1 Atoms for Peace Board of Governors GOV/2012/9 Date: 24 February 2012 Restricted Distribution Original: English For official use only Item 5(d) of the provisional agenda (GOV/2012/2) Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General A. Introduction 1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement 1 and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). 2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions 2 are binding on Iran. 3 The relevant provisions of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions. 4 1 The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May The Board of Governors has adopted eleven resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran: GOV/2003/69 (12 September 2003); GOV/2003/81 (26 November 2003); GOV/2004/21 (13 March 2004); GOV/2004/49 (18 June 2004); GOV/2004/79 (18 September 2004); GOV/2004/90 (29 November 2004); GOV/2005/64 (11 August 2005); GOV/2005/77 (24 September 2005); GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006); GOV/2009/82 (27 November 2009); and GOV/2011/69 (18 November 2011). 3 In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council: affirmed, inter alia, that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required by the Board in GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82; reaffirmed Iran s obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme; decided that Iran shall, without delay, comply fully and without qualification with its Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements; and called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of its Additional Protocol and to ratify it promptly (operative paras 1 6). 4 The United Nations Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Iran: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).
2 Page 2 3. By virtue of its Relationship Agreement with the United Nations, 5 the Agency is required to cooperate with the Security Council in the exercise of the Council s responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. All Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, 6 and in this respect, to take actions which are consistent with their obligations under the United Nations Charter. 4. This report addresses developments since the last report (GOV/2011/65, 8 November 2011), as well as issues of longer standing. It focuses on those areas where Iran has not fully implemented its binding obligations, as the full implementation of these obligations is needed to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran s nuclear programme. B. Clarification of Unresolved Issues 5. On 18 November 2011, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/69 in which, inter alia, it stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material, and personnel in Iran. The Board also called on Iran to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at restoring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran s nuclear programme. In light of this, and following an exchange of letters between the Agency and Iran, it was agreed that an Agency team would visit Iran for talks. 6. From 29 to 31 January 2012, an Agency team held a first round of talks in Tehran with Iranian officials aimed at resolving all outstanding issues. During the talks: The Agency explained its concerns and identified the clarification of possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme as the top priority. The Agency requested access to the Parchin site, but Iran did not grant access to the site at that time. The Agency and Iran had an initial discussion on the approach to clarifying all outstanding issues in connection with Iran s nuclear programme, including issues to be addressed, initial actions and modalities. 7 A draft discussion paper on a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues in connection with Iran s nuclear programme was prepared for further consideration. 7. Following that first meeting, exchanges between Iran and the Agency resulted in further elaboration of the structured approach. 5 The Agreement Governing the Relationship between the United Nations and the IAEA entered into force on 14 November 1957, following approval by the General Conference, upon recommendation of the Board of Governors, and approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is reproduced in INFCIRC/11 (30 October 1959), Part I.A. 6 The Charter of the United Nations, Article These modalities related, inter alia, to Iran s security concerns, ensuring confidentiality and ensuring that Iran s cooperation included provision of access for the Agency to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran.
3 Page 3 8. During the second round of talks in Tehran, which took place from 20 to 21 February 2012: The Agency reiterated its request for access to Parchin. Iran stated that it was still not able to grant access to that site. An intensive discussion was held on the structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues related to Iran s nuclear programme. No agreement was reached between Iran and the Agency, as major differences existed with respect to the approach. In response to the Agency s request, Iran provided the Agency with an initial declaration in connection with the issues identified in Section C of the Annex to the Director General s November 2011 report to the Board of Governors (GOV/2011/65). Iran s declaration dismissed the Agency s concerns in relation to the aforementioned issues, largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations. The Agency gave a presentation to Iran on the Agency s initial questions on Parchin and the foreign expert, 8 and provided clarification of the nature of the Agency s concerns and the information available to it, in this regard. C. Facilities Declared under Iran s Safeguards Agreement 9. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 15 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs). 9 Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, as indicated below, the Agency continues to implement safeguards at these facilities and LOFs. D. Enrichment Related Activities 10. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities in the following declared facilities, all of which are nevertheless under Agency safeguards. D.1. Natanz: Fuel Enrichment Plant and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant 11. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP): There are two cascade halls at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to design information submitted by Iran, eight units are planned for Production Hall A, with 18 cascades in each unit. No detailed design information has yet been provided for Production Hall B. 12. As of 19 February 2012, 54 cascades were installed in three of the eight units in Production Hall A, 52 of which were declared by Iran as being fed with UF Whereas initially each installed cascade comprised 164 centrifuges, Iran subsequently modified 30 of the cascades to contain 174 centrifuges each. 8 As referred to in Section C of the Annex to GOV/2011/65. 9 All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals. 10 The 54 installed cascades contained 9156 centrifuges; the 52 cascades declared by Iran as being fed with UF 6 on that date contained 8808 centrifuges. Not all of the centrifuges in the cascades that were being fed with UF 6 may have been working.
4 Page 4 All the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. As of 19 February 2012, no centrifuges had been installed in the remaining five units, although preparatory installation work had been completed in two of the units, including the placement in position of 6177 empty IR-1 centrifuge casings, and was ongoing in the other three units. As of 19 February 2012, there had been no installation work in Production Hall B. 13. The results of a physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FEP confirmed the inventory on 16 October 2011 as declared by Iran, within measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. Therefore, there were no consequences for safeguards arising from the seal breakage in the feed and withdrawal area reported by the operator in April The Agency has confirmed that, as of 16 October 2011, kg of natural UF 6 had been fed into the cascades since the start of operations in February 2007, and a total of 4871 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced. Iran has estimated that, between 17 October 2011 and 4 February 2012, it produced 580 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235, which would result in a total production of 5451 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235 since production began in February The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP since February and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ). 16. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP): PFEP is a research and development (R&D) facility, and a pilot low enriched uranium (LEU) production facility, which was first brought into operation in October It has a cascade hall that can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area designated for the production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area designated for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5). 17. The results of a PIV carried out by the Agency at PFEP confirmed the inventory on 13 September 2011 as declared by Iran, within measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. The results also show an improvement in the operator s measurement system, in particular in relation to the determination of the level of U-235 enrichment Production area: Iran first began feeding low enriched UF 6 into Cascade 1 on 9 February 2010, for the stated purpose of producing UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235 for use in the manufacture of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). 15,16 Since 13 July 2010, Iran has been feeding low enriched UF 6 into two interconnected cascades (Cascades 1 and 6), each of which consists of 164 IR-1 centrifuges As previously reported, 18 the Agency has verified that, as of 13 September 2011, kg of low enriched UF 6 had been fed into the cascades in the production area since the process began on 9 February 2010, and that a total of 73.7 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235 had been produced. Iran has 11 GOV/2011/29, para In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility (e.g. some waste and samples) are not subject to containment and surveillance. 13 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 14 August GOV/2011/29, para. 14; GOV/2011/54, para. 15; GOV/2011/65, para GOV/2010/28, para TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes. 17 GOV/2010/28, para GOV/2011/65, para. 15.
5 Page 5 estimated that, between 14 September 2011 and 11 February 2012, a total of kg of UF 6 enriched at FEP was fed into the two interconnected cascades at PFEP and that approximately 21.7 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. This would result in a total production of 95.4 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at PFEP since production began in February R&D area: In the area designated for Cascades 2 and 3, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF 6 into single machines, 10-machine cascades and 20-machine cascades of IR-1, IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuges. In a letter dated 1 February 2012, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to install three new types of centrifuge IR-5, IR-6 and IR-6s as single machines in Cascade 2. As of 21 February 2012, Iran had installed 58 IR-4 centrifuges in Cascade 4, which has not been fed with UF 6. Iran had also installed 164 IR-2m centrifuges in Cascade Between 9 and 12 August and from 5 November 2011 onwards, 21 Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF 6 into Cascade Between 29 October 2011 and 11 February 2012, a total of approximately kg of natural UF 6 was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails are recombined at the end of the process. 22. Based on the results of the analysis of the environmental samples taken at PFEP 22 and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ. D.2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant 23. In September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that it was constructing the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom. 24. To date, Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs: In October 2009, Iran stated that the purpose of the facility was the production of UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235, and that the facility was being built to contain 16 cascades, equally divided between two units (Unit 1 and Unit 2), with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. 23 In September 2010, Iran stated that the purpose of FFEP was to carry out R&D in addition to the production of UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235. In June 2011, Iran stated that the purpose of FFEP was the production of UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235, as well as to carry out R&D. On 18 January 2012, Iran informed the Agency that the R&D installation was being removed from FFEP. In its updated DIQ of the same date, Iran declared that FFEP was designed to facilitate the production of UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235 and the production of UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235 in both production units. The DIQ indicated that provision had also been made to enable the operator to use some of the cascades for production of 5% LEU while some of them are producing 20% LEU. 25. On 14 December 2011, Iran began feeding UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235 that it had previously transferred from FEP into one set of two interconnected cascades in Unit 2 at FFEP, containing 19 Iran had previously indicated its intention to install two 164-centrifuge cascades (Cascades 4 and 5) in the R&D area (GOV/2011/7, para. 17). 20 At which time Cascade 5 contained 54 IR-2m centrifuges. 21 At which time Cascade 5 contained 164 IR-2m centrifuges. 22 Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 3 August GOV/2009/74, para. 9.
6 Page centrifuges. 24,25 Since the Director General s previous report, Iran has installed 348 centrifuges in a second set of two interconnected cascades in Unit 2 and, on 25 January 2012, began feeding it with UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235. To date, all the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines. Iran has estimated that, between 14 December 2011 and 17 February 2012, a total of 99.3 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235 was fed into the two sets of interconnected cascades at FFEP and that approximately 13.8 kg of UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235 were produced. 26. As of 15 February 2012, in the four remaining cascades of Unit 2 and in the eight cascades of Unit 1, 2088 empty IR-1 centrifuge casings had been placed in position and all of the piping had been installed. In a letter dated 16 February 2012, the Agency requested Iran to provide details on how it intends to operate FFEP (whether to produce UF 6 enriched up to 5% U-235, to produce UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235, or to produce a combination of both). 27. The Agency has verified that FFEP is being constructed according to the latest DIQ provided by Iran. As previously reported, Iran provided some information in 2011 regarding the initial timing of, and circumstances relating to, its decision to build FFEP at an existing defence establishment. 26 Nevertheless, additional information from Iran is still needed in connection with this facility, particularly in relation to its original purpose, given the number of subsequent revisions to the DIQ for FFEP. 27 D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities 28. The Agency is still awaiting a substantive response from Iran to Agency requests for further information in relation to announcements made by Iran concerning the construction of ten new uranium enrichment facilities, the sites for five of which, according to Iran, have been decided. 28 Iran has not provided information, as requested by the Agency in its letter of 18 August 2010, in connection with its announcement on 7 February 2010 that it possessed laser enrichment technology. 29 As a result of Iran s lack of cooperation on those issues, the Agency is unable to verify and report fully on these matters. E. Reprocessing Activities 29. Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is obliged to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D. 30 In a letter to the Agency dated 15 February 2008, Iran stated that it does not have reprocessing activities. In that context, the Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at TRR and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. 31 The Agency carried out an inspection and design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 24 GOV/2011/54, para In June 2011, Iran was reported to have announced a decision to triple its (production) capacity, after which Iran would stop the 20% fuel production at Natanz (Dr Fereydoun Abbasi, Iran to Triple Production of 20%-Enriched Uranium, Fars News Agency, 8 June 2011). 26 GOV/2011/54, para GOV/2009/74, para Iran Specifies Location for 10 New Enrichment Sites, Fars News Agency, 16 August Cited on the website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 February 2010, at 30 S/RES/1696 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR. The MIX Facility is not currently processing any uranium targets.
7 Page 7 12 February 2012, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 13 February It is only with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access that the Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities in Iran. F. Heavy Water Related Projects 30. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not suspended work on all heavy water related projects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor), which is under Agency safeguards On 14 February 2012, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor at Arak and observed that construction of the facility was ongoing and that one heavy water concentration column had been installed. According to Iran, the operation of the IR-40 Reactor is planned to commence in In a letter dated 27 January 2012, the Agency, having not received any update of the DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor since January 2007, requested Iran to provide an updated DIQ. 32. Since its visit to the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) on 17 August 2011, the Agency, in letters to Iran dated 20 October 2011 and 27 January 2012, requested further access to HWPP. The Agency has yet to receive a reply to those letters, and is again relying on satellite imagery to monitor the status of HWPP. Based on recent images, the HWPP appears to be in operation. To date, Iran has not provided the Agency with access to the heavy water stored at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order to take samples. 34 G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication 33. Although it is obliged to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects, Iran is conducting a number of activities at UCF and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) at Esfahan which, as described below, are in contravention of those obligations, although both facilities are under Agency safeguards. 34. Uranium Conversion Facility: On 17 December 2011, Iran started converting UF 6 enriched up to 20% U-235 into U 3 O 8. As of 19 February 2012, the Agency had verified that 8 kg of uranium in the form of U 3 O 8 had been produced and that 7.3 kg of uranium in the form of U 3 O 8 had been subsequently transferred to FMP. 35. As previously reported, Iran started converting UF 6 enriched up to 3.34% U-235 into UO As of 19 February 2012, the Agency verified that Iran had produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO 2 and that 13.6 kg of uranium in the form of UO 2 had been subsequently transferred to FMP. 36. On 19 February 2012, the Agency verified that Iran had produced about kg of natural uranium in the form of UO 2. The Agency has verified that Iran has transferred kg of uranium in the form of UO 2 to FMP. 32 S/RES/1737 (2006), para. 2; S/RES/1747 (2007), para. 1; S/RES/1803 (2008), para. 1; S/RES/1835 (2008), para. 4; S/RES/1929 (2010), para Iran says Arak reactor to be launched in 2 years, Iranian Students News Agency, 18 February GOV/2010/10, paras 20 and GOV/2011/65, para. 34.
8 Page Fuel Manufacturing Plant: Since the Director General s previous report, Iran has worked towards the production of two types of fuel assembly at FMP for use in TRR (see paragraph 48 below): Assemblies made of fuel plates containing U 3 O 8 : On 14 November and 19 November 2011, the Agency verified two fuel plates containing natural U 3 O 8 that had been produced at the R&D laboratory at FMP; 36 on 3 January 2012, the Agency verified a fuel plate containing U 3 O 8 enriched up to 20% U-235; and on 1 February 2012, the Agency verified a fuel assembly consisting of 14 fuel plates containing U 3 O 8 enriched up to 20% U-235. Assemblies made of 12 fuel rods containing UO 2 enriched up to 3.34% U-235: The Agency verified one fuel assembly on 26 November 2011 and another one on 22 December All of the aforementioned fuel plates and fuel assemblies were subsequently transferred by Iran to TRR for irradiation testing. 38. In a letter dated 8 February 2012, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to start pellet, fuel rod and fuel assembly production on 12 February 2012 using natural UO 2, in order to produce fuel for the IR-40 Reactor. During a DIV carried out on 18 February 2012, the Agency observed that the fabrication of pellets for the IR-40 Reactor had started. 39. In a letter to Iran dated 6 January 2012, the Agency pointed out that an appropriate safeguards approach relating to the U 3 O 8 fuel manufacturing line was not yet in place at FMP. However, notwithstanding the absence of the safeguards approach, it proved possible on this occasion, as confirmed during an inspection carried out at FMP on February 2012, for the Agency to account for all of the nuclear material in the U 3 O 8 fuel manufacturing line. The Agency is now discussing with Iran a new safeguards approach for FMP. H. Possible Military Dimensions 40. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran s nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these. 37 Since 2002, the Agency has become increasingly concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, about which the Agency has regularly received new information. 41. The Annex to the Director General s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency indicating that Iran has carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information, which comes from a wide variety of independent sources, including from a number of Member States, from the Agency s own efforts and from information provided by Iran itself, is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible. The information indicates that: prior to the end of 2003 the activities took place under a structured programme; that some continued after 2003; and that some may still be ongoing. 42. In resolution 1929 (2010), the Security Council reaffirmed Iran s obligations to take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions GOV/2006/14 and GOV/2009/82, and to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran s nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, 36 GOV/2011/65, para GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40 45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18 25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14 21; GOV/2008/15, paras and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35 42; GOV/2011/65, paras and Annex.
9 Page 9 equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency. 38 In its resolution GOV/2011/69 of 18 November 2011, the Board of Governors, inter alia, expressed its deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions. I. Design Information 43. The modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran s Safeguards Agreement provides for the submission to the Agency of design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been taken, whichever is the earlier. The modified Code 3.1 also provides for the submission of fuller design information as the design is developed early in the project definition, preliminary design, construction and commissioning phases. Iran remains the only State with significant nuclear activities and in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement, which is not implementing the provisions of the modified Code The Agency is still awaiting receipt from Iran of updated design information for the IR-40 Reactor, and further information pursuant to statements it has made concerning the planned construction of new uranium enrichment facilities and the design of a reactor similar to TRR As reported previously, Iran s response to Agency requests for Iran to confirm or provide further information regarding its statements concerning its intention to construct new nuclear facilities is that it would provide the Agency with the required information in due time rather than as required by the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement. 41 J. Additional Protocol 45. Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran is not implementing its Additional Protocol. The Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the Agency, including by implementing its Additional Protocol S/RES/1929, paras 2 and In accordance with Article 39 of Iran s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, as previously explained in the Director General s reports (see e.g. GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007), the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010) to comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code GOV/2010/46, para See para. 28 of this report and GOV/2011/29, para Iran s Additional Protocol was approved by the Board on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.
10 Page 10 K. Other Matters 46. As previously reported, in August 2011 the Agency carried out a PIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) to verify, inter alia, nuclear material, in the form of natural uranium metal and process waste, related to conversion experiments carried out by Iran between 1995 and ,44 The Agency s measurement of this material was 19.8 kg less than the operator s declaration of kg. In a letter dated 2 November 2011, Iran provided additional information in relation to this discrepancy. In a letter dated 16 December 2011, the Agency informed Iran that, taking into account this additional information, the discrepancy remained, and that, therefore, further information was required of Iran. During discussions with Iran on 13 and 14 February 2012, the Agency requested access to records and personnel involved in the uranium metal conversion experiments. Iran indicated that it no longer possessed the relevant documentation and that the personnel involved were no longer available. Iran also indicated that the discrepancy may have been caused by there being a higher amount of uranium in the waste than had been measured by the Agency. In light of this, Iran has offered to process all of the waste material and to extract the uranium contained therein. The Agency has begun taking additional destructive analysis samples of material involved. The discrepancy remains to be clarified. 47. As previously reported, in a letter dated 19 June 2011, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to transfer some of spent fuel assemblies (HEU [high enriched uranium] Control Fuel Element (CFE) and Standard Fuel Element (SFE)) from spent fuel pool (KMPE) to reactor core (KMPB) in order to conduct a research project. As of 12 February 2012, this activity had yet to begin. 48. Since the Director General s previous report, Iran has continued the irradiation at TRR of fuel rods and plates manufactured at FMP (referred to in paragraphs above), including the irradiation of: one natural UO 2 fuel rod; 45 one of the fuel assemblies containing 12 rods of UO 2 enriched to 3.34% U-235 (subsequently used to replace one of the control assemblies in the reactor core of TRR); one of the natural uranium fuel plates containing U 3 O 8 ; and one fuel plate enriched to less than 20% U-235. On 22 February 2012, the Agency verified that the fuel assembly consisting of 14 fuel plates containing U 3 O 8 enriched up to 20% U-235 was in the spent fuel bay of TRR. 49. On 10 January 2012, the Agency carried out an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), during which the Agency noted that the reactor was shut down. In a letter dated 6 February 2012, Iran provided the Agency with the commissioning schedule for BNPP, which indicated that commissioning activity had commenced on 31 January L. Summary 50. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible 43 This material had been under Agency seal since GOV/2003/75, paras and Annex 1; GOV/2004/34, para. 32, and Annex, paras 10 12; GOV/2004/60, para. 33, Annex, paras 1 7; GOV/2011/65, para GOV/2011/54, para. 40.
11 Page 11 assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities The Agency continues to have serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran s nuclear programme, as explained in GOV/2011/65. Iran did not provide access to Parchin, as requested by the Agency during its two recent visits to Tehran, and no agreement was reached with Iran on a structured approach to resolving all outstanding issues in connection with Iran s nuclear programme. 52. Since the Director General s November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65), contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran continues to carry out uranium enrichment activities and has: increased the number of cascades being used to produce UF 6 enriched to 5% U-235; increased the number of cascades being used to produce UF 6 enriched to 20% U-235; and is preparing additional cascades at Fordow (FFEP) and Natanz (FEP). Iran has also announced its intention to install three new types of centrifuge at Natanz (PFEP) for R&D purposes. 53. The Director General urges Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and mandatory Security Council resolutions, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including: implementation of the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspension of enrichment related activities; and suspension of heavy water related activities. 54. The Director General calls upon Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency. The Director General urges Iran to work with the Agency to reach agreement on a structured approach, based on Agency verification practices, to resolve all outstanding issues. In particular, the Director General urges Iran to address the Agency s serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran s nuclear programme, including, as a first step, by responding to the Agency s questions related to Parchin and the foreign expert, and by granting early access in that regard. 55. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate. 46 The Board has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran s Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49).
Atoms for Peace Board of Governors GOV/2012/23 Date: 25 May 2012 Restricted Distribution Original: English For official use only Item 7(d) of the provisional agenda (GOV/2012/17, Mod.1 and Add.1) Implementation
International Atomic Energy Agency Derestricted 18 September 2004 (This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 18 September 2004) Board of Governors GOV/2004/59 Date: 30 August 2004
Institute for Science and International Security ISIS Report Defining Iranian Nuclear Programs in a Comprehensive Solution under the Joint Plan of Action Drawn from Institute for Science and International
Atoms for Peace Board of Governors GOV/2013/38 Date: 12 August 2013 Restricted Distribution Original: English For official use only Item 6(b) of the provisional agenda (GOV/2013/37) The Conceptualization
Atoms for Peace Board of Governors GOV/2015/68 Date: 2 December 2015 Restricted Distribution Original: English For official use only Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran
1 Conference Call with Dr. Olli Heinonen Transcript David Harris: Welcome ladies and gentlemen. I m absolutely delighted that The Israel Project is hosting Dr. Olli Heinonen for this conference call on
United Nations S/RES/2231 (2015) Security Council Distr.: General 20 July 2015 Resolution 2231 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7488 th meeting, on 20 July 2015 The Security Council, Recalling
Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook Vienna, May 2008 Services Series 15 IAEA Services Series No. 15 Nuclear Material Accounting Handbook May 2008 The originating Section of this publication in the IAEA
National Interest Analysis  ATNIA 22 with attachment on consultation Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
Institute for Science and International Security July 15, 2013 Update on the Arak Reactor By David Albright and Christina Walrond Despite the delays and problems in procuring essential equipment abroad
REGULATION Regulation for the System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material and Application of Additional Protocol (FANR-REG-10) Version 0 Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR) P.O.
New Proposed Department of Energy Rules to Clarify and Update Part 810 I. Introduction By Shannon MacMichael and Michael Lieberman of Steptoe & Johnson, LLP 1 Since April 2010, when former U.S. Secretary
Viewpoint Nuclear Safeguards How far can Inspectors go? by George Bunn A look at experience in Iran and North Korea and the origins of the NPT and safeguards in the 1960s offers insights into the authority
Institute for Science and International Security October 24, 2013 Iranian Breakout Estimates, Updated September 2013 By Patrick Migliorini, David Albright, Houston Wood, and Christina Walrond 1 Read the
This research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but reflects the views of the author and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting
[Australian Note] The Embassy of Australia presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honour to refer to discussions between officials of the Governments of Australia and the United
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 8 May 2014 NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.46 Original: English Third session New York,
Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal Key questions, points of divergence, pros and cons, pending legislation, and essential facts. April 2015 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy
March 2006 IRAN S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES Dr. Frank Barnaby The major powers suspect that Iran is clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. Firm evidence for this suspicion comes mainly from the International
Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities November 2007 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community (IC), overseeing
March 1978 INF International Atomic Energy Agency INFORMATION CIRCULAR GENERAL Distr. Original: ENGLISH THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT OF 4 MARCH 1977 BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
THE STATUS OF NUCLEAR INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ: AN UPDATE Meeting of the United Nations Security Council New York 7 March 2003 Mohamed ElBaradei Director General INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY My report
International transfers of nuclear material An overview of the Agency's safeguards role and activities in this area by Joseph Nardi The development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy has led to increased
ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL, NONPROLIFERATION, AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS July 2014 Prepared by the U.S. Department of State DEPARTMENT OF STATE Bureau of Arms Control,
CHAPTER 10 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY INSPECTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE Olli Heinonen The nuclear nonproliferation regime continues to face a broad array of challenges. It is easy to see why new solutions
Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation June 13, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL34544 Summary Iran s nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern
Measurements for nuclear forensic characterisation: synergies between international security applications Vitaly Fedchenko Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Content of this talk Introduction.
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY PREAMBLE The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties"), Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of
Part 16 South Carolina Electric and Gas V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 & 3 COL Application COLA Table of Contents Navigation Page Part 1 General and Administrative Information Part 2 Final Safety
The Status of Plutonium Management in Japan 21 July 215 Secretariat of the Atomic Energy Commission Cabinet Office 1. Preface (1) About this report This is a report on the current status of plutonium management
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY WITH REGARD TO HUMAN SECURITY Conference on Nuclear Weapons and Human Security Sanremo International Institute of Humanitarian Law Italian Ministry of
Special Declaration 16: Of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States on the urgent need for a nuclear weapon free world The Heads of State and Government of the Latin America and the Caribbean
STATEMENT BY THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, FRANCE, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 2015 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
AUGUST 2015 COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2011/70/EURATOM FOR THE RESPONSIBLE AND SAFE MANAGEMENT OF SPENT FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE WASTE First report from Denmark COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2011/70/EURATOM FOR THE RESPONSIBLE
Version: 1.1.2014 South Australia Local Government (Procedures at Meetings) Regulations 2013 under the Local Government Act 1999 Contents Part 1 Preliminary 1 Short title 2 Commencement 3 Interpretation
GIS and satellite images in nuclear safeguards A. Poucet, S. Contini & F. Bellezza European Commission, Joint Research Centre Institute for the Protection and Security of Citizens Ispra, Italy Abstract
Seoul Communiqué 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit We, the leaders, gathered in Seoul on March 26-27, 2012, renew the political commitments generated from the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit to
FOREWORD In recent years there has been a growing awareness of the potential for accidents involving radiation sources, some such accidents having had serious, even fatal, consequences. More recently still,
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Database Summary of the 11 th Heads of State Summit, Cartagena, Colombia (1995) General Views on Disarmament and NAM Involvement DISARMAMENT (Annex II: The Call from Columbia,
IDEAS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY UNIDIR RESOURCES Treatment of Pre-existing Fissile Material Stocks in an FM(C) T January 2010 Harold A. Feiveson All parties to the forthcoming Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Plutonium Watch Tracking Plutonium Inventories by David Albright and Kimberly Kramer July 25, Revised August 25 Plutonium is a key ingredient in nuclear weapons, making it one of the most dangerous materials
UNITED NATIONS A Page 1 Distr. GENERAL 21 February 1997 Fifty-first session Agenda item 12 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [on the report of the Second Committee (A/51/601)] 97-76873 /... 51/191.
COUNCIL PROCEDURE RULES 1. Introduction 2. Annual Meetings of Full Council 3. Ordinary Meetings of Full Council 4. Extraordinary Meetings of Full Council 5. Special Meetings 6. Time and Location of Meetings
PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THE ANTARCTIC TREATY. PREAMBLE The States Parties to this Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced of the need to enhance
LAW OF GEORGIA on Export Control of Armaments, Military Equipment and Dual-Use Products This Law establishes the principles and procedures for implementation of export control of arms, military technology,
Licensing Process for New Nuclear Power Plants in Canada INFO-0756 (Revision 1) May 2008 Licensing Process for New Nuclear Power Plants in Canada Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada
English is not an official language of the Swiss Confederation. This translation is provided for information purposes only and has no legal force. Nuclear Energy Act (NEA) 732.1 of 21 March 2003 (Status
UNITED NATIONS A General Assembly Distr. GENERAL A/RES/48/28 11 January 1994 Forty-eighth session Agenda item 36 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY [without reference to a Main Committee (A/48/L.40
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY The Government of Japan and the European Atomic Energy Community
Security and Safeguards Considerations in Radioactive Waste Management Raoul Awad Director General, Directorate of Security and Safeguards Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Radioactive Waste Management
COUCIL OF TH UROPA UIO N The Hague, 25 March 2014 8193/14 (OR. en) PRSS 187 The Hague uclear Security Summit Communiqué We, the leaders, met in The Hague on 24 and 25 March 2014 to strengthen nuclear security,
NRC FORM 374 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Page 1 of 8 Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-438), and Title 10, Code of Federal
Decision -/CP.20 Guidelines for the technical review of information reported under the Convention related to greenhouse gas inventories, biennial reports and national communications by Parties included
TRAINING SOFTWARE FOR SAFEGUARDS AT FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS Na Young Lee 1), Byung Marn Koh 1), Susan Pickett 2) 1) Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control 2) International Atomic Energy
PROTOCOL ON CLAIMS, LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AND INDEMNIFICATION To the Framework Agreement On a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium,
1 J7-TM-44883 Technical Meeting on the Implications of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident on the Safety of Fuel Cycle Facilities IAEA Headquarters Vienna, Austria 1 5 July 2013 INFORMATION SHEET 1. Background
Dear Delegates, It is a pleasure to welcome you to the 2014 Montessori Model United Nations Conference. The following pages intend to guide you in the research of the topics that will be debated at MMUN
FIFTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.28 STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL 27 November 2001 (BIOLOGICAL) AND
Use of electronic seals and remote data transmission to increase the efficiency of safeguards applied in a static Plutonium store L. Persson 1, S. Synetos 1, A. Ozols 1, K. Ruuska 1, R. Leslie 2, H. Du
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire Regulatory Considerations: Nuclear Technology, Prescribed Information and Export Controls Lisa Thiele Canadian Nuclear Safety
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties 1978 Done at Vienna on 23 August 1978. Entered into force on 6 November 1996. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1946, p. 3 Copyright United
SCHEDULE 9 Change Control Request Procedure 1. Introduction 1.1 This schedule sets out: (C) (D) (E) the resources to be made available and the processes to be followed where a Change is required or proposed;
Regulation on the implementation of the Norwegian Financial Mechanism 2009-2014 adopted by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursuant to Article 8.8 of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway
United Nations Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council
RC-17 Radiation Protection in Waste Management and Disposal Implementing the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Alejandro V. Nader
Cyber Security and the Canadian Nuclear Industry a Canadian Regulatory Perspective Terry Jamieson Vice-President Technical Support Branch Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission August 11, 2015 www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca
E PCT/GL/ISPE/4 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH DATE: September 30, 2015 PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT) PCT INTERNATIONAL SEARCH AND PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION GUIDELINES (Guidelines for the Processing by International
In force as of 15 March 2005 based on decision by the President of NIB ARBITRATION REGULATIONS Contents I. SCOPE OF APPLICATION... 4 1 Purpose of these Regulations... 4 2 Applicability to different staff
2374-19 Joint ICTP-IAEA School of Nuclear Energy Management 5-23 November 2012 Nuclear Security Fundamentals Module 9 topic 2 EVANS Rhonda, IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Office of Nuclear
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 350 EAST 35TH STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10016 Please Check Against Delivery Statement by H.E. Ambassador Li Baodong Head of the Chinese Delegation at
By Authority Of THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Legally Binding Document By the Authority Vested By Part 5 of the United States Code 552(a) and Part 1 of the Code of Regulations 51 the attached document has
Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Preamble The International Criminal Court and the United Nations, Bearing in mind the Purposes and Principles
Small Arms REVIEW CONFERENCE 2006 United Nations A/CONF.192/15 International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons Adopted
ASSURANCES OF SUPPLY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY International Workshop and Symposium on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Exploring New Approaches
REGULATION (EEC) No 2309/93 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use
Foreign Obligations Notification Process Santiago Aguilar Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 Agreements for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Current agreements with the IAEA, 21 countries, and Taiwan. The agreements
the European Economic Area (EEA) Financial Mechanism 2009-2014 adopted by the EEA Financial Mechanism Committee pursuant to Article 8.8 of Protocol 38b to the EEA Agreement on 13 January 2011 and confirmed
QUESTION 92 D Harmonization of formal requirements for trademark applications, registrations and amendments thereof Yearbook 1992/II, pages 344-345 Council of Presidents of Lucerne, September 15-19, 1991
The Institute for Science and International Security Digital Globe - ISIS PREVENTING IRAN FROM GETTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: CONSTRAINING ITS FUTURE NUCLEAR OPTIONS David Albright, Paul Brannan, Andrea Stricker,
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PETER WILSON INFORMAL MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO MARK THE OBSERVANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL DAY AGAINST NUCLEAR TESTS THURSDAY 5 SEPTEMBER 2013 This is my first week as the
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
CHAPTER 19 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT Article 19.1 : Objectives 1. The objective of this Chapter is to provide an effective, efficient and transparent process for consultations and the settlement of disputes arising
U NITE D DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY STATES OF A M ERICA HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM INVENTORY AMOUNTS OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM IN THE UNITED STATES U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE
NUCLEAR UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-D001 May 16, 2002 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL Charles Administrative Bechhoefer, Judge Chairman Richard Administrative F. Cole
Atoms for Peace Board of Governors General Conference GOV/2011/59-GC(55)/14 Date: 5 September 2011 For official use only Item 3(b) of the Board's provisional agenda (GOV/2011/46) Item 14(b) of the Conference's
IAEA NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES NO. FUNDAMENTALS OF A STATE S NUCLEAR SECURITY REGIME: OBJECTIVE AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS Revision 17.04 Page 1 of 20 FOREWORD [TO BE PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARIAT AT A LATER TIME]
CPR BANKING INDUSTRY DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMMITMENT COMPANY ADDRESS CITY, STATE, ZIP TELEPHONE/FAX Disputes arise between companies in the banking industry. We wish to avoid the high expense, long delays,
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA SESSION 2015 SESSION LAW 2015-118 SENATE BILL 455 AN ACT TO ENACT THE IRAN DIVESTMENT ACT. The General Assembly of North Carolina enacts: SECTION 1. Chapter 143C of the