Operation Tomodachi. and Lessons Learned. of Energy s Consequence. q Management Response Team (CMRT) to the. Reactor Accident

Transcription

1 DOE/NV/ Operation Tomodachi Japan Response Spring 2011 Operation Tomodachi A D t P d t Answers, Data Products, and Lessons Learned from the U.S. U S Department of Energy s Consequence q Management Response Team (CMRT) to the F k hi Fukushima-Daiichi D ii hi Reactor Accident This work Thi k was d done b by N National ti ls Security it T Technologies, h l i LLC LLC, under d Contract No. DE-AC52-06NA25946 with the U.S. Department of Energy. -1-

2 Earthquake -2- March 11, 2011,1446 JST 9.0 Magnitude earthquake hits off the coast of Japan

3 Triggering a tsunami Tsunami Photos: Nuclear Street.com; The Christian Science Monitor.com which devastated the Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant -3-

4 Friday, March 11 Nuclear Incident Team (NIT) stands up for 24/7 operations RSL assets activated (AMS, ECN) Saturday, March 12 CMHT activated at Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) Other NNSA assets activated Sunday, March 13 NIT requests preparation for deployment of the CMRT CONUS response capability never compromised Event Timeline Monday, March 14 Teams deploy to Japan Tuesday, March 15 (Wed 16 th Japan time) Teams arrive at Yokota Air Base CMOC rapid setup AMS personnel set up aircraft and conduct test flights at Yokota Air Base Thursday, March 17 Operations commence -5-

5 Issues we did not train / plan for: Release not controlled, stopped, or stabilized by the time the team deployed. There was little information available on the status of the damaged reactors (and the spent fuel pools) in the first days after the release. There was no assurance upon arrival that further releases would not occur. Protective actions for public safety were not completed when we deployed. d Initially, support was only requested by US Forces Japan and the US Embassy in Tokyo. There was no clear exit strategy. The demand for information from the White House and Secretary of Energy himself was unprecedented. d The other signatory agencies to the National Response Framework did not deploy so their roles and responsibilities were unassigned.

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7 Questions from Decision Makers Radiological Release(s) and Ground Contamination Was radiological material released off-site? Does deposited material exceed guidelines for evacuation and relocation of the public? What is the isotopic mixture of the deposited radiological material? Personnel Safety What are the health concerns for the DOE responders at Yokota Air Base? Are United States Military and US Embassy personnel in danger from the releases?

8 What was done Fixed wing and helicopter Up to 3 aircraft per day Surveys over US bases Joint DOE & GOJ survey Aerial Monitoring Why it was done Map pground deposition out to 80 km from FDNPP Support HADR Operations Support evacuation and relocation decisions Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant -7-

9 AMS Operations on USAF Aircraft First flights Thursday, March 17 Military-supplied aircraft C-12 fixed-wing (initially) UH-1 helicopter (initially) HH-60 helicopter (March 26) -8-

10 AMS Immediate Impact Critical Products First day s flights yielded vital information After the third day, deposition pattern was obvious -9-

11 AMS Third-day Cumulative Product -10-

12 Operation Tomodachi Japan Response Spring 2011 Joint US / Japan Aerial Survey Results -13-

13 Field Operations

14 What was done: Operations Ground Monitoring Mobile monitoring In-situ measurements Exposure rate measurements Air sampling Soil samples Swipes Where it was done: Yokota AFB Other AFBs Embassy Prioritized locations Why it was done: Calibrate aerial measurements Define isotopic mix Characterize the inhalation component of integrated t dose Assess vertical and horizontal migration of deposited material Verify safety of specific locations -15-

15 Vision Service Partnership

16 Unusual Requests and Discoveries!

17 The Right Product for the Right Audience

18 Questions from Decision i Makers Part II Can a system be established to actively monitor for additional releases and immediately inform USFJ, GOJ, and USG personnel if an additional release has occurred? How much cumulative dose will be received by the public while utilizing major transportation thoroughfares on the island?

19 A: Warning of additional release(s): Japan Infield Monitoring System (JIMS) Deployed cross-trained responders for on-site implementation Utilized DOE Crisis Response detection assets and telemetry/display system Modifications for continuous operation such as heat dissipation and extended battery power Web application for map-based viewing with approved access Deployed sensors at eight locations around Fukushima Daii-chi NARAC created template for predicting plume arrival times at key locations if an elevated reading occurred

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21 Train Data

22 A: Dose Received from Driving the Tohoku Expressway Utilized vehicular-mounted NaI system to acquire second-bysecond measurements along the roadway Correlated gross-count dwell NaI measurements with exposure rate measurements along a test line Integrated t the 1-Hz converted exposure rate measurements to estimate accumulated dose Determined dose to be <100 µrem for a 2-hour drive time on the expressway Tohoku Expressway

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24 Lessons Learned Severely underestimated the impact the White House and Secretary of Energy would have on the Home Team. Underestimated the amount of data (in Japanese, no less) we received early in the response. We were unprepared to deal with the extended plume phase of a nuclear power plant disaster that resulted from a catastrophic natural event. As we learned from the Sierra Grande fires and 9/11, no exercise, training, or drill will ever prepare us for the grueling schedule and the amount of stress a real world response inflicts. Operations are much more challenging in an OCONUS situation. -21-

25 End State US Military and Government of Japan to continue monitoring activities as needed Japanese trained & equipped to fly DOE AMS Japanese equipped with enhanced laboratory analysis capability (HPGe) USAF Bioenvironmental Flight equipped with enhanced field detection capability DOE continues to support Government of Japan, US Military, and US embassy from Home Team

26 Summary We are the nation s radiological consequence management capability Our teams provide world class response operations to radiological incidents overseas and, in the event of an RDD/IND incident, here in the homeland. Radiological i l Dispersal Device (RDD): any weapon that t is Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): illicit it nuclear weapons designed to spread radioactive material with the intent to stolen from a nuclear state or a weapon fabricated by a kill, and cause disruption upon a city or nation. Uses terrorist group from illegally obtained fissile nuclear conventional explosives to spread radioactive material; not weapons material that produces a nuclear explosion. a true nuclear weapon. -22-

27 Questions?