1943: Empire of the Sun

Transcription

1 1943: Empire of the Sun Tournament Scenario Analysis by Mark Herman Introduction The one truth about my adult life is that it gets in the way of my game playing. This fact impacts how I design my games these days and how I play those designs. One of the motivations in designing Empire of the Sun (hereafter EoTS) was to allow me to play the entire Pacific war in a long afternoon. The problem is not everyone plays as fast as I do and it is rare that I get more than 3 hours to game on a weekend. I recognized this fact and spent a great deal of effort in designing the year scenarios to be tense and competitive experiences on a three-hour budget. The key year of the war when both sides still had offensive opportunities and defensive challenges was Situation: Scenario design should be far more than just putting the forces in the right place and letting the players have at it. Each scenario requires the proper balance of historical narrative, strategic debate, and psychological motivation. In the 1943 scenario, Guadalcanal has just been captured and the Allies are threatening to advance on several axes of advance. The flip side for the Japanese is they still possess a potent navy, significant ground forces, and strong land based air units beyond those lost during the Guadalcanal campaign. One thing that I would note here is players often dislike short scenarios because due to the abbreviated nature of the scenario the Japanese can ignore the long-term impact of excessive losses. In the case of the 1943 scenario it turns out that this is an accurate reflection of historical Japanese strategy Recent scholarship has supported earlier controversial research that Hirohito was far more involved in strategic decisions than is acknowledged in most histories. My read on the situation is that Hirohito was the driving force behind the Japanese decision to fight hard for the Solomon Islands resulting in significant irreplaceable losses. This Japanese decision equates to a more profligate use of resources during the 1943 scenario and allows the short term thinking that naturally occurs in a short scenario to comfortably reside within this historical context. The Allies are set up for three axes of advance. In the China-Burma-India (hereafter CBI) theater, the Allied forces are about to initiate their Arakan offensive (Akyab hex) and Operation Longcloth (1st Chindit Expedition; Mandalay hex), while Stillwell is building up his Chinese forces in the north (Ledo Road). In New Guinea, Douglas MacArthur has just taken Buna and is poised to continue his advance into Lae. The Naval forces under Halsey are organizing to follow up on their recent capture of Guadalcanal by invading New Georgia where the Japanese are just finishing a new airfield. The Attu-Kiska sideshow in the Aleutians has to be addressed during the first turn of the scenario or the Allies suffer a one point political penalty that equates to a twovictory point (hereafter VP) shift. Japan's situation is predominantly defensive in character in the Pacific, while their positions in the CBI offer offensive opportunities that the Japanese did not exercise until the beginning of 1944, but are resident in this scenario as a path strategically debated but not taken. One of the key pressure points for the Japanese was China. Japan's invasion and failure to conclude the Sino-Japanese war remained the primary focus of the Japanese Army's leadership. Despite the Burma Road being cut by the capture of Lashio in 1942, the Allies had managed to cobble together an air re-supply route called the Hump that continued to maintain Chungking in the war. It is worth noting how EoTS handles the CBI in a holistic manner that captures the options available to both sides, while account ing for the severe logistic constraints imposed by this theater of operations. One factor that gets lost in most discussions around the CBI is the fact that its infrastructure changed dramatically over the course of the war. In 1942, Burma and Indian infrastructure was sparse and limited movement. The only connections between Burma and India were very rough tracks that could be traversed in bad weather only by four-wheel drive vehicles. Despite these problems the Japanese succeeded in conducting a rapid advance that forced the British out of Burma. On the flip side, the British managed to fight and withdraw the bulk of their forces across this supposedly impenetrable theater in Over the course of 1943 and into 1944 large improvements were made to the Arakan railroad and roads replaced tracks on the major routes in the region. Another feature of the CBI campaign was the extensive use of air transport to supply forces. Again, although the logistic problems were some of the worst seen in the Second World War, both sides managed to operate several hundreds of thousands of troops and porters in a vicious war. In EoTS terms, the two initial HQs. in the theater have reduced effuciency ratings of one and all of the CBI themed cards were also reduced in value to account for the historical logistic inefficiencies experienced by both sides. Players can improve the situation by expending resources to improve the CBI infrastructure simulated by the cost of moving a more effucient HQinto the region. Regardless, the CDG design naturally handles the episodic movement of forces in this region and the mathematical handicap for the region is baked into the HQratings and card values. The lack of easy to achieve game objectives, especially in the campaign game, usually sees both sides avoid wasting many resources in what was historically a sideshow. In the end both sides operated large forces offensively (~ 10+ divisions per side), which is larger than most people realize. However, short of a decisive Japanese offensive, little should be expected from this theater. The Japanese 1944 strategy was to launch an offensive through Imphal-Kohima with the objective of cutting the Arakan railroad at Dimasur. The goal was to complete the isolation of China by shutting down the Hump airfields in Northern India. Embedded within the Japanese offensive was the presence of the Indian National Army (hereafter INA)

2 under the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose. The Indian surrender rules are based on the notion that the Ghandi peace movement supported by the INA on Indian Territory, in a manner analogous to the German use of Lenin in World War I, over time would have de-stabilized India and forced it out of the war. There was no particular reason that this offensive could not have begun in 1943, except it was pre-empted by the Allied offensives at the beginning of this scenario coupled with Hirohito's strategic focus on the Bismarck barrier. The dynamic tension in the scenario are the biggest Allied VP opportunities and their ability to gain control of the Solomon Islands through the capture of Rabaul. This did not occur historically, but it creates the Japanese imperative to defend Rabaul akin to how they viewed it historically or suffer a 6 VP swing. For the Allies it is this threat to Rabaul by offensive action in the South Pacific that keeps Japanese focus on the Solomon Islands. If the Allies fail to generate sufficient pressure in the South Pacific it allows the Japanese to conduct a buildup in the CBI with a strong defense in the Central and South Pacific that is a scenario winning strategy. The side that gains and uses the initiative to dictate the direction and pace of play usually decides the outcome of this scenario. Initial Forces: (See the Initial Forces Map on page 41) In the 1943 scenario the correlation of forces for the scenario is close to parity. Ground forces on the map are almost identical (Allies 272 vs Japanese 261 factors), but the Allies hold an initial advantage in ground force ratio in the South Pacific. The ground replacements for both sides in this scenario are technically equal, except if the Japanese decide to pursue a China surrender strategy. To force a Chinese surrender requires an OC China offensive causing the Japanese to usually forgo taking any ground replacements in mid-1943 to improve their offensive chances. Due to initial USN carrier deficiencies the Japanese navy holds a slight naval edge in the Central and South Pacific. This is offset slightly by the British naval dominance in the Bay of Bengal. Over the course of the scenario the Allies will gain a significant advantage in carriers, especially if the War in Europe index removes the delay on Allied reinforcements. As long as the Allies are cautious about not losing all of their US carriers at the end of the first game turn, the Allies should be able to go where they want by the end of the scenario. This situation of eventual naval superiority is offset by the major Allied shortcoming in Amphibious Shipping Points (ASPs). During Tournament Scenario Analysis 1943: Empire of the Sun this scenario the Allies receive 15 ASPs. This ASP shortage puts a great strain on the Allied ability to prosecute amphibious assaults. Allied strategic success is driven to a greater than lesser degree by how efficiently they use their ASPs. The philosophy behind how I modeled the Pacific air war is covered in the EoTS design notes (Rulebook, page 48), but understanding the underlying simulation is critical in this scenario. At the beginning of the scenario the Japanese Army and Naval air forces begin the scenario with 190 factors whereas the Allies begin with 107 factors. The key to air superiority for the Allies is they will receive 10 air replacement steps that need to be used in reducing the Japanese air forces. If properly executed the Allies will begin to gain air superiority in late 1943 further bolstered by the arrival of the Essex class carriers. Failure to take risks with Allied air power early in the scenario will see a stronger than historical Japanese air capability. This creates an imperative for the Allies to ensure that some proportion of their turn 5 and 6 activations are used to reduce frontline Japanese air strength or suffer the consequences during turn 7 (last turn). Initiative Despite the prognostications of the traditional wargame crowd, card driven games (CDGs) are superior in their treatment of initiative on gameplay. In a scenario where the situation is one of force parity, the side that does a better job at gaining and maintaining the initiative usually prevails. The scenario is designed to give the Allies the initiative in the opening, so it is important that the Allies play their opening hand in a combinatorial manner to maintain the initiative and keep the Japanese on the defensive. Given the number of card hands possible only the opening Allied offensive can be examined in great detail, but I intend to couch my strategy remarks around how one thinks about maintaining Allied initiative. The Allies future offensive card is Operation Toenails. Operation Toenails is a 2 Operations Card (20C) that can be used by any Allied HQand confers a logistic value of 4, enabling from 5 to 7 activations depending on which Allied HQis used. Hopefully the Allies will have a choice of offensive cards to choose from, but Toenails is a strong opening under most circumstances. The object is how to use a strong opening in conjunction with the randomly dealt hand to maintain the initiative. Broadly, what the Allies want to do is offset the Japanese central position advantage by striking the Japanese periphery in a sequence that prevents the Japanese from freely shifting forces to block Allied thrusts or buildup for an offensive in the CBI. The objective is to prevent the Japanese from having the luxury of deciding where to send their reserves vice reacting to Allied offensives. In particular, the Allies do not want the Japanese to build up their CBI ground forces without the threat of losing significant positions in the Pacific (e.g., Rabaul). Operation Toenails Opening One of the first things that you should note about the opening in the 1943 scenario is the Japanese defense perimeter is vulnerable in numerous locations. The Japanese player will quickly address this situation, but the Allies get to make the crucial first move in the scenario, so it is an important one that should be considered prior to play. The goal of this first offensive should be to force the Japanese to react to the results of the first card. What this means is using a non-offensive event may appear appealing, especially an end ISR event, but it is likely a missed opportunity. My preference is to make my opening card a significant offensive event. The Allies may draw a better offensive event than Operation Toenails and if this is the case feel free to substitute it for the extra activations, but an opening with five to seven activations is the way I like to roll. South Pacific Toenails As the Allies begin the scenario under ISR this first offensive is an all US Navy or Army show. If you were to follow the original script

3 1943: Empire of the Sun Tournament Scenario Analysis the Allies would invade New Georgia where the Allies have air superiority and no Japanese ZOI, so there is only a 30% chance (barring the play of an intelligence reaction card) that the Japanese will react to the invasion. The Allies need to bring a naval unit into New Georgia to prevent a Japanese reaction from stopping the invasion. Since the Japanese also begin under ISR, and given the distribution of their initial forces, there is no chance of a reaction amphibious assault opposing this opening attack. There are four HQ (CentPac, South Pac, SW Pac, and ANZAC) that can launch an offensive in the South Pacific, with the most efficient one being South Pac HQ(Halsey), which can activate 7 units and unless the Allied plan requires the 1st Marine Division (Cairns) or the Marine Brigade (Oahu), all other relevant US forces are within range of Halsey. The objectives of an early South Pacific offensive are to gain a strong position in the Solomon Islands or make a strong move into the Marshalls. If the Solomon Islands are the objective, a direct attack on New Georgia is not a bad opening, but a superior play is to attack Bougainville and gain a port while isolating New Georgia. In fact the Allies can never go wrong if they focus on gaining ports. One issue raised by the Allies opening positions is the intermingling of Army, Navy, and Commonwealth units. Until the Allies can desegregate their forces they will find themselves relying on the ANZAC HQwith its less effucient activation capability. With this thought in mind it is in the South Pacific that a very strong opening can be conducted with the ANZAC HQon a 30C play. The way this opening would progress is the Allies use some combination of three of the following units: 1st Marine Division (Cairns), 2nd Marine (Guadalcanal), Marine SF Bde (Efate) or 3rd NZ Division (Noumea) to capture Eniwetok, Ponape, and Kusaie. The benefits of this opening are Kwajalein becomes semi-isolated from Truk with a tenuous airbase link via Marcus and Wake Island. In addition the Allies have captured three of their four progress of the war hex requirements. This move pre-empts the Japanese from setting their Marshall defenses and over time makes Kwajalein untenable by the last game turn. An interesting variant on this offensive is to use the fourth activation to move the 1st Australian Corps (Darwin) to Dacca via strategic movement prior to the Japanese closing the Sumatra strait with an air unit at Medan. Of all the openings that I have seen this is my personal favorite. That does not mean that it is the best, it just fits my style of play. A variant of this attack is to use CentPac HQwith the object of capturing Eniwetok and Kusaie (2nd Marine Division and SF Brigade), but launching the Marine Brigade (Oahu) with the BB Mississippi to make a quick strike at Attu. The Attu attack is vulnerable unless the offensive is a surprise attack, but if successful it is a two-victory point play. Another CentPac variant is if the Allies are holding a surprise attack card, which usually restricts the Allies to one ground activation, enabling a higher probability Allied attack on Attu supported by a naval raid on Kwajalein or Rabaul. Another ANZAC option is to initiate a New Guinea offensive to capture Lae. The advantage of this offensive is it uses the extra activations to start an air offensive against Rabaul to begin the process of wearing down the Japanese air assets. Making a quick attack against Lae with in-place units risks losing the battle, but the loss of the 3rd Australian corps can be a long term benefit as the eliminated unit can be reconstituted in the CBI using replacement steps. There is also a SW Pac (MacArthur) option whereby the XIVth Corps (Guadalcanal) captures Eniwetok with a major air offensive against Rabaul. There are other offensives possible, but the important point is these offensives are likely to cause a Japanese reaction to quickly shore up their other positions in the Pacific. If they play into the CBI instead of setting their defenses, the Allies should be prepared to push more aggressively in this area to gain further advantages and put the question back to the Japanese to either react in the South Pacific or pay a long term cost. SEAC Toenails Historically this scenario opens with several Allied offensives in the CBI and given the scenarios victory conditions it is wise not to ignore this theater. One of the advantages of Toenails in the CBI is it yields a useful +1 ground die roll modifier. The object for any early offensive in this theater is to pre-empt a Japanese build up and threaten a quick capture of Rangoon. An early capture of Rangoon would more or less shut out most future Japanese CBI offensive options in this scenario. There are two basic options in the opening, but both require an offensive event. If you use Toenails, SEAC HQactivates 5 units that allow the Allies to attack Mandalay, while smothering any reaction from Lashio or Rangoon. On a 30C offensive event the Allies can bring a Chinese army adjacent to Mandalay and place Lashio out of supply. An alternate option is to attack Lashio and Mytikyina to open the Burma Road (1 VP). If the Allies go for a CBI opening, it is good to plan on using at least 2 additional cards to make a serious move against Rangoon. The advantage of the 30C offensive event is it cuts off a third of the Japanese available ground forces and gives the Allies the necessary force advantage to take Rangoon. It is almost inevitable that the Japanese will react to this offensive allowing the Allies to continue with the initiative into their second card play. Regardless on what opening the Allies use, the most important factor is that it should begin a combination of offensives that shape the Japanese defense perimeter for the remainder of the scenario. As stated earlier the Allies need to consider how they are going to initiate battles whose object is to wear down Japanese air units along the front line. Given reasonable probabilities the Allies should not worry about losing air units as long as they are inflicting equal or near equal losses on the Japanese. Rabaul is a vulnerable point in the Japanese perimeter as they cannot abandon it without suffering a high VP cost. From the Allied position of Buna and later Lae, the Allies can maintain an aerial bombardment that allows them to attack Rabaul at full strength, hopefully creating a constant source of Japanese air unit attrition. Japanese Options The best defense is a good offense. The Japanese need to pick up several VPs to win this scenario. The game begins with the Japanese possessing 3 VPs (Australian Mandates plus cutting Burma Road minus Allied PW of 6) for an Allied tactical victory. If the Allies fail to re-capture Attu during the first game turn, the Allies will lose a political will point (hereafter PW) resulting in a two victory point shift. This Japanese score of 5 VPs just barely

4

5 1943: Empire of the Sun Tournament Scenario Analysis maintains an Allied tactical victory. Within this opening context the Japanese have three basic paths to victory: either a CBI invasion that captures some or all of Northern India, an aggressive stance in the South Pacific that cuts Australia off from Oahu, or the partial occupation of the Hawaiian Islands. The Japanese need to consider where they are going to hold the line in the Pacific. It is difficult to stop the Allies from gaining a victory point for holding four Solomon Island hexes and another victory point for holding four New Guinea ports if the Japanese are not taking an offensive stance in the South Pacific. That said, it is very difficult for the Japanese to win the game if they lose Rabaul and its six VP shift. While it is hard to stop the Allies from pushing along the New Guinea coast to capture four ports, the defense of Biak is the critical hex that prevents the Allies from scoring an additional two VPs for controlling the entire island. Given the shortage of Allied ASPs holding Rabaul, Biak, Saipan, and either Eniwetok or Kwajalein with a full strength Japanese army backed by air and naval support gives the Allies a steep climb to victory. If the Japanese decide to hold in the Pacific and attack in the CBI the Allies will be challenged to either accelerate their Pacific offensives, open up another axis of advance (DEI), or attempt to reinforce their position in the CBI. China-Burma-India Offensive Akin to the situation the Allies faced during the war this scenario is designed to force the Allies to throw resources into a sideshow that offers little strategic upside. For the Japanese the CBI was an integral part of their China strategy. The CBI was the backdoor that had to be closed to cut Chungking's access to Allied resources. If the Japanese can achieve what they failed to accomplish during the war they stand to gain up to 11 VPs. The Allies in response either need to limit the success of a CBI offensive or gain commensurate VP compensation in the Pacific. The CBI is isolated from the Pacific theater making it diffucult for the Allies to flow reinforcements there in response to a major Japanese attack. If the Allies decide to make this commitment there are only a few options available to them. One option is to redeploy Halsey's HQto India allowing for the use of US ground reinforcements in the defense of Northern India. Another tactic is to aggressively use the 3rd Australian Corps (Port Moresby) in New Guinea and then reconstituting it in the CBI with replacement steps. The other obvious choice is to shift ground forces from the Pacific to the CBI, but this requires the use of carrier forces once Japanese AZOI at Medan close the Sumatra straits. A serious offensive will require the Japanese to raise their CBI forces to their historical level of 10 divisions (5 full strength armies) supported by strong Army air units. The goal of any serious CBI offensive is Dacca. Once this geographic choke point is taken Northern India is out of supply. This makes the defense of Dacca from capture and control of Akyab critical for any Allied defense. It should be noted that General Slim throughout 1943 was seriously worried about an amphibious assault on Dacca and strongly garrisoned the area supported by an ad-hoc riverine force to protect it. There are numerous ways for the Allies to defend Northern India. Experience has shown that a perimeter defense anchored on Akyab, Imphal-Kohima, and Ledo rarely works as the Japanese can mass against ImphalKohima or Akyab and breakthrough to the open ground of Dimasur and Jarhat. There are several schools of thought on how to defend Northern India, but I favor a strong defense of Akyab with weaker Chinese units holding

6 Tournament Scenario Analysis 1943: Empire of the Sun 'Imphal-Kohima and Ledo backed by strong reserves at Dimasur and Dacca. If forced back onto Dacca the Allied player is forced to choose between an all out defense of Dacca or withdrawing to Calcutta. The withdrawal optuon threatens to cut the Japanese VP harvest in half by preserving a force that can recapture Dacca late in the scenario. If the Japanese decide to pursue the CBI offensive option, the Allies have a hard strategic choice to make; either expend units and activations fighting for the CBI or gain offsetting VPs in the Pacific. My preference is to push hard in the Pacific, while making a spirited defense with Allied initial forces focused on denying Dacca to the Japanese. It is the ability of the Allies to create sufficient pressure in the Pacific that often keeps Northern India out of Japanese hands. The important point is the side that holds the initiative calls the tune in the 1943 scenario. Mid 1943 (Game Turn 6) How the first turn goes has a big impact on the options that are available to the players and are too many to enumerate. Even after a large number of games I still continue to see new game situations. With this in mind there ire a couple of situations that can come to fruition in mid-43 (game turn 6) if resourced in the opening turn. One of my favorite campaign strategies and an important Japanese decision is whether or not to attempt and knock China out of the war. The Japanese open the game with a China offensive event with the China front status at breakthrough. It takes a net movement of three boxes to make China surrender and the event offers one of those boxes if unanswered by the Allies. Although there are several ways to play this, the simplest is for the Japanese to maintain the China offensive card in the future operations queue, take no ground replacement steps out of China in game turn 6, and hope to pull another China offensive event in their game turn 6 draw. This 'three card monty' gets executed by playing the two China offensive events in sequence followed with a coup de grace China OC offensive that usually has about a chance of success. Even if this strategy fails it will cause the Allies to drop one or two China event cards in response potentially conferring the initiative on the Japanese to pursue other objectives. An Allied option is to capture Koepang (Timor) during the first turn and then using subsequent reinforcements to open up another axis of advance. The Japanese lose one VP for each resource hex lost, which can also lead to a loss of a card during the scenario. The challenge for the Japanese is how to gain the initiative and leverage their central position to keep the Allied juggernaut at bay. The Japanese do not have suffucient ground units to defend the Pacific, attack in the CBI, and hold the DEL Once again this puts a premium on fighting for and holding the initiative to offset weaknesses in other theaters. Another set of strategies that require a first turn decision are the re-positioning of an HQ to create new offensive-defensive capabilities. The two HQ that are usually moved are the Japanese Combined Fleet HQ(hereafter CF HQ) and the US South Pac HQ(hereafter Halsey). For the Japanese to make a play for the Hawaiian Islands the CF HQhas to be re-positioned to Kwajalein. Although this is a rare play, if the Allies neglect the defense of Kauai and the Japanese get the right cards in their opening hand (e.g., Ugaki and Tinian air unit) it should be seriously considered. An alternate move is to place the CF HQin Manila or Tarakan to add extra activations to the Japanese perimeter defense. Another that I have already mentioned is shifting Halsey to the CBI to enable the use of US ground forces. It should be noted by placing Halsey in Dacca with a US carrier enables offensive options against Singapore and the DEI from the west, which the Japanese are poorly positioned to stop. Another alternate location for Halsey is Koepang from which Allied forces can threaten Northern New Guinea, Java, and Borneo resource hexes. If the Japanese push too many of their forces to the edge of their defense perimeter, deeper penetrations into the Philippines are also possible. Beyond this, the second turn should see the Allies continue to beat down the Japanese air and naval forces and remain focused on whatever axes of advance that were initiated in the opening turn. One of the worst sins the Allies player can face in the second turn is to lose focus and spread out their assets and not make a deep penetration into the Japanese VP positions. Failure to maintain focus or leave too much for the last game turn usually results in a significant Japanese advantage. Late 1943 The Allies gain naval superiority through their game turn 6 carrier reinforcements. Often the Allies get an opportunity to trade early game activations for war in Europe victories to gain an extra turn worth of reinforcements. The jury is still out on whether this is worth the loss of offensive tempo. Although these carrier reinforcements are usually not capable of rescuing a lost position, they are a major factor in a close game. Fundamentally, there is no correct answer; each situation demands its own calculus on the right path to take. Competitive players in any game or sport always know the score. If you are winning then you should look to lock-out your opponent from climbing back into the contest. If you are losing you need to know how you are going to score the points required to win. For the Allies it is likely that they will need to launch one very large amphibious invasion against a well-defended hex to win the game. A defending Japanese army will require an eight-ground step invasion force that will require a minimum of 4 ASPs. It is important that the four ground units are within range of both SW and CentPac HQ at the beginning of the last game turn to allow an opening major assault against a known Japanese defense disposition. Too often the need to stage the assault forces due to poor dispositions tips off the Japanese, who reinforce the likely objective. The Allied naval advantage should allow the attack to succeed, but if the Allies need to take more than one heavily defended hex there are insufficient ASPs to ensure success. Although it can happen earlier in the scenario, the Allied objective in the last turn is likely to be Kwajalein, Rabaul, Biak, or Saipan. It will be no surprise that these locations tend to attract a significant ground garrison. This puts a premium throughout the scenario on being alert for opportunistic missteps if the Japanese garrison these locations with weaker forces. In most close games the outcome will come down to whether one of these hexes falls to the Allies or not. Conclusion The 1943 scenario embraces asymmetrical forces and objectives. Both players have challenging offensive and defensive situations where their opponent can hold sway. For the Allies, maintaining your offensive momentum in the Pacific is your best defense for the CBI. However, as shown, the Allies can preempt in the CBI to reduce Japanese options later in the scenario. The Japanese need to pounce on any Allied missteps and once they have the initiative deliver a focused attack in the CBI, against Australia, or the Hawaiian Islands to score the necessary VPs to win. Remember, the player who holds the initiative for the majority of the game usually finds victory. The only way to score points in this scenario is to attack. The player with the initiative is the one who has the opportunity to attack and score. If you have the initiative try and keep it. If you do not have the initiative lure your opponent into situations where a well-structured reaction can gain the initiative. Bottom-line: let your game decisions be informed by this aspect of play. Good hunting...