Facts on the High-Speed Train for Saxony and Europe growing together

Transcription

1 Facts on the High-Speed Train for Saxony and Europe growing together Results of a comparative study of high-speed rail systems in the transport corridor Berlin Saxony Prague Vienna Bratislava Budapest Supplement study on SIC! Sustrain Implement Corridor October 2006

2 Summary The SIC! module focussed on the Comparative assessment of rail-bound highspeed systems along the pan-european Corridor IV on the basis of the technology variants conventional high-speed railway line and Transrapid maglev system. The necessary planning procedures required for a financial assessment of the survey area were followed: definition of system and stations, development of a rough line, calculation of travel times, traffic forecast, development of an operation programme, identification of expenditures and revenues for construction and operation as well as accessibility and socio-economic impacts. The endpoints of the surveyed lines are Berlin in the north-west and Budapest in the south-east. In the German area (Free State of Saxony, Berlin, Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt) the survey focussed on direct connections from Berlin to Dresden via Berlin airport as well as two alternative routes from Berlin BBI Airport to Dresden via Leipzig on the one hand and Cottbus on the other hand, which served as a basis for a detailed analysis in view of travelling through the conurbations of Leipzig and Dresden. The identified routes were the basis for the calculation of the travel times for both systems. In addition to the usual allowance, extra time was built in the schedule in order to allow for a certain flexibility regarding the detailed planning later on. Based on the results of travel time calculations a traffic forecast was made. It was necessary to take a look at different scenarios in order to demonstrate the impact of ticket pricing, improved links to the secondary rail network and the development of the petrol price on the expected passenger numbers and revenues. As bases for all further assessments served the direct connections as well as a forecast scenario considering a real increase of the petrol price of 80% for the year 2020 compared to the price of the year 2000, as well as a real increase of air fares of 8% and of the routedependent motorway toll of 0.07 EUR/km (optimum scenario). The next step was the definition of an operation concept. Different regular interval time tables for peak hours and off-peak hours were taken as a basis to consider the passenger amount distributed over the day. The identified travel speed over the entire route (direct connection) including all above-mentioned allowances is 265 km/h for the Transrapid, and 180 km/h for the wheel-track system. The resulting travel times e.g. between Berlin and Budapest are 5h 16 min for the wheel-track system, and 3h 20 min for the Transrapid (Berlin- Vienna: 3h 55 min and 2h 23 min respectively). The passenger forecast for the above-mentioned scenario showed lower values despite a 50% faster travel time for the Transrapid: general countable passenger vol- Page 2 of 16

3 umes for the wheel-track system (direct connection) range between 16 million passengers/year (Prague - Pardubice) and 3mn passengers/year (Prague Dresden); and between 10mn passengers/year (Prague Pardubice) and 3mn passengers (Prague Dresden) for the Transrapid variant. The reasons for the lower passenger numbers for the Transrapid basically are: Considerable transfer obstacles as it is not possible to link the train routes with the surrounding railway network. Considerable transfer obstacles due to stations located at the periphery (further investigations required that might lead to better results for the Transrapid). Higher ticket prices for the Transrapid, which, however, bring higher revenues despite lower passenger numbers for the Transrapid compared with the wheel-track variant. In parallel (and/or subsequently) to the previous work step initial investment costs for infrastructure and procurement of vehicles as well as annual operation and maintenance costs were calculated. Investigations from an operational point of view showed that both wheel-track system and Transrapid system do not reach the so-called financial break-even point within an observation period of 50 years, i.e. the revenues do not earn the total costs. However, it has to be mentioned that there is hardly any transport infrastructure worldwide that pays off from an operational point of view. What is important in the operational assessment is that with both systems a considerable positive cost-to-revenue ratio may be achieved. What is different between the two technology systems is that in the case of the wheel-track system, start-up investments are 30% lower than for the Transrapid (direct variant: wheel-track system 13.7 billion EUR, Transrapid 20bn EUR), on the other hand the annual balance of revenues and expenditures is also approx. 30% lower (direct connection: wheeltrack system 550mn EUR, Transrapid 795mn EUR), which means that shortly after the end of the observation period of 50 years the Transrapid may outperform the wheel-track system. From an economic point of view the SIC! project estimated an increase of the regionalized GDP to 21.4bn EUR per year through a Transrapid high-speed connection in the inner SIC! area; there is no estimation available yet for the wheel-track system. As to the non-financial impacts of the high-speed line regarding traffic, national economy, flora, fauna and humans experts see slight advantages of the Transrapid. From an operational and economic point of view the construction of the examined high-speed line can be recommended. However, against the background of the depth of investigation that was possible in the scope of the survey, this statement needs to be further confirmed by subsequent investigations. Weighing up the two different systems it showed that the construction of the line in Transrapid technology can absolutely be considered. Even if the Page 3 of 16

4 linkage is not as good, the technology and transport characteristics are better, and there are two aspects in favour of the Transrapid: first of all, the better competitiveness of the Transrapid compared to air traffic with travel distances of up to 1000 km due to its 50% faster travel time; and, secondly, the maintenance of the technology leadership in the field of a future technology for high-speed transport. Further investigations are required in order to differentiate the forecast of passenger numbers with the help of refined scenarios of the expected economic development in Eastern Central Europe, of an optimised selection and location of the stations as well as of a higher number of departures compared to earlier forecasts. The assessment of costs has to be extended over the entire life cycle and has to be supplemented by an economic cost-benefit-analysis. Due to the amount of investments required a step-by-step plan has to be developed, which generates maximum benefit at the earliest possible time. Provided a furthermore positive assessment the line has to be integrated into national and international infrastructure plans. Page 4 of 16

5 1 Tasks, Objectives 1.1 The additional SIC! module HSR Correlation with the Interreg IIIB project SIC! Under the research project SIC! - Sustrain Implement Corridor 1 the suitability of the northern Central European area for the development of a second European core area ( New Banana ) was surveyed between 2003 and The pan-european Corridor IV (Berlin Dresden Prague Vienna Bratislava Budapest South- East Europe) passes through this survey area as a central north-south transport axis. In 2004 the Saxony State Ministry for the Interior (SMI) commissioned the present survey as supplementary module to SIC! on the topic of high-speed transport. SIC! is a trans-national project in the field of regional and transport policy that analyses, models and quantifies among others the impacts of inter-regional accessibility on regional development, and offers the concerned regions and countries strategies and concrete measures including financing options for the development of a sustainable, trans-national, intermodal infrastructure programme. Detailed information on the umbrella project is provided by the SIC! Short Factbook and by the project site Tasks and objectives of the project The supplementary SIC! module consists of a comparative survey between the highspeed wheel-track system and the high-speed maglev system ( Transrapid ) in the Berlin Dresden Prague Vienna Bratislava Budapest Corridor as essential element of the pan-european Corridor IV. Regional impact and different alternative routes are examined for both systems. The results of this survey include a first expert recommendation for one of the two systems. The base year of the forecasts is 2020 (network status and traffic volume). 1 Cofinanced by the European Union under INTERREG III B CADSES ( ). Page 5 of 16

6 1.3 Overview on the work steps of the study In the scope of the supplementary module to SIC! on the topic of high-speed transport the following work contents were elaborated: (1) Derivation and presentation of the impacts of high-speed connections o On the accessibility within the Corridor o On spatial development effects in the regions concerned o On the regional economic development o As well as the impact of the regional economic development on the modal transport volume. (2) Horizontal and vertical alignment for the wheel-track and the Transrapid system o Development of alternative routes o In-depth examination of the marked out routes for both systems o In the area Berlin Dresden o In the area of the Erzgebirge mountain crossing o In-depth examination of the city through-routes of Dresden and Leipzig o Operation concept for both wheel-track system and maglev system o Calculation of travel times o Development of operation concepts including track schemes, operating hours, travel time contour maps, framework for time tables (3) Quantity structures and cost estimates of the relevant types of costs for both systems (wheel-track and maglev) regarding o Investment costs o Operation costs (personnel, maintenance, energy) (4) Assessment of economic efficiency for both systems (wheel-track and maglev) according to the methodological approach of the SIC! project. (5) Comparison of the best solutions for both systems under consideration of estimated economic effectiveness and definition of a first recommendation for implementation (6) Identification of the demand for further surveys Page 6 of 16

7 1.4 Technical survey area The technical survey area of this study comprises the area of the alignment of the high-speed line (see Figure 1-2). It starts in Berlin and includes Leipzig to the west and Cottbus to the east, reaches Dresden and then follows a broad corridor to Budapest via Prague, Brno, Vienna and Bratislava. Figure 1-1: Survey area and traffic assignment zones of the SIC! project Figure 1-2: Technical survey area, draft lines and stations (additional: Berlin Airport and Vienna Airport) Page 7 of 16

8 2 Results of the Survey Selection of the System Methodology and imponderables Technical dimensioning The planning of transport systems is a progressive and increasingly refined process. In order to obtain a well-balanced result, various circuit feedbacks have to be considered, which result from the fact that assumptions have to be made in an earlier project phase, and that the correctness and suitability of these assumptions can only be verified in subsequent project phases. Due to the design and volume of the survey only a linear development of planning steps largely without circuit feedbacks was possible. Figure 2-1: Design of the HSR survey During planning it became evident that some decisions to be taken had to be based on a more detailed examination of the alternatives focussing on the identification of the margin of costs and revenues with variation of technical parameters and transport-related system definitions (e.g. definition and location of stations). 2.2 Overall assessment The overall assessment whether the construction of a track-guided high-speed connection along the Pan-European Corridor IV between Berlin and Budapest is reasonable and can be recommended has to take into consideration the operational and economic impacts of such a connection. Page 8 of 16

9 It is possible to financially assess and estimate the operational impacts, the forecast of the expected traffic volume, however, brings numerous uncertainties. Thus according to the report (chapter 4.3) the expected traffic volume was assessed on the basis of three forecasts based on different assumptions regarding the future development of relevant frame conditions (basic scenario HSR scenario I, intermediate HSR scenario and optimistic scenario HSR scenario III) The economic impacts were assessed partly financially, partly non-financially. The financial assessment included the expected opportunity returns through existing routes that are no longer utilised for goods transport on the one hand, and on the other hand there is an estimation of the impacts of the Transrapid system on the regional economy available from the SIC! project. A comprehensive economic cost-benefit survey was not included in the study. In order not to disregard the non-financial impact completely, the survey was supplemented by a preliminary assessment of the non-financial impacts of the project on the basis of a preference choice matrix Operational impacts The investment calculations carried out for the optimistic scenario showed that if only seen from an operational point of view the high-speed connection does not refinance within the observation period of 50 years. In the investment phase prior to the start of operation the wheel-track technology is more economical due to lower investment costs. However, attention also has to be paid to general and project-specific influences: The wheel-track technology can look back on a 170 years long development history, during which the system has been largely optimised, whereas it is very likely that the predominant part of the optimisation potential of the Transrapid technology will only be tapped in the future. This could slightly benefit the surveyed line, and considerably benefit later projects. The wheel-track system utilises cost reduction potentials, which arise from the fact that existing infrastructure (status 2020) located around the line nodes doesn t have to be completely rebuilt, only upgraded. It is quite possible that in the course of a further detailing of the project additional investments in the nodes might be necessary. Page 9 of 16

10 Upon consideration of the operation phase alone, investment calculations show that revenues from the high-speed connection will very likely be able to cover their operation costs including maintenance costs, and to generate profits. The advantages of the Transrapid technology: despite lower passenger numbers (due to transfer obstacles, the location of some stations and higher fares) revenues of the maglev system are higher (due to higher fares), the operation costs on the contrary are lower than compared with the wheel-track system. This is above all due to expected lower maintenance costs and a smaller number of passengers required. In the operation phase the cost coverage is more than 440 % for the Transrapid (Maglev v1), and 280 % for the wheel-track system (Wheel-Track v1). An exception is the solution Wheel-Track v1, for which a slightly higher profit is estimated in the operation phase than for the Maglev solutions, which can be traced back to the fact that due to the forecast shorter travel times, the comparably fast Wheel-Track v2 line between Leipzig and Berlin attracts a high amount of the traffic volume from the rail line Berlin-Leipzig which has already been upgraded to a speed of 200 km. This also concerns the longdistant ICE lines from Southern Germany. The striking results of Wheel-Track v2 are thus mainly based on an intra-modal shifting of traffic within the railway system without any operational or economic benefit. Wheel-Track v2 is not followed up in this study. 2 Despite multiple cost coverage both technologies cannot refinance in the operation phase the high start-up investments over an observation period of 50 years with an arithmetic real interest rate of 3 %. After 50 years the capital values are 1.9 billion EUR Wheel-Track v1 and 2.3 billion EUR for Maglev v1. In the assessment of this insufficient operational profitability taking into account startup investments, consideration has to be given to the fact that investments in the transport infrastructure are considered a task of the public services given today s understanding of the state. Thus, investments in the construction and upgrading of the German primary rail network under the German Federal Law on the Upgrading of federal railway lines (Bundesschienenwege-Ausbaugesetz) are financed by means of non-refundable construction subsidies. Under these conditions the operational profitability of the operation phase is becoming a focal point of consideration. 2 If, however, in-depth studies show that there is a demand for four long-distant railway tracks between Page 10 of 16

11 2.2.2 Economic impacts The financial impacts of the opportunity returns achieved through lines within the existing network that are no longer used for goods transport were assessed on the basis of the SIC! Rail Link Load Forecast. In total a plus of approx. 6.6 million EUR annually of infrastructure fees are earned. 3. The values are in a range of about 0.6 % of fare income earned through the high-speed line Transrapid. On the whole the impacts on the line price through lines available for goods transport are thus rather insignificant. Other financial impacts that are not quantified here remain to be identified. The second economic impact assessed from a financial point of view is the stimulation of the regional economy. In the case of the Transrapid technology solution an increase of the GDB by 12.0 billion EUR/year in the traffic assignment zones with HSR stations, and by 21.4bn EUR/year in the entire inner SIC! survey area is expected in the scope of the SIC! project with investments costs amounting to 20bn EUR. The utilised econometric forecast quantifies and monetarises not only regional and socio-economic impacts of such infrastructure investments, but also serves as guideline for the regional authorities regional and economic policy. Even though the socioeconomic forecast does not include the impacts of the operation and construction of infrastructure according to the ordered study design, the utilised forecast model provides arguments suited to support the public authorities regarding investment and financing decisions in infrastructure issues against the background of the expected regional development or possible public financed investments, that return as tax yields. If the economy is stimulated as expected the refinancing of construction costs would appear in a completely different light in terms of national economy. It may be assumed that things are quite similar in the case of the wheel-track technology. As regards the impacts of the project, which cannot be assessed from a financial point of view, there are slight advantages for the Transrapid system. Berlin and Leipzig, estimates would have to be revised. Page 11 of 16

12 2.2.3 Conclusion From an operational point of view and over a period of 50 years the two best variants Maglev v1 and Wheel-Track v1 with a capital value of 1.9bn EUR and 2.4 bn EUR respectively, are similarly suited for the realisation of the high-speed connection between Berlin and Budapest along the northern section of the pan-european Corridor IV. With an internal interest rate of 2.21 % Maglev v1 achieves slightly better results than Wheel-Track v1 with 2.02 %. From the point of view of the operator Maglev v1 should be favoured due to higher revenues from operation, especially as after 50 years the residual values of infrastructure remain in both systems; and as a period of operation can be expected that considerably exceeds 40 years. The system interference between the existing railway network and the novel Transrapid system has already been taken into consideration in so far as the additional transfer obstacle has been taken into account in the traffic forecasts for the maglev solutions. Furthermore it has to be considered that a further fine-tuning of the project might result in slight advantages for Maglev v1 (location of maglev stations, more detailed analysis of the utilisation of the existing railway system etc.) It can be furthermore expected that cost reduction potentials of the maglev system could be significantly larger at the time of future re-investment, if the new technology would be broadly applied. In that case the situation for both operation and investment costs for the Transrapid over the subsequent observation period is better than at the time of this survey. However, it has to be mentioned that from an operational point of view given a real interest rate of 3% (or higher) both technologies should not be used. This also applies to newly constructed railway lines, which were built on the basis of considerations that go beyond the mere operational horizon, and which will probably be built in the future under the precondition of transport political continuity. From an economic point of view things present themselves slightly differently: on the one hand a considerable stimulation for regions whose living standard is below the EU average, is to be expected. The construction of the line would have distinct positive effects on the political objectives propagated in the EU treaties regarding the equalisation of living standards in 3 Calculations for SIC! scenario 3 (Maglev v1). Page 12 of 16

13 Europe; the development of a second European core area would be greatly supported. Furthermore, the approx. 900 km long line connects five European countries and is thus of particular significance for European integration, the importance of which is expressed through funding provided by the EU for transnational lines. In the comparison of the two technologies two further aspects are of significance from an economic point of view: 1. To maintain Europe s technological leadership in the field of the track-guided high-speed technologies, which is in danger today through the activities in South-East Asia above all in the maglev field. In this respect the middle- and long-term perspectives and targets of transport systems in Europe play an important role. 2. The better competitiveness of the Transrapid compared to air traffic due to a travel speed which is 50% faster than the wheel-track technology: for the distance segment between 500 to 1000 km, which for transport political reasons should not be left to air traffic, the Transrapid is the better suited system. The advantages of the Transrapid regarding the non-financial project impacts should also not be neglected. 2.3 Recommendation In view of the results of the survey the expert recommends the construction of a track-guided high-speed connection within the pan-european Corridor IV from Berlin via Dresden Prague Vienna Bratislava to Budapest. This recommendation is based on the expected positive economic and demographic development within the survey area as well as on the expected long-term operational success of the transport system. The decision on the technology of the high-speed connection has to be based on: 1. Operational aspects 2. The character of the investment in a transport system and its impacts on both economy and environment as well as on 3. Questions regarding technology development Under consideration of all these aspects the results of the present survey speak in favour of a construction of the Transrapid in maglev technology. This preference re- Page 13 of 16

14 sults from the fact that given the expected long operating period the Transrapid seems to be the more future-oriented solution. The definitive decision should, however, be based on the further analysis of both technologies, particularly regarding - More detailed routes - The adjustment and refinement of the passenger volume forecast - The verification of the estimated costs particularly for the maglev technology due to less experience with this system - An in-depth examination of the risks - The clarification of possibilities for project financing. Page 14 of 16

15 Imprint Client Freistaat Sachsen, Staatsministerium des Innern, Abteilung Landesentwicklung Referat 45 Europäische Raumordnung, Fachplanung, Wilhelm-Buck-Str. 4, D Dresden Ministerialrat Dr. Edgar Trawnicek, Dipl.-Volkswirt Jörg Kellermann (Free State of Saxony, State Ministry of the Interior, Regional Development Section, Dept. 45 European Spatial Policy, Sectoral Planning ) Contractors IPE Integrierte Planung und Entwicklung regionaler Transport- und Versorgungssysteme Ges.m.b.H, Kaiserstraße 45, A Wien office@ipe.co.at Dr. Gerhard Platzer, Mag. Rudolf Sebastnik, Dipl.-Geogr. Albrecht Malcherek Intraplan Consult GmbH, Orleansplatz 5a; D München, Dipl.-Ing. Tobias Kluth Sub-Contractors Kompetenzzentrum für Hochleistungsbahnen und Magnetbahnsysteme der Technischen Universität Dresden, D Dresden (Center of Excellence for High Performance Railways and Maglev Systems at Dresden University of Technology) bestehend aus / consisting of: o TU Dresden, Professur für Gestaltung von Bahnanlagen Prof. Dr.-Ing. Wolfgang Fengler, Dipl.-Ing. Dirk Stollberg, Dipl.-Ing. Jens Stehle o Institut für Bahntechnik GmbH, Dresden/Berlin Prof. Dr.-Ing. Arnd Stephan, Dipl.-Ing. Eckart Fritz, Dipl.-Ing. Tobias Hauswald o TU Dresden, Professur für Baubetriebswesen Prof. Dr.-Ing. Rainer Schach, Dipl.-Ing. René Naumann-Jährig o Obermeyer ALBIS Bauplan GmbH, Dresden Dr.-Ing. Peter Lätsch, Dipl.-Ing. Holger Dietz Page 15 of 16

16 Advisory Committee Amt der Burgenländischen Landesregierung (Office of the Province Government of Burgenland, Department European Affairs and Statistics), Leadpartner of SIC!, Eisenstadt, Austria Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Saxon State Government for Economy and Labour), Dresden, Germany DB Netz AG, Frankfurt am Main, Germany DB Magnetbahn GmbH, Berlin/Munich, Germany Transrapid International GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin, Germany Sekretariat für den Paneuropäischen Korridor IV (Secretariate for the pan- European Transport Corridor IV), Germany Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung der Länder Berlin-Brandenburg (Joint Planning Department of Berlin and Brandenburg), Berlin/Potsdam, Germany Thüringer Ministerium für Bau und Verkehr (Thuringian Ministry for Construction and Transport), Erfurt, Germany Ministerium für Regionalentwicklung der Tschechischen Republik (Ministry of Regional Development of the Czech Republic) (MMR), Prague, Czech Republic Verkehrsministerium der Tschechischen Republik (Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic), Prague, Czech Republic Dresden, October 2006 Page 16 of 16