Doing Political Economy: Approaches to Public Policy Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy And Wilf Family Department of Politics

Transcription

1 Doing Political Economy: Approaches to Public Policy Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy And Wilf Family Department of Politics Mike Gilligan (Associate Professor of Politics) Sanford Gordon (Associate Professor of Politics) Alastair Smith (Professor of Politics) Mondays and Wednesdays Dedication: This course is dedicated to the memory of our beloved colleague, Professor Fiona McGillivray, who was the primary contributor to its development. Introduction: Political economy is a field of inquiry that has made great strides in recent year in explaining political and economic behavior by characterizing the incentives of actors and the context in which these actors make decisions and influence outcomes. The purpose of this class is to introduce students to these theoretical approaches and show how they can be used to address contemporary policy questions. First, students are introduced to the tools of modern political economy. In a relatively non-mathematical manner, students will also learn the conceptual basis of statistical testing. These tools are then applied to policy problems in three substantive areas: international relations, American politics and comparative politics. Through these methods and their application, students will learn how to evaluate public policy using theory and evidence. Grading: Students must complete four homework assignments, one midterm and one final. Each homework assignment will count as one-eighth (12.5%) of the final grade. Assignments must be your own work and are due in class. All late assignments will be penalized a half letter grade per day after the due date. The midterm exam is on Mon, October 27 th (closed notebook); the final exam Wednesday December 17 th 8-9:50AM. These exams are compulsory. If they present any scheduling difficulties please let us know within the first week. Each exam will be worth 25% of the final grade. Students can study in groups but all work on exams and assignments must be your own. Profs. Gordon, Gilligan, and Smith have open office hours (see below). A class T.A. is also available to discuss readings and answer questions. Students can download selected slides from Blackboard. A class reading packet is available from New University Copy (11 Waverly Place New York). Other materials will be posted on Blackboard Office Hours and Contact Information (All Professors Offices are in 19 West 4 th Street) Gilligan Room 426. Thursdays michael.gilligan@nyu.edu Gordon Room 311. Mondays, 3-5. sanford.gordon@nyu.edu Smith Room 406. Monday 2-5. Alastair.Smith@nyu.edu

2 2 Course Schedule I. Wed 3 rd Sept Introduction : What is Political Economy? Meet the Professors; Course Overview II. Mon 8 th Sept Microeconomics of Political Economy Bates, Robert Markets and States in Tropical Africa, selections Institute of Economic Affairs 2000 report on the history of the CAP and the possibility of reform III. Wed 10 th Sept Formation of the State Leeson, Peter T Anarchy Unbound, or: Why Self- Governance Works Better than You Think Rodrik, Dani The Limits of Self-Enforcing Agreements Rodrik, Dani Second-Best Institutions IV. Mon 15 th Sept Public Goods and Collective Action Problems Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. The Evolutionary Basis of Collective Action. Chapter 53 in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy V. Wed 17 th Sept Preference Aggregation Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Mark S. Bonchek Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, ch. 4 VI. Mon 22 nd Sept Spatial Models Fiorina, Morris P Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 2 nd edition, ch. 9

3 3 VII. VIII. IX. Wed 24 th Sept Agenda Control Rosenthal, Howard. The Setter Model. In Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich, eds., Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, pp Matsusaka, John. Direct Democracy Works. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005 Mon 29 th Sept Delegation Moe, Terry M The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science 29: Wed. 1 st Oct. Constitution Building: Electoral Laws Problem Set #1 Due Grofman, Bernard. The Impact of Electoral Laws on Political Parties. Ch. 6 in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy Laver, Michael. Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context. Ch. 7 in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy X. Mon 6 th Oct Constitution Building: Presidentialism and Federalism XI. Wed 8 th Oct Information, Incentives, and Elections Gordon, Sanford C., and Gregory Huber The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2: XII. Wed 15 th Oct Information and Influence Problem Set #2 Due Landa, Dimitri, and Adam Meirowitz Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy. Working paper. You may skim pp , the section entitled, Are Game-Theoretic Conclusions an Artifact?

4 4 XIII. Mon 20 th Oct Rent-seeking and trade McGillivray, Fiona Privileging Industry, ch. 1 Jensen, Nathan, and Jong Hee Park Where s the Beef? The Political Economy of U.S. Agriculture Policy. The Political Economist 10: 1-8 XIV. Wed 22 nd Oct Corruption Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: Varese, Federico The Sopranos? No, The Shepherds. The Times, April 14 McCarthy, Michael, and John Phillips Italy s Toxic Waste Crisis, the Mafia and the Scandal of Europe s Mozzarella. The Independent, March 22 Phillips, John Modern Mafia Operates at Every Level of Italian Society. The Independent, March 22 Kahn, Gabriel In Sicily, Farmland Seized from Mafia is Hard to Cultivate. Wall Street Journal, July 20 XV. Monday 27 th Oct Midterm XVI. Wed 29 th Oct Political Business Cycles Schultz, Kenneth A The Politics of the Political Business Cycle. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Jan., 1995), pp XVII. Mon 3 rd Nov Development: economic theories The reading for this class will be posted on Blackboard XVIII. Wed 5 th Nov Foreign Aid and Development Chapters 16 and 17 in Thomas Oatley s The Global Economy: Contemporary Debates. Pearson Longman.

5 5 XIX. Mon 10 th Nov Democratization and Development Carles Boix, Susan C Stokes Endogenous Democratization. World Politics Jul. 55(4): John S. Ahlquist Review of Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge. Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Comparative Political Studies 2007; 40; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George Downs Development and Democracy. Foreign Affairs Sep/Oct 84(5): XX. Wed 12 th Nov Oil and Development Ross, Michael The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Politics 51(2): XXI. Mon 17 th Nov Partisan Politics and Domestic Inequality Bartels, Larry M Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, ch. 2. XXII. Wed 19 th Nov International Cooperation: Why Do States Cooperate? Problem Set #3 Due The reading for this class will be posted on Blackboard XXIII. Mon 24 th Nov International Cooperation: Enforcement and Compliance Downs George W. et. al Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation. International Organization. 50: XXIV. Wed 26 th Nov Movie: Yes Minister

6 6 XXV. Mon 1 st Dec International Cooperation: Bargaining Fearon, James D. Bargaining Enforcement and International Cooperation. International Organization. 52: and (try to get the gist of the results on pages ) Blaydes, Lisa Rewarding Impatience a Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC. International Organization. 58: pages , and (try to get the gist of the rest) XXVI. Wed 3 rd Dec Rationalist Explanations for Wars Fearon, James D Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization. 49: XXVII.Mon 8 th Dec Civil Wars and other Political Violence Problem Set #4 Due The reading for this class will be posted on Blackboard XXVIII. Wed 10 th Conclusion and Overview