Lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

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Clarence Sims
7 years ago
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Lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Root Cause Analysis l Insufficient attention to external events (earthquakes and tsunamis) which can cause SBO as a result of common caused failure.

1 Lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Root Cause Analysis l Insufficient attention to external events (earthquakes and tsunamis) which can cause SBO as a result of common caused failure. l Insufficient efforts to continuous risk reduction by collecting and analyzing operational experiences and the latest technological improvement. l Poor communication performance resulted in reluctance to introduce new safety enhancement features. Conclusion l Root cause of Fukushima Nuclear Accident is insufficient preparedness resulting from lack of company-wide Safety Awareness, Engineering capability, and Communication ability. l Fukushima Nuclear Accident should not be concluded as a consequence of a natural disaster. Instead, the accident should be recognized as the failure to prevent accident that should have been addressed by intelligent measures prior to the disaster. l Operators of nuclear power plants must have a level of safety awareness that far exceeds other industries. In addition, we must improve safety and reduce risk on a daily basis referring OE information and technical advances from all over the world. 1

Negative linkage of insufficient readiness for accidents Negative linkage of the lack of Safety awareness, Engineering capability and Communication ability went into insufficient readiness for

2 Negative linkage of insufficient readiness for accidents Negative linkage of the lack of Safety awareness, Engineering capability and Communication ability went into insufficient readiness for accident. Underestimate external event risk Underestimate severe accident risk Consider capacity factor as an only important performance indicator Not to learn from others experience Safety awareness Lack of daily effort to improve safety Excess costs for SCC and seismic measures for an availability factor Worried plant shutdown because of minor mistakes Explanation is required if we admit it is not safe Overconfidence that safety had been established Desire that it is safe enough Communication ability Continue risk communication Too much dependence on plant manufacturer Engineering capability Insufficient inhouse design capability Insufficient ability to understand total system High-cost structure Focused on supervision work Excess dependence on partner companies Avoid direct work by inexperienced personnel Engineering capability Insufficient inhouse direct work capability Ritual emergency training Cannot explain additional measures necessity if it is safe enough Insufficient readiness for accidents 2 2

3 Nuclear Safety Reform Plan Reflection of Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Nuclear Safety Reform Plan was compiled on March 29, It contains six action plans. Action plan 2 Strengthening observation and assistance for management Safety awareness Action plan 1 Reform from top management Action plan 3 Action plan 5 Action plan 6 Strengthening individual ability to propose defensein-depth safety measures Strengthening emergency response capabilities by frequent training and drill Develop system engineering skill and implementation of direct management Engineering ability Communication ability Action plan 4 Enhancing risk communication performance Our Volition Improve safety level day by day reflecting the experience of Fukushima Nuclear Accident and be a nuclear operator who can continuously create supreme safety. 3

4 4 Action Plan1: Reform from top management Safety Awareness(1/5) l Training course for top management has been introduced to improve safety awareness. l Nuclear leaders should learn from good practices of others. u Training for top managements to analyze and examine Fukushima nuclear accident to improve safety awareness. u Top managements are visiting oversea operators to learn good practices.

Action Plan1: Reform from top management Safety Awareness(2/5) l Leaders and managements walk down working field whenever possible, to talk with members and check field and facilities by themselves.

5 Action Plan1: Reform from top management Safety Awareness(2/5) l Leaders and managements walk down working field whenever possible, to talk with members and check field and facilities by themselves. l Leaders send safety messages to all members to clarify their expectation and to exemplify behaviors of good nuclear safety culture, through direct talk, video, intra-net, . u Power station safety inspection undertaken by executives 5

6 6 Action Plan1: Reform from top management Safety Awareness(3/5) l All members of nuclear power division review one of 10 traits of a healthy nuclear culture every day. 10 Traits of a healthy nuclear safety culture 10 Traits Poster Parsonal Accountability Questioning Attitude Effective Safety Communication Leadership Safety Values and Actions Decision Making Respectful Work Environment Continuous Learning Problem Identification and Resolution Environment for Raising Concerns Work Processes

7 7 Action Plan1: Reform from top management Safety Awareness(4/5) l Self and oversight trend analysis to ensure a healthy nuclear safety. Self-evaluation of 10 traits and 40 behaviors If the result has not changed from the previous one after a certain special event, evaluations must be investigated. When current evaluation result is significantly different from previous one, events occurred during the evaluation period will be checked. Current cycle Previous cycle Company-wide

8 Action Plan2: Observation and support for management Safety Awareness(5/5) l The Nuclear Safety Oversight Office (NSOO) was established in May 2013. l To oversee all aspects of nuclear safety 1.

8 8 Action Plan2: Observation and support for management Safety Awareness(5/5) l The Nuclear Safety Oversight Office (NSOO) was established in May l To oversee all aspects of nuclear safety 1. ensure compliance with regulations and company standards 2. provide advice on world best practice 3. oversee nuclear safety culture, governance and leadership Board of Directors Report NSOO Advise Overseas Advisors External Mentors President Oversee Head: Dr. John Crofts Staff: 3 teams (KK, 1F, HQs) CNO CDO - 14 Senior Reactor Engineers Support - External Mentors Meeting with overseas advisors

9 Concluding remarks 9 Never forgetting the Fukushima nuclear accidents, TEPCO will continuously make our safety level higher; today than yesterday, and tomorrow than today. Be a nuclear operator who continues to strive for supreme safety.

WANO CORPORATE PEER REVIEW PROGRAM

WANO CORPORATE PEER REVIEW PROGRAM The example of Rosenergoatom Concern Peer Review, April 2011 - Process and significance - Results By J. Regaldo WANO CORPORATE PEER REVIEW PROGRAM - A PROGRAM STARTED