The Comparative and Dynamic Analysis of Constitutions
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1 The Comparative and Dynamic Analysis of Constitutions Tom F. Ginsburg, University of Chicago ESNIE 2011, Cargese France
2 Introduction: What Do Constitutions Do? Traditional perspectives Establish institutions of government Limit government Express fundamental values Economic perspectives Rules about rules (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) Provide political-economic stability and allow precommitment (e.g. North and Weingast 1989) Devices for selecting and controlling agents (James Madison 1789) Large-C vs. small-c constitutions
3 Sample and waves of constitutionmaking Number of Countries Number of New Constitutions Year Countries in Existence New Constitutions Countries with Constitutions
4 Sample Time: Space: All independent countries Laws: The nominal constitution or basic law or; Laws that set up or suspend a branch of government
5 Three questions How long do constitutions last? What determines their content? Do they matter? de jure-de facto correspondence [Inform constitutional design]
6 I. The Endurance of Constitutions How long do constitutions last? How long should constitutions last? What explains their demise?
7 Is Long Life Good? Arguments against long life: Thomas Jefferson: Anti-democratic. Constitutions may not fit after some time Arguments for long life: Political conservatism (Burke) Necessary for the institutions of democracy to develop Instrumental view: long life is good if it gives us good things (economic growth, democratic stability)
8 Constitutional Duration, FDI and Democracy Mean Foreign Direct Investment (Billions US$) Mean Polity Score Constitution Age Constitution Age
9 Difference between text and practice over time Parliamentary Power De Facto - De Jure Measure Age of the Constitution Civil Liberties De Facto - De Jure Measure Age of the Constitution
10 Baseline Survival Estimates Survival Rate Age
11 Survival Estimates, by Region Survival Western Europe Latin America Analysis Time (years)
12 Survival Estimates, by GDP per capita Survival Rate GDP/capita = $15,000 GDP/capita = $2, Age
13 National Patterns of Lifespan Australia Brazil Dominican Rep El Salvador Mexico Panama Uruguay Cumulative Lifespan
14 Explaining Constitutional Duration: A Contractual Perspective Constitutions as political bargains that must usually be self-enforcing Formation: involves bargaining and reservation price Contractual incompleteness Hidden information: e.g. oil deposits in Kurdistan Incomplete information: future contingencies Time may have offsetting effects Stable until they are subject to internal or external pressures which lead to demand for renegotiation Risk factors for constitutional systems Shocks/precipitating factors (e.g. war, economic crisis) Structural sources of resiliency State characteristics (wealth, ethnic homogeneity, legal system) Constitutional features: flexibility, inclusion, specificity
15 Baseline Hazard Rate Hazard Estimate Hazard Rate Age of the Constitution
16 Predictors of Death in multivariate hazard models Predicted lifespan: 19 years PRECIPITATING FACTORS Defeat in War (+) Coups and Crises (+) Neighboring Constitutional Diffusion > Global Constitutional Diffusion (+) STATE-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS Ethnic Fractionalization (+ in autocracies) Wealth (-) Post-1945 (+) Legacy of Endurance (-) INTERNAL FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTIONS Flexibility of Amendment Procedures (-) Constitutional Review x Democracy (-) Our measure of Inclusion: Public promulgation (-) Specificity: Detail > Scope (-)
17 II. The Relation between Text and Practice The insufficiency of gap studies Provision as the unit of analysis Dimensions of variation Structure v. rights Time horizons Costliness: degree of contemplated change Precision and clarity
18 Civil Liberties: de facto vs. de jure KUW COM MYA THI BRU LIB NEW AUL SAU ISR AUS FRN MAD NOR LEB TON TUN SIN MOR CZR DEN MNC MAL LIE NTH UAE VAN LUX JOR BOT IRE SYR MAS USA LAO DJI BEL JAM FSM CHL PRK NAU QAT TUV DMA EQG DOM SWD SKN MAA INS SVG CAO YEM AFG GRN TRI SOM KBI SOL AAB TAZ BHM CDI CAN PAK IRN MLT ZIM HAI CHN BOS GAB EGY MAG WSM KEN ICE ALG IND BAR LAT NIR BEN CUB CEN SLU BAH SEN BNG COS OMA BHU TOG URU BLZ ZAM SAL TAW SEY DRV LBR PAL GFR NIG GNB MSI CON NEP GUI SUR GUY ANG MLI PNG SRI SUD FIN TAJ JPN ETH FJI IRQ SIE LES GAM UZB CHA CYP AND BLR DRC ARG NAM POL PAN TKM PHI SPN BFO GHA KYR ITA BUI HON ROK SWA MON KZK GUA BOL STP CAM GRC RWA ERI EST MAW ETM PER RUM MLD RUS GRG MZM UKR SAF TUR ARM BUL UGA MAC VEN LIT COL SWZ ALB BRA NIC CRO ECU HUN PAR AZE SLO MEX SLV CAP POR YUG de jure de facto
19 Human Rights Human Rights (r = 0.15; n = 186) D.F. Human Rights Index NZL AUS AUT ISR THA BRN LBY SAU FRA NOR DNK LUX USA MUS ESPLCA BLZPNG MWI NAM ALB GHA BFA PRY MKD NIC ECU COMBWA JAM FSM NRU MHL PLWCHE GAB GMBKOR SLE GTM TUV BOL POL HND BENMOZ SUR TLS MCO LBN SLVKEN DOM EST MDA TJKMNG RWA BGR ZAF GRC BRA BIH MAR DJICOG GEOZMB HTI FJI TON MRT IDN UKR NER MDV SWZ AGO MEXARM VENROU SRB TZA SGP OMN CMRBGD PHL SYC KHM UGA TUN JOR KAZ MYS ARE IND BHR NGA TGO AFG CIV GINCAFTUR AZE BDI PAKEGY LKA IRQ BTN RUS COL TKMETH TCD CHN NLDMA CAN BEL MLT GRD WSM BRB VUT LIE KIR ISL IRL KNA VCT MDG BHS ATG SWE FIN CHL ITA SEN GUY SLB DEU TTO PANURY LSO MLI CRI CYP GNB JPN PER LVA AND ARG HUN HRV LBR CPV STP SVN LTU CZE PRT SVK LAO GNQ CUB ZWE SYR PRK QAT VNM DZA UZB ERI BLR SDN NPL COD D.J. Human Rights Index
20 Property Rights Property Rights (r = -0.20; n = 135) D.F. Property Rights Index BRU LIB NEW NOR SWD LUX AUS NTHCAN IRE FIN DEN AUL ICE FRNSIN SPN GMY USA PORSWZ CYP BEL BAH TAI OMA CZR JPN MLT CHL SAU LAT BHM QAT MOR GRC UAE ISR KOR ITA HUN NAM POL SLV TUN BOT BUL SLO CRO LIT EST JOR DRV MAL TAZ NIC INDTUR ROM RUS ETH CHN LEB TRI PRK PAN COS KZK MLD BFO GAM AZE SAF UKR INS GAB SYR ALG EGY IRN MZM URU ZAM KEN SIE SEN THI GNB MLI GUAANG SRI GHATOG JAMPAK PER BLR DOM PHI MAW ARM MAG CON SAL CAO SUR PNG ALB PAR BRA SUD YAR BNG CUB ARG NIR COL IRQ GUY HON CDI GUI ECU BOL NIG LBR HAI DRC VEN ZIM SOM MEX MON UGA D.J. Property Rights Index
21 Parliamentary Power Parliamentary Power (r = 0.46; n = 148) D.F. Parliamentary Power Index MNG MKD DEUHRV ALBEST GRC CHE CZE SVN BGR ESPIRQISRDNK HUN ITA NLD LTU MDA LVA BEL ROU NOR SVK POL PNG TUR JPNNICBGD NZL MUS IRL SRB AUT FIN BIH USA JAM CAN FJI ZAF PRY SLV ETH KHM LSO GEO KOR AUS CRI IND BEN PRT GHA PER UKR URY VENBFA NERPHL ARG TTO NAM HND COL IDN HTI FRA PAN BRA ECU MEX NGA CHL ARM NPL LBR MWI GTM LKA DOM TLS MOZ LBN UGA RWA VNM CHN TGO AZE AFGMRT IRN MYS BWA GUY COG AGO SEN CAF GAB ERI SGPBTN GMB UZBCIV QAT GNB RUS MDG BDI LAO CUB TJK GIN TZA CYP MLI SYR COD KAZWE BLR MAR CMR JOR SWZ SDN TCD OMN KEN ZMB EGY TUN DZA LBY BHR SAU ARE TKM SOM PRK SWE D.J. Parliamentary Power Index
22 Prevalence of Term Limits Percent of Countries Year 1 Term Total No Successive Terms/Non- Successive Terms Allowed 2 Terms Total 2 Successive Terms/Non- Successive Terms Allowed Explicitly No Term Limits Notes: universe is constitutional systems with fixed-term heads of state, since 1850
23 Arguments for and against term limits Arguments for Incumbent has agenda control, media exposure, control over government machinery tyranny Status quo bias Indirect effects: barrier to entry Will induce public-regarding behavior in final period (Virginia plan) Arguments against Restriction on choice Experience may improve performance (Hume) Uniquely qualified leader Will lead to private-regarding behavior in the final period (final version of US Const.) Instrumental view; default rule.
24 Determinants of Overstay Characteristics of the leader age, military background, assumed power through irregular means Type of term limit: two terms Younger constitution (democracies only) Previous overstay makes future overstays less likely
25 III. Form: The Content of Constitutions External influences on constitution making Diffusion and the question of herd behavior Direct imposition Learning Rational design: e.g. judicial review as an insurance mechanism
26 Right to Free Speech Percent Providing Right Year
27 Right to Health Care Percent Providing Right Year
28 Right to Free Education Percent Providing Right Year
29 Figure 2 Number of rights provided, by year (n = 549 new cons?tu?ons) Number of rights year
30 Effect of Universal Declaration of Human Rights Proportion with right post presinoc cruelty couns life torture asylum slave childpro remuner strike occupate doubjep healthr citdep miranda provhlth fairtri trilang rghtapp falseimp solissuf inherit matequal busines safework devlpers fndfam speedtri examwit seprel libel marriage cappun standliv prerel childwrk intprop shelter infoacc citren healthf freecomp nomil provwork transfer selfdet debtors jury scifree juvenile conright corppun testate prisonrg samesexm arms cultrght freemove opinion proprght jointrde expost habcorp privacy leisure censor pubtri wolaw press assoc express petition assem freerel Proportion with right in 1948
31 Convergence of constitutional form Proportion of Questions Answered Period General Amending Executive Legislature Judiciary Federalism Elections Regulatory Bodies International Duties Criminal Procs Rights Proportion of Questions Answered Special Issues Democracies Regime-Type General Amending Executive Legislature Judiciary Federalism Elections Regulatory Bodies International Duties Criminal Procs. Autocracies Rights Special Issues Proportion of Questions Answered Legal Tradition General Amending Executive Legislature Judiciary Federalism Elections Regulatory Bodies International Duties Criminal Procs. Common Law Civil Law Rights Proportion of Questions Answered Special Issues Largest Religion General Amending Executive Legislature Judiciary Federalism Elections Regulatory Bodies International Duties Criminal Procs. Christian Other Muslim Rights Special Issues
32 Conclusion Summary town hall view of constitutions is out of date: region and time seem to be important determinants of content Some provisions seem to matter in some circumstances Constitutions endure when more like statutes: flexible and detailed Research challenges and future directions Measurement of de facto performance Solving omitted variable and endogeneity problems
33 Cline Center for Democracy at the
34 Japan Democracy
35 Brazil Democracy
36 Chile Democracy
37 Dominican Republic Democracy
38 Constitutions Written Under Occupation by the US Similarity to the US Constitution DR Germany Japan Korea Iceland GFR Iraq 2004 Afghan Iraq Year C
39 Proximity to the Japan 1946 Constitution Philippines Uruguay Chile Canada Japan 1889 Peru United States Of America Nicaragua Finland Dominican Republic El Salvador Venezuela Norway Ecuador Poland Liberia Turkey/Ottoman Empire Costa Rica Tonga Haiti Egypt Mexico Honduras Afghanistan Portugal Lebanon Argentina Panama Paraguay Liechtenstein Colombia Iceland Czechoslovakia Albania Thailand Denmark Estonia Bolivia Yugoslavia (Serbia) Belgium Ireland Guatemala Ethiopia Netherlands Spain Luxembourg Latvia France Brazil Austria Russia (Soviet Union) Japan 1946 Indonesia Australia Lithuania Mongolia -.4 Cline Center for Democracy at the
40 Predicting Constitutional Similarity Non-Occupation Constitutions Occupation Constitutions b s.e. b s.e. State s Previous Constitution Year difference (in 100 s) Occupier s Constitution Common Land Border Common Colonizer Common Language Constant N (Constitutional Dyads ) R-squared Cline Center for Democracy at the
41 Proximity to the Iraqi 2005 Constitution Iraq 2004 Djibouti Nigeria Trinidad And Tobago Kyrgyz Republic United States of America Burundi Niger Namibia Iraq 2005 Benin Chad Bangladesh Mali Egypt Afghanistan Rwanda Papua New Guinea Equatorial Guinea United Arab Emirates Cameroon Burkina Faso Somalia Honduras Bahrain Argentina Brunei Libya Taiwan Luxembourg Syria Austria France -.4 Cline Center for Democracy at the
42 Environmental Variables Global Constitutional Events Neighboring Constitutional Events Gain of Territory Lose of Territory Defeat in War Domestic Crisis Economic Crisis Democratic Transition Authoritarian Transition Extra-constitutional Leadership Change Intra-constitutional Leadership Change 1.13 ( 1.05, 1.22) 2.13 ( 1.38, 3.28) 1.19 ( 0.85, 1.67) 1.16 ( 0.77, 1.74) 1.08 ( 0.81, 1.44) 1.33 ( 1.03, 1.72) 1.14 ( 0.89, 1.47) 1.48 ( 1.16, 1.89) 1.30 ( 1.02, 1.65) 1.88 ( 1.59, 2.24) 0.90 ( 0.74, 1.09) Hazard Ratio Estimates and 90% Confidence Intervals
43 France Democracy
44 The Effect of Amendment Rate on Duration Survival Estimate Based on Cox Results Amendments/Year=1 Amendments/Year= Constitution Age
45 Explaining rights presence Table 2 Summary of Estimates for Explaining the Presence of Certain D.J. Rights (Models 4-5) Variable s Appe al Ass oc Cou ns Exam wit Expre ss Freem ove Freer el Presin oc Pre ss Pubt ri Speed tri Tortu re Time- Invariant 1 st Before WWII British Colony French Colony Christian (%) Muslim (%) Time- Variant Democra cy Populatio n (ln) GDP (ln) Treaty Ratificati on Spatial Lags Foreign Aid Competit or Export Competit or Common Colonizer Common Legal Foreign Aid Export 0 Region Regime Tot al
46 Structural Variables Interim Constitution Reinstated Constitution Legacy of Endurance Inclusiveness Democracy at Promulgation Occupation Constitution Amendment Rate Amendment Rate Squared Judicial Review in Authoritarian Regimes Judicial Review in Democratic Regimes Scope Detail Executive Term Limits Single Executive Parliamentary Power 2.09 ( 1.61, 2.71) 0.73 ( 0.54, 1.00) 0.01 ( 0.00, 0.04) 0.32 ( 0.23, 0.46) 1.12 ( 0.88, 1.43) 1.07 ( 0.80, 1.43) 0.21 ( 0.09, 0.53) 1.15 ( 1.05, 1.26) 1.15 ( 0.93, 1.43) 1.13 ( 0.77, 1.66) 0.43 ( 0.16, 1.15) 0.14 ( 0.04, 0.49) 0.75 ( 0.63, 0.89) 0.96 ( 0.81, 1.13) 1.00 ( 0.47, 2.10) Hazard Ratio Estimates and 90% Confidence Intervals
47 Determinants of Overstay (cont.) (n = 350; 87% classified correctly) Age Age Squared Previous Career - Military Previous Career - Lawyer Number of Previous Terms Irregular Entry 1 Term Allowed 2 or More Terms Allowed Non- Consecutive Terms Prohibited Number of Previous Overstays Regime - Polity2 Age of Regime Number of Executives Constitution Age 0.31 (- 0.06, 0.68) (- 0.01, 0.00) 1.10 ( 0.24, 1.96) 0.42 (- 0.45, 1.28) 0.63 (- 0.21, 1.48) 1.76 ( 0.85, 2.67) 1.12 (- 1.21, 3.46) 2.08 ( 0.20, 3.96) (- 1.65, 0.62) (- 0.62, 0.17) (- 0.18,- 0.02) 0.01 (- 0.01, 0.02) 0.91 (- 0.26, 2.07) (- 0.04, 0.00) Coefficient Estimates and 95% Confidence Intervals
48 Determinants of Overstay (cont.) The following makes overstay more likely: Leader around age 40 (0.07 increase) Leader who was previously in the military (0.13 increase) Leader who assumed office through irregular means (0.26 increase) Two term limit (0.33 increase) The following makes overstay less likely: Lower Polity IV score (~0.01 decrease for each unit) Older constitution (~0.002 decrease for each year) Presidential Systems (0.09 decrease) Results depend on regime-type Only consistent result is that of profession(military leaders always make overstay more likely) Age of the constitution is significant in democracies
49 Consequences of Overstay Constitutional/Political Crisis? Only 32 constitutions (<5% of all constitutions) died as a result of overstay, but this is a high percent of overstays Political conflict is less likely surrounding term limit violations than the end of potential overstayers terms 0.7 years with conflict versus 1.1 years Overstay makes future overstays less likely 24.9% of executives overstay in countries with no previous overstays versus 15.1% in countries with at least 1 overstay Overstay seems to have no effect on the level of democracy Virtually no change in countries polity scores during the tenure of overstayers (similar to potential overstayers), regardless of regime-type
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