A SECURE BILLING SERVICE WITH TWO-FACTOR USER AUTHENTICATION IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS. Received March 2010; revised July 2010
|
|
- Jack Terence Maxwell
- 8 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Internatonal Journal of Innovatve Computng, Informaton and Control ICIC Internatonal c 2011 ISSN Volume 7, Number 8, August 2011 pp A SECURE BILLING SERVICE WITH TWO-FACTOR USER AUTHENTICATION IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS Chun-Ta L 1, Cheng-Ch Lee 2,4,, Lan-Jun Wang 3 and Chen-Ju Lu 1 1 Department of Informaton Management Tanan Unversty of Technology No. 529, Jhong Jheng Road, Yongkang, Tanan 710, Tawan th0040@mal.tut.edu.tw 2 Department of Lbrary and Informaton Scence Fu Jen Catholc Unversty No. 510, Jhong Jheng Road, Tape 242, Tawan Correspondng author: cclee@mal.fju.edu.tw 3 Department of Informaton Management Yuan-Ze Unversty No. 135, Yuan-Tung Road, Chung-L 320, Tawan 4 Department of Photoncs and Communcaton Engneerng Asa Unversty No. 500, Loufeng Road, Tachung 413, Tawan Receved March 2010; revsed July 2010 Abstract. Recently, Das proposed a secure two-factor user authentcaton scheme based on hash functon, whch s effcent enough to be mplemented on most of the target resource-constraned devces, such as low-computaton smart cards and low-power sensor nodes n wreless sensor networks (WSNs). As Das clamed, the proposed scheme can resst attacks and threats such as many logged-n users wth the same logn dentty, stolen-verfer, guessng, mpersonaton and replay. Unfortunately, we fnd that Das s authentcaton scheme s nsecure aganst attacks of unknown user, password guessng and masquerade. In ths paper, based on the framework of Das s two-factor user authentcaton, we ntroduce a secure bllng servce, and analyze our extended scheme on how to acheve mposter preventon, as well as resst aganst the drawbacks of Das s scheme. Keywords: Bllng servce, Hash functon, Informaton securty, Smart cards, User authentcaton, Wreless sensor networks 1. Introducton. Wreless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become techncally and economcally feasble and drawn ntensve nterests from both academc and ndustral areas [10]. They consst of spatally dstrbuted autonomous sensors to cooperatvely montor physcal or envronmental condtons, such as temperature, sound, vbraton, pressure, moton and pollutants. WSNs have been used for a wde varety of applcatons such as envronment montorng, wld anmal trackng, health montorng and mltary sensng. To access the sensor nodes, some secure mechansms are necessarly aganst unauthorzed actons, and ths s an extremely mportant securty ssue n WSNs. However, gven the strngent constrants on processng power, memory, bandwdth and energy consumpton of small devces, t s very dffcult to desgn sutable secure mechansms for WSNs. Recently, a lot of secured user authentcaton schemes are proposed to prevent unauthorzed access n WSNs. For example, Watro et al. [23] suggested a user authentcaton scheme usng the RSA [21] and Dffe-Hellman algorthms [3]. However, t s too expensve 4821
2 4822 C.-T. LI, C.-C. LEE, L.-J. WANG AND C.-J. LIU to apply asymmetrc cryptography to WSNs, because ther scheme requres huge computatons that could easly exhaust the sensor s resources. To overcome ths weakness, Wong et al. [24] rased an effcent user authentcaton scheme for WSNs usng only a hash functon, whch s more economcal than usng asymmetrc cryptography. However, Tseng et al. [22] showed that Wong et al. s scheme s vulnerable to replay attack, forgery attack, password guessng attack, and that logn users cannot freely change ther passwords. To resst these weaknesses, Tseng et al. proposed an mprover verson of Wong et al. s scheme. Unfortunately, Ko [4] proved that Tseng et al. s scheme suffers from replay and masquerade attacks. Nevertheless, we fnd that Tseng et al. s scheme s not protected from guessng and stolen-verfer attacks due to low-entropy passwords can be off-lne guessed by eavesdroppng durng logn phase and passwords need to store n GW-node s database. Subsequently, Das [1] ponted out that both Watro et al. s and Wong et al. s schemes are nsecure and then proposed a more secured and effcent user authentcaton scheme wth only one hash functon as well, and applyng the two-factor authentcaton concept to WSNs. Ths resulted two-factor authentcaton usng devces such as tokens and smart cards has been proposed to solve the password problem and shown to be dffcult to hack [2, 13, 17]. Moreover, the Das scheme [1] was clamed that t s able to resst the threats of many logged n users wth the same logn dentty, stolen-verfer, guessng, mpersonaton and replay [6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20]. In ths paper, the Das s two-factor user authentcaton scheme s studed and we fnd that the scheme s also nsecure aganst the attacks of masquerade, off-lne password guessng, and unknown user ones. The detaled securty analyss s shown n a later secton. On the other hand, although the valdty of logn user can be verfed by user authentcatng, ncreasng the securty of the network communcatons, whch may not be suffcent for admnstratve nodes, especally, when the sensng data have great commercal value. Is there a smple and secure way for them to solve ths problem? A secure bllng servce seems applcable to ths stuaton. Therefore, we propose a novel mechansm of bllng servces to restran users from exposng ther secret nformaton and work towards goals nherent n a WSN system such that the valuable resources are not abused. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, ths work s the frst attempt to provde a secured bllng servce wth two-factor user authentcaton n WSNs. The remander of the paper s organzed as follows: Secton 2 revews Das s scheme, whle Secton 3 analyzes ts securty weaknesses; Secton 4 presents our proposed bllng servce mechansm and Secton 5 analyzes the protocol; conclusons are drawn n Secton 6 and fnalze ths paper. 2. Revew of Das s Scheme. In ths secton, we brefly revew Das s two-factor user authentcaton scheme for WSNs that utlzes a hash functon [1]. Before revewng ths scheme, the abbrevatons and notatons used throughout the paper are shown n Table 1. There are three partcpants n Das s scheme: the logn users, the gateway node (GWnode) and the sensor nodes (S-node). In ths scheme, each user holds a user s dentty and ts correspondng password n order to logn to the GW-node wth hs/her smart card. Das s scheme can be dvded nto two phases,.e., regstraton and authentcaton. Frstly, each new user has to regster wth the GW-node of WSNs n order to become a legtmate user n the regstraton phase, whle by defnton, ths phase s performed only once. Then, each user can grant a vald dentty, password and a personalzed smart card ssued from the GW-node. After that, wth the help of user s password and smart card the user can logn to the S/GW-node and access nformaton whthn the WSNs. Fnally,
3 A SECURE BILLING SERVICE WITH TWO-FACTOR USER AUTHENTICATION 4823 Table 1. The notatons used through the paper Notatons Descrpton U user ID dentty of U P W password of U DID dynamc logn dentty of U GW-node gateway node of WSN S-node sensor node of WSN T tmestamp K secret key of GW-node S n some nearest sensor node x a secret parameter generated by the GW-node and stored n some desgnated S-nodes H( ) cryptographc one-way hash fucnton E SK { } the sgnng functon wth user s prvate key SK concatenaton of bts Exclusve OR operaton message transmsson the S/GW-node can valdate the legtmacy of the logged-n user n the authentcaton phase. Next, we brefly revew the two phases n Das s scheme as follows The regstraton phase. When a user U wants to regster wth the WSNs, U freely chooses hs/her password P W and sends a regstraton request (ID, P W ) to the GW-node through a secured channel. Upon recevng the regstraton request, the GWnode computes N = H(ID P W ) H(K). Then, the GW-node stores H( ), ID, N, H(P W ) and x a nto the personalzed smart card. The smart card s then released to U n a secured manner The authentcaton phase. Ths phase s further dvded nto logn phase and verfcaton phase. The detaled steps of the authentcaton phase of Das s scheme are depcted n Fgure Logn phase. If the user U wants to logn to the network, U nserts hs/her smart card to a termnal and keys ID and P W. Then the smart card checks whether the nputted patterns are the same as the stored ones. If they are correct, the smart card performs the followng steps: 1. Computes DID = H(ID P W ) H(x a T ), where T s the current tmestamp of U s local system. 2. Computes C = H(N x a T ) and then sends the logn request {DID, C, T } to the GW-node Verfcaton phase. Upon recevng {DID, C, T } from U at tme T, the GW-node verfes the valdty of U and verfcaton steps work as follows: 3. Checks the correctness of the tmestamp. If the tme nterval between T and T s greater than T, the GW-node rejects the logn request. The T s the expected tme nterval for a transmsson delay. 4. The GW-node frst computes H(ID P W ) = DID H(x a T ). 5. The GW-node then computesc = H((H(ID P W ) H(K)) x a T ).
4 4824 C.-T. LI, C.-C. LEE, L.-J. WANG AND C.-J. LIU 6. If C = C, the GW-node accepts the logn request; otherwse, t performs the rejecton acton. 7. The GW-node computes A = H(DID S n x a T ), where S n s some nearest sensor node s dentty to respond to the query/data that U s lookng for and T s the current tmestamp of GW-node s system. The GW-node sends {DID, A, T } to S n. 8. S n verfes the correctness of the tmestamp T and computes A = H(DID S n x a T ). 9. If A = A and the tmestamp are correct, S n responds to U s query. We suggest readers to refer [1] for more detals on ths scheme. User GW-node S-node 1. Compute DID = H(ID P W ) H(x a T ) 2. Compute C = H(N x a T ) DID, C, T 3. Verfy T 4. Compute H(ID P W ) = DID H(x a T ) 5. Compute C = H((H(ID P W ) H(K)) x a T ) 6. If (C = C ) then accept, else reject 7. Compute A = H(DID S n x a T ) DID, C, T 8. Verfy T 9. If H(DID S n x a T ) = A Query response / data Else no response and termnate the operaton Fgure 1. Authentcaton phase of Das s scheme [1] 3. Vulnerablty of Das s Scheme. In Das scheme [1], t s assumed that replcaton or extracton of parameters from the prvate sector of the smart card s qute dffcult. However, many researches have demonstrated that malcous attackers can extract the parameters from the smart card to attack legal users [5, 25, 26]. In the followng subsectons, we shall show that Das s scheme s nsecure aganst the masquerade attacks, off-lne password guessng attacks and unknown user attacks.
5 A SECURE BILLING SERVICE WITH TWO-FACTOR USER AUTHENTICATION The masquerade attack. In ths subsecton, we shall show that Das s scheme s not robust enough aganst the masquerade attack from an attacker U e. An attacker U e who has regstered as a user of GW-node can forge the dentty of other users as long as they regstered at the same GW-node. Frstly, the attacker U e ntercepts a transmtted logn request {DID, C, T } from a publc channel and forges another user to logn the GW-node. Then, U e can derve H(K) and H(ID P W ) as follows: H(K) = N e H(ID e P W e ), H(ID P W ) = DID H(x a T ). Note that N e and x a are stored n U e s smart card, whle ID e s U e s dentty and P W e s U e s password. Once U e has these two values of H(K) and H(ID P W ), U e can masquerade as U to logn GW-node and generate a vald logn request of U at new tmestamp T. U e computes DID = H(ID P W ) H(x a T ) and C = H((H(ID P W ) H(K)) x a T ), and then transmts {DID, C, T } to the GW-node. After verfcaton, U e s logn request wll pass and the GW-node wll beleve tself s communcatng wth the user U. Wth our masquerade attacks, an attacker can ncessantly masquerade as any legal user to logn the gateway node wthout knowng the user s password. Therefore, Das s scheme suffers from the masquerade attack The off-lne password guessng attack. In ths subsecton, we suggest an off-lne password-guessng attack aganst Das s scheme, where an attacker U e can off-lne guess a vald user s password from eavesdroppng. No partcpaton of GW-node s requred, so GW-node does not notce ths threat at all. When a user U starts a procedure transmttng a logn message {DID, C, T } to GWnode, an attacker U e ntercepts t and computes H(ID P W ) = DID H(x a T ), where x a s stored n U e s smart card. Fnally, U e executes an off-lne password guessng attack and then derves U s password P W teratng upon all possble choces of P W : Step 1. U e guesses a random password P W. Step 2. U e computes H(ID P W ) from U s dentty and P W. Step 3. U e compares H(ID P W ) to H(ID P W ). A match n Step 3 above ndcates the correct guess of U s password. Therefore, U e succeeds to guess the low-entropy password P W The unknown user attack. In ths subsecton, we shall show that Das s scheme cannot resst the unknown user attack and an attacker U e who has regstered as a user of GW-node can leak some secret parameters for other non-regstered users to ndefntely logn GW-node at anytme. Fnally, Das s scheme causes multple logns wth the sngle dentty at the same tme and GW-node was not aware of havng caused weakness. Before descrbng the attack, we assume that a non-regstered user U n gets the secret parameters H(K) = N e H(ID e P W e ) and x a from a regstered user U e and the detaled steps of the unknown user attack on Das s scheme are ntroduced as follows: Step 1. U n generates a current tmestamp T and computes a vald logn request {DID n = H(ID n P W n ) H(x a T ), C n = H(N n x a T ), T }, where ID n and P W n are meanngless values chosen by U n and N n = H(ID n P W n ) H(K). Step 2. U n sends {DID n, C n, T } to GW-node. Step 3. GW-node computes H(ID n P W n ) = DID n H(x a T ) and C n = H ((H(ID n P W n ) H(K)) x a T ). Step 4. GW-node compares C n? = C n. If t holds, GW-node accepts U n s logn request; otherwse, GW-node rejects t.
6 4826 C.-T. LI, C.-C. LEE, L.-J. WANG AND C.-J. LIU KS n Generate H(KS n) KS n 1 H(KS n 1 )... KS 1 H(KS 1) KS 0 Use Fgure 2. Generaton of one-way hash-chan keys Accordng to the above-mentoned cryptanalyss, the weakness of Das s scheme s due to GW-node does not store any password/verfer table and the parameter H(ID n P W n ) has no way for GW-node to confrm who a user s and whom a user logns to. The man authentcatng characterstcs of Das s scheme s that GW-node only verfes a logn user by checkng whether he/she can provde legal parameters x a and H(K) or not. Therefore, anyone who has possessed x a and H(K) s elgble for legal logn and Das s scheme cannot avod attacks of that many logged n users wth the same logn-d. 4. The Proposed Scheme. To overcome the above-mentoned attacks, we propose an mprovement on Das s scheme n ths secton. For bllng mechansm, t can be classfed among charged partes n terms of prepay servces, real-tme servces and servce sessons. Under a prepay servce stuaton, the payer prepays before usng specfc servces. In the case of real-tme servces, the payer s payment takes place on-lne and mmedately. In a servce sesson, after enjoyng specfc servces the payer connects to servce provders for makng payments. Usng our scheme, whch proposes prepay and sesson-based servces n order to prevent the network servces from potental abuse attacks, securty mechansms requre the charged partes to provde bllng authentcaton and mpostor preventon. We call ths approach as a secured bllng servce wth two-factor user authentcaton n WSN envronments. The nvolved phases of our bllng servce are based on Das s scheme [1]. The detals of the enhanced and revsed scheme are descrbed n the followng subsectons The regstraton phase. When a user U wants to regster wth the WSNs, the regstraton steps work as follows: Step R1. U freely chooses hs/her password P W and sends a regstraton request (ID, P W, n) to GW-node through a secured channel, where n represents the maxmum number of sessons for a prepay servce. Step R2. Upon recevng the regstraton request, GW-node computes the one-tme master key N = H(ID K sno#) and sends N and sno# to U through a secured channel, where sno# s a unque servce number generated by GW-node. Then, U generates a seres of one-tme hash-chan sgnature keys for prepay servce wth desgnated sessons. U computes the followng parameters: Step R3. U computes the nth one-tme sgnature key KS n = H(N ) and the other rth one-tme sgnature key KS r 1 = H(KS r ), where r = n, (n 1),..., 1. Step R4. U sgns the ntal one-tme sgnature key by ts prvate key to get the sgnature Sg = E SK {KS 0 }, where SK s U s prvate key. Note that one-tme hash-chan keys K r wll be used n the reverse order of ther producton durng the subsequent rth sessons, where r = 1, 2,..., n. Step R5. U sends {ID, Sg, KS 0 } to the GW-node through a secured channel.
7 A SECURE BILLING SERVICE WITH TWO-FACTOR USER AUTHENTICATION 4827 User GW-node 1. Send {ID, P W, n} 2. Send N, sno# 3. Compute KS r 4. Sgn KS 0 5. Send {ID, Sg, KS 0 } 7. Issue smart card 6. Mantan RT Fgure 3. Regstraton phase of the proposed scheme Step R6. GW-node verfes the valdty of Sg. If t holds, GW-node computes M = H(ID K sno#) H(P W ). Then, the GW-node stores {H( ), ID, M, KS 0, H(P W ), x a } nto the personalzed smart card and mantans a regstraton table (RT ) for a prepay servce and the format of RT s shown as follows: User Servce Master Intal User Sessons dentty number key parameter sgnature ID sno# n N KS 0 Sg where the 1st feld of RT records the user s dentty, the 2nd feld records the unque servce number, the 3rd feld records a maxmum number of sessons for a prepay servce, the 4th feld records the one-tme master key, the 5th and 6th felds record ntal parameter KS 0 and ts sgnature, respectvely. Step R7. GW-node ssues the smart card to U n a secure manner. Fgures 2 and 3 show the producton of one-way hash-chan keys and the detaled steps of regstraton phase, respectvely The authentcaton phase. Ths phase s further dvded nto logn phase and verfcaton phase. The detaled steps of the authentcaton phase of our proposed scheme are depcted n Fgure Logn phase. If the user U wants to logn to the network, n the rth sesson, the logn steps work as follows: Step A1. U nserts hs/her smart card to a termnal. Step A2. U nputs ID, P W and KS r, where r = 1, 2,..., n. Step A3. The smart card computes H(P W ) and H(KS r ) and checks whether the nputted values are the same as the stored ones or not. Step A4. If they are not match, the smart card termnates the logn phase; otherwse, the smart card replaces KS r wth KS r 1 and performs the followng steps: The smart card computes DID = M H(P W ) = H(ID K sno#) and C r = DID KS r.
8 4828 C.-T. LI, C.-C. LEE, L.-J. WANG AND C.-J. LIU The smart card sends the logn request M r = {ID, C r, sno#, T r, H(DID sno# T r )} to the GW-node, where T r s the current tmestamp of U s system Verfcaton phase. Upon recevng M r = {ID, C r, sno#, T r, H(DID sno# T r )} from U at tme Ts r, the verfcaton steps work as follows: Step A5. GW-node checks the correctness of the tmestamp. If the tme nterval between T r and Ts r s greater than T, GW-node rejects the logn request. The T s the expected tme nterval for a transmsson delay. Step A6. GW-node then computes DID s = H(ID K sno#) and KS r = C r DID s. Step A7. If KS r 1 equals H(KS r Step A8. GW-node replaces KS r ), the GW-node accepts U s logn request. wth KS r 1 ; otherwse GW-node rejects U s logn s retreved from GW-node s regstraton table. request. Note that KS r 1 Then the GW-node computes A r = H(DID S n x a T r s ), where S n s some nearest sensor node s dentty to respond to the query/data that U s lookng for and Ts r s the current tmestamp of GW-node s system. The GW-node sends Ms r = {DID, A r, Ts r } to some nearest sensor node S n. Step A9. S n verfes the correctness of the tmestamp Ts r. Step A10. S n computes A r = H(DID S n x a Ts r ). If A r = A r and the tmestamp are correct, the S n responds to U s query. 5. Analyss of the Proposed Scheme. In ths secton, we shall verfy the securty that our proposed scheme provdes and dscuss the relevant cost for provdng such securty Securty analyss. As stated n Secton 3, we assume that a smart card has a possblty of permttng authorzed users from retrevng the parameter. When ths assumpton s held, Das s scheme unavodably prevents unauthorzed user U e from masqueradng a legal user U and GW-node stll beleve that t s communcatng wth the user U. In the followng, we wll descrbe securty contents of our proposed scheme. (1) For masquerade attacks, n our mproved verson H(K) and H(ID P W ) are computed as DID = H(ID K sno#) and C r = DID KS r, and the value of K and KS r are only known by GW-node and the user, respectvely. Moreover, due to the property of one-way hash functon t s computatonally nfeasble for the attacker to compute K gven the ntercepted values of ID and sno#. Therefore, unlke n Das s scheme, the attacker cannot forge a vald value of DID to pass the authentcaton of GW-node and the masquerade attack s prevented n our proposed scheme. (2) For off-lne and on-lne password guessng attacks, n our scheme H(P W ) s only computed n user s system and snce U logns to GW-node by presentng M r nstead of H(ID P W ), the attacker cannot drectly obtan H(ID P W ). Furthermore, when a user loses hs/her smart card, wthout the knowledge of P W and KS r, no one can apply the smart card to produce a vald logn request. As a result, the attacker U e cannot guess P W by performng off-lne and on-lne guessng attacks on M r. Thus, the proposed scheme can resst the password guessng attacks. (3) For unknown user attacks, a regstered user U must derve DID = H(ID K sno#) from M and nput one-tme sgnature key KS r to get the verfcaton of the DID s and KS r from GW-node. Therefore, our scheme wll restran U to share hs/her secret nformaton to other non-regstered user U n even f U n can successfully guess the secret value DID from H(DID sno# T r ). Because U n does not have the vald one-tme sgnature key KS r, t s dffcult for U n to mplement the unknown user attacks by constructng the logn nformaton C r. Moreover, only regstered
9 A SECURE BILLING SERVICE WITH TWO-FACTOR USER AUTHENTICATION 4829 user can submt the vald logn request M r to GW-node wth correspondng KS r and GW-node can re-compute the hash value of a gven sgnature key KS r to verfy f t equals the prevously receved sgnature by checkng KS r 1? = H(KS r ). If the equaton holds, GW-node makes sure that M r s sent by U and beleves that M r s not replay nformaton because M r contans the current tmestamp T r. Fnally, the regstered user U can permts the connecton wth GW-node and GW-node can charge for provdng U the authorzed access n WSNs. User GW-node S-node 1. Insert smart card 2. Input ID, P W, KS r 3. Check H(P W ), H(KS r ) 4. Replace KS r wth KSr 1 Send M r 5. Check T r 6. Compute DID s, KS r 7. Verfy KS r=1? = H(KS r ) 8. Replace KS r wth KS r 1 Send M r s 9. Check T r s Query response / data 10. Verfy A r? = A r Else no response and termnate the operaton Fgure 4. Authentcaton phase of the proposed scheme 5.2. Performance analyss. In ths subsecton, the performance comparsons of our proposed scheme and other related schemes are summarzed n Table 2. From Table 2, the computatonal costs of Das s scheme requre 8 hashng operatons for a successful user authentcaton. Contrary to our scheme, the computatonal costs are very low,.e., only 7 hashng operatons are requred. Therefore, our scheme acheves effcency, compared wth Das s scheme. Consderng functonalty requrements, the proposed scheme s well suted to WSNs as t acheves the mportant securty goals of bllng servce and ressts varous attacks, and Das s scheme does not provde bllng servce and cannot wthstand guessng and masquerade attacks.
10 4830 C.-T. LI, C.-C. LEE, L.-J. WANG AND C.-J. LIU Table 2. Performance comparsons of our scheme wth other related schemes Wong s Tseng s Das s Our scheme [24] scheme [22] scheme [1] scheme Logn phase 3H 2H 3H 3H Authentcaton phase 1H 2H 5H 4H Resst replay attacks NO NO YES YES Resst stolen-verfer attacks NO NO YES YES Resst guessng attacks NO NO NO YES Resst masquerade attacks NO NO NO YES Bllng servce NO NO NO YES H: number of H( ) operaton. 6. Conclusons. In ths paper, we show that Das s two-factor user authentcaton scheme s stll vulnerable to the attacks that many logged n users wth the same logn-d and needs more securty mechansms between the user and GW-node. To solve the problems of Das s scheme, we proposed a secure bllng servce based on one-tme sgnature key to prevent from above-mentoned attacks. The proposed servce wll not add addtonal computatonal cost to the smart card n authentcaton phase and makes proposed bllng servce qute applcable to two-factor authentcaton cryptosystems n dstrbuted networkng envronments. Acknowledgment. Ths research was partally supported by the Natonal Scence Councl, Tawan, under contracts no: NSC E and NSC E REFERENCES [1] M. L. Das, Two-factor user authentcaton n wreless sensor networks, IEEE Transactons on Wreless Communcatons, vol.8, no.3, pp , [2] M. L. Das, A. Saxena and V. P. Gulat, A dynamc ID-based remote user authentcaton scheme, IEEE Transactons on Consumer Electroncs, vol.50, no.2, pp , [3] W. Dffe and M. E. Hellman, New drectons n cryptography, IEEE Transactons on Informaton Theory, vol.it-22, pp , [4] L. C. Ko, A novel dynamc user authentcaton scheme for wreless sensor networks, Proc. of IEEE ISWCS, pp , [5] C. C. Lee, M. S. Hwang and I. E. Lao, Securty enhancement on a new authentcaton scheme wth anonymty for wreless envronments, IEEE Transactons on Industral Electroncs, vol.53, no.5, pp , [6] C.-T. L, M.-S. Hwang and Y.-P. Chu, A secure and effcent communcaton scheme wth authentcated key establshment and prvacy preservaton for vehcular ad hoc networks, Computer Communcatons, vol.31, no.12, pp , [7] C.-T. L, M.-S. Hwang and C.-Y. Lu, An electronc votng protocol wth denable authentcaton for moble ad hoc networks, Computer Communcatons, vol.31, no.10, pp , [8] C.-T. L, M.-S. Hwang and Y.-P. Chu, Further mprovement on a novel prvacy preservng authentcaton and access control scheme for pervasve computng envronments, Computer Communcatons, vol.31, no.18, pp , [9] C.-T. L, M.-S. Hwang and Y.-P. Chu, Improvng the securty of a secure anonymous routng protocol wth authentcated key exchange for ad hoc networks, Internatonal Journal of Computer Systems Scence and Engneerng, vol.23, no.3, pp , [10] C.-T. L, M.-S. Hwang and Y.-P. Chu, An effcent sensor-to-sensor authentcated path-key establshment scheme for secure communcatons n wreless sensor networks, Internatonal Journal of Innovatve Computng, Informaton and Control, vol.5, no.8, pp , [11] C.-T. L and Y.-P. Chu, Cryptanalyss of threshold password authentcaton aganst guessng attacks n ad hoc networks, Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, vol.8, no.2, pp , 2009.
11 A SECURE BILLING SERVICE WITH TWO-FACTOR USER AUTHENTICATION 4831 [12] C.-T. L, C. H. We and Y. H. Chn, A secure event update protocol for peer-to-peer massvely multplayer onlne games aganst masquerade attacks, Internatonal Journal of Innovatve Computng, Informaton and Control, vol.5, no.12(a), pp , [13] C.-T. L and M.-S. Hwang, An onlne bometrcs-based secret sharng scheme for multparty cryptosystem usng smart cards, Internatonal Journal of Innovatve Computng, Informaton and Control, vol.6, no.5, pp , [14] C.-T. L, An effcent and secure communcaton scheme for trusted computng envronments, Journal of Computers, vol.20, no.3, pp.17-24, [15] C.-T. L, M.-S. Hwang and S.-M. Chen, A batch verfyng and detectng the llegal sgnatures, Internatonal Journal of Innovatve Computng, Informaton and Control, vol.6, no.12, pp , [16] C.-T. L, C.-H. We, C.-C. Lee, Y.-H. Chn and L.-J. Wang, A secure and undenable bllng protocol among charged partes for grd computng envronments, Internatonal Journal of Innovatve Computng, Informaton and Control, vol.6, no.11, pp , [17] C.-T. L and M.-S. Hwang, An effcent bometrcs-based remote user authentcaton scheme usng smart cards, Journal of Network and Computer Applcatons, vol.33, no.1, pp.1-5, [18] C.-T. L and C.-C. Lee, A novel user authentcaton and prvacy preservng scheme wth smart cards for wreless communcatons, Mathematcal and Computer Modellng, [19] C.-T. L, C.-C. Lee and L.-J. Wang, A two-factor user authentcaton scheme provdng mutual authentcaton and key agreement over nsecure channels, Journal of Informaton Assurance and Securty, vol.5, no.2, pp , [20] C.-T. L, C.-C. Lee and L.-J. Wang, On the securty enhancement of an effcent and secure event sgnature protocol for P2P MMOGs, The 2010 Internatonal Conference on Computatonal Scence and Its Applcatons, LNCS, vol.6016, pp , [21] R. L. Rvest, A. Shamr and L. Adleman, A method for obtanng dgtal sgnatures and publc key cryptosystems, Communcatons of the ACM, vol.21, pp , [22] H. R. Tseng, R. H. Jan and W. Yang, An mproved dynamc user authentcaton scheme for wreless sensor networks, Proc. of IEEE Globecom, pp , [23] R. Watro, D. Kong, S. Cut, C. Gardner, C. Lynn and P. Kruus, TnyPK: Securng sensor networks wth publc key technology, Proc. of ACM Workshop on Securty of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks, pp.59-64, [24] K. Wong, Y. Zheng, J. Cao and S. Wang, A dynamc user authentcaton scheme for wreless sensor networks, Proc. of IEEE Internatonal Conference on Sensor Networks, Ubqutous, and Trustworthy Computng, pp , [25] C. C. Wu, W. B. Lee and W. J. Tsaur, A secure authentcaton scheme wth anonymty for wreless communcatons, IEEE Communcate Letters, vol.12, no.10, pp , [26] P. Zeng, Z. Cao, K. K. R. Choo and S. Wang, On the anonymty of some authentcaton schemes for wreless communcatons, IEEE Communcate Letters, vol.13, no.3, pp , 2009.
A Secure Password-Authenticated Key Agreement Using Smart Cards
A Secure Password-Authentcated Key Agreement Usng Smart Cards Ka Chan 1, Wen-Chung Kuo 2 and Jn-Chou Cheng 3 1 Department of Computer and Informaton Scence, R.O.C. Mltary Academy, Kaohsung 83059, Tawan,
More informationAN EFFICIENT GROUP AUTHENTICATION FOR GROUP COMMUNICATIONS
Internatonal Journal of Network Securty & Its Applcatons (IJNSA), Vol.5, No.3, May 2013 AN EFFICIENT GROUP AUTHENTICATION FOR GROUP COMMUNICATIONS Len Harn 1 and Changlu Ln 2 1 Department of Computer Scence
More informationA Secure Nonrepudiable Threshold Proxy Signature Scheme with Known Signers
INFORMATICA, 2000, Vol. 11, No. 2, 137 144 137 2000 Insttute of Mathematcs and Informatcs, Vlnus A Secure Nonrepudable Threshold Proxy Sgnature Scheme wth Known Sgners Mn-Shang HWANG, Iuon-Chang LIN, Erc
More informationThe Development of Web Log Mining Based on Improve-K-Means Clustering Analysis
The Development of Web Log Mnng Based on Improve-K-Means Clusterng Analyss TngZhong Wang * College of Informaton Technology, Luoyang Normal Unversty, Luoyang, 471022, Chna wangtngzhong2@sna.cn Abstract.
More informationSupporting Recovery, Privacy and Security in RFID Systems Using a Robust Authentication Protocol
Supportng Recovery Prvacy and Securty n RFID Systems Usng a Robust Authentcaton Protocol Md. Endadul Hoque MSCS Dept. Marquette Unversty Mlwaukee Wsconsn USA. mhoque@mscs.mu.edu Farzana Rahman MSCS Dept.
More informationProvably Secure Single Sign-on Scheme in Distributed Systems and Networks
0 IEEE th Internatonal Conference on Trust, Securty and Prvacy n Computng and Communcatons Provably Secure Sngle Sgn-on Scheme n Dstrbuted Systems and Networks Jangshan Yu, Guln Wang, and Y Mu Center for
More informationAn RFID Distance Bounding Protocol
An RFID Dstance Boundng Protocol Gerhard P. Hancke and Markus G. Kuhn May 22, 2006 An RFID Dstance Boundng Protocol p. 1 Dstance boundng Verfer d Prover Places an upper bound on physcal dstance Does not
More information3C-Auth: A New Scheme for Enhancing Security
Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.18, No.1, PP.143-150, Jan. 2016 143 3C-Auth: A New Scheme for Enhancng Securty Narasmhan Harn and Tattamangalam R. Padmanabhan (Correspondng author: Narasmhan
More informationYixin Jiang and Chuang Lin. Minghui Shi and Xuemin Sherman Shen*
198 Int J Securty Networks Vol 1 Nos 3/4 2006 A self-encrypton authentcaton protocol for teleconference servces Yxn Jang huang Ln Departent of oputer Scence Technology Tsnghua Unversty Beng hna E-al: yxang@csnet1cstsnghuaeducn
More informationA Cryptographic Key Assignment Scheme for Access Control in Poset Ordered Hierarchies with Enhanced Security
Internatonal Journal of Network Securty, Vol.7, No., PP.3 34, Sept. 8 3 A ryptographc Key Assgnment Scheme for Access ontrol n Poset Ordered Herarches wth Enhanced Securty Debass Gr and P. D. Srvastava
More informationAn Approach for Detecting a Flooding Attack Based on Entropy Measurement of Multiple E-Mail Protocols
Journal of Appled Scence and Engneerng, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 79 88 (2015) DOI: 10.6180/jase.2015.18.1.10 An Approach for Detectng a Floodng Attack Based on Entropy Measurement of Multple E-Mal Protocols
More informationVRT012 User s guide V0.1. Address: Žirmūnų g. 27, Vilnius LT-09105, Phone: (370-5) 2127472, Fax: (370-5) 276 1380, Email: info@teltonika.
VRT012 User s gude V0.1 Thank you for purchasng our product. We hope ths user-frendly devce wll be helpful n realsng your deas and brngng comfort to your lfe. Please take few mnutes to read ths manual
More informationProactive Secret Sharing Or: How to Cope With Perpetual Leakage
Proactve Secret Sharng Or: How to Cope Wth Perpetual Leakage Paper by Amr Herzberg Stanslaw Jareck Hugo Krawczyk Mot Yung Presentaton by Davd Zage What s Secret Sharng Basc Idea ((2, 2)-threshold scheme):
More informationWatermark-based Provable Data Possession for Multimedia File in Cloud Storage
Vol.48 (CIA 014), pp.103-107 http://dx.do.org/10.1457/astl.014.48.18 Watermar-based Provable Data Possesson for Multmeda Fle n Cloud Storage Yongjun Ren 1,, Jang Xu 1,, Jn Wang 1,, Lmng Fang 3, Jeong-U
More informationA Genetic Algorithm Based Approach for Campus Equipment Management System in Cloud Server
JOURNAL OF ELECTRONIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 11, NO. 2, JUNE 2013 187 A Genetc Algorthm Based Approach for Campus Equpment Management System n Cloud Server Yu-Cheng Ln Abstract In ths paper, we proposed
More informationA Novel Multi-factor Authenticated Key Exchange Scheme With Privacy Preserving
A Novel Mult-factor Authentcated Key Exchange Scheme Wth Prvacy Preservng Dexn Yang Guangzhou Cty Polytechnc Guangzhou, Chna, 510405 yangdexn@21cn.com Bo Yang South Chna Agrcultural Unversty Guangzhou,
More informationPAS: A Packet Accounting System to Limit the Effects of DoS & DDoS. Debish Fesehaye & Klara Naherstedt University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign
PAS: A Packet Accountng System to Lmt the Effects of DoS & DDoS Debsh Fesehaye & Klara Naherstedt Unversty of Illnos-Urbana Champagn DoS and DDoS DDoS attacks are ncreasng threats to our dgtal world. Exstng
More informationPKIS: practical keyword index search on cloud datacenter
Park et al. EURASIP Journal on Wreless Communcatons and Networkng 20, 20:64 http://jwcn.euraspjournals.com/content/20//64 RESEARCH Open Access PKIS: practcal keyword ndex search on cloud datacenter Hyun-A
More informationsscada: securing SCADA infrastructure communications
Int. J. Communcaton Networks and Dstrbuted Systems, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2011 59 sscada: securng SCADA nfrastructure communcatons Yongge Wang Department of SIS, UNC Charlotte, 9201 Unversty Cty Blvd, Charlotte,
More informationA Dynamic Load Balancing for Massive Multiplayer Online Game Server
A Dynamc Load Balancng for Massve Multplayer Onlne Game Server Jungyoul Lm, Jaeyong Chung, Jnryong Km and Kwanghyun Shm Dgtal Content Research Dvson Electroncs and Telecommuncatons Research Insttute Daejeon,
More informationFault tolerance in cloud technologies presented as a service
Internatonal Scentfc Conference Computer Scence 2015 Pavel Dzhunev, PhD student Fault tolerance n cloud technologes presented as a servce INTRODUCTION Improvements n technques for vrtualzaton and performance
More informationConferencing protocols and Petri net analysis
Conferencng protocols and Petr net analyss E. ANTONIDAKIS Department of Electroncs, Technologcal Educatonal Insttute of Crete, GREECE ena@chana.tecrete.gr Abstract: Durng a computer conference, users desre
More informationQOS DISTRIBUTION MONITORING FOR PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN MULTIMEDIA NETWORKS
QOS DISTRIBUTION MONITORING FOR PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN MULTIMEDIA NETWORKS Yumng Jang, Chen-Khong Tham, Ch-Chung Ko Department Electrcal Engneerng Natonal Unversty Sngapore 119260 Sngapore Emal: {engp7450,
More informationA Novel Methodology of Working Capital Management for Large. Public Constructions by Using Fuzzy S-curve Regression
Novel Methodology of Workng Captal Management for Large Publc Constructons by Usng Fuzzy S-curve Regresson Cheng-Wu Chen, Morrs H. L. Wang and Tng-Ya Hseh Department of Cvl Engneerng, Natonal Central Unversty,
More informationScalable and Secure Architecture for Digital Content Distribution
Valer Bocan Scalable and Secure Archtecture for Dgtal Content Dstrbuton Mha Fagadar-Cosma Department of Computer Scence and Engneerng Informaton Technology Department Poltehnca Unversty of Tmsoara Alcatel
More informationA role based access in a hierarchical sensor network architecture to provide multilevel security
1 A role based access n a herarchcal sensor network archtecture to provde multlevel securty Bswajt Panja a Sanjay Kumar Madra b and Bharat Bhargava c a Department of Computer Scenc Morehead State Unversty
More informationCanon NTSC Help Desk Documentation
Canon NTSC Help Desk Documentaton READ THIS BEFORE PROCEEDING Before revewng ths documentaton, Canon Busness Solutons, Inc. ( CBS ) hereby refers you, the customer or customer s representatve or agent
More informationDEFINING %COMPLETE IN MICROSOFT PROJECT
CelersSystems DEFINING %COMPLETE IN MICROSOFT PROJECT PREPARED BY James E Aksel, PMP, PMI-SP, MVP For Addtonal Informaton about Earned Value Management Systems and reportng, please contact: CelersSystems,
More informationResearch on Privacy Protection Approach for Cloud Computing Environments
, pp. 113-120 http://dx.do.org/10.14257/jsa.2015.9.3.11 Research on Prvacy Protecton Approach for Cloud Computng Envronments Xaohu L 1,2, Hongxng Lang 3 and Dan Ja 1 1 College of Electrcal and Informaton
More informationA Novel Problem-solving Metric for Future Internet Routing Based on Virtualization and Cloud-computing
www.ijcsi.org 159 A Novel Problem-solvng Metrc for Future Internet Routng Based on Vrtualzaton and Cloud-computng Rujuan Zheng, Mngchuan Zhang, Qngtao Wu, Wangyang We and Haxa Zhao Electronc & Informaton
More informationAd-Hoc Games and Packet Forwardng Networks
On Desgnng Incentve-Compatble Routng and Forwardng Protocols n Wreless Ad-Hoc Networks An Integrated Approach Usng Game Theoretcal and Cryptographc Technques Sheng Zhong L (Erran) L Yanbn Grace Lu Yang
More informationA DISTRIBUTED REPUTATION MANAGEMENT SCHEME FOR MOBILE AGENT- BASED APPLICATIONS
Bamasak & Zhang: A Dstrbuted Reputaton Management Scheme for Moble Agent-Based Applcatons A DISTRIBUTED REPUTATION MANAGEMENT SCHEME FOR MOBILE AGENT- BASED APPLICATIONS Omama Bamasak School of Computer
More informationEfficient Dynamic Integrity Verification for Big Data Supporting Users Revocability
nformaton Artcle Effcent Dynamc Integrty Verfcaton for Bg Data Supportng Users Revocablty Xnpeng Zhang 1,2, *, Chunxang Xu 1, Xaojun Zhang 1, Tazong Gu 2, Zh Geng 2 and Guopng Lu 2 1 School of Computer
More informationA Replication-Based and Fault Tolerant Allocation Algorithm for Cloud Computing
A Replcaton-Based and Fault Tolerant Allocaton Algorthm for Cloud Computng Tork Altameem Dept of Computer Scence, RCC, Kng Saud Unversty, PO Box: 28095 11437 Ryadh-Saud Araba Abstract The very large nfrastructure
More informationPerformance Analysis of Energy Consumption of Smartphone Running Mobile Hotspot Application
Internatonal Journal of mart Grd and lean Energy Performance Analyss of Energy onsumpton of martphone Runnng Moble Hotspot Applcaton Yun on hung a chool of Electronc Engneerng, oongsl Unversty, 511 angdo-dong,
More informationInstitute of Informatics, Faculty of Business and Management, Brno University of Technology,Czech Republic
Lagrange Multplers as Quanttatve Indcators n Economcs Ivan Mezník Insttute of Informatcs, Faculty of Busness and Management, Brno Unversty of TechnologCzech Republc Abstract The quanttatve role of Lagrange
More informationData Broadcast on a Multi-System Heterogeneous Overlayed Wireless Network *
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 24, 819-840 (2008) Data Broadcast on a Mult-System Heterogeneous Overlayed Wreless Network * Department of Computer Scence Natonal Chao Tung Unversty Hsnchu,
More informationSecure Network Coding Over the Integers
Secure Network Codng Over the Integers Rosaro Gennaro Jonathan Katz Hugo Krawczyk Tal Rabn Abstract Network codng has receved sgnfcant attenton n the networkng communty for ts potental to ncrease throughput
More informationAn Evaluation of the Extended Logistic, Simple Logistic, and Gompertz Models for Forecasting Short Lifecycle Products and Services
An Evaluaton of the Extended Logstc, Smple Logstc, and Gompertz Models for Forecastng Short Lfecycle Products and Servces Charles V. Trappey a,1, Hsn-yng Wu b a Professor (Management Scence), Natonal Chao
More informationPerformance Analysis and Comparison of QoS Provisioning Mechanisms for CBR Traffic in Noisy IEEE 802.11e WLANs Environments
Tamkang Journal of Scence and Engneerng, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 143149 (2008) 143 Performance Analyss and Comparson of QoS Provsonng Mechansms for CBR Traffc n Nosy IEEE 802.11e WLANs Envronments Der-Junn
More informationOn the Optimal Control of a Cascade of Hydro-Electric Power Stations
On the Optmal Control of a Cascade of Hydro-Electrc Power Statons M.C.M. Guedes a, A.F. Rbero a, G.V. Smrnov b and S. Vlela c a Department of Mathematcs, School of Scences, Unversty of Porto, Portugal;
More informationModule 2 LOSSLESS IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS. Version 2 ECE IIT, Kharagpur
Module LOSSLESS IMAGE COMPRESSION SYSTEMS Lesson 3 Lossless Compresson: Huffman Codng Instructonal Objectves At the end of ths lesson, the students should be able to:. Defne and measure source entropy..
More informationA Design Method of High-availability and Low-optical-loss Optical Aggregation Network Architecture
A Desgn Method of Hgh-avalablty and Low-optcal-loss Optcal Aggregaton Network Archtecture Takehro Sato, Kuntaka Ashzawa, Kazumasa Tokuhash, Dasuke Ish, Satoru Okamoto and Naoak Yamanaka Dept. of Informaton
More informationNetwork Security Situation Evaluation Method for Distributed Denial of Service
Network Securty Stuaton Evaluaton Method for Dstrbuted Denal of Servce Jn Q,2, Cu YMn,2, Huang MnHuan,2, Kuang XaoHu,2, TangHong,2 ) Scence and Technology on Informaton System Securty Laboratory, Bejng,
More informationINVESTIGATION OF VEHICULAR USERS FAIRNESS IN CDMA-HDR NETWORKS
21 22 September 2007, BULGARIA 119 Proceedngs of the Internatonal Conference on Informaton Technologes (InfoTech-2007) 21 st 22 nd September 2007, Bulgara vol. 2 INVESTIGATION OF VEHICULAR USERS FAIRNESS
More informationAPPLICATION OF PROBE DATA COLLECTED VIA INFRARED BEACONS TO TRAFFIC MANEGEMENT
APPLICATION OF PROBE DATA COLLECTED VIA INFRARED BEACONS TO TRAFFIC MANEGEMENT Toshhko Oda (1), Kochro Iwaoka (2) (1), (2) Infrastructure Systems Busness Unt, Panasonc System Networks Co., Ltd. Saedo-cho
More informationThresPassport A Distributed Single Sign-On Service
ThresPassport A Dstrbuted ngle gn-on ervce Teru Chen 1, Bn B. Zhu 2, hpeng L 2, Xueq Cheng 1 1 Inst. of Computng Technology, Chnese Academy of cences, Bejng 100080, Chna chenteru@software.ct.ac.cn, cqx@ct.ac.cn
More informationA Programming Model for the Cloud Platform
Internatonal Journal of Advanced Scence and Technology A Programmng Model for the Cloud Platform Xaodong Lu School of Computer Engneerng and Scence Shangha Unversty, Shangha 200072, Chna luxaodongxht@qq.com
More informationHollinger Canadian Publishing Holdings Co. ( HCPH ) proceeding under the Companies Creditors Arrangement Act ( CCAA )
February 17, 2011 Andrew J. Hatnay ahatnay@kmlaw.ca Dear Sr/Madam: Re: Re: Hollnger Canadan Publshng Holdngs Co. ( HCPH ) proceedng under the Companes Credtors Arrangement Act ( CCAA ) Update on CCAA Proceedngs
More informationYi Mu and Vijay Varadharajan. School of Computing and IT, University of Western Sydney, Nepean, PO Box 10, Kingswood, N.S.W.
Anonymous Internet Credt Cards Y Mu and Vjay Varadharajan School of Computng and IT, Unversty of Western Sydney, Nepean, PO Box 10, Kngswood, N.S.W. 2747, Australa Emal: fymu,vjayg@ct.nepean.uws.edu.au
More informationWhat is Candidate Sampling
What s Canddate Samplng Say we have a multclass or mult label problem where each tranng example ( x, T ) conssts of a context x a small (mult)set of target classes T out of a large unverse L of possble
More informationIT09 - Identity Management Policy
IT09 - Identty Management Polcy Introducton 1 The Unersty needs to manage dentty accounts for all users of the Unersty s electronc systems and ensure that users hae an approprate leel of access to these
More informationTrust Formation in a C2C Market: Effect of Reputation Management System
Trust Formaton n a C2C Market: Effect of Reputaton Management System Htosh Yamamoto Unversty of Electro-Communcatons htosh@s.uec.ac.jp Kazunar Ishda Tokyo Unversty of Agrculture k-shda@noda.ac.jp Toshzum
More informationA High-confidence Cyber-Physical Alarm System: Design and Implementation
A Hgh-confdence Cyber-Physcal Alarm System: Desgn and Implementaton Longhua Ma 1,2, Tengka Yuan 1, Feng Xa 3, Mng Xu 1, Jun Yao 1, Meng Shao 4 1 Department of Control Scence and Engneerng, Zhejang Unversty,
More informationAn Ad Hoc Network Load Balancing Energy- Efficient Multipath Routing Protocol
246 JOURNA OF SOFTWAR, VO. 9, NO. 1, JANUARY 2014 An Ad Hoc Network oad alancng nergy- ffcent Multpath Routng Protocol De-jn Kong Shanx Fnance and Taxaton College, Tayuan, Chna mal: dejnkong@163.com Xao-lng
More informationA hybrid global optimization algorithm based on parallel chaos optimization and outlook algorithm
Avalable onlne www.ocpr.com Journal of Chemcal and Pharmaceutcal Research, 2014, 6(7):1884-1889 Research Artcle ISSN : 0975-7384 CODEN(USA) : JCPRC5 A hybrd global optmzaton algorthm based on parallel
More informationDamage detection in composite laminates using coin-tap method
Damage detecton n composte lamnates usng con-tap method S.J. Km Korea Aerospace Research Insttute, 45 Eoeun-Dong, Youseong-Gu, 35-333 Daejeon, Republc of Korea yaeln@kar.re.kr 45 The con-tap test has the
More informationResearch of Network System Reconfigurable Model Based on the Finite State Automation
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL., NO. 5, MAY 24 237 Research of Network System Reconfgurable Model Based on the Fnte State Automaton Shenghan Zhou and Wenbng Chang School of Relablty and System Engneerng, Behang
More informationSecure encrypted-data aggregation for wireless sensor networks
In Wreless Networks, 16:4, May 2010, pp. 915-927 Wreless Netw (2010) 16:915 927 DOI 10.1007/s11276-009-0177-y Secure encrypted-data aggregaton for wreless sensor networks Shh-I Huang Æ Shuhpyng Sheh Æ
More informationInter-domain Alliance Authentication Protocol Based on Blind Signature
Internatonal Journal of Securty Its Alcatons Vol9 No2 (205) 97-206 htt://ddoorg/04257/sa205929 Inter-doman Allance Authentcaton Protocol Based on Blnd Sgnature Zhang Je Zhang Q-kun Gan Yong Yn Yfeng Tan
More informationAn Adaptive and Distributed Clustering Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks
2007 Internatonal Conference on Convergence Informaton Technology An Adaptve and Dstrbuted Clusterng Scheme for Wreless Sensor Networs Xnguo Wang, Xnmng Zhang, Guolang Chen, Shuang Tan Department of Computer
More informationMinimal Coding Network With Combinatorial Structure For Instantaneous Recovery From Edge Failures
Mnmal Codng Network Wth Combnatoral Structure For Instantaneous Recovery From Edge Falures Ashly Joseph 1, Mr.M.Sadsh Sendl 2, Dr.S.Karthk 3 1 Fnal Year ME CSE Student Department of Computer Scence Engneerng
More informationSecure Walking GPS: A Secure Localization and Key Distribution Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks
Secure Walkng GPS: A Secure Localzaton and Key Dstrbuton Scheme for Wreless Sensor Networks Q M, John A. Stankovc, Radu Stoleru 2 Department of Computer Scence, Unversty of Vrgna, USA 2 Department of Computer
More informationDesign and Development of a Security Evaluation Platform Based on International Standards
Internatonal Journal of Informatcs Socety, VOL.5, NO.2 (203) 7-80 7 Desgn and Development of a Securty Evaluaton Platform Based on Internatonal Standards Yuj Takahash and Yoshm Teshgawara Graduate School
More informationReinforcement Learning for Quality of Service in Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)
Renforcement Learnng for Qualty of Servce n Moble Ad Hoc Network (MANET) *T.KUMANAN AND **K.DURAISWAMY *Meenaksh College of Engneerng West K.K Nagar, Cheena-78 **Dean/academc,K.S.R College of Technology,Truchengode
More informationLinear Circuits Analysis. Superposition, Thevenin /Norton Equivalent circuits
Lnear Crcuts Analyss. Superposton, Theenn /Norton Equalent crcuts So far we hae explored tmendependent (resste) elements that are also lnear. A tmendependent elements s one for whch we can plot an / cure.
More informationAn Interest-Oriented Network Evolution Mechanism for Online Communities
An Interest-Orented Network Evoluton Mechansm for Onlne Communtes Cahong Sun and Xaopng Yang School of Informaton, Renmn Unversty of Chna, Bejng 100872, P.R. Chna {chsun,yang}@ruc.edu.cn Abstract. Onlne
More informationAuditing Cloud Service Level Agreement on VM CPU Speed
Audtng Cloud Servce Level Agreement on VM CPU Speed Ryan Houlhan, aojang Du, Chu C. Tan, Je Wu Department of Computer and Informaton Scences Temple Unversty Phladelpha, PA 19122, USA Emal: {ryan.houlhan,
More informationVembu StoreGrid Windows Client Installation Guide
Ser v cepr ov dered t on Cl enti nst al l at ongu de W ndows Vembu StoreGrd Wndows Clent Installaton Gude Download the Wndows nstaller, VembuStoreGrd_4_2_0_SP_Clent_Only.exe To nstall StoreGrd clent on
More informationDP5: A Private Presence Service
DP5: A Prvate Presence Servce Nkta Borsov Unversty of Illnos at Urbana-Champagn, Unted States nkta@llnos.edu George Danezs Unversty College London, Unted Kngdom g.danezs@ucl.ac.uk Ian Goldberg Unversty
More informationHow To Understand The Results Of The German Meris Cloud And Water Vapour Product
Ttel: Project: Doc. No.: MERIS level 3 cloud and water vapour products MAPP MAPP-ATBD-ClWVL3 Issue: 1 Revson: 0 Date: 9.12.1998 Functon Name Organsaton Sgnature Date Author: Bennartz FUB Preusker FUB Schüller
More informationTrivial lump sum R5.0
Optons form Once you have flled n ths form, please return t wth your orgnal brth certfcate to: Premer PO Box 2067 Croydon CR90 9ND. Fll n ths form usng BLOCK CAPITALS and black nk. Mark all answers wth
More informationFrequency Selective IQ Phase and IQ Amplitude Imbalance Adjustments for OFDM Direct Conversion Transmitters
Frequency Selectve IQ Phase and IQ Ampltude Imbalance Adjustments for OFDM Drect Converson ransmtters Edmund Coersmeer, Ernst Zelnsk Noka, Meesmannstrasse 103, 44807 Bochum, Germany edmund.coersmeer@noka.com,
More informationEvaluation of Coordination Strategies for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks Aiming at Surveillance Applications
Evaluaton of Coordnaton Strateges for Heterogeneous Sensor Networs Amng at Survellance Applcatons Edson Pgnaton de Fretas, *, Tales Hemfarth*, Carlos Eduardo Perera*, Armando Morado Ferrera, Flávo Rech
More informationEfficient Bandwidth Management in Broadband Wireless Access Systems Using CAC-based Dynamic Pricing
Effcent Bandwdth Management n Broadband Wreless Access Systems Usng CAC-based Dynamc Prcng Bader Al-Manthar, Ndal Nasser 2, Najah Abu Al 3, Hossam Hassanen Telecommuncatons Research Laboratory School of
More informationA GENERIC HANDOVER DECISION MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
A GENERIC HANDOVER DECISION MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS Shanthy Menezes 1 and S. Venkatesan 2 1 Department of Computer Scence, Unversty of Texas at Dallas, Rchardson, TX, USA 1 shanthy.menezes@student.utdallas.edu
More informationRESEARCH ON DUAL-SHAKER SINE VIBRATION CONTROL. Yaoqi FENG 1, Hanping QIU 1. China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) yaoqi.feng@yahoo.
ICSV4 Carns Australa 9- July, 007 RESEARCH ON DUAL-SHAKER SINE VIBRATION CONTROL Yaoq FENG, Hanpng QIU Dynamc Test Laboratory, BISEE Chna Academy of Space Technology (CAST) yaoq.feng@yahoo.com Abstract
More informationOptmal Revocatons n Ephemeral Networks
Optmal Revocatons n Ephemeral Networks: A Game-Theoretc Framework Igor Blogrevc, Mohammad Hossen Manshae, Maxm Raya and Jean-Perre Hubaux Laboratory for computer Communcatons and Applcatons (LCA1), EPFL,
More informationIWFMS: An Internal Workflow Management System/Optimizer for Hadoop
IWFMS: An Internal Workflow Management System/Optmzer for Hadoop Lan Lu, Yao Shen Department of Computer Scence and Engneerng Shangha JaoTong Unversty Shangha, Chna lustrve@gmal.com, yshen@cs.sjtu.edu.cn
More informationUnderstanding the physical and economic consequences of attacks on control systems
I N T E R N A T I O N A L J O U R N A L O F C R I T I C A L I N F R A S T R U C T U R E P R O T E C T I O N 2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 7 3 8 3 avalable at www.scencedrect.com journal homepage: www.elsever.com/locate/jcp
More informationLuby s Alg. for Maximal Independent Sets using Pairwise Independence
Lecture Notes for Randomzed Algorthms Luby s Alg. for Maxmal Independent Sets usng Parwse Independence Last Updated by Erc Vgoda on February, 006 8. Maxmal Independent Sets For a graph G = (V, E), an ndependent
More informationA Dynamic Energy-Efficiency Mechanism for Data Center Networks
A Dynamc Energy-Effcency Mechansm for Data Center Networks Sun Lang, Zhang Jnfang, Huang Daochao, Yang Dong, Qn Yajuan A Dynamc Energy-Effcency Mechansm for Data Center Networks 1 Sun Lang, 1 Zhang Jnfang,
More informationManaging Resource and Servent Reputation in P2P Networks
Managng Resource and Servent Reputaton n P2P Networks Makoto Iguch NTT Informaton Sharng Platform Laboratores guch@sl.ntt.co.jp Masayuk Terada NTT DoCoMo Multmeda Laboratores te@mml.yrp.nttdocomo.co.jp
More informationBUSINESS PROCESS PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT USING BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORK. 0688, dskim@ssu.ac.kr
Proceedngs of the 41st Internatonal Conference on Computers & Industral Engneerng BUSINESS PROCESS PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT USING BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORK Yeong-bn Mn 1, Yongwoo Shn 2, Km Jeehong 1, Dongsoo
More informationA Certified Email Protocol using Key Chains
A Certfed Emal Protocol usng Key Chans J. Cederqust SQIG-IT and IST, TULsbon, Portugal M. Torab Dasht CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands S. Mauw Unversty of Luxembourg, Luxembourg Abstract Ths paper ntroduces
More informationEffective Network Defense Strategies against Malicious Attacks with Various Defense Mechanisms under Quality of Service Constraints
Effectve Network Defense Strateges aganst Malcous Attacks wth Varous Defense Mechansms under Qualty of Servce Constrants Frank Yeong-Sung Ln Department of Informaton Natonal Tawan Unversty Tape, Tawan,
More informationData Mining from the Information Systems: Performance Indicators at Masaryk University in Brno
Data Mnng from the Informaton Systems: Performance Indcators at Masaryk Unversty n Brno Mkuláš Bek EUA Workshop Strasbourg, 1-2 December 2006 1 Locaton of Brno Brno EUA Workshop Strasbourg, 1-2 December
More informationCompact CCA2-secure Hierarchical Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption for Fuzzy-entity Data Sharing
Compact CCA2-secure Herarchcal Identty-Based Broadcast Encrypton for Fuzzy-entty Data Sharng Weran Lu 1, Janwe Lu 1, Qanhong Wu 1, Bo Qn 2, Davd Naccache 3, and Houda Ferrad 4 1 School of Electronc and
More informationA Crossplatform ECG Compression Library for Mobile HealthCare Services
A Crossplatform ECG Compresson Lbrary for Moble HealthCare Servces Alexander Borodn, Yulya Zavyalova Department of Computer Scence Petrozavodsk State Unversty Petrozavodsk, Russa {aborod, yzavyalo}@cs.petrsu.ru
More informationTracker: Security and Privacy for RFID-based Supply Chains
Tracker: Securty and Prvacy for RFID-based Supply Chans Erk-Olver Blass Kaoutar Elkhyaou Refk Molva EURECOM Sopha Antpols, France {blass elkhyao molva}@eurecom.fr Abstract The counterfetng of pharmaceutcs
More informationdenote the location of a node, and suppose node X . This transmission causes a successful reception by node X for any other node
Fnal Report of EE359 Class Proect Throughput and Delay n Wreless Ad Hoc Networs Changhua He changhua@stanford.edu Abstract: Networ throughput and pacet delay are the two most mportant parameters to evaluate
More informationStudy on Model of Risks Assessment of Standard Operation in Rural Power Network
Study on Model of Rsks Assessment of Standard Operaton n Rural Power Network Qngj L 1, Tao Yang 2 1 Qngj L, College of Informaton and Electrcal Engneerng, Shenyang Agrculture Unversty, Shenyang 110866,
More informationA new anonymity-based protocol preserving privacy based cloud environment
Abstract A new anonymty-based protocol preservng prvacy based cloud envronment Jan Wang 1*, Le Wang 2 1 College of Computer and Informaton Engneerng, Henan Unversty of Economcs and Law, Chna 2 SIAS Internatonal
More informationA Study on Secure Data Storage Strategy in Cloud Computing
Journal of Convergence Informaton Technology Volume 5, Number 7, Setember 00 A Study on Secure Data Storage Strategy n Cloud Comutng Danwe Chen, Yanjun He, Frst Author College of Comuter Technology, Nanjng
More informationA Performance Analysis of View Maintenance Techniques for Data Warehouses
A Performance Analyss of Vew Mantenance Technques for Data Warehouses Xng Wang Dell Computer Corporaton Round Roc, Texas Le Gruenwald The nversty of Olahoma School of Computer Scence orman, OK 739 Guangtao
More informationPower-of-Two Policies for Single- Warehouse Multi-Retailer Inventory Systems with Order Frequency Discounts
Power-of-wo Polces for Sngle- Warehouse Mult-Retaler Inventory Systems wth Order Frequency Dscounts José A. Ventura Pennsylvana State Unversty (USA) Yale. Herer echnon Israel Insttute of echnology (Israel)
More informationRUHR-UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM
RUHR-UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM Horst Görtz Insttute for IT Securty Techncal Report TR-HGI-2006-002 Survey on Securty Requrements and Models for Group Key Exchange Mark Manuls Char for Network and Data Securty
More informationVision Mouse. Saurabh Sarkar a* University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, USA ABSTRACT 1. INTRODUCTION
Vson Mouse Saurabh Sarkar a* a Unversty of Cncnnat, Cncnnat, USA ABSTRACT The report dscusses a vson based approach towards trackng of eyes and fngers. The report descrbes the process of locatng the possble
More information"Research Note" APPLICATION OF CHARGE SIMULATION METHOD TO ELECTRIC FIELD CALCULATION IN THE POWER CABLES *
Iranan Journal of Scence & Technology, Transacton B, Engneerng, ol. 30, No. B6, 789-794 rnted n The Islamc Republc of Iran, 006 Shraz Unversty "Research Note" ALICATION OF CHARGE SIMULATION METHOD TO ELECTRIC
More informationAuthenticated AODV Routing Protocol Using One-Time Signature and Transitive Signature Schemes
JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 1, NO. 1, MAY 2006 47 Autentcated AODV Routng Protocol Usng One-Tme Sgnature and Transtve Sgnature Scemes Sd Xu Unversty of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australa Emal: sdx86@uow.edu.au
More information