Washington s China Card

Transcription

1 Review Article Washington s China Card 1. R.G. Pradhan, America and China: A Study in Cooperation and Conflict (UDH, New Delhi, 1983), pp. 225, Price Rs. 175/-. 2. Gerald Segal (ed) The China : Factor Peking and the Super Powers (Croom & Helm, London, 1982) pp.210, Price THE UNITED STATES of America, as the champion of fiberal democracy, has jealously taken up the cause of the free world. Ever since it discarded its isolationist policy in the post-war phase, the major objective of its foreign policy has been to prevent at any cost the proliferation of communist regimes in the world. In the operationalization of its containment policy, it was but natural that the Soviet Union and the People s Republic of China were treated as its major adversaries in the cold war phase. A number of investigative studies have been undertaken in that country on the relevance of facing the communist challenge. One such study analyzing the Communist mysteries to the foreign policy planners in Washington says: Russia and China, the two communist giants, will surely loom large in our future. Both are lands of mystery and we negotiate with them in a kind of diplomatic fool.2 Another study undertaken jointly by 13 Foreign Policy Research centres for the LJS Senate while delineating the major goals of US foreign policy comn~.ents : It must meet the communist military challenge. Military power is a pre-requisite to, but not a substitute for an elective foreign policy. The basic US military requirements are: (a) retaliatory power sufficient to make the cost of~ launching a major attack on the free world unacceptable to communist leadership, (b) mobile forces capable of coping with limited 513

2 war situations, (c) a research and development programme to ensure maximum progress in militarily useful scientific and technological projects, (d) a long-range global military aid programme to strengthen US and allied defenses....3 in order to operationalize such a major concern to face the communist challenge in the cold war phase, the US presidents formulated several strategies. For instance, the Truman doctrine as announced by President Harry S. Truman in late February 1947, emphasized that the United States must support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.4 President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his overjealousness to contain the communist threats from both Russia and China in Jaruary 1957 asked the Congress for a joint resolution that would authorise the President to use American armed forces as he deems necessary to defend the Middle East and other areas from any overt armed aggression by international communism. It was later recognized as the Eisenhower doctrine. 5 In pursuance of such broad objectives, the US presidents beginning from Harry Truman to Lyndon B. Johnson have treated the People s Republic of China (PRC) as a major adversary along with the USSR. While critically summing up Washington s China policy in the cold war years, a research study highlights as follows: The central issue of American policy has practically nothing to do with the hotly debated question of recognizing the communist regime and admitting it to the United Nations. The central issue is.. how can the US best act to contain the communist threat to the free nations of Asia.~ The report recommends that America must give primary emphasis to the development of strong, free societies in the Asian countries and that it may not seek to deal with the Communist Chinese challenge directly. Interestingly enough, at the same time another study suggests that; Working in carefully thought out stages, America should proceed slowly to investigate the possibilities for normalizing the relations with Communist China... This policy might not only serve to stabilize the situation in the Far East, but is necessary if the US is to maintain the support of its allies on its Chinese policy. 7 Significantly enough, as reports of such studies were gathering dust at the US Congressional library, a conservative President, Richard Nixon, picked up the threads and started recasting the China policy of his country. It is he who with adequate spade work successfully changed the course of the long embittered relationship with the PRC. It is important to understand why and how Washington played the China card from time to time. What were the factors which contributed to Nixon s U-turn in his country s China policy? Has the Soviet Union been a key factor in America s China policy? Has the scenario changed after Nixon s exit from office and in the new situation in post-mao China? We shall attempt to answer these questions. Before we deal with the findings of the two substantially different and yet complementary studies of Washington s China Policy, it is in order to touch 514

3 - that upon the so-called Nixon doctrine and its relevance for China and have a quick glance at Beijing s perception of the first world. NIXON DOCTRINE The Nixon Doctrine was an outcome of President Nixon s well considered views on the contemporary international scene and was briefly highlighted by him in a special address to the UN General Assembly on 18 September It said that a major American role remains indispensable, and - that - that other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines the emerging polycentrism of the communist world presents dinerent challenges and new opportunities. Reflecting on his nation s policy towards China, Nixon emphasized in his special report to the US Congress in the following words: The PRC is making a claim to leadership of the less developed portions of the world. But for that claim to be credible and for it to be pursued effectively, communist China must expose herself with the outside world.9 Expressing concern at his country s unresolved problem with PRC for more than two decades, he believed that international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile towards it. He envisaged no advantage for his country from the Sino-Soviet rift. He also kept a precondition that any dialogue with the PRC could not be at the expense of America s international commitments and especially its special link with Taiwan.10 All these statements are significant pointers to a major pohcy shift which raise the question: what was Beijing s view of the two super powers? CHINA AND THE FIRST WORLD The PRC has essentially looked at the outside world from its security perspective, although its ideology has occasionally intruded into it. The perception of threats to its security varied from time to time, but the concern has been constant. Another major contributing factor has been its domestic politics. After the cultural revolution, when there was a major thrust towards modernization, it was natural that Beijing gave special attention to its American connection. Besides, as rightly highlighted by Gerald Segal, PRC s foreign policy has by and large hinged on its relations with the super powers. When its relations with one or both changed, its relations with many other countries also changed. Such an analysis has been broadly accepted by several other scholars. Probing the Moscow connection in 515

4 Sino-Ajnerican relations, R.G. Pradhan has only briefly touched on such a crucial variable. Of course he has clearly said, China s differences with the Soviet Union, both ideologically and otherwise, hinged on the question of relations with the United States... The new balance of power brought about by limited detente in Soviet-American relations deprived China of some of its status leverage. Segal looks at the PRC s role vis-a-vis the super powers from a triangular perspective. In his view, China is clearly the third most significant force in the world, both in terms of perceptions of Moscow and Washington and in terms of the facts of political life. As a matter of fact, at present China is the only power other than the super powers with a fully independent nuclear force and a considerable second strike capability. One has to agree with Segal in his hypothesis that although there were previous polycentric tendencies and indicators of multipolarity in the international system, the PRC stood out as the single most important factor which regularly figured in both the US and USSR s calculations. He has cited several useful illustratons in support of his argument. Another interesting syndrome which emerges from Segal s analysis is the question of pivot power. Until the 1960s, Moscow really influenced the hostile phase of Sino-US relations. But once the process of Sino-US detente started in the 1970s, the central place was taken by Washington. The period since then has been dominated by the virtual abandonment of the super power detente and increasing cooperation between the PRC and the US in politico-military spheres. Pradhan in his essentially chronological study has failed to perceive the change in the comparable roles of the two super powers. WHY A U-TURN The prolonged period of hostility between the US and China took a major shift in the early 1970s, especially after President Nixon sent his secretary of State, Henry Kissinger on a secret visit to Beijing in late It was however preceded by the so-called ping-pong diplomacy in April Thereafter President Nixon went on a state visit in February 1972 and signed the well publicized Shanghai Agreement. But the formal diplomatic contact between the two countries started only in 1979 with the exchange of ambassadors. During the last part of the 1970s, both countries had developed parallel interests in international affairs. Several observers have thrown light on the factors leading to a major policy shift by both Washington and Beijing. Pradhan has highlighted two causative factors for the Sine-American rapprochement (i) the US desire to improve relations with China, and (ii) better appreciation of each other s perspectives. Besides, in his view the negative factor of anti-sovietism was in no way responsible for this development. But Segal and his fellow contributors seem to contradict such a viewpoint. Michael Yahuda probes a little deeper into the new shift. Ple takes note of Kissinger s adniiration 516

5 for the personalities of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Of course he accepts the logic of the Nixon administration that the shift took place mainly due to its search for a global equilibrium, rather than containing or encircling the Soviet Union from all sides. Besides, it was also believed to be a logical outcon~e of the triangular relationship with the communist world that the US had to face. Kissinger s simple logic that such an equilibrium. among the three major global powers would automatically lead to eventual cooperation in the seventies and eighties, has been highly unrealistic. The analyst, for reasons best known to him, has approved this interpretation. The reason given by Yahida from the Chinese perspective seems to be more convincing. He believes that it was the logical outcome of the turbulent internal politics in China. His argunzent is as follows: On the eve of the cultural revolution in , rather than soil his revolutionary banner in Soviet mud by a compromise with Russia because of the American threat in Vietnam, Mao chose to confront the two super powers simultaneously... The greater threat was internal, not external. Compromising with either of them could then only lead to a split on the home front. Although one by large accepts such an explanation on the domestic compulsions in China s external relations, it does not seem to tell the whole story. It has been by and large accepted by long time China watchers that by the close of the 1960s, China s estrangement with the Soviet Union was nearly complete. There was a large concentration of the Red army on the Russian border. The Soviet Union was already charged at the Communist Party Congress in China as a revisionist power in collusion with other reactionary forces. It was practically difficult for Beijing to fight two formidable enemies simultaneously. Besides, its exclusion from the United Nations was causing enough strains on its position. Its credibility in the entire third world was quite low. So Beijing had no other alternative than to show olive branch to Washington at such a critical juncture. THE 1 OST-112A~ PHASE With the exit of Mao and Zhou from the political scene in China, moderate like Deng Tsiao Peng have taken over the lever of power. At present there is increasing emphasis on industrialization and modernization of China. Beijing is also willing to import both capital and technology from outside. It is equally concerned to make a major breakth.rough in its agriculture. It wants to open up to the outside world by expanding its external trade and signing a number of cultural agreements with several other countries. tn order to ;strengthen its defence potential, it is even prepared to sign bilateral agreements on arms sales and high technology. Naturally, in order to realize these objectives, the best bet for the PRC is Washington. The latest press reports suggest that the Reagan Administration has already negotiated with China a nuclear pact under which the Chinese nuclear submarine will get a considerable boost. Of course, getting congressional 517

6 approval is yet uncertain. There is a domestic compulsion for the Reagan administration to support such a commercial bonanza, as it would net a profit worth several billions and provide employment to thousands of American youth. Chinese President Li Xiarinian during his recent visit to the US has favoured the purchase of American civilian reactors, rather than going in for the ones front West European sources on the ground that the Chinese would rather acquire technology from the teacher than from the student.13 Segal and his fellow contributors as well as Pradhan have given only some minor projections for the future of America s China connection. They seem to believe that history is repeating itself through the present strategy of the Soviet Union to control the intermediate zone (i.e. the Persian Gulf), which may lead to another major war. On a closer analysis it seems to be a one-sided view. Pradhan merely mentions the continuing Sino-Soviet dialogue and Washington s plea for developing parallel interests with Beijing. He does not perceive any major fallout from Sino-US rapprochement. To a close observer of the international scene, it is not really the triangular relationship between the US, USSR and China which matters so much. In today s multipolar world other emerging centres of power like the EEC and Japan will have to be taken into account. Besides, even if the US plays its China card well, global equilibrium cannot be ensured by Reagan s proposed Strategic Defence Initiative or the Star War project and by Nioscoiw s inevitable counter-measures against it. It may lead to a dangerous drift in the world strategic map. Department of Political Science R.L.A. College Delhi University New Delhi PRAMOD K. MISHRA 518 NOTES 1. See for details, Paul Y Hammond, The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York, 1969), pp Lester Mask and Andrey March, Global Challenge to the United States (Associated University Presses, Ganbury, New Jesrey, 1976), p Jay Cerf et al. eds. Strategy for the 60 s (Praeger, New York, 1961), p Hammond, n. 1, p Ibid., p Cerf, n. 3, p Ibid., p USA Government of US Foreign Policy for the 1970s : Building For Peace (A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 25, February 1971, Washington DC), p Ibid., p Ibid., p See also Chun-tu Hsiieh (ed), China s Foreign Relations : New Perspectives (Praeger, New York, 1982), pp Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 14 September, Ibid.,