Understanding & Analyzing Iran s Nuclear Intentions. Testing Scott Sagan s Argument of Why do States build Nuclear Weapons

Transcription

1 Understanding & Analyzing Iran s Nuclear Intentions Testing Scott Sagan s Argument of Why do States build Nuclear Weapons Dissertation by Oliver Schmidt Master of Arts in International Relations Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University Academic Year 2007/ September 2008

2 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 2 Table of Contents Abstract Introduction The case of Iran Concept & Methodology Scott Sagan and Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? The Security Model Basic Concepts of Neo-Realism The Concept of Deterrence The Security Model The Domestic Politics Models The Norms Model Applying the Hypotheses to the Case of Iran The Security Model The domestic politics model The Norms Model Thesis Testing Sagan Does Iran want to build nuclear weapons? Assessing Iran s nuclear capabilities Technical aspects of Iran s nuclear program Iran s ballistic and cruise missile program International reactions and concerns First indications for Iran s nuclear intentions? The Security Model The International Level The Regional Level Preliminary Conclusion...53

3 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University The Domestic Politics Model International & Regional Aspects Domestic Aspects Preliminary Conclusion The Norms Model International Aspects Regional Aspects Domestic Aspects Preliminary Conclusion Conclusion How helpful are Sagan s three models in assessing the case of Iran? Does Iran, according to Sagan s models, intend to build nuclear weapons? Is Iran s nuclear program a threat for the west? What are the dangers of the Iranian case?...78 Appendix Map: Nuclear Weapons Status Map: Iran s Nuclear Facilities Map: Satellite Images of Iran s Nuclear Sites Map: Iran s planned nuclear fuel cycle Map: Ballistic Missile Proliferation Map: Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Missiles Map: Iran s missile facilities Map: Iran s Political System...87 Bibliography...88

4 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 4 Abstract This dissertation: Understanding & Analysing Iran s Nuclear Intentions Testing Scott Sagan s Argument of Why do States build Nuclear Weapons, focuses on three questions: first, does Sagan s argument provide a helpful tool to analyse a state s nuclear intention; second, does Iran want to build nuclear weapons, and third, does Iran pose a threat to Western interests or security. Therefore, these works outlines Sagan s theoretical approach briefly, before deriving hypotheses and apply it to the case of Iran. Scott Sagan offers three analytical categories: the security model, the domestic politics model, and the norm model to assess a state s nuclear intention. Additionally, this work provides a brief survey of technical aspects and the current status of Iran s civil nuclear, and military missile program. A brief history shows the political development of the case until June Scott Sagan s approach provides a helpful tool to assess the nuclear intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although the models provide a good analytical framework, it is difficult to provide prognoses, rather than explanations in retrospect. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that Iran does not pose an immediate threat for US and European security and interests. At the same time, Iran s case does provide plenty of reasons for concern, especially regarding the future of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security.

5 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 5 Understanding & Analyzing Iran s Nuclear Intentions Testing Scott Sagan s Argument of Why do States build Nuclear Weapons 1. Introduction Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, [ ] 1, 190 states signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The treaty entered into force in 1970, after it was opened for signature two years prior. In the year 1995 the signatories of the non-proliferation treaty decided in favour of the indefinite extension of the possibly most successful tool of nuclear non-proliferation. 2 The NPT forms the core of international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The basic idea of the agreement is that every country should have the opportunity to use nuclear energy for civil purposes, but the military use should be prohibited and exclusively allowed to the five countries that detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967 namely the USA, Russia, United Kingdom, China and France. The IAEA forms the control and verification body for the compliance of the NPT member states. Its founding dates back to the beginning of nuclear non-proliferation, with the Atoms for Peace Program initiated by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in The NPT has faced a severe crisis since the last Review Conference in While the countries of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) demanded more commitment regarding 1 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), ( ). 2 NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part I), Annex: Decision 3 Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ( ). 3 Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, pp Speech by: Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs United Nations: The Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Regime Debilitation and the Risk of Collapse, at: Nuclear Weapons The greatest Peril to Civilization - A Conference to Imagnie a World without them, Yale University, 21 February Also: Joseph F. Pilat: The end of the NPT regime?, in: International Affairs 83: 3, 2007, pp

6 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 6 the topic of non-proliferation, the non-aligned, non-nuclear weapon states demanded a significant step towards the disarmament of the nuclear arsenal owned by the five nuclear weapon states, in accordance with article 6 of the NPT. Moreover, they demanded and underlined each member s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the development of a domestic enrichment capability, according to Article III and IV NPT. 5 During the Cold War only two nations became nuclear-armed states, which are not recognised as nuclear weapon states in accordance with the NPT, namely Israel and India. On the 14 th of May 1974 India conducted a nuclear weapons test after their nuclear program started in the mid Israel never publicly announced the possession of nuclear weapons but it has been recognised as nuclear armed by the United States since Since the end of the Cold War four cases of proliferation have gathered enormous attention. On October 9, 2006 North Korea detonated a nuclear device and affirmed suspicions about a military nuclear program. 8 The country is also known to develop multi-stage ballistic missiles and it has conducted several missile flight tests over the last few years. 9 The second case of proliferation was Pakistan, which successfully conducted a nuclear test in 1998 as a response to growing tensions between India and Pakistan. Pakistan also possesses a medium and intermediate ballistic missile capability. 10 An alerting case of nuclear proliferation was detected in the aftermath of the Gulf War in Iraq surprised the world with a highly developed nuclear weapons program and limited means to deliver weapons of mass destruction as the United Nations Special Commission could reveal after the war of The final case tht has resulted in urgent debates among the members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) the Islamic Republic of Iran 12, 5 Harald Müller: A Treaty in troubled Waters Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference, in: The International Spectator, 3/2005, pp Also: U.S. Concerns about Declining Effectiveness of Nonproliferation Regime, in: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 4. October, 2005, pp The Federation of American Scientists: India Nuclear Weapons, ( ). 7 The Federation of American Scientists: Israel Nuclear Weapons, ( ). 8 Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies: North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test, , ( ). 9 Daniel A. Pinkston, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College: The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, February 2008, ( ). 10 Arms Control Association Fact Sheet: Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan, November 2007, ( ). 11 International Atomic Energy Agency: Iraq Nuclear File Key Findings, ( ). 12 BBC News: Un approves new Sanctions on Iran, March , ( ).

7 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 7 suspected of developing a military nuclear capability since Iran is developing medium and intermediate ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. 14 Several reports indicating a cooperation between Iran and North Korea regarding the development of ballistic and cruise missiles. 15 The famous warning note by Henry Kissinger, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn reminds of the urgency and dangers of nuclear proliferation: The accelerated spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands The case of Iran The Islamic Republic of Iran is in the centre of international attention. There are multiple reasons for the increased interest in the foreign and security policy of the country. Among others, Iran s support for political militant groups 17 in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territory and more recently in the conflict areas of its neighbours Afghanistan and Iraq provides plenty of reasons for concern, and Iran has a place on the US Department of States list as state sponsor of terror The International Atomic Energy Agency: In Focus IAEA and Iran, ( ). 14 Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies: Iran s Nuclear and Missile Programs A Status Report, November 2007, ( ). See also: Andrew Feickert, CRS Report for Congress: Iran s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, August 23, 2004, ( ). 15 Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association: Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation, January/ February 2007, ( ). 16 George P. Shultz/ William J. Perry/ Henry A. Kissinger/ Sam Nunn: Towards a Nuclear-Free World, in: The Wall Street Journal, 15. January 2008, p The term is used in accordance with: Doron Zimmermann/ Andreas Wenger (Editor): Tangled Skein or Gordian Knot? Iran and Syria as State Sponsors of Political Violence Movements in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories, in: Züricher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 70, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2004, 1BB3-4160FD357B79&lng=en, ( ). 18 US Department of State: Country Report on Terrorism, Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview, 30 April 2007, ( ). See also: Doron Zimmermann/ Andreas Wenger (Editor): Tangled Skein or Gordian Knot? Iran and Syria as State Sponsors of Political Violence Movements in Lebanon and in the Palistinian Territories, in: Züricher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 70, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2004, 1BB3-4160FD357B79&lng=en, ( ).

8 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 8 Additionally, Iran has caused an ongoing and intense debate about its nuclear program and following, the future of nuclear non-proliferation. This debate has been triggered by irregularities regarding Iran s duty to declare nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), according to Iran s IAEA Safeguards Agreement 19 and the concern about the purpose of Iran s ballistic missile program. 20 While the case of Iraq has illustrated the importance of arms control and disarmament, the case of North Korea but even more the case of Iran endangers the future of nuclear non-proliferation and the NPT in particular. Additionally, Iran is considered to be hostile against the US and its interest, particularly in the region of the Greater Middle East. Therefore, President George W. Bush named the country in the Axis of Evil Speech and claims that Iran poses a threat to the region of the Greater Middle East and beyond. 21 The US President pointed out that generally: The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. And: Daniel Bayman: Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:3, pp And: Anthony H. Cordesman: Iran s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, CSIS, 15 July 2006, ( ). 19 IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/ 214, : The Text of the agreement between the Agency fort he application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ( ). 20 Policy Department External Policies Study: Missile Defence and European Security, The European Parliament, November 2007, pp 9 10, < ence%20>, ( ). See also: US National Air and Space Intelligence Center: Ballistic And Cruise Missile Threat, March 2006, < ( ). And: US National Intelligence Council: Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015, December 2001, < ( ). For a very precise assessment: Robert H. Schmucker: Iran and its Regional Environment, The Nuclearization of the Broader Middle East as a Challenge for Transatlantic Policy Coordination Panel 1, Second Transatlantic Conference, Berlin, March 27, 2006, < ( ). And: Anthony Seaboyer/ Oliver Thränert: What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe, in: Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C. ( ).

9 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 9 They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends and we will oppose them with all our power. 22 The assessment that Iran constitutes a threat is only partly shared by the states of the EU the threat analysis is considerably different and less urgent regarding Iran s capabilities to deploy ballistic missiles, which could threaten Europe and the development of a nuclear device. 23 A research paper for the EU Parliament concludes: We can detect a difference in perception about the nature and immediacy of the ballistic missile threat, and in how best to meet it, between the US Administration and most of Europe (to varying degrees). This involves differences over how quickly certain states particularly Iran - might develop long-range missiles capable of targeting European and US populations, and also the likelihood of such capability becoming a real threat. It is also partly the manifestation of a historical/cultural phenomenon. Europeans are more familiar with having to live with geographically proximate threats than is the US Concept & Methodology The question of how to stop nuclear proliferation is linked to the task of understanding why states seek nuclear weapons in the first place? Only the understanding for a states motivation to acquire a nuclear arsenal can provide proper proposals to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The reasoning for behind states acquiring military nuclear capability can vary, but one argument that is prominent among rational theorists of International Relations and the Realist School of International Relations in particular is that states tend to develop nuclear weapons if they are facing an external security challenge and a nuclear deterrent would enhance their security. With the words of professor John M. Deutch: 22 President Bush, West Point, New York, , in: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p 17, < ( ). 23 Regarding the capability based threat assessment, it is necessary to know that it is one thing to develop a nuclear device and to conduct a successful test, but it constitutes a serious technical challenge to build a nuclear device in size and weight that could be delivered by ballistic missiles. 24 Policy Department External Policies Study: Missile Defence and European Security, The European Parliament, November 2007, p 39, < ence%20>, ( ).

10 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 10 The fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be improved. 25 This argument is challenged, or extended by Scott D. Sagan 26, who argues in his article Why do States build Nuclear Weapons 27, that in addition to the security aspect two other factors have to be considered in order to explain a state s motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Sagan claims that next to security aspects, domestic and prestigious or norms factors can trigger military nuclear proliferation and restrain. Focusing merely on security issues to explain the proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot elucidate all cases. The example of France s decision to develop nuclear weapons will demonstrate the importance of Sagan s multifaceted approach. The decision of France to build nuclear weapons, even though France already has joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which includes extended security guarantees by the United States for the western states of Europe. It could be argued that after the Suez Crisis in 1956, France decided to develop an independent nuclear arsenal because of reasonable doubt towards US security guarantees. However, France decision to develop nuclear weapons was not based entirely on security aspects, because France s program was initiated prior to the Suez Crisis, in December If the reason for France s nuclear program was based on its doubts towards the US nuclear umbrella, why did not other European states followed France s example? Scott Sagan offers a strong explanation, which highlights the importance of prestigious aspects in France s calculation, the raison d'être is to re-establish France as a world great power. 29 With Sagan s words: France emerged from World War II in an unusual position: it was a liberated victor whose military capabilities and international standing were not at all comparable to the power and status it had before the war. It should therefore not be surprising that the government of both the Fourth and the Fifth Republic vigorously explored alternative means to return France to his historical great power status John Deutch: The Nuclear Threat, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41, Fall 1992, pp Scott D. Sagan is Associate Professor of Political Science and a faculty associate of the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. He functions as advisor for the US Congress Commission of Strategic Posture and the US National Intelligence Council. 27 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare The History of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, pp Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 78.

11 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 11 Sagan s explanation seems to provide a viable approach especially considering the Iranian case, which cannot be understood by mono-causal explanations, addressing only an increased Iranian need for security. As the latest US National Intelligence Estimate assesses, Iran s motivation to develop nuclear weapons might be a mixture of national security, prestige, and regional influence. 31 Considering these aspects, it is seems to be the logical consequence to use Sagan s approach to understand and analyse Iran s nuclear intentions, combining his three strong explanatory approaches, rather then only focusing on one. Professor Scott Sagan is an expert on the subject of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, he wrote several fundamental articles on nuclear safety and security and the famous debate with Kenneth N. Waltz The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed. This dissertation aims to test Sagan s theory by testing it against the case study of Iran, answering the question: Does Iran, according to Sagan, want to build a military nuclear capability? After applying Sagan s framework to the case, it will be interesting to see whether the theory provides enough coverage to explain and predict Iran s policy without gaps or contradictions. In order to execute this test the work will introduce Sagan s theoretical argument and derive verifiable hypotheses from Sagan s approach. Before the next step a technical evaluation of Iran s nuclear and missile program will provide an elaborated common base of knowledge regarding Iran s capabilities. In the next step it is necessary to compare his claims with the case of Iran in detail, splitting Sagan s three explanatory approaches in three levels of analysis, the international, the regional, and the domestic level. Finally, it is necessary to conclude whether, according to Sagan, Iran wants to build nuclear weapons and evaluate if Sagan s theory is helpful to assess the Iranian case. This part of the work is also where the usefulness of Sagan s work in regards to the case study of Iran will be evaluated. In the end, this work will try to provide an insight in the essential problems of nuclear non-proliferation caused by the case of Iran and to provide an answer to the question: Does Iran pose a threat? 31 US National Intelligence Council: National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, November 2007, [see: Key Judgements E.], < ( ).

12 2. Scott Sagan and Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? The central purpose of this article is to challenge the conventional wisdom about nuclear proliferation. I argue that the consensus view, focusing on national security considerations as the cause of proliferation, is dangerously inadequate because nuclear weapons programs also serve other, more parochial and less obvious objectives. Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than a tool of national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity. 32 The quote above indicates Sagan s three motives for states to develop a military nuclear capability. Traditionally, the argument of security is put forward to explain a state s motives to build nuclear weapons. Sagan offers two additional explanations: He refers to as the domestic politics model and the norms model. 33 Sagan claims that a long tradition in scholarship explains cases of nuclear weapon proliferation by security interests only. This explanation fits into certain schools of International Relations as an academic discipline but oversimplifies reality and ignores possible additional explanatory factors. The following chapter will provide an overview of Sagan s three models to explain nuclear proliferation. This chapter will also formulate revised hypotheses, by applying Sagan s theory to the case of Iran in order to be able to test the validity of the theory. 2.1 The Security Model In order to understand Scott Sagan s security model of proliferation it is important to clarify the theoretical background of his claims. Therefore, this work will briefly illustrate the basic principles of Neo-Realism (also known as Structural Realism) as a school of International Relations and the basic concepts of deterrence in an application of Neo-Realism regarding the use of nuclear weapons. 32 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.

13 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University Basic Concepts of Neo-Realism To understand the broader implications of nuclear weapons in the international system, it is necessary to reveal the basic assumptions of Structural-Realism as a theory of International Relations. 34 One basic postulate of Neo-Realism is that the international system is anarchic, which means that there is no international institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 35, which could sanction state behaviour. 36 Therefore the international system could be compared with the state of nature in Thomas Hobbes Leviathan. Among states, the state of nature is the state of war. 37 Within this state of nature all states are concerned with survival. To maximize their security in order to survive, states act rationally. This leads to the assumption that the international system is a self-help system in which states constantly compete for security. In their efforts to secure their survival states are always uncertain about the intentions of other actors and this means that prospects for cooperation are low and states constantly have to act under the logic of the Security Dilemma. 38 Because states can never be certain about the intentions of other states, they try to maximize their security. This means that they try to be self-sustaining and powerful, measured in economic and military terms. Weak states are more likely to be involved in armed conflicts than a relatively powerful state. The reason for this is that a powerful state is able to deter any possible aggression by signalising that the expenses of an aggression would exceed the benefits. 39 Two different opinions exist on the question of how to maintain a relatively powerful state among competitors. One option is constantly trying to increase one s relative power with the aim of achieving regional or even world hegemony. 40 The other option is keeping the balance of power by trying to keep the status quo; in this case states have to be very sensitive for relative gains I will mainly focus on the work of Kenneth N. Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer. 35 The term is used in reference to Max Weber: Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf). 36 John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001, p Kenneth N.Waltz: Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, Mass., 1979, p John J. Mearsheimer, in: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theory - Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p The amount of literature concerned with deterrence is immense. Therefore I will not follow that discussion in detail, but show important aspects whenever necessary. 40 John J. Mearsheimer, in: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theory - Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p John J. Mearsheimer, in: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theory - Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p

14 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 14 The theory of Structural Realism gives clear expectations about state intentions and state behaviour. Now, it is time to highlight the impact of nuclear weapons and its specific implications for states in the international system The Concept of Deterrence In the early days after the invention of the nuclear bomb, it was seen as a tactical weapon of increased firepower that leads to superiority on the battlefield. Later, the idea of nuclear weapons as tactical weapons became less important but remained and was addressed in so called limited wars scenarios. 42 However, over time nuclear weapons were regarded less as tool for fighting wars than as a political tool. As a result, in these areas the role of armed forces, and in particular nuclear forces, must not be considered from the point of view of their possible employment in war, as has been our habit, but from that of the prevention of war, in other words of deterrence. 43 Until the end of the Cold War, the concept of deterrence was the leading military strategy to secure peace between the Soviet Union and the USA. Along with other political approaches and reforms of military doctrines based on the logic of deterrence, the Cold War ended without a major war, including nuclear exchanges. To sum that up deterrence can be defined as, Influencing the action of another party in order to restrain them from doing something unacceptable by presenting them with the prospect that you will respond with something equally unacceptable. In short using threats and, if necessary, punishment to change another s behavior. 44 But, there are several preconditions, to make deterrence work. Deterrence requires the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on another country Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd Edition, 1989, London, pp and Andre Beaufre, in: Lawrence Freedman (Editor): War, 1994, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, p Klaus-Dieter Schwarz: The Future of Deterrence, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Research Paper, June 2005, p 5. < ( ). 45 Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Sagan, Scott D./ Waltz, Kenneth N.: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p 21.

15 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 15 First, it is necessary to have the capabilities to retaliate; secondly, the threat to use them must be credible. 46 That means that, within the logic of deterrence, it is necessary to possess a survivable second-strike capability which offers the option to retaliate after a first strike that aims to disarm. 47 Furthermore, the command and control structure must be able function after a first strike, too. 48 To explain the difference between deterrence and coercion, Klaus-Dieter Schwarz refers to Thomas Schelling, who defines coercion or coercive diplomacy as a way to force someone to do something, in contrast to deterrence, which aims to keep someone from doing something. 49 In order to specify the concept of deterrence in greater depth, it is possible to distinguish several different types of deterrence. Klaus-Dieter Schwarz offers three groups as ideal types of deterrence. He differentiates immediate and general deterrence as one pair, punishment and denial, and central and extended deterrence. 50 Schwarz refers to immediate deterrence as a threat to cause harm in an ongoing conflict. Therefore, it is necessary for the addressee to be explicitly aware of the threat and is aware of the possible significant impact on him. In contrast to immediate deterrence, Klaus-Dieter Schwarz explains the term general deterrence as a latent threat, which needs not to be explicit. Its effect should be to deter possible rivals from even trying to challenge another state. The credibility is purely based on military capabilities. Schwarz describes the punishment and denial strategies as options to strike against civilian structures (punishment), which was the basic concept of the Massive Retaliation -Strategy 51 during the Cold War. The denial strategy, in contrast, aims to strike against military targets to paralyse the opponent s capabilities and military options. The concept of central deterrence describes the idea that deterrence works when a state s vital interests are threatened. The important aspect is that it is possible to doubt the credibility of a retaliatory response when only minor interests are at stake. That is exactly the problem with the concept of extended deterrence, which means that a country uses its capabilities to deter possible rivals from launching any aggression against other countries 46 Joseph Nye: Understanding International Conflicts An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th Edition, Pearson/ Longman, New York, San Francisco, Boston, London, et al., 2007, p James Writz in: Alan Collins (Editor): Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2007, p Kenneth N. Waltz, in:, Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p Klaus-Dieter Schwarz: The Future of Deterrence, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Research Paper, June 2005, p 10, < ( ). 50 Klaus-Dieter Schwarz: The Future of Deterrence, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Research Paper, June 2005, pp < ( ). 51 US NSC 162/2 Basic National Security Policy, 30. October 1953, < ( ).

16 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 16 or spheres of interest in other parts of the world. The best example is the US security guarantee for Western Europe in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 52, which was doubted repeatedly by the European allies during the Cold War and eventually led to the shift in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation s (NATO) military doctrines from massive retaliation (MC 14/2) 53 to flexible response (MC 14/3) 54. Following the logic of deterrence, it is possible to conclude that the possession of nuclear weapons could enhance the security of a state by enhancing its deterrence capability. Using the words of Kenneth N. Waltz: Peace has become the privilege of states having nuclear weapons, while wars have been fought mainly by those who lack them. 55 And: The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. [ ] Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed The Security Model Sagan explains that according to the security model states, which all exist in a self-help system, must ensure their survival and protect their sovereignty and interests. The author then differentiates between strong states that are able to pursue a credible deterrent force on its own and weak states which seek an alliance and hope to benefit from extended deterrence guarantees. 57 This model, as an explanation for nuclear weapon proliferation, leads to an international system that forces states to a policy of balance of power and status quo, while the security dilemma heightens the risk of arms races and conflicts. 52 Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, < ( ). 53 North Atlantic Military Committee MC 14/2, < >, ( ). 54 North Atlantic Military Committee MC 14/ 3, < >, ( ). 55 Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p Kenneth N. Waltz, in:, Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57.

17 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 17 Whenever a new state is seen to be developing nuclear weapons, it is likely that its rivals will consider preventive war under this better now than later logic. 58 According to the zero-sum logic, the increase of security for one state will reduce the security of another in its perception. According to John Herz, this will set the security dilemma in place, which bears the great danger of war. 59 The uncertainty about the intentions of other states makes cooperation to overcome the dilemma very unlikely. 60 This leads to the assumption that the emergence of new nuclear powers additional to the existing ones could lead to a dangerous arms race, which increases the likelihood of war. According to Structural Realism the logic of the state actor within the self-help system cannot guarantee the decline of arms races. The incentive to increase its own security at the cost of the security of others will remain even among nucleararmed states. Sagan considers the option for states to overcome the collective action problem and refers to the NPT as an international institution that provides the transparency, and control which are needed to reduce the incentives to acquire a nuclear deterrent. 61 But according to Mancur Olson, there remains the incentive to gain additional benefit by being the only one who defects and not comply with the treaty obligations 62. Each state would prefer to become the only nuclear weapons power in its region, but since that is an unlikely outcome if it develops a nuclear arsenal, it is willing to refrain from proliferation, if and only if, its neighbours remain non-nuclear. 63 Additionally, Sagan names to two strong structural incentives for nuclear weapons proliferation. First, he claims that, since the end of the Cold War the world has become more uncertain and therefore security guarantees have become less credible. 64 Second, Sagan cites George Shultz with the words: 58 Scott D. Sagen, in: Scott D. Sagen/ Kenneth N.Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p John H. Herz: International politics in the atomic age, Columbia University Press, New York, John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, p For an explanation how international institutions can reduce the problems of collective action see: Robert O. Keohane: After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, Mancur Olson: The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods & Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 62.

18 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 18 Proliferation begets proliferation. 65, referring to the problem that states have an increased incentive to develop nuclear weapons when another state in region has done so before. 66 Kenneth N. Waltz has described this with the words: Nuclear states have tended to come in hostile pairs. 67. Finally, it is important to consider that the incentive to build a nuclear weapon decreases when a threat or security challenge decreases. That is Sagan s way of explaining nuclear restraint with Structural Realism. 68 In short, from a realist s perspective, nuclear restraint is caused by the absence of the fundamental military threats that produce positive proliferation decisions The Domestic Politics Models Scott Sagan introduces three main domestic actors in connection with a nation s decision to go nuclear: first, the nuclear energy establishment of a country, including scientific institutions and companies; second, the military as domestic bureaucratic actor; and third politicians who whish to use the topic of nuclear weapons for their political party or their personal standing regarding public opinion and public support. 70 According to Sagan, in order to understand cases of nuclear proliferation or nuclear restraint, it is very important to pay attention to the domestic debate. The aspect of emerging or diminishing threats can be used in the internal debate to create a window of opportunity in favour of or against nuclear weapons. 71 This leads Sagan to argue that decisions regarding nuclear armament or disarmament are not only made in accordance with emerging or 65 George Shultz, cited in: Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.

19 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University 19 diminishing threats but also for reasons of internal political changes and struggles. 72 Sagan also stresses the importance of non-nuclear sources of prestige for domestic actors in order to secure a future for nuclear non-proliferation. The argument is simple: Sagan says that pro-nuclear weapons actors gain additional influence if nuclear weapons represents a positive symbol in the domestic debate. An example of his, as already mentioned in the introduction, is that the NPT nuclear weapon states are reluctant to effectively disarm, that the US refuse to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 73, and that they still relay on nuclear first-use doctrines. Therefore, the non-nuclear weapon states have to ask themselves why they should comply with the treaty obligations if states still relay heavily on nuclear weapons. This is a simplified but effective argument; however, it needs to be mentioned that the purpose of the NPT is subject of ongoing discussions. While the western states, including the nuclear states underline the nonproliferation aspect of the treaty, some groups of states demand more commitment to disarmament and civil cooperation. 74 But to summarise Sagan s main arguments of the Domestic Politics Model, in his own words: [ ], nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or inevitable solutions to international security problems; instead, nuclear weapons programs are solutions looking for a problem to which to attach themselves so as to justify their existence. 75 Security threats are therefore not the central cause of weapons decisions according to this model: they are merely windows of opportunity through which parochial interests can jump Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p UN Resolution 50/245: ( ); The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: ( ). 74 Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73. And: Harald Müller: A Treaty in troubled Waters Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference, in: The International Spectator, 3/2005, pp Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.

20 Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation MA International Relations Lancaster University The Norms Model Sagan s Norms Model focuses on the functions nuclear weapons serve besides pure security reasons. He uses the word norms with respect to Constructivism as a school of International Relations. 77 Karsten Frey discusses the role of norms in nuclear policy making, referring to Scott Sagan s work. Frey describes that most countries oppose the development of nuclear weapons because of a negative attitude towards nuclear weapons, which is referred to as the nuclear taboo. 78 This normative predisposition can vary among different countries or change over time, affecting a country s nuclear policy. The opposite of the nuclear taboo is the nuclear myth, which describes the attachment of symbolic meanings to a states identity and desired international prestige. 79 Scott Sagan points out that many scholars refer to a vague linkage between pro-nuclear decisions and the enhancement of international prestige, defined as international influence and security. 80 In contrast, Sagan identifies nuclear weapons as symbols of national and international politics, while norms can affect a state s decision-making. According to Sagan pro- or anti- nuclear weapon decisions are: 77 Scott Sagan refers for example to: Martha Finnemore: Norms, Culture, and World Politics Insights from Sociology s Institutionalism, in: International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2, (Spring 2006), pp And: Robert Jervis: The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1989, pp See also: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, chapter six and chapter nine. For the term norms in the context of nuclear weapons decisions see: Nina Tannenwald: Stigmatizing the Bomb Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, in: International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, p. 8. Also: Karsten Frey: Of Nuclear Myths and Nuclear Taboos, in: Peace Review A Journal of Social Justice, Vol. 18, pp Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute Barcelona d Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October See also: Karsten Frey: Of Nuclear Myths and Nuclear Taboos, in: Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute Barcelona d Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76.