Phishing and Banking Trojan Cases Affecting Brazil



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Phishing and Banking Trojan Cases Affecting Brazil Cristine Hoepers cristine@cert.br! Centro de Estudos, Resposta e Tratamento de Incidentes de Segurança no Brasil Núcleo de Informação e Coordenação do Ponto BR Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil

The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee - CGI.br CGI.br is a multi-stakeholder organization created in 1995 by the Ministries of Communications and Science and Technology to coordinate all Internet related activities in Brazil. Among the diverse responsibilities reinforced by the Presidential Decree 4.829, has as the main attributions: to propose policies and procedures related to the regulation of Internet activities to recommend standards for technical and operational procedures to establish strategic directives related to the use and development of Internet in Brazil to promote studies and recommend technical standards for the network and services security in the country to coordinate the allocation of Internet addresses (IP) and the registration of domain names using <.br> to collect, organize and disseminate information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics http://www.cgi.br/english/

CGI.br and NIC.br Structure GOVERNMENT (Appointed) I. E. CIVIL SOCIETY (Elected) Executive Branch Administrative Support Legal Counsel Pubic Relations Domain Registration IP Assignment Studies and Surveys About ICT use Internet Engineering and New Projects W3C Brazilian Office 1 Ministry of Science and Technology (Coordination) 2 Ministry of Communications 3 Presidential Cabinet 4 Ministry of Defense 5 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 6 Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management 7 National Telecommunications Agency 8 National Council of Scientific and Technological Development 9 National Forum of Estate Science and Technology Secretaries 10 Internet Expert 11 Internet Service Providers 12 Telecommunication Infrastructure Providers 13 Hardware and Software Industries 14 General Business Sector Users 15 Non-governmental Entity 16 Non-governmental Entity 17 Non-governmental Entity 18 Non-governmental Entity 19 Academia 20 Academia 21 Academia

CERT.br Activities Incident Handling Coordination Facilitation Support Statistics Training and Awareness Courses Presentations Documents Meetings Network Monitoring Distributed Honeypots SpamPots http://www.cert.br/about/

Agenda Overview of techniques used in the country Traditional phishing Malware enabled financial fraud from simple trojans to more sofisticated attacks

CERT.br Phishing Handling System Phishing URLs data donation MS IE, Firefox, Yahoo!, UOL, Trendmicro fetcher Download a copy of each phishing page Extract and store data in a DB Donate data to partners online cases refeed the system phishing data tester Update uptime Check status no status changed? closed cases archive yes no status is offline? validator IH manually checks the new status yes alert IH about the change We handle phishings hosted in Brazil or affecting Brazilian organizations

Traditional Phishing Statistics for 2010-2011 2010 Total Cases: 7959 Unique URLs: 7826 Unique SHA1s: 3609 2011 Total Cases: 12466 Unique URLs: 12298 Unique SHA1s: 6330

2010-2011 Timeline - Brazilian Brands

2011 Timeline - International Brands

2011 Phishing Cases by Country Code (IP Allocation) 2010

Domains Where Phishing Pages Were Hosted 2010 2011 hosting companies URL shortener

Average Uptimes for Phishing Pages 2010 2011

CERT.br Malware Handling System emails trojanfilter Extract suspicious URLs from emails URLs sm2av Select new malware from malware s list Send malware copy to each AV vendor that does not detect the malware yet email with the malware copy malware files (confirmed) trojancheck Fetch and store malware candidate Using AV, confirm if file is really a malware Create a list with the confirmed URLs istronline add new URLs list entry IP, date, URL, AV signature notify Get IP contacts Create email with the list entry data and a email template Send notification asking to remove the malware email with the notification Try to fetch malware in order to check if it is still online Update stats DB including the new date and status of the malware URL This system only handles malware targeted to Brazilian users and used for financial fraud

Malware Stats 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Malware Cases by Country Code (IP Allocation) 2010 2011

AV Efficiency 2011 (time of discovery)

Case study with malware and phishing: CPEs compromised

The Problem with the CPEs Low-end CPEs (ADSL connections only) admin password exposed via web interface allow WAN management all with the same chipset bug fixed and reintroduced depending on the firmware version Bug is some years old

Password Visible via Web Interface

How the Attack Worked scan Find vulnerable CPE Change password Change CPE DNS Servers redirected to a page with links to a malware that disables banking protections DNS incorrectly resolves names for high profile sites Once the protection is disabled, DNS incorrectly resolves names for several banks (for short periods of time)

Late 2011 Statistics US 96% China 2% Ukrain 2% January 2012: more than 300k CPEs still infected 40 malicious DNS servers found

But not only Brazil Found during the investigation lists of compromised CPEs in Europe India Latin America

Attacks Still Going On (honeypots logs) # provides old password "pwdold", new password "pwnew! # and a confirmation "pwcfm"!! T 2012/03/20 05:34:21.727864 208.115.204.2:36710 -> x.x.x.226:80! POST /password.cgi?usrpassword=dnschange HTTP/1.1..! Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded...! username=3&pwdold=user&pwnew=dnschange&pwcfm=dnschange!!! # POST /dnscfg.cgi! # sets two DNS servers x.x.x.86 and x.x.x.191!! T 2012/03/21 16:46:52.767176 69.65.43.74:34763 -> x.x.x.69:80! POST /dnscfg.cgi HTTP/1.1..Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=.. Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded...! dnsprimary=x.x.x.86&dnssecondary=x.x.x.191! &dnsdynamic=0&dnsrefresh=0!!

Questions? Cristine Hoepers cristine@cert.br CGI.br - Brazilian Internet Steering Committee http://www.cgi.br/ NIC.br http://www.nic.br/ CERT.br http://www.cert.br/