GNSS Vulnerability Issues in Korea

Transcription

1 GNSS Vulnerability Issues in Korea May 14, 2013 Sang Jeong Lee National GNSS Research Center Chungnam National University

2 Contents GPS jamming in Korea GoK policy GBAS deployment plan JLOC as a National Agenda Program 2

3 GPS Jamming in Korea GNSS Vulnerability Critical issue especially for infrastructure, e.g. airport, wireless communications network GPS jamming in Korea GPS disruptions for the past three years due to North Korean jamming(reported by the Central Radio Management Office of South Korea) GPS jamming Dates Jammer locations Aug 23 26, 2010 (4 days) Kaesong Mar 4 14, 2011 (11 days) Kaesong, Mountain Kumgang Apr 28 May 13, 2012 (16 days) Kaesong Jammer 50~100Km area jamming (Maximum 400Km) HaeJu North Korea GaeSeong Affected areas GPS disruptions Gimpo, Paju, etc. 181 cell towers, 15 airplanes, 1 battle ship Gimpo, Paju, Gangwon, etc. 145 cell towers, 106 airplanes, 10 ships Gimpo, Paju, etc. 1,016 airplanes, 254 ships Effected the communication and some of military equipment Incheon International Airport Seoul South Korea 3

4 GoK Policy GNSS vulnerability issues in civil applications GBAS deployment plans Widely deployed wireless communications network Governmental policy International cooperation ICAO, ITU Development of countermeasures Field manuals in case of jamming Jammer location technology 4

5 International Cooperation ITU( ) the problem about whether the North Korea jamming violate or obey the international regulation ICAO( ) Expressed serious concern about North Korea's GPS jamming and urged to prevent recurrence of similar incidents ITU and ICAO will conduct joint research about the impact of GPS jamming in the international civil aviation Notice the decision of the board of directors for all 191 ICAO member states

6 National Countermeasures Ministry of Security and Public Administration ( , ) prepare the field manual in case of GPS jamming Korea Communications Commission ( ) operate the warning system and GPS emergency response team Development of Countermeasure for Safety of Life application GBAS Development plans (2010~2014) JLOC as National Agenda Program (2010~2015) To protect integrity, ground facilities must quickly detect the presence of any hazardous interference falling within the restricted band used by GNSS To protect availability, ground personnel must be able to quickly locate and deactivate the interference source

7 GBAS Deployment Plans Issues and Needs in Korea Amount of the Air traffic increases 5% per year in Korea Mountainous terrain over 70%, Airspace & Route are restricted due to MOA Difficult to implement two-way ILS service in some airports Demand for new green technologies for the aircraft operation * MOA : Military Operating Area 7

8 GBAS Operational Technology Development GBAS CAT-I Operational Technology Development Program Purpose Schedule Establish the GBAS Approval Process for Korea Build up the National Research Infrastructure and the GBAS Demo. Airport Develop the Research Capability for GBAS Technology ~ (3 Years and 11 Months) Supported by MLTM (Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs) Scope Establish the FAA Certified System at the GBAS Demonstration Airport Develop the T&E Equipment and System for Approval Activities; SDA, FA, OA Build up the Government Approval Process and TDP Establish the Korean Ionosphere Threat Model Improve the Integrity S/W with Field Data Verification

9 GBAS Operational Technology Development Milestone of GBAS 1 st Year ( ) 2 nd Year ( ) 3 rd Year ( ) 4 th Year ( ) GBAS Selection GBAS Contract KOM (PMP, TEMP) GBAS FAT Approval process Study GBAS KARI Acceptance Airport Civil Work MSD, Stability Test Procedure development SAT Final report Flight test & inspection FRR Ground Test Test Equipment TRR T&E Design Civil Work Permission Site Survey Construction Plan Test Airport Selection Test Airport Site Survey PMP : Project Management Plan TEMP : T&E Master Plan FAT : Factory Acceptance Test TRR : Test Readiness Review MSD : Measured Site Data SAT : Site Acceptance Test FRR : Flight Readiness Review

10 Summary Finished Site Survey/Site selection and started civil work for installing GBAS Ground system at Gimpo Airport. Developed Test Equipment and decided Testing/Inspection Requirements for Ground/Flight testing and inspection of GBAS Designed GBAS Flight Procedure(ILS-like) for GLS GBAS Ground system will be installed into Gimpo Airport by the 2 nd Quarter of this year.

11 Jammer Location Technology as a National Agenda Program Funded by Korea Research Council of Fundamental Science Technology in 2010~2015 Development of Jammer location technologies for GBAS operation 11

12 System configuration for field test. Monitor Server, algorithm processor IF data storage Control Station Data Collection TDOA, AOA Algorithm Jammer Location Algorithm IF Snapshot Sampling Data (4xTDOA, 2xAOA) TCP/IP, HTTP Wireless Network Monitoring Station Google Map Jammer Location result HTTP Control Station H/W Wireless Network Antenna Power supply Jamming Signal Receiving Station RF/IF signal processor Time synchronization processor Jamming Signal Receiver (TDOA,AOA) Jamming Signal Receiver (TDOA,AOA) Jamming Signal Receiver (TDOA) Jamming Signal Receiver (TDOA) Receiving Station H/W Jamming Signal CW, DSSS Jamming Signal 12

13 Novatel Antenna TDOA Antenna AOA Antenna TDOA Data Receiver AOA Data Receiver REF/Time Syn. Supply Controller Sever/HDD Data receive S/W Web Server Power Supply PC Google Map 5 element array antenna Power Supply Data trans. SW AOA/TDOA Data Receiver REF Clock/Time Sync. Novatel, DL V3 Receiver Hardware Software 13

14 Field test environment. System operation confirmation GPS receiver operation confirmed Wireless Network confirmed Jamming signal transmission(a site) Jammer location operation confirmed Jamming signal shutdown(a site) GPS receiver reoperation confirmed Experimental field 14

15 Field test environment Location : a radio test site of a national research center Control Station 4th signal receiving station 3rd signal receiving station 1st signal receiving station Reference station(for TDOA) Experimental environment 2ed signal receiving station 15

16 Correlation value TDOA measurement North Correlation value TDOA measurement Correlation value TDOA measurement Correlation value Field test results. TDOA algorithm Correlation result TDOA measurement TDOA measurement 1.12 x 107 correlation function(rcv1-rcv1), peak = TDOA measurement(rcv1-rcv2), var = Reference station Sample x 107 correlation function(rcv1-rcv2), peak = Variance = 7.3m 10m TDOA meas time[s] TDOA measurement(rcv1-rcv3), var = ed signal receiving station 3rd signal receiving station Sample x 107 correlation function(rcv1-rcv3), peak = Sample 1.09 x 107 correlation function(rcv1-rcv4), peak = Variance = 3.5m time[s] TDOA measurement(rcv1-rcv4), var = m TDOA meas. 2 TDOA meas NE plot, var N = var E = CEP = 23.9m 150m 50m m 200 True position Variance = 3.3m 150 National 4th signal Sample GNSS Research Center, CNU receiving station time[s] East

17 Field test results. AOA algorithm AOA measurement 1st signal receiving station 2ed signal receiving station Improvement is being done 17

18 Future work modification (Multi, Dynamic Jammer) Implementation at Airport Improvement of AOA technique Considering dynamic jammer using FDOA, TDOA/FDOA algorithm Considering multiple jammers Other jammer type CW, DSSS, Swept, Pulse Synchronization GPS sync. Atomic clock sync. Jammer Location test bed Operation Implementation at an airport 18

19 Milestone of NAP 1 st Year nd Year rd Year th Year th Year th Year Jammer Localization System Test-operation Implementation at the international airport Final field test Time synchronization (GPS clock Atomic clock) Algorithm complementation for multi-jammer Field test Field test environment construction Component test Specification for field test H/W & S/W reconfiguration Feasibility test(h/w) Feasibility test(s/w) Development of jammer localization technologies Preliminary for JLOC 19

20 Thank you for your attention 20