Ketil Ellertsen The Korean War: And The Dangers of Misperceptions

Transcription

1 Ketil Ellertsen The Korean War: And The Dangers of Misperceptions Term Paper POL2019 Institute for Sociology and Political Science, NTNU Fall 2014

2 Introduction There have been many factors and aspects of the Korean War which have not been understood or not been public knowledge until recently. During the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, numerous classified documents have been released to the public and they have helped to shed light on some of these. It has been put forth by scholars that there were several misperceptions prior to the Korean War which ultimately resulted in the outbreak (Zhao 1997). This paper will first seek out to identify these misperceptions and analyze if there is substantial evidence that they were (either indirectly or directly) the cause for the Korean War. Secondly it will discuss the probability of avoiding the outbreak of war if both sides had not misjudged each other. Thus I present two hypotheses: 1. The Korean War broke out primarily because of misperceptions from the US side. 2. The Korean War broke out primarily because of misperceptions from the Communist side. Note: In the second hypothesis communist side refers to the major communist actors involved in the Korean War, i.e. the USSR, China and North Korea. The structure of this paper will be as follows: First an introduction to the Korean War, with a brief summary of the most important events. Secondly, a section identifying the various misperceptions made from either side building up to the war. Thirdly, a section discussing the implications of the misperceptions made and finally a conclusion to the hypotheses. The Korean War Before the second World War, Korea had been under Japanese rule for 35 years. Directly after the end of World War II, Korea was divided at the 38th parallel between the Soviet Union and the United States: the US controlled the south, and the USSR the north. The two superpowers had different goals in dividing Korea. The US reason behind the separation was to accept the surrender of Japanese troops and to assist the formation of a (...) Korean government (Zhao 1997:92). The Soviet Union on the other hand wished to uphold satisfactory relations with the US and expected Korea to fall into the

3 Soviet sphere (Zhao 1997:92) in the future regardless. In other words, the separation was intended to only be a temporary solution, however history has shown us this would not be the case. Both North Korea and South Korea were carefully molded into states which reflected the ideology of their benefactors. North Korea became a communist state, under the influence of the Soviet Union and Stalin, where Kim Il Sung was appointed leadership. In the south, the Republic of Korea was established with Syngman Rhee as its leader. The differences between the south and north only increased from this point and on, and would eventually lead to war between the two. The following year, Kim Il Sung tried several times to persuade Stalin to greenlight an unification of Korea through force (Wada 1998), but the Soviet leader refused his requests, wanting to refrain from directly engaging the United States. Stalin feared that the Soviet Union was not strong enough to win over the US in a war at that point (Weathersby 1999:93). However, the Soviet Union did supply the North Koreans with military technology, e.g. weapons, ammunition, tanks and aircrafts (Zhihua 2000:48). While the US on the other hand extracted the bulk of its forces from South Korea, only leaving around 500 officers to help rebuilding the state (Zhao 1997). The lack of interest shown by the US government for South Korea culminated on January 12th, 1950, when Secretary of State Dean Acheson held a speech signalling South Korea being outside their perimeter of defense (Weathersby 1999). Six months later, on June 25th, North Korea invaded South Korea, in a massive attack which led to their occupation of the peninsula mere six weeks later (Zhao 1997:94). The North Korean army was superior in every way and met little resistance from the southern army. In response to North Korea s advances, President Truman and the United Nations quickly adopted resolutions which encouraged its members to commit forces to the liberation of South Korea (Zhao 1997). The UN forces, in which the US supplied the most, landed in South Korea on September 15th. After five weeks the forces ended up at the Chinese Korean border, having recaptured the South and occupying North Korea. This resulted in a Chinese offensive into North Korea, pushing back the UN soldiers. Mao Zedong, fearing further expansion into China or the establishment of an

4 anti communist state in an unified Korea (Yufan & Zhihai 1990: ), sent in (Zhao 1997:95, Yufan & Zhihai 1990:112) Chinese soldiers to repel the UN occupation. Originally, Stalin had promised Soviet air support for the Chinese army, however just before the attack he retracted the promise. Stalin did not want to involve Soviet military personnel in direct combat with US forces. Nonetheless, the Chinese army managed to push back the UN forces and secure the capital of South Korea, Seoul (Zhao 1997). After several months back and forth between the two sides, a stalemate was reached, with North Korean and Chinese forces in the north, and UN and South Korean forces in the south. Yet again the 38th parallel divided them (Weathersby 1999:95). Misperceptions It is not uncommon for misperceptions to, in some way or another, be connected to the outbreak of war. As Levy and Thompson (2009:135) have noted: If misperceptions lead to states to have divergent expectations about the likely outcome of war, so that at least one side expects a better outcome from war than peace, it may be very difficult for adversaries to reach a negotiated settlement that avoids war. In the case of the Korean War several scholars (see Kim (1999), Zhao (1997) and Yufan & Zhai (1990)), have noted that there were numerous misperceptions on both sides of the conflict. The US side made four misperceptions, or miscalculations, prior to the war breaking out: (1) The Americans believed that North Korea was fully under the control of the Soviet Union, meaning that any move North Korea made, would be viewed as a Soviet one. Therefore, it was perceived that the USSR would not engage in any activity which might risk a direct war with the US. (2) The US underestimated the strength and capabilities of the North Korean army, and simultaneously overestimated the proficiency and strength of the South Korean army. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union were supplying the North Korean army with substantial amounts of equipment and training, in contrast to the South Korean army which got little in comparison from the US.

5 (3) The US underestimated the Soviet Union s desire and strategic advantage in gaining total control of Southeast Asia. Soviet turned towards Asia after Stalin realized that competing against the US and Great Britain over control in Europe was futile (Zhihua 2000:47). (4) The Korean peninsula was relative strategically unimportant for the US. They were trying to avoid wasting men and equipment on the peninsula and rather have them stationed in areas which were more likely to be in need of them. The communist side on the other hand suffered other misperceptions which might have enabled the decision to attack South Korea: (1) After the withdrawal of US troops, in addition to the infamous speech by Dean Acheson, the communist side felt fairly certain that the US would not commit to the defense of South Korea. (2) It was also believed from the communist standpoint that the Americans would not intervene because this would be, according to Mao Zedong: (...)an internal matter that the Korean people would decide for themselves (Zhao 1997:94). (3) In case the Americans would intervene it was further believed that they would not be able to arrive in time to affect the war. Discussion The first listed misperception made by the US is connected to the third one. They did not believe that the USSR would risk war, because they were not prepared for what that would entail. However, in underestimating the importance of seizing full control over Korea for the Soviet Union, they also underestimated the risks Stalin and his allies were prepared to take. On the other hand, the Americans were correct in some regard. Stalin wanted to avoid a direct confrontation between US and Soviet soldiers at all costs (Yufan & Zhai 1990:111). Evidence supporting this are numerous, e.g. Stalin s refusal to send in air support for the Chinese or his refusal to send Soviet generals to North Korea to assist Kim Il Sung (ibid.:109). It would seem like the US did not expect Stalin to engage in a proxy war. However, in doing so, Stalin managed to take the Americans by surprise and prove their perception wrong.

6 The second misperception the US did was to underestimate the North Korean army and overestimating the South Korean one. Had the US intelligence been better informed about the state of the northern army, they might have been opted to station more military personnel in the south, or at least provided better training and equipment on par with the Soviets. This might have discouraged the communist alliance to attack South Korea, even more likely if the US had left a substantial military force behind. The fourth and final misperception the US did prior to the war was perceiving greater importance in having military forces stationed in Europe than in Asia. This point may be connected to the previous one. A substantial increase of armed US forces in South Korea would probably deter any urge to attack. On the other hand, it is difficult to predict what would have happened in Europe if they chose to prioritize Asia instead. However, it would be logical to believe that if the US had known the importance of South Korea for the Soviet Union, it would for that reason alone increase the importance for the US as well. Stalin and his allies first and second misperception are connected. First they believe that the US will not come to South Koreas defense. That in itself is not an illogical assessment: The US had, both by action and statements, signalled that they were not particularly interested in South Korea. Second they believed that the US would not get involved in an inter Korean war. The reason behind this might be the speech held by Acheson. In it he describes the defense perimeter which the US would hold, and South Korea was excluded from the perimeter. This means that the US would not explicitly rush to defend South Korea in the advent of an attack, which was what Stalin and Kim Il Sung were hoping for. The third misperception made by the communist alliance was believing that a possible US intervention would arrive too late. They were probably right, as it took the US almost two months to assemble an attack. However, if it were not for General Douglas MacArthur s plan to attack behind enemy lines (Yufan & Zihai 1990), the outcome of the UN offensive might have been different. The course of the war would also be different, in communist favor, if the Chinese had entered the war earlier, though their decision to enter was a last resort and would probably never have occurred if not absolutely necessary.

7 In light of the misperceptions present on both sides of the conflict, there s no easy way in telling which one was the primary reason for the outbreak of the Korean War. The US on the one hand where ignorant to the extent the communist coalition were prepared to go to gain full control over Korea. On the other hand however, Stalin underestimated the US concern of an unified communist Korea. Which one of these two misperceptions carry most weight? If the US were aware of the overhanging danger of invasion from North Korea, they would have stationed more troops in the south. This would as previously discussed probably have deterred Stalin from giving the go ahead to Kim Il Sung, and prevented the war. The misperception the US had involving overestimating the South Korean defenses and underestimating the North Korean strength is a minor misstep in comparison to the others. Had they realized their mistake, they would probably have taken steps to mend their error, either intensifying their efforts to equip and train the South Korean forces or stationed more troops there. If they had chosen the latter it would, as stated previously, most probably dissuaded a communist attack. Conclusion Through analyzing and comparing the misperception had by both sides prior to the Korean War, one may steadily find a common thread. In every step throughout, one always returns to the notion that the US should have shown more commitment to South Korea. They should have stationed more US troops in the region, they should have trained and equipped the South Korean army better and they should signalled stronger interest in South Korea. North Korea with support from Stalin chose to attack South Korea based on these three elements. If the US has stationed more troops in the region, Stalin would have denied Kim Il Sung s request for attack and the war would have been avoided, at least for that point in time. In conclusion: The Korean War broke out primarily because of misperceptions from the US side. Reference List:

8 Kim, Youngho. "The origins of the Korean War: Civil war or Stalin's Rollback?." Diplomacy and Statecraft 10, no. 1 (1999): Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. Causes of war. John Wiley & Sons, Macdonald, Douglas J. "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism." International Security (1995): Wada, Haruki. "The Korean war, Stalin's policy, and Japan." Social Science Japan Journal 1, no. 1 (1998): Weathersby, Kathryn. "The Korean War Revisited." Wilson Quarterly 23, no. 3 (1999): Yufan, Hao, and Zhai Zhihai. "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited." The China Quarterly 121 (1990): Zhao, Suisheng. Power competition in East Asia: From the old Chinese world order to post cold war regional multipolarity. London: Macmillan, 1997 Zhihua, Shen. "Sino Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East." Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (2000):