Model RFQ for Performance Based Fire and Gas System Design Basis Development and Validation. Revision 0, 7 June 2011

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1 Model RFQ for Performance Based Fire and Gas System Design Basis Development and Validation Revision 0, 7 June 2011

2 Table of Contents 1. Scope Terms and Abbreviations Terms Abbreviations Reference Documents Reference Drawings COMPANY Standards External Standards Potential Document Conflicts or Errors Study Objectives Study Methodology Fire and Gas Zone Definition HAZID and FGS Function Development Analyze Risk and Define FGS Performance Targets Design Basis Consequence Modeling Detector Technology Assessment Fire and Gas Mapping for Coverage Verification FGS Function Safety Availability (SIL) Verification FGS Requirements Specifications FGS Verification and Validation Study Deliverables Project Schedule Meetings and Presentations Information to be Presented in the Proposal Basis of Commercial Proposal Appendix A Facility Description Appendix B FGS Zone List and Zone Extents Drawing Appendix C FGS Function List Typical Appendix D FGS Performance Target List June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 2

3 Appendix E Design Basis Consequence Modeling Results Appendix F Typical Fire and Gas Mapping Results Appendix G Typical FGS Requirements Specifications Components June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 3

4 1. Scope This document defines the scope of work for the Performance Based Fire and Gas Detection and Suppression System Design Basis to be performed for the facilities described in Appendix A Facility Description. 2. Terms and Abbreviations 2.1 Terms COMPANY ENGINEER CONSULTANT SCOPE OF WORK (Name of Operating Company) (Name of Engineering Company, if subcontracted through third party) Entity contracted by COMPANY or ENGINEER to perform the scope of services contained in this document The work required to complete the Performance Based Fire and Gas Detection and Suppression System Design Basis, as detailed in this document, for the facilities described in Appendix A Facility Description 2.2 Abbreviations F&G Fire and Gas FGS Fire and Gas System 3. Reference Documents The project documentation, codes, standards, and other documents that define the scope of this project and the limitations and expectations under which the project is to be executed are listed in the following sections. 3.1 Reference Drawings Drawing Number DXXX.XXX 01 SHT 1 DXXX.XXX 02 SHT 1 DXXX.XXX 02 SHT 2 DXXX.XXX 02 SHT 3 DXXX.XXX 02 SHT 4 DXXX.XXX 02 SHT 5 Title PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY LEGEND SHEET, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY HIGH PRESSURE SEPARATOR, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY LOW PRESSURE SEPARATOR, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY PIPELINE PUMP, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY GAS COMPRESSOR, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 4

5 Drawing Number DXXX.XXX 02 SHT 6 DXXX.XXX 03 SHT COMPANY Standards Document Number NONE 3.3 External Standards Document Number NFPA 72 ISA TR IEC Title GAS COMPRESSOR UTILITY DETAILS, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY PLOT PLAN, GAS PRODUCTION FACILITY Title N/A Title National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code Guidance on the Evaluation of Fire and Gas System Effectiveness Functional safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the process industry sector 3.4 Potential Document Conflicts or Errors The documents that are referenced in Section 3 of this document are incorporated by reference into this request for proposal document. If any errors of conflicts are found to occur within this proposal document or the incorporated reference documents, the conflicts shall be brought to the attention of ENGINEER or COMPANY for resolution. 4. Study Objectives The primary objective of this study is to develop a design basis for the implementation of a fire and gas detection and suppression system. At the conclusion of the study the facility, as described in Appendix A Facility Description, shall be completely defined in terms of detector layout and logic functionality. This layout and functionality will be developed in such a way that tolerable risk targets are achieved for the facility, in accordance with COMPANY standards, as shown in Section 3.2, with respect to fire hazards, combustible gas hazards, and toxic gas hazards. The study shall include the following, tasks with associated deliverable documents: Define the fire and gas zones Hazard Identification (HAZID) study facilitation to support FGS function development Identify the fire and gas safety instrumented functions of each zone Analyze Risk and Define FGS Performance Targets, including: o Classify each zone o Grade all zones classified as a process area o Develop zone extents diagrams (where applicable o Assign detector coverage targets (where applicable) o Assign FGS function safety availability (SIL) target (where applicable) June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 5

6 Perform Design Basis Consequence Modeling (Jet fires, pool fires, vapor cloud fires, combustible gas dispersion, and toxic gas dispersion) Perform detector technology assessment to facilitate detector technology selection Perform Fire and Gas Mapping to verify that the proposed detector layout achieves coverage performance targets Perform FGS function safety availability (SIL) verification calculations Develop FGS Requirements Specifications, including: o FGS General Requirements o FGS Zone List o FGS Zone Extents Diagrams o FGS Zone Grading Diagrams o FGS Detector List with Type, Location, Orientation, and Set Points o FGS Detector Layout Diagrams FGS System Verification and Validation Testing 5. Study Methodology The study shall be performed in accordance with the methodologies and constraints specified in the following sections. 5.1 Fire and Gas Zone Definition CONSULTANT shall review the scope of facilities of this project (as defined in Appendix A Facility Description) in order to determine and document the appropriate separation and segregation of the physical facility into discrete zones. In the definition of the zones, CONSULTANT shall review the plan drawings of the facility and define zone boundaries considering the following attributes of the facility: Similar Equipment: Location of zone boundaries will be defined in such a way as to group equipment with similar process hazards Differentiate by Deck: Different decks typically imply different zones FGS System Actions: If different actions are required to be taken as the result of confirmed fire or confirmed gas releases, then different zones will be defined Segregation of Hazards: Desire to prevent gas migration from one operating area to adjacent areas may require definition of separate hazard zones Classified Electrical Equipment: The need to protect non classified electrical equipment within a module or enclosure and segregate from classified areas requires definition of a separate zone Special Occupancies: Occupied areas of high value equipment (turbine drivers) may require definition of separate / distinct zones to afford additional protection within areas with special occupancies The FGS Function Definition activity shall result in a preliminary zone list. The zone list will subsequently be updated after the hazard identification (HAZID) study with associated FGS function development. The activity shall also result in zone extents drawings where the physical boundaries of the zones are June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 6

7 identified and overlaid on facility plan diagrams. A typical zone list and a typical zone extents diagram are provided in Appendix B FGS Zone List and Zone Extents Drawing. 5.2 HAZID and FGS Function Development CONSULTANT shall travel to COMPANY site to facilitate a meeting and workshop where the hazards that are present in each zone, for which fire and gas system protection is desirable, shall be identified. The workshop shall be performed using the Hazard Identification (HAZID) technique. CONSULTANT shall facilitate and document the results of the meeting. CONSULTANT facilitator shall be experienced in the HAZID technique and shall have performed a minimum of two (2) studies whose results were employed to define fire and gas zone hazards for performance based fire and gas studies. In addition, for each zone and hazard where automated actions exist, are proposed in the design, or are required by the COMPANY fire and gas philosophy document, these automated actions shall be documented in a FGS function list. The FGS function list will contain the following information: A brief description of each FGS function A tag number for each FGS function (if available) A list of inputs and outputs for each FGS function Reference information for each FGS function, including drawing numbers where the FGS functionality is described General requirements for all FGS and an explanation for use of the FGS function list Specific notes for individual FGS functions, as needed. FGS function list development shall be lead by CONSULTANT facilitator who is competent in FGS design and SIS design as evidenced by ISA 84 Expert or ISA SVS certificate, in order to ensure that the functions are properly defined. The activities in this task shall be documented in a revised FGS zone list incorporating the hazards determined during the HAZID study, and in the FGS function list. A sample FGS function list is shown in Appendix C FGS Function List Typical. 5.3 Analyze Risk and Define FGS Performance Targets CONSULTANT shall conduct and document a risk analysis where the appropriate performance targets for each FGS function are defined. The risk analysis and associated documentation shall be performed in accordance with COMPANY procedures for performance based fire and gas system design. Each zone is assigned a category to determine performance requirements for fire and gas detection, which includes targets for detector coverage. Each FGS function with a hydrocarbon zone shall be assigned a safety availability (SIL) target. The analysis shall be based on risk of safety and/or commercial impacts of fire and gas releases in the zone. The risk ranking analysis shall result in a fire grade or gas grade, which forms the basis for assigning the performance targets. The risk analysis shall be performed by a facilitator that has experience in performing performance based FGS categorization and grading studies (minimum of two studies). June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 7

8 The risk analysis shall be performed on a location by location assessment of hazards, and shall consider the following factors. 1. Assessment of the Hydrocarbon Processing Equipment 1.1 Amount and type of equipment in the zone 1.2 Potential credible sources of hydrocarbon in the zone 1.3 Ignition Sources 1.4 Concentrations of toxic gases in processing fluids 2. Assessment of Fire and Gas Consequences 2.1 Determine release scenarios which the system is intended to protect against 2.2 Identify confinement and congestion in the process areas that could aggravate flammable gas hazards, e.g., open grating versus solid decking 2.3 Consider commercial asset valuation and business interruption consequences 2.4 Consider safety related consequences including personnel and public safety 3. Assessment of release likelihood 3.1 Aggregate likelihood of release from all identified release sources to determine overall likelihood 3.2 Determine the time required for the hazard to escalate 3.3 Determine opportunity for effective operator response action to prevent hazard escalation 4. Assessment of level of human occupancy 5. Assessment of production value for process The results of this risk analysis, in accordance with COMPANY procedure, shall define the required performance targets of coverage and safety availability. In addition, CONSULTANT shall define the physical extents of the graded area based on the COMPANY procedure considering locations of leak sources and protected distances from those leak sources, which are a function of the grade. The results of this task shall be documented in a FGS Performance Target List and FGS Grade Extents Diagram. A typical FGS Performance Target List and FGS Grade Extents diagram are shown in Appendix D FGS Performance Target List. 5.4 Design Basis Consequence Modeling CONSULTANT shall perform design basis consequence modeling in order to determine the expected physical extents of the typical scenarios that are expected for the facility under study. Consequence modeling shall be used to determine the design basis of the fire and gas detection and suppression system. CONSULTANT shall ensure a proper understanding of the potential consequences of a hazard so that an appropriate degree of integrity can be specified. Hazards safeguarded with FGS can be difficult to assess in a qualitative manner, and it is often desirable to quantitatively assess the degree and magnitude of the potential hazardous outcome. These outcomes could include a pool fire, jet fire, combustible gas cloud dispersion with a vapor cloud fire / explosion, toxic gas cloud formation and dispersion, or a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE). June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 8

9 During the HAZID, a series of credible design basis scenarios shall be selected for modeling by a team of experts. The assessment of consequences is done using computerized modeling to determine the size and extent of these hazardous outcomes. The hazards are then assessed in terms of the potential impact to onsite or offsite personnel, the environment, or in terms of equipment damage. The design basis consequence modeling can then be used with the customers risk management guidelines to accurately determine the severity of the hazard; and an appropriate degree of integrity is selected for safeguards that will detect and prevent the hazardous condition. This often reduces excessive conservatisms that are inherent to qualitative risk assessment techniques such as PHA or LOPA. The design basis consequence modeling is documented along with other design basis information for safety instrumentation & control systems, and it should be maintained for the life of the process as well as updated when significant changes occur to the process conditions. The results of the design basis consequence modeling shall be included in the FGS Design Basis Report, and shall include length and width estimates for the various consequence types along with footprint colorized maps for each modeled scenario. Typical results of design basis consequence modeling are presented in Appendix E Design Basis Consequence Modeling Results. 5.5 Detector Technology Assessment CONSULTANT shall perform a detector technology assessment whose results shall be used to select the most appropriate detector technology for all of the detection applications of the study. CONSULTANT shall list all available detector technologies for fire detection and gas detection. Each technology will be described with respect to its strengths and weaknesses, along with a listing of the attributes that can affect performance, such as reflected light, spurious radiation sources, etc. Subsequently, the facility shall be considered, along with a listing of the performance affecting attributes that are present in the zones. A comparison of the performance affecting attributes of each zone against the relative strengths and weaknesses of each detector type shall be made and shall result in the selection of detector technology for all of the zones. The results of the detector technology assessment shall be documented in the Fire and Gas Design Basis report. 5.6 Fire and Gas Mapping for Coverage Verification CONSULTANT shall perform fire and gas mapping to verify that the coverage targets that were selected for each fire and gas zone are achieved by the proposed design. The mapping study shall consider the following factors. 1) The proposed layout and orientation shall be assessed to ensure the following a) To ensure the coverage footprint is sufficient to provide the required hazard alarms and control actions b) To ensure that detector views are not impeded by pipe work, cable trays, or other obstructions. 2) The effective range of the selected detectors shall consider the expected environment, with the estimate based on test data June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 9

10 The fire and gas mapping study shall be of the geographic coverage variety for both fire detection arrays and gas detection arrays. The geographic coverage shall calculate the fraction of the area of a monitored process zone which, if a fire or gas release were to occur, would be detected. The fire and gas mapping shall be performed utilizing a computer aided design tool that will generate a colorized map of the coverage provided in a zone, along with tabulated and calculated results. The fire and gas mapping tool shall have, at a minimum, the following attributes for fire modeling. Perform modeling in three dimensions Calculate the analysis results for any user selected elevation of interest Accurately model any make and model of fire detector (i.e., the results of the computer software shall create a map that is essentially identical to the cone of vision presented in each equipment vendor s product literature when the detector is located at the elevation of interest and oriented with no angle of declination) Accurately model the effects of changes in detector elevation away from the elevation of interest Accurately model the effects of changing angle of declination with respect to the elevation of interest Accurately model multiple different detector sensitivity settings for each detector Accurately model multiple fires from different materials of interest for each detector as required (e.g., methanol fires, methane fires, hexane fires) Accurately model the impact of obstructions to fire detector view in full three dimensions Accurate model multiple obstruction geometries, including but not limited to, cubes (cuboid), spheres, cylinders, cylindrical vessels horizontal and vertical) Present tabular results of the area where 1. No detectors are sighted 2. A single detector is sighted 3. Two or more detectors are sighted Present a color coded map of the elevation of interest showing where 1. No detectors are sighted 2. A single detector is sighted 3. Two or more detectors are sighted Limit graphic results and tabulated results to the fire grading extents instead of the overall zone. Present multiple independent results for the multiple zone grades that may be present in a zone. The fire and gas mapping tool shall have, at a minimum, the following attributes for gas modeling. Perform modeling in three dimensions Modeling of point detection systems along with open path detection systems Present graphical results at any user selected elevation of interest Present tabular results of the area where June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 10

11 1. No detectors are sighted 2. A single detector is sighted 3. Two or more detectors are sighted Present tabular results for either a single elevation or fully in three dimensions for the entire three dimensional room space Present a color coded map of the elevation of interest showing where 1. No detectors are sighted 2. A single detector is sighted 3. Two or more detectors are sighted Limit graphic results and tabulated results to the gas grading extents instead of the overall zone. Present multiple independent results for the multiple zone grades that may be present in a zone. All fire and gas mapping shall be performed by personnel who are certified by the software vendor to be qualified to perform fire and gas mapping studies and qualified to use the fire and gas mapping software. All mapping scenarios shall be certified by the software vendor as being accurate and representative with respect to the documentation that describes each fire and gas mapping scenario. The results of the study shall be presented as one fire coverage map and one gas coverage map for each zone, with tabulated results of the mapping analysis. For typical fire and gas detection mapping results, see Appendix F Typical Fire and Gas Mapping Results. 5.7 FGS Function Safety Availability (SIL) Verification CONSULTANT shall perform verification calculations to ensure that the proposed design and associated testing and maintenance philosophy achieve the selected safety availability (SIL) targets. CONSULTANT shall build reliability models that allow calculation of the relevant design parameters of SIL, safety availability, and achieved fault tolerance. These calculations shall be performed using databases of equipment failure rates and associated failure attributes. The calculation shall be performed using a software toolkit that has been formally verified and validated to accurately calculate these results in conformance with IEC and the ISA TR technical report. CONSULTANT shall ensure that personnel performing Safety Availability / SIL verification are competent to perform these calculations, including but not limited to ensuring personnel hold a certificate as an ISA 84 SIL Verification Specialist (SVS) or certificate as an ISA 84 Expert. The results of this task will be documented in the FGS Design Basis Report. 5.7 FGS Requirements Specifications CONSULTANT shall prepare a FGS Requirements Specifications document set. The purpose of this document set is to provide a comprehensive conceptual design that can subsequently be used as the basis for fire and gas equipment supply and detailed design activities such as equipment selection and logic development and programming. The specifications shall contain both functional requirements and integrity requirements and shall be developed in general accordance with Clause 10 of the IEC standard. The document set shall be composed of multiple parts. First, a section describing the general June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 11

12 requirements of the entire FGS system shall be prepared. This section shall contain all general information that pertains to the entire FGS system, along with specific notes that detail any special situations or exclusions to the general requirements. In addition to the general requirements the following documents shall be generated and incorporated. FGS Logic Cause and Effect Diagrams FGS Detector Lists with detector types, locations, orientations, and set points FGS Detector Layout Diagrams The documentation shall be created utilizing the same format as those presented in Appendix G Typical FGS Requirements Specifications Components. 5.8 FGS Verification and Validation CONSULTANT shall facilitate and participate in FGS system design verification and validation testing. The objective of the verification and validation activity is to ensure that the installed FGS system is in compliance with the FGS performance specifications and its operation suitably matches the performance level and assumptions that were made during the design phase. The activity will occur in two distinct phases. The first phase shall be a verification of installed equipment against the FGS Requirements Specifications. During this phase all detectors will be viewed at the facility in order to verify that they are the correct type, and installed in the proper orientation and location, as per the FGS layout diagrams and FGS detector list. The verification phase shall also include verification that all of the requirements listed in the general requirements and notes have been implemented in the FGS logic solver and that the FGS logic solver has been programmed in accordance with the FGS Cause and Effect Diagrams. The verification phase shall begin with the development of a verification and validation procedure and checklist, and shall result in completion of the verification checklist and submission of a deviation record (punch list) of any deviations that were found from the FGS Requirements Specification. The second phase of this task will involve CONSULTANT facilitation of validation testing. The validation testing shall be accomplished by physically activating each detector by either simulating a fire with a fire simulator, or creating an above alarm limit gas concentration through application of a sample gas. For each gas detector the sample gas shall be applied by COMPANY technicians who are under the direction of CONSULTANT, using calibration gases supplied by COMPANY. Upon application of the calibration gas proper activation of the sensor will be verified along with proper activation of all effects, such as lights, horns, and associated process actions. For each fire detector, the fire and gas mapping results for each individual detector will be reviewed and a representative set of points around the perimeter of the detector s cone of vision will be identified. Each of the points along the perimeter will be simulated using a fire simulator device provided by COMPANY that is compatible with the fire detector. Activation of the sensor at each point shall be verified. For the first activation point, the activation of the proper effects will also be verified. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 12

13 The results of the verification and validation activity will be documented in a verification and validation report that will include the completed checklists and notated test procedures. 6. Study Deliverables The project described in this request for proposal shall result in the following documents, drawings, and specifications as a result of the study work. 1. FGS Study Report describing the scope methodology and results of the study, including the following work products as appendices: Zone List Zone Grading 2. FGS Requirements Specifications including the following sections and drawings: General Requirements and Notes FGS Cause and Effect Diagrams 3. FGS Verification and Validation Testing Report, including the following sections Verification and Validation Plan Verification and Validation Checklist All deliverables shall be submitted in a fixed (non editable) format, e.g., Adobe PDF or equal, and in the native editable format, e.g., Microsoft Word, or equal. 7. Project Schedule <<INSERT PROJECT SCHEDULE REQUIREMENTS INTO THIS LOCATION AS DICTATED BY PROJECT CONDITIONS>> 8. Meetings and Presentations The scope of the project shall include the following meetings and presentations to be performed at COMPANY site, professional fees and travel and living expenses are to be included in the fixed price submitted by CONSULTANT. Kick Off Meeting HAZID Zone Definition Meeting Preliminary Results Review Meeting Final Results Presentation 9. Information to be Presented in the Proposal The proposal generated by CONSULTANT for this SCOPE OF WORK shall include the following information in order to be considered in compliance with this Request for Quotation. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 13

14 Description of the SCOPE OF WORK Proposed by CONSULTANT Methodology to be implemented, including acceptance criteria Assumptions upon which the proposal is based Assumptions utilized during study execution for technical tasks Details of all software tools implemented Details of sources of references and databases implemented Composition of the study team, including resume of key personnel Competency justification for key personnel Proposed schedule for project execution In addition, any clarifications, qualifications, or exclusions by CONSULTANT to the SCOPE OF WORK contained herein shall be clearly listed separately. If no clarifications, qualifications, or exclusions are noted by CONSULTANT in their proposal document, the CONSULTANT shall be considered in full compliance with the SCOPE OF WORK requirements. 10. Basis of Commercial Proposal The commercial proposal shall be in compliance with the terms and conditions of COMPANY or ENGINEER standard purchasing terms and conditions for technical service projects (standard terms and conditions are attached). The proposal shall be prepared on the basis of a fixed price for services and expenses. Time and materials proposals shall not be accepted. The SCOPE OF WORK is well defined. As such, the level of effort is clearly determinable by a competent consultant. Inability to provide a fixed price lump sum quotation shall be considered a lack of competency of the CONSULTANT to perform these services, resulting in a rejection of the proposal. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 14

15 Appendix A Facility Description Overview The General Oil & Gas Operating Company s production facility located in Chemical City, TX processes hydrocarbon fluids coming out of natural gas wells located in production platforms. The wells discharge the production fluids into a main production header, which in turn supplies the facility with feedstock. In the first stage of the separation process (high pressure stage), the production fluids enter a high pressure separator where the liquid and gas components are separated at a specific temperature and pressure. The gas leaving the high pressure separator is predominantly composed of lighter hydrocarbons and does not need any additional treatment. The gas leaves the facility via the export gas pipeline to neighboring gas processing companies. In the second stage of the separation process (low pressure stage), the liquid from the first stage enters the low pressure separator and flashes at a specific temperature and pressure. The gas stream from the low pressure separator is compressed and the compressed gas combines with the gas leaving the high pressure separator. The liquid from the low pressure separator is considered to be stabilized for processing purposes and it is pumped into the high pressure export liquid pipeline. The major equipment used in this process, includes a High Pressure Separator, Low Pressure Separator, Export Pump and Gas Compressor are described in the following sections. High Pressure Separator (V 101) Hydrocarbon fluids enter the high pressure separator (V 101) through a pressure reducing valve (PRV 101A) which reduces the pressure from approx.700 psig (production header pressure) to 350 psig (first stage operating pressure). The pressure in the separator is maintained by the pressure control valve PV 101B. Flashing occurs in the vessel causing separation of gas and liquid components. Reduction in flow velocity causes the liquid droplets to drop out of the gas stream. The separator vessel provides the retention time needed for effective gas liquid separation and also provides a surge volume necessary to handle intermittent surges of liquid. The liquid level in the vessel is maintained by the level control valve LV 101A. As the hydrocarbon fluids come into contact with the inlet diverter, most of the liquid falls into the liquid section and the gas flows over the inlet diverter. The gas stream continues to flow horizontally above the liquid section and small drops of liquid not separated by the inlet diverter are separated out by gravity. Drops of liquid that are too small to be separated by gravitational force are removed from the gas stream by a de mister pad. The gas leaves the high pressure separator and enters the export gas pipeline to neighboring gas processing facilities. Over pressure protection of the high pressure separator is provided by relief valve PSV 101. Low Pressure Separator (V 102) June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 15

16 The liquid from the high pressure separator enters the low pressure separator through the level control valve LV 101A. The operating pressure in the low pressure separator is maintained at 50 psig to flash off the lighter hydrocarbons into the gas phase and partially stabilize the liquid phase. The vapor and liquid disengage similar to V 101. The gas is sent to compressor C 104 and the partially stabilized liquid is pumped out using pump P 103. Over pressure protection of the low pressure separator is provided by relief valve PSV 102. Export Pump (P 103) The partially stabilized hydrocarbon liquid from V 102 is pumped using high pressure pump P 103 to the export liquid pipeline. P 103 is a multistage pump that discharges the liquid at a pressure of 2200 psig needed to transport the hydrocarbon liquid several miles before it can be further processed. A pressure relief valve PSV 103 protects the pump from damage in case of a blocked flow in the export liquid pipeline. Gas Compressor (C 104) The gas stream leaving the low pressure separator V 102 at a pressure of 50 psig enters compressor C 104 where its pressure is increased to 350 psig to match the gas pressure leaving the high pressure separator. The pressure controller PIC 104A controls pressure from the compressor to the export gas pipeline. The pressure controller senses changes in separator pressure and sends a signal to either open or close the control valve PV 104A accordingly. Controller FIC 104 provides anti surge control by spilling back sufficient material through FV 104 to the low pressure separator and prevents surging. Over pressure protection of the suction and discharge sides of the compressor are provided by pressure relief valves PSV 104A and PSV 104B respectively. Support Facilities The support efforts include: 1. A site with roads 2. Security with perimeter chain link fencing a guard house and an entry gate 3. Utilities to enable the process to work: electricity; fuel oil or diesel; instrument air and water 4. Safety systems include fire water deluge, personnel protection, and escape 5. Vent systems which discharge to a flare header and flare June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 16

17 Appendix B FGS Zone List and Zone Extents Drawing The FGS Zone List and Zone Extents Drawing begin on the following page. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 17

18 FGS Zone List Item Zone ID Zone Description FGS Zone Category 1. Zone 1 Local Control Building - Electrical Switch Room E - Special Equipment Special, High Value, Electrical or Electronic Equipment 2. Zone 2 Local Control Building - Control Room D - General Occupation General Occupation 3. Zone 3 Local Control Building - Battery Room E - Special Equipment Special, High Value, Electrical or Electronic Equipment 4. Zone 4 Local Control Building - Air Lock D - General Occupation General Occupation 5. Zone 5 Local Control Building HVAC Fresh Air Intake V - Ventilation Ventilation System 6. Zone 6 Gas Plant - Process Area H - Hydrocarbon Hydrocarbon Processing Area Zone Extents Drawing The Zone Extents Drawing is shown on the following page. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 18

19 Z005 V-101 C-104 Z001 Control Room P-103 V-102 Z003 Z004 Battery Room Air Lock Z002 Tag No. Equipment List Description Electrical Switch-Room V-101 High Pressure Separator V-102 Low Pressure Separator P-103 Export Pump C-104 Gas Compressor 1. All dimensions are in inches. NOTES CLIENT REV DESCRIPTION DATE BY APP 0 As Built 3 Jun 11 SAG BB DRAWN S. A. Gray 3 Jun 11 CHECKED B. Buck 3 Jun Riverside Drive, Suite 200, Columbus OH APPROVED DRAWING TITLE APPROVED FGS Zone Extents VisioDocument Gas Production Facility FILE PATH DRAWING NUMBER SHEET REV This drawing, 2011 Consulting Corporation is business confidential. No part of this document may be circulated, quoted, or reproduced for distribution other than by the above named client without prior written approval from Consulting Corporation. General Oil and Gas Operating CO. SCALE 1 in : 100 in DXXX.XXX-05 1 OF 1 3

20 Appendix C FGS Function List Typical Plant: 1. Sample Plant Item Zone ID Zone Description Zone Type 1. Zone 1 Local Control Building - Electrical Switch Room 2. Zone 2 Local Control Building - Control Room 3. Zone 3 Local Control Building - Battery Room E - Special Equipment D - General Occupation E - Special Equipment 4. Zone 4 Local Control Building - Air Lock D - General Occupation 5. Zone 5 Local Control Building HVAC Fresh Air Intake 6. Zone 6 Gas Plant - Process Area H - Hydrocarbon FGS Function ID Z1-A Z3-A Z3-B Z4-A Z4-B Description / Function 1. General Area Building Smoke Detection System - Alarm 1. General Area Building Smoke Detection System - Alarm Point Hydrogen Gas Detection - Alarm & S/D of Battery Charger System 1. Manual Call Point - Alarm Point Combustible Gas Detection - Alarm V - Ventilation Z5-A 1. Point Combustible Gas Detection - Alarm, HVAC S/D & ESD Z5-B Z6-A Z6-B 2. Point Toxic Gas Detection - Alarm, HVAC S/D & ESD 1. Gas Compressor (C-104) - General Area Coverage Optical Fire Detection System - Alarm & ESD 2. Export Pump (P-103) - General Area Coverage Optical Fire Detection System - Alarm & ESD High Pressure Separator (V-101) - General Area Coverage Optical Fire Detection System - Alarm & ESD Z6-C 3. Low Pressure Separator (V-102) - General Area Coverage Optical Fire Detection System - Alarm & ESD Design Intent FGS Hazard Tag AC Fire SD- 001A/B AC Fire SD- 002A/B AE- 009A/B Inputs Sensor Voting Input Group Logic Tag 1ooN 1oo1 Building Deluge 1ooN 1oo1 Building Deluge 2oo2 Battery Charger System SEG Comb. Gas MCP-001 1oo1 1oo1 ESD + Blowdown AE- 008A/B 2oo2 HVAC Fire Damper SEG Comb. Gas AE-010 1oo1 1oo1 HVAC Fire Damper SEG H2S Gas AC Fire BE-001 BE-002 BE-003 BE-004 AC Comb. Gas AE-001 AE-002 AC Fire AE-003 AE-004 2ooN 1oo1 SDV-104 SDV-106 SDV-103 Outputs SDV-104 SDV-102B SDV-101 SDV-104 2ooN 1oo1 SDV-104 SDV-106 SDV-103 SDV-104 SDV-102B SDV-101 SDV-104 2ooN 1oo1 SDV-104 SDV-106 SDV-103 Final Element Voting Output Group Logic Location (LS) 1oo1 1oo1 FGS 1oo1 1oo1 FGS 1oo1 FGS Function Notes 1oo1 1oo1 FGS Additional Action to ESD + BD Process. Safety Critical Action is to 1oo1 protect building occupants and equipment from hazardous gas. 1oo1 1oo1 FGS Additional Action to ESD + BD HVAC Process. Safety Critical Action is to protect building occupants and equipment from hazardous gas. 2oo2 1oo1 FGS 2oo2 3oo3 1oo1 2oo2 XooX FGS 2oo2 3oo3 1oo1 2oo2 XooX FGS 2oo2 June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 20

21 Plant: 1. Sample Plant Item Zone ID Zone Description Zone Type FGS Function ID Description / Function Design Intent FGS Hazard Tag Inputs Sensor Voting Input Group Logic Tag Outputs Final Element Voting Output Group Logic Location (LS) FGS Function Notes SDV-104 SDV-102B 3oo3 SDV-101 SDV-104 1oo1 Z6-D 4. Gas Compressor (C-104) - General Area Coverage (open-path & point) Optical Combustible Gas Detection System - Alarm & ESD AC Comb. Gas SDV-104 SDV-106 SDV-103 2oo2 XooX FGS 2oo2 SDV-104 SDV-102B 3oo3 SDV-101 SDV-104 1oo1 Z6-E 5. Export Pump (P-103) - General Area Coverage (open-path & point) Optical Combustible Gas Detection System - Alarm & ESD AC Comb. Gas SDV-104 SDV-106 SDV-103 2oo2 XooX 2oo2 SDV-104 SDV-102B 3oo3 SDV-101 SDV-104 1oo1 Z6-F 6. Low Pressure Separator (V-102) - General Area Coverage (open-path & point) Optical Combustible Gas Detection System - Alarm & ESD AC Comb. Gas SDV-104 SDV-106 SDV-103 2oo2 XooX 2oo2 SDV-104 SDV-102B 3oo3 SDV-101 SDV-104 1oo1 Z6-G 7. High Pressure Separator (V-101) - General Area Coverage (open-path & point) Optical Combustible Gas Detection System - Alarm & ESD AC Comb. Gas SDV-104 SDV-106 SDV-103 2oo2 XooX 2oo2 SDV-104 SDV-102B 3oo3 SDV-101 SDV-104 1oo1 June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 21

22 Appendix D FGS Performance Target List Item Zone ID Zone Description 6. Zone 6 Gas Plant - Process Area Zone Type H - Hydrocarbon Graded Area Tag Equip Tag Equip Type Hazard Type Leak Description Z5-1 C-104 1E-1 Comb. Gas Small Leak of HP Gas from Export Gas Compressor Large Leak of HP Gas from Export Gas Compressor Hole Size Item Leak Frequency Graded Areas Equipment List Consequence (Risk Matrix) Severity - Safety Severity - Asset Leak Scenarios Severity - Environment Hazard Rank (Release Rate) HC HAZARD RANKING Rank Criteria Hazard Rank (Occupancy) Ignition Probability F(unmit) 5 mm 9.2E-02/yr <1 kg/sec <=50% E- 04/yr 25 mm 8.0E-03/yr to 50 kg/sec Z5-2 P-103 WH Liquid HC 5 mm 2.8E-03/yr to 50 kg/sec Leak of Stabalized Liquid From Export Pump Z5-3 V-101 SV Comb. Gas Leak of HP Gas from High Pressure Separator V-102 SV Comb. Gas Leak of LP Gas from Low Pressure Separator <=50% E- 04/yr <=50% E- 05/yr 25 mm 2.4E-04/yr >50 kg/sec <=50% E- 05/yr 5 mm 9.2E-04/yr to 50 kg/sec <=50% E- 05/yr 25 mm 8.0E-05/yr >50 kg/sec <=100% E- 05/yr Safety Grade Asset Grade Env. Grade None A None A C B None None None None B C B B None B None B C C None Graded Areas Selected Grade June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 22

23 FGS Zone Grading The figure on the following page presents a FGS Zone Grading Extents drawing. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 23

24

25 Appendix E Design Basis Consequence Modeling Results The following figures show typical results of design basis consequence modeling. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 25

26 Appendix F Typical Fire and Gas Mapping Results Geographic Fire Coverage The figure on the following page presents the results of a Geographic Fire Coverage calculation. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 26

27

28 Geographic Gas Coverage The figure on the following page presents the results of a Geographic Gas Coverage calculation. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 28

29

30 Appendix G Typical FGS Requirements Specifications Components Cause and Effect Diagram The figure on the following page presents a typical fire and gas logic cause and effect diagram. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 30

31

32

33

34 Detector List The following figure presents a typical fire and gas detector list. Detector Type Tag X Coordinate Y Coordinate Elevation Above Grade Rotation (deg) Declination (deg) Point Source Gas Detector (HC) BTX ' 6" N 26' 0" E 6 0 N/A N/A Point Source Gas Detector (HC) BTX ' 6" N 14' 6" E 6 0 N/A N/A Point Source Gas Detector (HC) BTX ' 0" N 14' 6" E 6 0 N/A N/A Point Source Gas Detector (HC) BTX ' 6" N 7' 6" W 6 0 N/A N/A Point Source Gas Detector (HC) BTX ' 0" N 17' 0" W 6 0 N/A N/A Point Source Gas Detector (HC) BTX ' 0" N 7' 6" W 6 0 N/A N/A Optical Fire Detector ATX ' 8" N 35' 8" E W of S 35 Optical Fire Detector ATX 002 7' 4" N 40' 2" E W of N 35 Optical Fire Detector ATX ' 8" N 7' 2" E E of N 35 Optical Fire Detector ATX ' 6" N 3' 8" W W of S 35 Optical Fire Detector ATX ' 0" N 18' 0" W E of N 35 Note: All detector coordinates are measured relative to the North East corner of the control room building. Notes June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 34

35 Detector Layout Diagram The figure on the following page presents a typical fire and gas detector layout diagram. June 2011 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION Page 35

36

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