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- Osborne Richards
- 7 years ago
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2 ..., !:..., "#$!%!% &' (&$% )'- (' (*&!+,%.. #-..., "#$!%!% &' $ '$- -, #*!% &. ' '#/ &! %'% 0- &.. '#' '" &( & &'- -&- 1&"&((, $'#2- - $ (*! $! $#-23, 1 #/! & $ $' -&" &*-, '* $ (,- "& 4 «, &'%» (*&!+ 1&- '$ 1 &"#&$2 &'" -&" '&. $ $( # 1&1' $( & &,- ) " '& 1& 1& +,% '$! "& $ $&- (!+ #$-+. & 1# $ $ %.#,&'% '&" #%. ISBN ISBN #*" ', $$, 2013
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12 )!4)!#)0 4)-'#2 )&% ) )- *&2$ '-0, ' #+!&!&+!#!*%.)*#).!& &0 #0!1 *#&2, #$'0 *)(!4*(5 '#)55 1!#'* ' 2"0-(%)!*+ '#++ )(.!&!#' '!%,#% *!#)&!0!&1#2 +-) '& ',*+!*(!9), 660!' "&2$ #)!$, '$!#4& *#%)!* 4)#' ''0 ' #/ ) '$.!*"(.!#06( )1# #( 4)*#!* )!!+#)- '#!0 '' % %)% ''&0 ' ))/ )!*% 0)% *)!. #% 4)#!*. '$1)' (2013 %.) '!&+!*(!- 41&* ) &0 +%.!#& -$+. ) '$!*( *#'!# 1)#&( +*)#!#. 4)'0!) ' 4)'+ #) 41& +)$( *!)'#)!.. +%+ #*0 41 1$& 1!&'& #+, # )"$ 4)-& 4)&-$( + *)!!6!#' &/,*+!*% 4&-0!#)$ 4#+ )+&- " #/(! 4+!' '+4)+&+% *+4)+!!, ' #+!& ' 0)(!9). *!&!#', ' #/ 4)#. 4!.)05#!0 '$/$ -0. *, !#)!#)$. & '"-*"&) )+ ' %%. /* 3/),!. 0'&0#!0 «'-&'$+ #*)$- #$+ &'*+», *#)$( *)-#!10 2 +&$+ 4$#$+ 4&+#+. +!#! #+, )&!#$( +)$( & 4&#!*(,&#$, 4)!#'#&2 44" 1. * 4'&056 1&2/!#' )"',!- ## 1.+$+ 4)&-#2 )&"5 )!*( 0)( 4)%)++$, *#)0 '!#) )!!+#)'#!0 ** 4)* - -#.!*% 4)%)!!. 4 '!. 2.#0# '#2 )9)+- #),!&56% 4 4#.++ #+ 4)# ' %%. * - )9)+#) #+ &/2 +&& )&"5 )!*( 0)( 4)%)++$. )+ 4)%')$! «1&2/( #)(*(» #% '&!., *#)$(!+% %')#2.'% &) 0#&& & + 4)!#'#2 4)"!! 1%60 ) ' )+*. 1. // Project Syndicate..,
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«!#- )-% 4)#)!#'»? #'#$,# +% )% '4)-!$ /&!' #)- '!#06( +%)9, *#)0 0'&0#!0 )'#+ ) 4!( *% «-4&#!*!4*#$ )!*( 0)( 4)1&+$». *&5.#&!2 1$ '$)#2 1&%)!#2 &- +) -, # &4*' 9+ % )--!*5 4)-*, #*- '( #& ) 4%#'*,#( *%. 13
14 ! &" ' "( )!*$!*# &# +##2, # ' %. +& *#!+'&!0 ' +)( 4)'&!# )!*( 0)( 4)%)++$. )-.0.&' 0'&0&!2 4)'*+ +)*!*. #)!' &-+ )+!#*,!&'#&2,.&!2 4 0)$+ #*+ =. + 4,#+ %) 1$& - + 4)'$. %!)!#', *#)$ 4)!&!2 * %') )!4)!#) 0)% )-0, 44!' % 1 5& %. )#9")'' 2 9')& %. + +!6-!#'5# *#)$ 9*#$, *#)$ %')0# '+-!# 4)'- 0 #% '-4)*&$.!!&'( ' 0)( 1&!#. *,! 1975 %. ' %)!*+ 0)+ -!!&'#&2!*+ "#) (:) 4)'&!2!!&'0 4 &)+ 1- %65 ) '$&5 4� 1&% (#)1- #%) 0)% #4&' %. )!#'& #/0! %. 44!&! %#!#'+ %&/ '!1?+&56. (comprehensive) %)#0. &0 0)$. %!)!#'!#*'. %&/5 %)#0. (4)'&2$( * 3.1) 0) %!)!#' 10#!0 9)+)'#2 7 0)$. +#- )&., *#)$ +4)#)# & 4)'# '#)!#)$,!16# 1 '!. +!#..-0 #*. +#)&'.!4*- #) %#!#',!!'(!#)$, 4)'0# '!+5 4)')* 5# "* 4&#$ #!# 0'&( %!)!#' #!- #&2 0)$. +#)&' +!# %&! 2 Cordesman A., Burke A. The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies P :. 2. I /......:!-", #
15 * 3.1,#%!%&/0, %!)!#' &-$ 1$& 9)- +)'#2 7 '+ 0)+ 1?*# 180 ( 40'&0 + 0)% +#)& 4. % **. 4)#( * +)*!*+!5*!!#- )$ %#!#' +%& - '*#2,.#0 ' %) 1$& '0# *)! ))1#* +*#% 0)% #4&'% "*& (:) ** #.!*( 4)4!$&* &0!0 0)% )-0 4)0'& #)! * 4)1)#5 ' '+-% )1#- * 4� #0-&'% )*#) #4 CANDU 5. )+ #%, 4&)'&!2, # * 1980 %. '!9. 9)- "$ 4!#)0# 4)4)0# 4 4))1#* 6.!& )&",#% 4)*# )!#'&!0 4)%'$+ 0)$+ %!)!#'+,!4!1$+ '$&0#2 4&#( ' 4)+$/&$. +!/#1..,#+ ' *#01) 1976 %.!#)!#'!#)- $. &!&& 4)!#'& 3)" '!'0! 4&+ 4!#'* ' ) «'!#'#&2(»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oven R. Boom in Canadian Reactors // Washington Post, Timmerman K. Iran s Nuclear Program: Myth and Reality // Iran Brief, & $ : $ -$ ( )..:!-", # Bonn Concern Ends Iran Nuclear Pact // New York Times,
16 # ) '$4&0#!' 10#&2!#'!%&! %&/5! 7 4)+ %)#(. 7#+!4!1!#''&!&- 56 1!#0#&2!#':!)$ %' )!*0 0)0 4)%)++.&!2 ' %&1*(!#%", #* ** )*'!#'!#)$ '& 1.+!# ' )&- ". 7# 1$& 1!&'&,*+!*+ *)!+ ', &+ )%. 4))##' #!#!#'+ 4( 4- )-*, # 4)'& * 4)*)65 9!)'0 0)( 4)%)++$ +!!'(,+%)" )!*. $.-0)6*'. *, 120!#)*'.+!*% 9!*% 4)#- +#' %)!*% ')!##, ' *#)+ )+6&!0 :,!#&!2 '!% 8 9. )-)*!*0 '( 1#&2 4*& %) '+-!# #*% ', **.+!*, 4)+0'/-!0 )*"+ '. 1'$. (!#'(.!15 1!4*!#2 )!*% )*'!#' '$$'& )&+0 )-++ +!( '0 0)0 4)%)++, *#)0 4!& #-0 0)%!!&'#&2!*% )*#) ' )* (1981 %.) 4&& '$( +4&2!.!#!#,!( '$4!- #& #5)+ )1&#)'& '$.!4"&!#' ',#( 1&!#, ' 15 ) '&&!& )1# )%)++ &5( 4&!#25!*)#& 10. * '!.,#.!&( *&!2!## &0 '!!#'&0 4)-% )'0 0)( 4)%)++$.!&'0. 4)&-'/(!0 '($, (-!#'0 )-+!*"( #!#!#'0,*!4)+#&2( 1$ #!6!#'&0,#% 4)*# 4)/&!2 4!#4 #*- #2!0. + +!+ )&"0 %+ '( 0)( 4)%)++$!&2 1!4*& %).!) %' )!* )*'!#'!#& )!-!+#)'#2 '+-!#2 '!!#'&0!1!#'( 0)( 4)%)++$, 4-'++,!*&556( '5!!#'- &0565.,#( "&25 ' 1987 %. ) 4!# «)%» )$*, )%'% 4*!#!*+ $+ 1& ) +, *4& #.!*5 *+#"5 *+4#$ '. %'$. 9 Segal D. Atomic Ayatollahs: Just What the Mideast Needs-An Iranian Bomb // Washington Post, & #.& - ( -? [,( &] // )*-( ( IranAtom.Ru..,
17 "#)9% +&( +6!# (-1, )!* ' IR-1). * #.&% 4)+05#!0 &0 1%60 ) +5# '(, #* ** +%#!4&2'#2!0 &0 )- 1#* ) )-(% *!#'. / 4)1)# 1)'0 &0 "#)9-% 1%60 ), 4 #- ')-5 )!*(!#)$, #% 1$& 4)0# )*'- #&+ )%" 4 #+(,)% ) (7). - ')+ 1$& 4!#'& 4! #.!*. 4)"!!' 4)' ) %1)( ' +#&&!*5 9)+ +.!*( 1)1#* 1%6% +#&&!*% ) ' 4&!9)$. %) 9"&2 0'&, # #*0 #.-!*0 *+#"0 + 4)/'&! *- 0 9)+"0 +# '-4)*&,!'+&!#2 1,#+!!#)$ '$!/% )*'!#' '$%&0#!#)(. )+ #%,!6!#'# 4!2+ 0- #&&$ +(, 4! ' 1988 %., ' *#)+ *$'# 1.+!#2 ) 4!#4 * 0)+ ) =, 1!4*$ 4)&!#25 "&( )!*% )*'!#',!#& &0#2!1 '+ #+!#)+, *#- )$ 4)&-&!#)!#'! %)+ ' 0)( 1&!#. )'( 4 ) 44& )%#, *#)0 ' *" %' #&2* 4)'& + *#'( $ %)!*%!!&- '#&2!*% )*#) ' :, # 4'&& 4)'!# %!4&2' 0)% #4&'!!#425 1%60 *& 20%, 4!#'& &0,#% )*#) 116 *% #4&' 13.!&-!#' +)*!*% '&0 ' 1992 %. )%# #*&!2 # &2(/. 4!#'* ' 0)% #4&' 1)'0, #*- # 4%#'* )!*. #.!*.!4"&!#',!+#- )0!#%#$ ) %')!# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Report of the IAEA Director General Nov. 15. P $ /(: $ & & & [,( &] // )*( ( «News.Israelinfo». '-, Barneby F. The invisible Bomb: the nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East. London: Tauris, P Cordesman A., Burke A. The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies P
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«4*)#- $»!1)* (1992 %.), +#5)$(!#* (#)' +6!#25 27 *# (1994 %.)!!&'#&2!*( #0-&'- $( )*#) &'( +6!#, 4'&056( )1#$'#2 -% 100 % 4� (1995 %.) 17. (!#'+ +)*!*.,*+!*.!*"( +6% 4&#!*% '&0 #!#)!#'! )+ ' 0)( 1&!# 1$& '$-$ #*#2!0 )&0, - 0 *!#. #&2*!!0!+%& #!#0#2!' 4)' #*!#)!#',.#0 %)&!2 #&2* #+ 4)*#+, *#)$ #!&!2 * *#%) «*)#(» 0)( 4)*" '!#)%+!#'#!#'! '!+ #)1'- 0+ "&2% *#&2!#' +-)$ ( ) (- $..: & 0%, # (-% &- $( ) $ %%. 1 #. $ %$ & 23 &' - %(, $ $ $( )&&. 17 Koch A., Wolf J. Iran s Nuclear Facilities: a Profile
19 10#&2!#' *, ' 4) %%. )!!(!*!4"&!#$!#)& ' /) 7! '- '0$+,)%#!*+ )*#) (VVER-1000). )+! *1) %.,## 1?*#!#& )!4)!#)- 0#2!0 %)# 7.!)$ %' )*'!#' %)!#)&!2 +*!+&2!#2 *)% &", 4)!#$. * 0)( 4)%)++,!"&25!*&50 &51( #* 9)+". ),#+!#'*!) 1$&!&! +*#% :. *!&!#', ' %%. '!!!&'#&2!* 4$#-*!#)*#)!* )1#$ () 4 )!*( 0)( 4)%)++ '&!2 #&2* ')+*. 7, 1 4)'&0 #.!*. ')!##' 0)$.!!&'#&2!*. "#)' 19. (!#)$,,# '&'& ')+0. 4)',! )%(, 4'&0& '$- 4&0#2 #* )1#$!##!*)$#, 4!#4 &-- '0!1!#' 4)'!#' *+4#'%'$."#)9%.!1$( #)! 4)!#'&0# ## 9*#, # 4)# ' 4) %%. & *1) /+-9!- #')&, 4 *#)$+ $+,!*)#5 )*#', 4 *- #)( 0)$(!##! )!&-#!#)#%!*( %)#(!.)0!6!#'''/( '&!#. "&25!#-0 #- *%!##! 4)4&%&!2!6!#'&!&56. +): -!4&2' '!. '+-!#( &0 4)1)#0-1.+( #.&% 4)'!#' 0)% )-0; - #4)'* ' )&$ %!)!#' )!*.!4"&!#' &0!1) 1.+( 9)+"; -!!*)#$. 0)$. "#)' 4)4)0#(, *#- )$ +%& 1$ #&2* 4&0#2 )% )%, 4)'#2 )1#$ ' '#++ ) ,..,.. 0( #( // & «( (» /... 4; ( " 2%..:!($ $ 1*$ (! ##,5), # Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran/Report of the IAEA Director General Nov. 15. P $ % : $ -$ - $ [,( &] // )*( ( «"-$»..,
20 "&25 )&"!#'* '$!/% )*'!#' ' %%. 4!# 1& ) 3 +&. &&. 1$& *4&$ ' *#() 4*!#!*% 1)'0 &0 1%60 ),!##% &0!1)* 40#!# %'$. "#)9% -1. -'++, +,# 4!#'*!#& )- /56( &0 4&%!'0 * 1999 %. #.&%(. 4)- '!#' )!*+!4"&!#+.,#+ ')+ %) 1$& '$- )!/)#2!!#'!#*' )!*( 0)( 4)%)++$!# 4)!#'#&( #.!*. ')!##', #*- #2 4)'!#' *+4&*#56. 4)4)0#0. 1)-4)+$/&% *+4&*! 4)'!# /)*+!- /#1$ *4* )1-+ '*+% 1)'0,!4"- &2$.!)#'!#& '$!*4)% &5+0, 1.+$. &0 4)'!#' %'$. "#)9%.!#%#$ ' *" %'!4. ' )&" 4)%)++$ 1%60 ) *4&$ 4!$ 1.- +$. +#)&' *+4&*#56. 4!&-& &0 )!*% )*'!#' - 4) 4)# #+!'+ &0 )')- #$'0!#'#!#'56% 4$#% 4)'!#' 0)+ 1?*# ' #, *#)$(!)!'&!0 **.)/ *)4& +!*)' 4!&2!*.0(!#' 4)4)0#!)-! %)+$+ 4+$+ 4& %. ) 4&& *!# 4&5 #.!*5 *+#"5!')/!#''$. %'$. "#)9% -2, *#)$ 1$& +6 4)$6% 4*&0 ' ' #$) ) 0'&0&!2 1& -$+ ',*!4&#". 0'&- 5 )!*(!#)$, 4#')-( 7, 2002 %. **. )1# 4!'5 4)'!#' %'$. "#)9% -2 4)'&!2. &2* ' +)# 2003 %. 7 *&5&!#- '#!#'56( *#)*#!!#( *+4(, *#)0!#&*&!2!!)2( 4)1&+(,*!4)# )0 *+4#' )1-- % 4)'!#'.!4*#)',#( *+4!!#)$ 7 '$0'& 44$#*!4&2'0 "#)9-% 1)'0 &0 1%60 ). ')+!'&!2 )% 1?*#$ 0)( - 9)!#)*#)$.!#!#, )"$ 4$#&!2!'#2 )'$ +!#)-0 ' 4)'", 4!$ *#)$. ',*''- &# *!-*! )!!#'&05# *& 5 #$!. # 4)!#- # *+!)-,#%.+!*%,&+# ' ) (+ 0,1%). 1$ )'( )$ 4&)'&!2 #2 ' %, 4)'!#' )'% *"#)# 20
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«%)0 *+)$», 4'&056 '$&0#2 4&#( 1&% 0)% #4&' 24. 7## "#) #*- )!4&%# *#(!*( &1)#)(!#'*( 4 4)'!#' *!-*! ) )$ &)$+ 1)'+, 4!#'&$+ = ' 1978 %., *#) +-# 1$#2!4&2' &0 1%60 21 & 3 & [,( - &] // )*-( ( IranAtom.Ru.., * 1, $ % 1%% %%% &$ % ' 150 % & $ $% &$ - 1 / :!#, # Perabo B.A. Chronology of Iran s Nuclear Program // Monterey Institute of International Studies P
22 ).!&!#'*,!*&5+ «%)0. *+)», 4-'++,.0#!0 ' )1+!!#0. )%( +( )%"( 0'&0#!0 )0$( "#(!.$( /!, +56( #0-&'$(!!&'#&2!*( )*#) &'( +6!#. ++,#% #+ )!4&-$: +#5)$(!#* (#)' *#(!*- % 4)'!#' +6!#25 27 *#, *#)$(!4&2# &0 )1#$ 4)0* 900 %. '$!*1%6% ) (), ' «4*)#$»!1)*.!,# 1)' 1$& 4!#'&- #0 ' 4) %%..#!0 4 *#)&+ 7. )#2+ 4 +!#!##!0 #( -!.$( /!.$, 0&"(! '/#. )!4&%# +&&+4)$+ *&5#)+,&*#)+%#- $+!4)#)+ &0 )&0 #4', +4)#)'$+ #0 ' & %'.,#+ 1)' #.-!* '+- 4 1&2/ *&!#' '$!*1%- 6% ), '.!4*"( 7 ' %%. 1$& 4#')-, # +&&+4)$( *&5#)!4&2- #!0 #&2* &0 4&0!#1&2$.,&+#'. )+ #%, "#)!6 "*&#)+ 1&2%(!*% 4)'!#'. '!$ 2004 %. '!9. (!#'# ' 4 *')! ), % 4)'#!0 %*!9#) ) (UF 6,,# 0'&0#!0 4%#'#&2(!#( 4) "#)9-+!4!1 1%- 60 )).,#+ 4)4)0# 4& 550 # %*!9#- ) ), *#)$. 120 # 4)'& 4)4)0# 4 1%65 ) ' #.!2 #*- '$4!*5#!0 - *#)$ 41$ 4)*#$, '*&50 *! ), *#)$(!&-# +#)&+ &0 4)'!#' 0)% #4&'.!9. (!#'# *+4&*! 4 4)'!#' 0)% #4&' &0 )*#)' )&% #4.. 4)'$.,#+ *+4&*! )1# )!*+!4"&!#+ &!2 4-  18 #4&'$&056.!1)*,!)-6. )!!# %60 20% (4 )-235), ' #*!1)*! )+, 1%6$+ 3,3%,!0#2!1)*!' 4))% ). #!(! 9*")5#: 4)4)0# 4 1%6-5 ) () 4$# 4)4)0#), %! 2007 %. )1- #$'#!0 *1%6$( ) (),,*!4)+#&2 4)4)0# 4 1%65 ), *#)+ '!'+ 4)'0#!0 $!!&'0!6!#'&05#!0 4$#- 22
23 *!#)*#)!* )1#$, ' #+!& 4 #!#)'5 '$. #4' %'$. "#)9% IR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 IR-6s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m, *#)$ ' 2 4 ) 4)'#&2 %'$. "#)9% -1. * "#)9% IR-2m 4*.0#!0 '!# #!#)'0,. %*!9#- ) ) 6 4'&!0. #) +!0" *&!#' "#)9% -1 '&&!2 1861, IR-2m 319. %&! 4)!#'&( ) 9)+", %) 4&)# )+!##2,#+ 4)4)- 0# + 25 #$!. %'$. "#)9% 25. )!.) $/. #+4' '' "#)9%,# +-# 1$#2!6!#'- & *!#01) %. ++,#% 2710 %'$. "#)9% -1 %#' * )1# 4++ 4)4)0# 4 1%65 ) ' 3). 7# 4'&0# '!& 4)0#0!#'#-!#'56% 4&#!*% )/0 1!4#2!## '$!* #+4$ 1%60 ), '4 )-(% *!#'. 25 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran // Report of the IAEA Director General P
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32 *&!#' ), 1%6% 20%, #!#2 )1##2 240 *% #*% 0)% +#)& 37. 4)& 2013 %. 1$'/( &2* '( )'* )&0 () +! & 4)4&-&, # * &# $/% % 4)!# *- 5 «*)!5 )#»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«-» $3%$ - $$ 8 % &(% &$ 25 % %% & ( 90% &&-235). 32
33 &0 1%60!4&2'#2 #&2* *4&$ 4!$ 4!#'& 3 &0 /)!*( 7 0) #4&',!1!#' 0) #4&'!!#425 1%60 20%, 4) &0 )1#$ %)!*%!!&'- #&2!*% )*#). * '!&!4&2'0 0)% #4&' (' ' U 3 O 8 ) 10#&2 4#)1#!0 % *')!0 ' %1)5 9)+ %*!9#) ) (UF 6 ), # &0 "#)9-%!4!1 1%60. 4),#+ 4-!& 1%60 1# *4& )!64&056(!0 +#)& '!% 4&#&2$( 0)$( 1)0. 4$+ $+, &0 4)1)'0 '!% *4- &% ' U 3 O 8 20% 1%60 1)# ' UF 6 -!*&2* & '/(!0 )&2!*( '$(,*!- 4)# +! &!##, # 4)./. &0 ')- #. )'#0!1$#( 1)#0 *')!0 +-# 1$#2 '$4&- + + &5 42.!& - ) %#'# U 3 O 8 #4&'$&056!1)*!## 1. %)-!*+!!&'#&2!*+ )*#), # 1%6$( 20% ) (!#'#&2 1# 4)%$+ &0 &2(/% 1%60. )+ #%, 1%6$( 20% U 3 O 8.#!0 4 %- )# $ 4)1)'0 % ' )%5 9)+ 1# '$0'&$.,# 9)+"0 *-#!0 ' '# - 4!!#, % 4)#' %) +%# 4)4)0#2 )- '$( -!#* +)$. 1$( '$/ ++&2$(!)*, 1.+$( &0 4)'0 0)%!4$#0, 1&* * ')+!0 #+( 1+1$ &2% )'0, #* ** 0)$( 14)4!!' )-(% ) +# #!#&2 4)!#5 *-!#)*"5. # - ')+0 %!#'* * "&! )*- #$ 4)!#'&0#!&-5 #.!*5 '' &0 -!#*. +!!'-%+#)!*. %)( *!#)*"5 %&'(!# (1%&'*). + 4,#+ &0 %#'&0 0)$. 1%&'* 1$!4&25# )-($( 4&#(, 40'&!1!#'$. 4!' *#)% 4* +&')0#. )+,#%,!&# #$'#2, # %#'& 0)% 41 Hibbs M. Reconverting Iran s U 3 O 8 to UF 6. // Arms Control Wonk Ibid. 33
34 1)0!' 4� (+4&'% #4)!#&2*!&-, #,# 4)1&+ &% +% )/#2.20, - *4'!## *&!#',#% 0)% +#)& 43. #*( #*( )0!%&! '!#$( )!# &- +) -, *#)$( '$)-#!+ '!4!1!# ) 4)'!# 0) )-, #$'0!&-!#2,#( %&1 4)1&+ ' )!*+ 4)+$/&+!*#) ')-5#, # &0!0 0)% )-0 #)1#!0!+0 4)'0 * (#* #.&% 1$&!- $ 4# 70, -., ** 4&%#!0, +-!'1- (# ' #)#). ),#+!##!0, #!& *!# ')0 )0!+%&!'#2,# #.&%5, #,# *-#-!0 '4& 4!&+ ), )'2 4)+$/&% )'#0 *#)% -, + ' *$. %!)!#'.. ')+- 0'&0#!0, # ) 4&& 9)+"5 *!#)*" 0)% 14)4!!& 4 «!#» 1& ), #+ 4)*#!* # 1$'/.!'#!*. 9*'- 0)6*'. ) 4!&. '$&05# *)" 0!&' &* 45. -'++, '$/4)'0 9)+"0 #)1# &2- (/( 4)')*. * 4 1!&5# ')$ '!#')!#, #*- ' #+, # %) - 4)0& )/! 0)% )-0. *, 4 +5 )* 3#"4#- )* -)%!###!#)#%!*.!!&'- ( ', -!(! +- %')#2 & 0)% 4#"&, 4!*&2* 1&# 1%6$+ )+ ' *&!#'.,!##$. &0 4)'!#'!*&2*. " 0)% )-0 4)!&' &2(/% 1%60 43, ' - % (% $% &(, % $ 2006 %., % &, 1 ' ' - $- %$, 1& $ '-$ -' &-. ' 2009 %. '$& &' ' 1& -& % $% $ & ( $( : & 2012 %. %, $ ' 2012, 9 4. #$ 25. # Warrick J. Russian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko s aid to Iran offers peek a nuclear program // Washington Post,
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itt W., Walrond C., Albright D., Wood H. Iran s Evolving Breakout Potential. ISIS Report. London, ; Jones G. Iran s Rapid Expansion of its Enrichment Facilities Continues as the U.S. Concedes That Iran Is Getting «Closer and Closer» to Having Nuclear Weapons. Non-Proliferation Education Policy Center. Arlington (USA),
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«#+ *!*'», % '#)( *!* 4)'# «.'!#$» & #.$ ''2 ''# +#- )& ' 4)'$( *!*, # &# 4)"!! 1%60 1&,99*#'$ !"#.! $% &(% * // 2 -( $% - $: )* &% 83 &%- % )& 3 $( ),, M.: 5*'( & ( ), # Hearing: Preventing a Nuclear Iran. House Committee on Foreign Affairs // Washington D.C Heinonen O., Henderson S. Nuclear Talks with Iran: Diplomacy and Diminishing Time. Policywatch Washington Institute for Near East Policy // Washington D.C
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38 %) '$(# 0)% *)!. 7# '#)## + 1$&!& '!#( 9)+!9)+&)' #*, # #) 40#2, # + 0'&0#!0 «.)+» (4)#$+). - )0#,,#+ 1?0!0#!0 #, 4+ *#)$ (!#'0 )- ' 0)( 1&!#!'+!#+$! 4)#+,!*-+, «))1#*», ' #& # «1&0» 0)$+ )-+. )+ #%, 9#' +-# 1$#2 #+ 4) + 1-!#0#&2!#': 4)+),!& 1#!#, #!#)!#&*- '#!0!!+)#&2( 4!!#25. #$'0 )&%5 #!#2 ), *$( 4)# &20!1)!$'#2!!#' **!6!#'$( ,#%, )!* )*'!#' #')-#, #!)2( %)( &'!#' 0'&0#!0 #&2* 0) )-, '! '$ )-0 +!!'% #-0.,# 0'&0#!0!&($+, #* ** ' ')+0 )-)*!*( '($!#) *)# 4')%&!2 45!!4&2'- +.+!*% )-0. -'#)$., 4) *$. )!#. #$'&!2 )&2-!!#0!( ' 0)( 9)!#)*#)$ *!#'!.% 0)% +#)&, #*- # #.-!* 4)1&+$, *#)$ 1- '*5# 4) ') '$. 4)'!#'$. 4)"!!'. ),#+ - 4+#2, # 4) '$. '$ )' 1%60 ) #.&%-!* 1)' *% )1## #*, ** +. -#)#2.,!& ) 4)+# )/ )1#* )- -(% ), # ')0 & 1#,#  0)+ 1?*- #,.06+!0 4 %)#0+ 7. ),#%!-!## ' #+, # *)#$ #*% 1?*#.)/ '!#$ '-'/$+!&+ () 4)#'*. & )+ &0 4)'!#' )-(% ) 1$& 1$!4&2'#2!*)#$ 4)4)0#0, +6!# *#)$. ) '!#$ #, #!#)+& ) *!- 5 0)% )-0 +-!)-#2 53.,## 4)"!!, Mousavian S.H. Globalising Iran s Fatwa against Nuclear Weapons // ISIS. Survival. London, Vol. 55, No. 2. P ; Ansari A. Iran: A Nuclear Fatwa? // Chatham House Expert Comment. London, Fitzpatrick M. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Worst-case Outcomes. IISS. London, P
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