Development of an IPv6 Honeypot
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1 Development of an IPv6 Honeypot Klaus Steding-Jessen CERT.br Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil NIC.br Network Information Center Brazil CGI.br Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 1/16
2 About CERT.br Created in 1997 as the national focal point to handle computer security incident reports and activities related to networks connected to the Internet in Brazil. International Partnerships CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 2/16
3 Our Parent Organization: CGI.br Among the diverse responsibilities of The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee CGI.br, the main attributions are: to propose policies and procedures related to the regulation of the Internet activities to recommend standards for technical and operational procedures to establish strategic directives related to the use and development of Internet in Brazil to promote studies and technical standards for the network and services security in the country to coordinate the allocation of Internet addresses (IPs) and the registration of domain names using <.br> to collect, organize and disseminate information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 3/16
4 CGI.br/NIC.br Structure 01- Ministry of Science and Technology 02- Ministry of Communications 03- Presidential Cabinet 04- Ministry of Defense 05- Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 06- Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management 07- National Telecommunications Agency 08- National Council of Scientific and Technological Development 09- National Forum of Estate Science and Technology Secretaries 10- Internet Expert 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 4/ Internet Service Providers 12- Telecom Infrastructure Providers 13- Hardware and Software Industries 14- General Business Sector Users 15- Non-governamental Entity 16- Non-governamental Entity 17- Non-governamental Entity 18- Non-governamental Entity 19- Academia 20- Academia 21- Academia
5 Agenda Introduction Motivation for a Honeypot The Project Results Conclusion 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 5/16
6 Introduction (1) IPv6 standardized in 1998 (RFC 2460) not widely adopted yet (< 1% of today s traffic) Some improvements over IPv4: larger address space: 32 to 128 bits no more v4 space by the end of streamlined protocol header autoconfiguration network layer security (IPSec) QoS capabilties mobility 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 6/16
7 Introduction (2) Some of the attacks against v4 networks are the same: attacks against applications Denial of Service attacks malware New problems: transition methods autoconfiguration lack of: best practices policies training tools 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 7/16
8 Motivation for a Honeypot Force us to study IPv6 Better understand the current level of attacks in IPv6 networks scanning, probes, etc malware on v4 hosts using tunnels? harvesting of addresses spam 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 8/16
9 The Project (1) Cooperation beetwen CERT.br and CEPTRO.br two /48 IPv6 blocks a /48 block is usually given to enterprises a /48 = 2 16 /64 = /64 blocks or IP addresses one domain under.br hosted at v4/v6 reacheable DNS servers just AAAA records 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 9/16
10 The Project (2) one IPv6 server reachable via IPv6 only receiving traffic from those two /48 IPv6 blocks logging all traffic and generating alerts hosting an web server fake content dinamically generated addresses on each page and inside files hosting an mailserver server MX for this domain configured to receive to every address on our domain 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 10/16
11 The Project (3) one IPv4 server reachable via IPv4 only hosting an web server on a different domain activelly being harvested by spammers receiveing spam on a daily basis with references to the IPv6 server s links 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 11/16
12 The Project (4) IPv6 Internet IPv4 Internet DNS Server: Dual Stack (IPv6/IPv4) Returns only AAAA records. IPv6 Honeypot: IPv6 only; Two /48 networks. IPv4 Honeypot: IPv4 only; Have links and e mails addresses from the IPv6 domain in the webpages CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 12/16
13 Results (1) Since deployment (end of march, 2009) we have observed very little activity: 1 IP using a native IPv6 address DNS query from a.edu server no DNS service running at our end misconfiguation? probe? 3 IPs using 6to4 2002::/16 space, reserved for 6to4 deployments (RFC3056) HTTP activity, following a link Windows machines from.no,.pt,.ir 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 13/16
14 Results (2) 1 IP using a IPv4 to IPv6 gateway HTTP activity Linux machine using the SixXS-IPv6Gate 1 IP using Teredo 2001:0000::/32) space, reserved for Teredo HTTP activity, following a link from wikipedia 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 14/16
15 Conclusions overall IPv6 acitivity is still very low malicious or not transition methods like 6to4 and Teredo being used popular search engines do not work with IPv6-only sites 2009 CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 15/16
16 References CERT.br CEPTRO.br IPv6.br This presentation will be available (soon) at: CSIRTs with National Responsibility Meeting - Kyoto, Japan - July, 2009 p. 16/16
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