NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. WASHINGTON,O.C ra F!JR Case No o'l-ol. November 5~ 1975

Transcription

1 . 11/cl~,/ tv//..:(' NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON,O.C ra F!JR Case No o'l-ol GONFIDE!~TIAL Oocc..Ement No -.._;.-_..:../::;..~~---- November 5~ 1975 Dear MitclJ.: Attached are the NSC Staff comments onthe Senate Select Committee 1 s draft 11 C overt Action.in Chile, The fundamental point to be made our perspective is that a public statement copfirming not only the 11 fact of'' but specifics of past covert actions will have a terribly damaging impc;.ct on: our position of leadership in the international community; our position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and other adversaries; and our ability to preserve intelligence relationships with many countries. These matters may be considered in E:xecutive session,and, if need be, legislation proposed based.upon these hearings. As a practical matter, we recognize the difficulty of publishing. a report of substance without citing examples which to draw conclusions.the alternative to a report of substance could be a statement of general findings, conclusions and recommendations, along with a classified annex, suitably sanitized, to support these findings. I think the attached comments support the necessity for avoiding public disclosure of the type c;.nd scope of our activitie s in Chile and the concomitant danger of placing at hostage the sue.cess of future covert activities. In short, we support a strong objection, on principie, to any unclassified publication of this material. Sincerely; 4/ ~~- McFarlane Lt. Colone l; U.S.M.C. Military Assistant to the A s sis t a nt Withheld under statutory authority of the to the President for National Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 Secur,Ity Affairs U.S.C., section 403g) / _ Central Intelligen c e Agency ~ATTACHMENTS 1!E..CLAS_$_lFI~J>-JJNJlER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL. E.O , SECTION 5.3(b)(3) ISCAP No \ D- OO"I., document \ l Photo C-opy Gerald R. Ford Library

2 Comments on Senate Select Committee Report on Chile We have reviewed the Church Committee Staff Report on Covert Action in Chile and concur most strongly in the CIA position that this material should not be published and should not be discussed in public session. In general, the report is markedly one-sided. It refers to "massive" involvement, b~t as compared to what? It makes it appear that only the United States was involved in tliis activity, and make.s no attempt to cor relate our activity with that of Cuba and the Soviet Union on the other side. It ajso infers. the documentation that has been provided the Committee that there was direct U.S. involvement in the coup and the death of General Rene Schneider, which was not the case. In addition, we recognize the legitimacy of a debate on whether or not the United States should cnnduct covert activity at all or whether we should have done so in Chile. However, such a debate cannot take place in public without, in effect, prejudging the issue. Such public debate would provide our potential adversaries with sufficient material (as "'!ell as frighten off any potential collaborators) to destroy.for all practical purposes any U.S. capability to conduct covert operations, even if it s.hould be decided such operations were in the U.S. interest.. Also, how can they equate this study with the legal requirement of the Director of Centrq.l Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods? The Committee study clearly says it is describing CIA methods --it uses that label. It also exposes individuals and groups.. 0I'l IV-18 it describes in some detail and if one misses the correct identification, well, more details are.. offe.red on page I 1-- and while the study notes that 11 Uncon.fl.rmed charges of CIA involvement were made, 11 the study proposes.to correct that by confirming that CIA was indeed involved. Why is.it necessary to name names? The story could be told in generalities-- a large newspaper, a p-lajor politicalparty, a political splinter group, etc. But throughout the paper names are named. In fact, sometimes specific individual agents may be Photo C-opy Gerald R. Ford l.:.ibraty. I

3 2 I E.O , section ~,3(b)(1) 1. Specific individuals who took risks to collaborate with us in clandestine endeavors which our policy makers deemed were in our national interests are to be subject to public exposure and worse. It is not cloak-and-daggerish to suggest that some lives could be in jeopardy. And what about the impact on our efforts elsewhere in the world?. Can we expect to attract the collaborators we need to conduct clandestine operations if they see that their names and roles may be publicized by the Congress? And what about other places where leaders are looking for "paper tigers'' to bash around and use this material to claim that a newspaper in their country {or a rival politician-.:.australia today, for example- -or military group, etc. is ''obviously 11 being supported by CIA because here is an official document of the Congress which describes this as one of CIA's methods. _, On page V -2, the study philosophically notes the fact ''That the United States was involved has been taken for granted in Latin America for many years. 11 Again, it proposes to. remove all doubts. by offering confirming evidence, naming names, telling who got the rnoney and how much! I E.O , section 3.3(b}(l} On page V -4 it throws some tar but notes 'on page V -6 that CIA faces a difficult situation.in talking about relations with multinational corporations for fear it "may reveal sensitive sources and methods." L ' Exposure could. ruin careers, _destroy the economic we ll being, or worse, of many individuals. And the fact remains, that in spite of char~ that CIA Photo C-opy Gerald R. Ford tibrary

4 3 The DCI says, this material remains classified~ To give it pubhc exposure could endanger the lives of individuals who cooperated with us, affect our foreign relations not only with Chile but with other nations, and would be a serious and harmful blow to future, clandestine and covert action operations of our government. We have marked in red the various identifications which we believe should be protected. Stating this information in generalities would not detract the conchisions of the study or its purpose of analyzing the system. There would still be sufficient details to support the conclusions. If we are going to fight against release of classified information which would damage our.foreign policy and national security interests, this is the time. e Photo Copy Gerald R. Ford Library

5 '..... :. Comments on Senate Select Committee Report on Chile ;. We have reviewed th e Church Corpmittee StaffReport on Covert Action in Chile and concur most strongly in the CIA position that this material should not be published and should not be discussed in public session :.. \' ' :.: In general, the report is markedly one-sided. It refers to "massive'' involvement, but as compared to what? It makes it appear that only the United States was involved in this activity, and makes no attempt to correlate our activity with that of Cuba and the Soviet Union on the other side. It also infers the documentation that has been provided the Committee that there was direct U.S. involvement in the coup and the death of Generai Rene Schneider, which was not the case. In addition, we recognize the legitimacy of a debate on whether or not the United States should conduct covert activity-at all or whether we should have done so in Chile. However, such a debate cannot take place in public without, in effect, prejudging the issue. Such public debate would provide our potential adversaries with sufficient material (as well as frighten o f 'any potential collaborators) to destroy for all practl.cal purposes any U.S. capability to conduct covert operations, even if it should be decided such operations were in the u.s. interest. 0 -~ - Also, how can they equate this study with 'the legal requirement of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods? The Committee study clearly says it is describing CIA methods -- it uses that label. It also exposes individua.ls and groups. On IV-18 it desc~ibes in some detail and if one misses the correct identification, well, more details are. offered on page I 1-- arid while the study notes that.rr Unconfirmed charges of CIA involvement were made, 11 the study proposes to correct that by confirming that CIA was indeed involved. Why is it necessary to name names?. The story could be told in generalities -- a large newspaper,.a Jnajor political party, a political splinter group, etc. But throughout the paper names are named. In fact, soznetimes spec.ific individual agents may be I :. :... e. Photo Copy... -:;. G~rald ~.. Ford Ubrary

6 . ~.., '..... z. ' '.. 1 F).~. f~s26,. ~ection3.~(b)(l).i.identi(ied-- e. g., IV, 7~. -"a Rad~ ~~l jburriali~tl, Iwho joined with others who are identifh;;d on 2 June to or anize the Legion of Liberty;.., :... --~ : -': ~~.. :.;,_.., :~> ~ ~\ : :_. ~...~ - :-.~ ~~~ :'.,..: ~-- ~ :~:~ -:;or~~:.:~~~.::::~ _ :. - _.';,:... : -~~;;.;.-.-:: - --~ <- :.- -. Specific individuals ' whotookrisks '.tocoijaborat'e~ with 'us'' in clandestine ~ndeavo.rs vthi~h '~U.r '"p~lic\r:.~la~e~s,d,ee.med 'w~~ e in ;..' our national interests are to be,:st1bjed to public exposure and ~ worse. It is.not cloak~aild-dagg~;ish to S.D.gg~s(that ~ om.e lives... co~ld be in j~~gardy _i ~S-~:<.. :..... ''''-~:s ;;~,t~ - z:a:x~~:~,;~h=,i:'apc~-\~:!'c~i[a-j };!t~s;:-~: t:~c t~n c':ja::i! ~iilt~.::,;,<(';:...,... clandestine op~rations ifthey ~ee that their : :na:f:ne"i'a~r;les m:a:y.. ~,~,., : ~: ; - be." publicized by the Cqngress? Anq what ab()ut other places,:vher;_e - -~.C"".. I~aders are looking.for 11 paper tiger sri to bash around and use. this '-<.~< f:: ~.'>:~ material to claim that a new spaper ih their country (or a rival. politician--australia today, for example--or military group, etc. is "obviously" being supported by CIA because here is an official document of the Congress which describe!? this as one of CIA's method$..: :: On page V -2, the study, philosophitally notes. the fact 11 That the United States was involved has been taken for granted in Latin America for.many years. 11 Again, itproposes to remove all doubts by offering confirming evid,ence, n;;trhing names, telling.who got the money and how much!. je;p.13526,se<;tion 3.3(b)(1) I. On page V -4 it throws some tar but notes on page V -6 that CIA faces a difficult situation in talking about relations with multinational corporations for fear it 11 may reveal sensiti,ve sources and methods." Exposure could ruin careers, destr.oy the economic well being, or worse, of many individuals. And the fact remains, that in spite of charges that CIA....\..-,... _.,.... ' :-.. plfdfo oo py...: '.'.: :.- Gerald.'f,fFord Library,: ~....

7 #... '..".....: '.. -~ - : # 3. '.. > :. ~ :,.... '. -~ IL ~-E_.o_._l-35_2_6,-se-c-tio...,...n-3--,.3...,...(b.,...)(-1),..,..._...,..--~l... '...., ' The DCI says this material remains classified. To give it public exposure could' endanger the lives of individuals who cooperated with us, affect our foreign relations not only with Chile.but with other nations, and wouldbe _ a serious ~ nd harmful blow to future clandestine and covert action operations of our government. ' -;.. We have marked in red the various identifications -...vhl.~h we believe should be protected. Stating this information i!). generalities.would not detract the conclusions of the study or its purpose of analyzing the system. The re would still be sufficient details to support the conclusions ;.... If we are going to fight against release of classified inform ation.--which would damage our.foreign p~licy and national security i..ote rests, this is the time.,.. -: '... :.. _, '. :,...: :-.... :~- -- ::.....:....,. ~ ::...:::.'.:=:,...,,.: ;.,: ;,.. - ~.:..'.,. _; ':'.' :'.. : ~..' -...._,,.,,,,... '". ~.. ', ~... :.'... :.:...:.... -:-- -.: ~~~ '..... I'...: :.. :... :.. ;... : ~ ::- ;"... : :. i -. ;..-:...'.,. e ":...,.., _Photo C-opy <;;erald R. Ford Library