honeytarg Chapter Activities
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1 honeytarg Chapter Activities Marcelo Chaves Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil - CERT.br Network Information Center Brazil - NIC.br Brazilian Internet Steering Committee - CGI.br
2 Agenda Our Organization and Mission Chapter activities! Distributed Honeypots Project! SpamPots Project
3 CERT.br Activities
4 CGI.br and NIC.br Structure GOVERNMENT (Appointed) I. E. CIVIL SOCIETY (Elected) Executive Branch Administrative Support Legal Counsel Pubic Relations Domain Registration IP Assignment Studies and Surveys About ICT use Internet Engineering and New Projects W3C Brazilian Office 1 Ministry of Science and Technology (Coordination) 2 Ministry of Communications 3 Presidential Cabinet 4 Ministry of Defense 5 Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 6 Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management 7 National Telecommunications Agency 8 National Council of Scientific and Technological Development 9 National Forum of Estate Science and Technology Secretaries 10 Internet Expert 11 Internet Service Providers 12 Telecommunication Infrastructure Providers 13 Hardware and Software Industries 14 General Business Sector Users 15 Non-governmental Entity 16 Non-governmental Entity 17 Non-governmental Entity 18 Non-governmental Entity 19 Academia 20 Academia 21 Academia
5 The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee - CGI.br CGI.br is a multi-stakeholder organization created in 1995 by the Ministries of Communications and Science and Technology to coordinate all Internet related activities in Brazil. Among the diverse responsibilities reinforced by the Presidential Decree 4.829, has as the main attributions: to propose policies and procedures related to the regulation of Internet activities to recommend standards for technical and operational procedures to establish strategic directives related to the use and development of Internet in Brazil to promote studies and recommend technical standards for the network and services security in the country to coordinate the allocation of Internet addresses (IP) and the registration of domain names using <.br> to collect, organize and disseminate information on Internet services, including indicators and statistics
6 Use of Honeypots for Network Monitoring
7 Brazilian Distributed Honeypots Project Goal: to increase the capacity of incident detection, event correlation and trend analysis in the Brazilian Internet space! 51 sensors distributed in 22 cities! Hosted by 41 Partners in government, energy, telecom, ISPs, academia! Based on voluntary work! Transparent configuration no black-box! No production data is captured! Each partner can use its sensor as a complement to its own IDS Data collected is used to! Notify networks that originate attacks! Donate data to other National CSIRTs! Generate public statistics/trends
8 Architecture of the Network of Honeypots Anonymized data sent to CSIRTs and trusted partners Detailed reports just for members
9 Uses of the Data to Help the Community Individual Incident Notifications Only for IPs allocated to Brazil Sent to whois contacts and CSIRTs (when one exists) With anonymized logs Includes a description of the problem, how to identify compromised machines, how to recover, etc Daily donation of anonymized data To CSIRTs with national responsibility! All traffic coming from IPs allocated to the given country To organizations that share data with ISPs! Team Cymru (SSH brute force attacks and some botnet traffic)! Shadowserver Foundation (SSH brute force attacks)! Arbor ATLAS (SSH brute force attacks)
10 Public Statistics: Flows - Top TCP Destination Ports
11 Public Statistics: Port Summary
12 Public Statistics: Heat Maps (future work) Daily image based on flows directed to the honeypots Daily animated GIF based on syn packets seen by the honeypots (1-hour frame)
13 Public Statistics: Hilbert Map (future work)
14 SpamPots Project
15 SpamPots Project Network of Honeypots emulating open proxies and SMTP servers Capturing 11 million spams/day, on average Active sensors: AT (CERT.at), AU (AusCERT), BR (CERT.br and CSIRT-USP), CL (CLCERT), EC (CSIRT UTPL), NL (SURFcert), TW (TWCERT/CC), UY (CSIRT Antel) Sensor candidates: AE (aecert), AR (CSIRT Banelco and Univ. de La Plata), DE (Telekom-CERT), GR (FORTH, ICS), MY (MyCERT), PL (CERT Polska), TH (ThaiCERT), TN (TunCERT), UK (OX-CERT), US (UAB) and ZA (via SURFcert) Objectives: Measure the problem from a different point of view: abuse of infrastructure X spams received at the destination Measure the abuse of end-user machines to send spam Develop better ways to! identify phishing and malware! identify botnets via the abuse of open proxies and relays
16 SpamPots Project Overview of the Architecture
17 Spampots Project: Infrastructure monitoring
18 Spampots Project: Data Mining Portal (1/2) February 2012: top 15 country codes
19 Spampots Project: Data Mining Portal (2/2) February 2012: top 10 ASNs per country code
20 Improving cooperation in spam fighting Provide data to trusted parties Help their constituency to identify infected machines Identify malware and scams targeting their constituency Currently providing data about spams coming from networks assigned to! JP: to JADAC / IIJ / JPCERT/CC / Min. of Communications! TW: to NCC-TW
21 Links! CGI.br Brazilian Internet Steering Committee NIC.br Network Information Center Brazil CERT.br Computer Emergency Response Team Brazil honeytarg honeypots for Threats and Abuse passive Reconnaissance and information Gathering
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