Institute of Social Psychology Flagship Lecture Series

Transcription

1 Institute of Social Psychology Flagship Lecture Series Lecture 5 Attributions and Responsibility Bradley Franks

2 Outline of Lecture 1. Introduction rerum cognoscere causas 2. Attribution Research 3. Attribution Errors and Culture 4. Attribution and Social Explanation 5. Summary and Conclusions 2

3 Attribution and Responsibility 1 Introduction Social life involves making sense of other people and their behaviour by making attributions (explanations) of the cause of their behaviour In doing so, we often make assessments regarding responsibility, allocating praise and blame for actions We make attributions not only regarding the behaviour of individuals, but also of groups of individuals and other social entities, such as organisations, governments, football teams, committees, and so on 3

4 Attribution and Responsibility 1 Introduction E.g., Policies of governments and plans for social change by NGO s (e.g., re. poverty, homelessness, health pandemics, famine) depend on attributional assumptions about: Who is responsible for those problems Who is responsible for generating solutions to those problems Who can and should take actions to solve them (e.g., individual behaviour change, government action, community empowerment) Explanations of and prescriptions for the activities of organisations and other institutional groups depend on attributional assumptions about: Who is responsible for the successes and failures of the group Who can and should take actions to improve its success in future (e.g., management, politicians, CEO s, other leaders) 4

5 Attribution and Responsibility 1 Introduction However: We shouldn t take peoples behaviour to indicate their responsibility unless that behaviour is intentionally caused by them, and unless those individual intentions are all that matters in causing the behaviour Questions: Are we accurate in assessing whether people s behaviour is intentionally caused? Or are our assessments error-prone (or biased)? and Is the picture of making attributions for individual behaviour based on their intentions appropriate for all social explanations of social behaviour? Or are there more complexities that need to be taken into account? 5

6 1 Introduction Heider (1958): Social Attribution We make attributions like amateur or naive scientists The specific reasons or causes offered for a behaviour are often less important than the way general way the cause is located in the explanation: i.e., Internal attributions versus external attributions PS?? A*ribu/ons and Responsibility 2010/11 6

7 2 Attribution Research The Four Ages of Attribution Research Attribution research since Heider has gone through several ages, which reflect different conceptions of people as engaged in causal attribution: The naïve scientist 1960 s The flawed perceiver 1970 s The cognitive miser 1980 s The motivated tactician 1990 s and onwards 7

8 2 Attribution Research The Four Ages of Attribution Research The Naïve Scientist 1960 s e.g., Kelly s Covariation theory; Jones & Davies Correspondent Inference theory People as intuitive scientists seek to understand causality by combining information according to rational principles These principles may reflect the kinds of methods used in experimental psychology and data analysis techniques (e.g., ANOVA) Errors and biases in attribution constitute departures from the norm for competent performers 8

9 2 Attribution Research The Four Ages of Attribution Research The Flawed Perceiver 1970 s e.g., Jones & Nisbett on Actor-Observer differences People have different perspectives on events that are related to their being actors or observers These different perspectives are as much perceptual as they are cognitive (i.e., they concern what can be seen and heard from a given social-physical position) No one person has perceptual or informational access to all of the causally relevant information in a situation Such partial perceptual access results in errors and biases in attribution, which are departures from adaptive or optimal processing 9

10 2 Attribution Research The Four Ages of Attribution Research The Cognitive Miser 1980 s e.g., Gilbert s two-step/discounting model Cognitive economy the tendency to aim to conserve mental effort favours heuristics or rules of thumb Biases in attribution involve heuristics that usually (but not always ) provide a useful answer Cognitive economy thereby makes use of reasonable assumptions, which can also make errors 10

11 2 Attribution Research The Four Ages of Attribution Research The Motivated Tactician 1990 s onwards e.g., Hasleton & Funder s (2006) evolutionary error management theory People have access to a range of options for making causal inference These options differ in their cognitive effort/costs People use cognitive resources (e.g., inference rules) tactically High cost resources are used when accuracy matters most (when an error would be more costly); low cost resources are used when accuracy is less important (when an error would be less costly) 11

12 3 Attribution Errors and Culture The Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE) Attribution Errors The processes of attribution are arguably beset with errors and biases, suggesting that everyday attribution may not always be a sound basis for assessing others responsibility A key example is the Fundamental Attribution Error: Ross (1977): The tendency to overestimate the importance of the actor and to underestimate the situation as a determinant of action 12

13 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Explaining the FAE? A 1970 s style perceptual/informational explanation? The actor is more salient perceptually and informationally: observers tend to focus their attention on actors, while the situational causes of the actor s behavior are less salient and may be unknown. A 1980 s style cognitive processing explanation? A two-step process (e.g., D. T. Gilbert, 1989): First step is normally non-conscious automatic internal attribution Second step is effortful and conscious considering possible situational causes, possibly discounting the first step s attribution The FAE may arise because people only proceed to the second step if the situational information is very salient, and it very often is not 13

14 Culture and the FAE 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Fletcher & Ward (1988): Does the FAE depend on Culture? The FAE may be an error but it is not fundamental in fact, it may be only fundamental to specific types of culture (e.g., the West) and not others (e.g., East Asia) Miller (1984): The FAE and culture USA and Hindu Indian children made similar numbers of internal and situational attributions for the everyday actions of others As they grew older, they diverged: USA adults explained behaviours largely via traits (e.g., recklessness or kindness) Indian Hindus adults explained the same behaviours via external factors (e.g., social roles, obligations, physical environment) 14

15 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE relevant proverbs? Behind an able man there are always other able men Good fences make good neighbours The nail that sticks up will be hammered down The squeaky wheel gets the grease The hawk with talent hides its talons Don t hide your light under a bushel Life is for one generation, a good name is forever Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me A single arrow is easily broken, but not ten in a bundle If you can t beat them, join them Spilled water will never return to the cup You can t fit a square peg in a round hole East Asian proverbs in blue USA proverbs in red 15

16 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE Some Possible Explanations (1) Different Prevalent Values or Ideology (2) Different Default Ways of Thinking (3) Different Default Self-Construals 16

17 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE Some Possible Explanations (1) Different Prevalent Values or Ideology - Hofstede (1981); Ichheiser (1949), Farr & Markova (1995): Western individualism valuing individual autonomy and uniqueness tendency to emphasise the role of personal and to underestimate the role of situational factors individual responsibility, praise and blame East Asian collectivism valuing group membership and conformity tendency to emphasise the role of situational and to underestimate the role of personal factors individual-relative-to-group responsibility, praise and blame Individualism translates directly into a tendency to locate the causes of behaviour within individuals, whereas collectivism suggests that causes are to be found outside the individual 17

18 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE Some Possible Explanations (2) Different Default Ways of Thinking - Nisbett (2003): Western atomism emphasis on construing events and objects in terms of their own internal qualities, leading to clear binary category judgements and essentialism use of binary, linear logic (e.g., excluded middle supporting the Law of Double Negation Elimination) East Asian holism emphasis on understanding the contextual relations of events and objects, viewing them in a more holistic manner use of dialectical logic (e.g., tolerance of contradictions, denial of excluded middle) The default atomistic or holistic ways of thinking as applied to people directly give rise to different default tendencies to take into account information regarding the person or the situation in attribution 18

19 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE Some Possible Explanations (3) Different Default Self-Construals - Markus & Kitayama (1992): Western independence socialisation towards developing a sense of self as unique and separate from others emphasis on construing self as relatively invariant across different settings East Asian interdependence socialisation towards developing a sense of self as connected with others, defined by social roles and relationships emphasis on construing self as context dependent The default independent or interdependent ways of construing the self directly give rise to different default tendencies to take into account information regarding the person or the situation in attribution 19

20 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE has the role of culture been overstated? Choi & Nisbett (1999); Nisbett (2006): USA versus China, Japan If situational information is not made salient, then Japanese and Chinese participants often make same FAE as USA If situational information is made salient, then Japanese and Chinese participants FAE is reduced (whereas USA participants FAE is not) Implications: The FAE may be a common starting point across cultures Different cultures may have different default tendencies to direct people towards situational information and so can decrease or heighten the extent of the FAE as appropriate This is consistent with Gilbert s two-step model of attribution (taking adding culture as an additional variable), and also with Error Management Theory 20

21 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE has the role of culture been overstated? Haselton & Nettle (2006): Error Management Theory FAE is fundamental but it is not an error it is an evolutionary design feature: natural selection has fashioned mental processes that are biased toward committing errors which are less costly in reproductive terms False Positives are often less costly than False Negatives (e.g., predator avoidance) The FAE and Error Management Theory: FAE leads people to avoid social partners who have once acted badly, because they might repeat those actions in future (e.g., cheating) False Negative error: to assume that a person s actions do not indicate a disposition (and thus not take it into account in future interactions): cost = risk of involvement with someone who could later inflict harm False Positive error: to misinterpret someone as antisocial because of action which was in fact contextually caused (i.e., to judge people more negatively than is warranted): cost = opportunity cost: avoiding those who might in fact be good partners Cultures which encourage lower FAE also have stronger normative controls on individuals performing negative social behaviours, reducing the scope for committing False Positives 21

22 3 Attribution Errors and Culture Culture and the FAE a General Negativity Bias? Asch (1948); Hamlyn, Wynn & Bloom (2010); Vaish, Grossmann, & Woodward (2008) 3 month old infants evaluate others on the basis of their social behaviour towards third parties: an aversion to antisocial actors (who hindered the success of others goals) no independent attraction to prosocial actors (who helped the success of others goals) Negative social information may be developmentally privileged in influencing childrens preferences for engaging in social interaction Such a negativity bias appears to persist into adulthood, leading to overemphasising negative behaviours and under-emphasising positive ones in forming views of others personalities This is consistent with a general tendency to make False Positive errors regarding others negative behaviours i.e., to view negative behaviours as internally caused, and so as providing a reason to avoid those others in future (as in Error Management Theory s view of the FAE) 22

23 4 Attribution and Social Explanation Attribution, Social Explanation and Societal Psychology - Does Attribution Theory Over-Simplify Social Explanation? (1) Different Explanations Within Cultures - Cognitive Polyphasia (2) Mind reading of intentions versus position/role reading? (3) Individual intentions versus collective/joint intentions?

24 4 Attribution and Social Explanation Does Attribution Theory Over-Simplify Social Explanation? Is Causal Explanation of Behaviour Context-dependent? (1) Different Explanations Within Cultures - Cognitive Polyphasia Moscovici (2002); Jovchelovitch (2007); Legare, Gelman & Rosengren (2010) Characterisations of the FAE and attribution in general suggest less flexibility of explanation than seems necessary Some views (including Social Representations Theory) propose the idea of multiple or situated rationalities : People draw upon different kinds of systems of beliefs to explain a single event (e.g., scientific versus religious accounts of illness), and are not troubled by apparent contradictions between them People may thus entertain multiple, contradictory explanations for single behaviours internal, external or interactive Attribution is not just about fitting the facts, but rather about fitting the facts filtered through norms associated with systems of beliefs that can vary within a culture and are drawn on in specific contexts or for specific purposes (i.e., situated rationality)

25 4 Attribution and Social Explanation Does Attribution Theory Over-Simplify Social Explanation? Is the level of Individual Action Intentions the most Important One? (2) Mind reading of intentions versus position/role reading? Gillespie (2005); Mead (1934); Franks & Dhesi (2010); Chen-Idson & Mischel (2001) Much of what we read about other peoples mental states and dispositions is not drawn directly from observing their behaviours per se, Rather, it is drawn from understanding their behaviours in the context of shared patterns of norms about social roles, positions and activities we assume they have the mental states that are consistent with those norms Reading beliefs and intentions depends on seeing the person in the context of the situation (and the demands of the situation in the context of the person), 25 rather than as separate from it

26 4 Attribution and Social Explanation Does Attribution Theory Over-Simplify Social Explanation? Is the level of Individual Action Intentions the most Important One? (3) Individual intentions versus collective/joint intentions? Searle (1996); Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll (2005); Tuomela (2002); Franks (2010) Attribution is based on a form of intentional stance (Dennett, 1978) which assumes a form of methodological individualism (Weber, 1910): Only individuals have true agency - behaviour motivated by intentions held by individuals (or their internal states) to act qua an individual Such intentions solely have the individual as the subject: I intend 26

27 4 Attribution and Social Explanation Does Attribution Theory Over-Simplify Social Explanation? Is the level of Individual Action Intentions the most Important One? (3) Individual intentions versus collective/joint intentions? Intentional behaviour is not always explained by individual intentions: Behaviour often involves joint or we intentions: entering into joint or collaborative actions (e.g., following the joint norms of a sports game), where there is a plural subject, we and not I we intend We often hold groups or collectivities of individuals per se responsible: And usually do not thereby assume that every individual member of those groups holds the same beliefs or intentions (M. Gilbert, 1989; Goldman, 2004; Pettigrew, 1979) - e.g., governments, corporations Neither we intentions held by individuals, nor explaining the behaviour of collectivities, seems to involve only or reduce to the I intentions of individuals 27

28 5 Summary and Conclusions The process of making causal attributions may not be a sound basis for judging the responsibility of other people A major reason for this is that attribution is imbued with deeply-held cultural assumptions about how responsibility for actions is understood: the individualistic culture/ideology of the West: Assumes that the individual is the prime locus of causality (cf., FAE) Also underpins the working assumption of Heider s original motivation for studying attribution that people do in fact have stable personalities, which could act as predictable causes of their behaviour So culture has a major impact on this process: the FAE may be in part a Western cultural construct But the ultimate explanation of the FAE may also connect with evolutionary dispositions of the kind suggested by Error Management Theory 28

29 5 Summary and Conclusions Much attribution theory has failed to grapple with the complexities of everyday social explanation and action: it has Often assumed a commonsense dualism about the causes of behaviour Often over-estimated the extent to which people seek single, consistent sets of explanations of behaviour Over-estimated the extent to which everyday interaction involves inferring mental states of actors Over-estimated the role of individual intentions in social action 29

30 5 Summary and Conclusions A Societal Psychology of attribution would suggest An interactional basis for individual intentions and behaviours That different sets of beliefs can simultaneously support different explanations for the same behaviour That we assume mental states will fit with the norms of the roles enacted, unless there is evidence to the contrary Much social action is best explained by collective or joint intentions and this suggests an integral role for evolved dispositions, culture and group relations in understanding causal explanations 30