New Technology and Profits

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1 Another useful comparative statics exercise is to determine how much a firm would pay to reduce its marginal costs to that of its competitor. This will simply be the difference between its profits with the new, lower marginal cost and its profits before the investment. We would thus have to calculate equilibrium profits in the two equilibria. Therefore, this is different than what we did before in the sense that we will start with an asymmetric duopoly and examine a shift to a symmetric one. Recall with the differing technologies, we had differing marginal cost values c 1, c 2, and we solved for aggregate equilibrium output: Q N = 2a c 1 c 2 3b

2 Which we can sub into the demand function to get equilibrium price: p N = a + c 1 + c 2 3 With equilibrium price and quantity compute we can calculate equilibrium profits before investing in the new technology. Profits are (p c 1 )q 1. Which after plugging in our previous expression for equilibrium prices and quantities, we get (after some messy algebra): ( a + c2 2c 1 ) 2 π 1 = 1 b 3 Recall what we are interested in is how much Firm 1 is willing to pay to lower its marginal cost to c 2.

3 To illustrate how to dow this we will set some parameter values and solve for the others. Specifically, p = 16.66, Q = 8.33, c 1 = 15, c 2 = 10. From this, we can solve for the parameters in the demand curve. We will get a = 25, b = 1. So this will imply that initial profits are 25/9; Whereas with the new technology profits will be, because now c 1 = 10, 225/9.

4 So the difference, and thus the willingness to pay is This comparative static exercise is useful to avoid misleading conclusions. For example, if we took initial output (before the new technology) as given, and compute the gain from reduced marginal costs, we would get a number small than That s because by reducing marginal costs, Firm 1 is more competitive and will produce more output in equilibrium. We might also think we can compute the gain in investing by the difference in Firm 2 and Firm 1 s profits when their costs differed. In this case would overestimate the gain from investing.

5 This is because when Firm 1 becomes more aggressive, Firm 2 s equilibrium output will be lower, and furthermore, the equilibrium price will be lower as well. So in general, taking equilibrium values as constant will lead to incorrect estimation of the effects of exogenous changes. Whereas comparative statics takes into account all the equilibrium effects that follow.

6 Dynamics and Elimination of Dominated Strategies While we have motivated Cournot equilibrium by the concept of Nash. But in fact Cournot equilibrium can be motivated by iterative elimination of dominated strategies. To see this, we can view the game as a dynamic one, in the sense that in the first period, Firm 1 chooses its output. In the second, Firm 2 chooses its optimal output given the period 1 choice. And so on, with Firm 1 picking in the odd periods and Firm 2 in the even. As we can see graphically, this will eventually converge to the Cournot strategy pair. Remarkably, this will happen no matter what the initial output in period 1 is. So this motivates us using Cournot equilibrium as a prediction on what will eventually happen when two firms play the game.

7 Collusion What we just concluded was that total profits were lower in oligopolies than monopolies. This decrease stemmed from an externality. That is, a firm maximized its own profit not taking into account the profits of its competitor. So firms will attempt to establish agreements to increase their collective market power. As we ll see such agreements can result in all firms being better off. This type of behavior will be referred to as collusion.

8 Collusion Cartel agreements are an institutional form of collusion. A leading example is OPEC but there are many others. More frequently collusion results from secret agreements, mostly because its illegal. We will model such agreements with the objective of reducing supply and or increasing prices. Though generally, collusion can also refer to advertising expenditures, setting quality standards etc.

9 Collusion To start we will consider a simple duopoly with homogeneous products and constant marginal costs. If firms set prices we know this would correspond to the Bertrand model. We also know that in equilibrium firms would set price to marginal cost. But if prices are allowed to change over time we would want to model this somehow. Suppose time is t = 1, 2,..., and in each period firms simultaneously set prices. Firms will play a Bertrand game in each of an infinite series of periods. We ll refer to this as a repeated game.

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