.everyregionineveryyearhaslessvariationinpricesthanthe EU-25asawhole.ThelargeanderraticfluctuationsintheactualCVfiguresfromyeartoyearderivefromspot pricedatawhichisitselfwidelyvariable.also,someoftheregionshaverelativelyfewmembers,soprice 25

26 changesinonecountrycanaffectsignificantlythetotalregion svariability.still,thepatternisclear:regions demonstratemorepriceconvergencethantheeuropeanaverage. Onecaveattothediscussionisthatthesamepriceintwocountriescanhavedifferentimplications.Forexample, ifthepriceofelectricityinluxembourgisthesameasthepriceofelectricityinpoland,thenpoles,whose incomesaresignificantlylower,areactuallypayingmuchmoreforelectricityinrealterms.inotherwords,one cancheckforpriceconvergencecontrollingforincomedifferences.spaceconstraintspreventsuchananalysisin thisreport. Thefinalobstacletoachievingpriceconvergenceliesinnetworkcosts,whicharenotsubjecttocompetitive pressure.figure5,takenfromjamasbandpollitt(2005),showsthevarioussourcesthatcontributetofinal electricityprices.networkchargesarebothalargepartofpricesandhighlyvariable.onemechanismthatmight bringaboutmoreuniformnetworkchargesiscontinuednetworkunbundlingcombinedwithindependent incentiveregulationofnetworks.theformerpreventsanti-competitivenetworkpricingbyverticallyintegrated firms,andthelatterbringsefficiencyimprovementsthroughmethodssuchaspricecaps(jamasbandpollitt 2005). Figure 5 Estimated breakdown of expected electricity prices 2004 (50 mwh /year customer) ( /mwh before taxes) 2.3 Conclusions ThestructureofelectricitytariffsiscommontonearlyeveryEuropeanuserandcountry.Onemaindifferenceis thatindustrialusershavealargerarrayoftariffsthandomesticconsumers.also,electricityserviceprovidersin openmarketshavemoreflexibilityinadjustingtariffsthanthoseinregulatedmarkets. Priceshavedecreasedsincethestartofliberalisation,althoughmostofthefallsoccurredbefore2000.AtanEU levelpriceshaveslowlyconvergedforsomegroupssincetheopeningofmarkets,whileataregionallevelprice differencearemuchless.severalfactorsotherthanfailureofmarketreformsmightbedrivingrecentpricerises aswellaslackofconvergence. 26